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Abstract. 
 
This study identifies power relationships within forest conservation decision-making in 
Nova Scotia, Canada. Rather than rely on the ‘customary science’ of resource 
conservation largely based on biological and physical parameters, this analysis is steeped 
in the traditions of social science and policy analysis. This study’s central focus is the 
Forest Improvement Act (FIA): 1962-1986. Forest conservation policies and legislative 
initiatives developed prior to FIA enactment such as the Small Tree Act (STA): 1942 - 
1965 are treated in this study as the FIA’s policy gestation period. Theoretical and 
practical insights derived from this pre-FIA period are used in the assessment of the FIA 
and these combined understandings are subsequently applied to the analysis of 
contemporary forest conservation policy. For contemporary analysis, six case studies 
including the Nova Scotia Envirofor process and the St. Mary’s River Landscape and 
Ecology Management proposal, as well as a recent provincial government initiative are 
examined.  
 
This study utilises a broad range of decision-making and resource management theory to 
tease out understandings of the particular character of the policy process. The analysis 
utilises various decision-making models, theories of power, and multi-agency decision-
making models as well as the Environmental Modernisation literature developed by 
Turner, O’Riordan and Weale and others. In addition to the investigative methodologies 
used generally throughout this study, the Envirofor and the St. Mary’s case studies 
employed a ‘participant observer’ approach that provided otherwise unavailable insights 
into these conservation initiatives. 
  
Regardless of policy content, this study shows that external forces such as woodfibre 
markets were key to the implementation of ground level forest conservation. Ironically, 
this study links the renewal of forest conservation legislation to the demand for increased 
forest exploitation. New forest policy initiatives were as much to do with pacifying 
conservation interests as they were about promoting ground level forest conservation.
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Chapter One: 
Introduction. 
 
Whether Nova Scotians are directly involved in forestry for their livelihood or spend their 
leisure time in the forests, the forests are an important symbol of Nova Scotians’ welfare 
and identity. Unfortunately, for forest policy, different forest values have given rise to 
different visions for the forests. One vision sees the forests primarily as an industrial 
installation; a contrasting view sees them as a playground. Over the years, these 
contrasting views of forest management have differentially affected ground level forest 
management and stewardship. This has resulted in recurring difficulties for policy makers 
in defining the forest management problem, determining the public interest, and 
prescribing workable forest resource management policies. To get at the heart of this 
dilemma, this study examines the development of forest conservation legislation and 
policy in Nova Scotia. This largely hindsight review identifies underlying issues and 
suggests possible solutions for contemporary forest managers. This study argues that the 
fundamental issues of forest conservation are vividly seen through a historical review and 
are most clearly seen by focusing on the underlying mechanisms of power and influence 
that impinge the forest conservation management process. 
 
Background: 
 
Canada's forest represent 10% of the world's total, nearly half of Canada’s landscape is 
covered by forests--approximately 418 million hectares. Nationally 71% of forests is in 
provincial ownership, 23% is owned federally and only 6% are privately owned. In 
Canada in 1996, commercial forests represent about 53% of the total forests (about 28% 
of the land base). The forest sector contributed $20.6 billion to Canada’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and contributed over $32.1 billion to the country’s net balance of trade.1 
According to Wyn forestry accounted for 3% of the gross domestic product, 13% of 
manufacturing employment, and 21% of total exports in 1987.2  
                                                 
1 Natural Resources Canada 1997. The State of Canada’s Forests: 1996-1997. 
Ottawa, Canadian Forest Service. 102. 
2 Grant, Wyn P. Forestry and Forest Products. In Coleman, William D., & 
Skogstad, Grace (Eds.) Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: a structural 
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For the province of Nova Scotia, forestry is of proportionally greater significance than the 
average for Canada. As a source of employment Nova Scotia’s forests are critically 
important, especially in rural areas. Although the population of Nova Scotia is less than 
one million (944,283), 11,000 jobs rely directly on forestry. An additional 5,000 are 
indirectly employed as a result of activity in the forestry sector. This total represents about 
one job in 23 compared to the national average of one in 25.3 Total shipments of forest 
products were valued at $1 billion in 1996 for Nova Scotia whereas in 1994 they 
amounted to $800 million representing about 30% of the province’s total exports.4 
Besides industrial value, Nova Scotia’s forests have other important social and cultural 
values including hunting and fishing. In 1991, the province issued 77,000 sport fishing 
and 70,000 big game hunting licenses. In addition, many Nova Scotians use the forests for 
aesthetic pleasure and non-consumptive recreation. They retreat in large numbers to their 
coastal, lake, and backwoods cottages to enjoy family, friends, and nature in the 
summertime. A study of the importance of wildlife to Canadians estimated that 642,000 
Nova Scotians over fifteen years of age (92.7%) are involved annually in wildlife 
activities whether at home, at the cottage, or in the countryside.5 
 
In Canada, the provinces are notionally sovereign managers of natural resources. In 
reality, especially in so-called ‘have not’ provinces like Nova Scotia, external forces 
control much of what happens at ground level. These external forces include foreign 
markets, multinational investment, and federal trade and commerce policies. This external 
control over the destiny of forest management in Nova Scotia is not new. Outside 
influences have been pervasive and deep-rooted since the seventeenth century. As a 
colonial outpost, for example, Nova Scotia’s resources were first exploited by the French 
and then the English. Later, in 1867 Canadian Confederation effectively transferred power 
                                                                                                                                      
approach. Clark Pitman,  1990, 118-140. 
3 Forestry Canada. The State of Canada's Forests - 1991: Second Report to 
Parliament--Environmental, Social and Economic Indicators. Ottawa, Canada's Green 
Plan, 1992, 15.  
4 Rau, Brian."Pulp and Paper Shuffle: NS. Mills Reorganize to Battle Recession, 
High Dollar, [and] Market Glut."  January 31, 1993; The Chronicle Herald, F4. 
5 Canadian Wildlife Service. The Importance of Wildlife to Canadians: Highlights 
of the 1991 Survey. Environment Canada, Ottawa, 1993. 
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and in time much wealth and influence up the St. Lawrence River to Upper and Lower 
Canada (Ontario and Quebec). In the early twentieth century reduced development interest 
and financial investment in Nova Scotia, especially after World War I, led to a marginal 
forest industry and a gradually deteriorating forest resource.6 
 
Benign neglect was generally the order of the day until the nineteen forties. Then, the 
industry greatly accelerated forest degradation to support the Allies’ World War II effort.7 
More recently, especially in the last four decades, multinational concerns from the U.K., 
Sweden, and the U.S.A.; and a transnational from New Brunswick, increasingly 
dominated the forest industry and forest management.8 These industrial interests have 
more systematically and intensively exploited the forest resource than their colonial 
predecessors. This more recent exploitation did not come solely at the hands of 
multinationals. Sandberg argues, for example, that in the sixties, seventies, and eighties 
the provincial government acted as ‘agent state’ for multinational forest exploitation 
rather than sovereign resource steward.9 
 
Although there has been a succession of forest conservation policy and legislative 
initiatives that date back nearly three hundred years, this study argues that little prudent 
forest resource management and conservation resulted. It shows instead that government’s 
predominantly laissez-faire attitude to forest conservation in this century, although 
encouraging economic activity in rural areas, overwhelmingly ‘sustained’ profits for 
outside interests. This study shows the province accomplished this relative economic 
stability primarily by mining stock resources on commercial and Crown lands and 
marginalising small woodlot owners using structurally uneven bargaining.  
 
This study also shows that governmental passivity, bolstered by a lack of public interest, 
characterised forest management in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century. 
                                                 
6 Johnson, Ralph S. Forests of Nova Scotia. Four East Publications, Halifax, NS., 
1986, 127-185. 
7 Johnson, 246. 
8 Downe, Don. Nova Scotia Forest Production Survey. Nova Scotia Department of 
Natural Resources, Government of Nova Scotia, Halifax, 1994, 11. 
9 Sandberg, L. Anders ed. Trouble in the Woods: Forest Policy and Social Conflict 
in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Acadiensis Press, Fredericton, NB, 1992, 2. 
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Further, this study argues, that more recent policy formulation has engendered greater 
public interest that has led to increased industrial volatility and uncertainty. In fact, both 
environmental and labour controversy rocked the forest industry during the late seventies 
and early eighties. First, a major controversy arose over spruce budworm spraying, and 
then herbicide spraying escalated industrial acrimony. A woodfibre marketing dispute 
then followed between small woodlot owners and a forestry multinational. During this 
period of industrial unrest, Nova Scotia’s environmentalists launched a concerted effort to 
make forest management more responsive to environmental concerns. This study shows, 
however, that their efforts here had little lasting impact. 
 
More recently a number of events have tempered industrialists’ cavalier attitude toward 
forest management and forest conservation practices. This corporate shake-up gives some 
reason for hope and some impetus for considering possible options to manage the forest 
resource sustainably. One such development was a ‘wake-up call’ that came in 1989 in 
the form of a national opinion poll commissioned by Canada’s own pulp and paper 
industry. The results ranked the forest industry as one of Canada’s least trusted as well as 
its worst environmental polluter.10 Another development was a growing sensitivity to 
environmental matters by government and the public that was substantially an outgrowth 
of the Brundtland Commission Report in 1987.11 Although this report gave immediate 
worldwide attention to environmental concerns, it took some time to have any impact 
within Canadian based forest industrialists. A third development was Canada’s own 
“Green Plan for a Healthy Environment” launched in 1990.12 This report and associated 
programmes seemed to signal a new seriousness by the federal government to build on 
environmental rhetoric with purposeful programme action. 
 
Since about 1990 forest industrialists have shown increased sympathy toward 
environmental concerns and have appeared much more willing to join in the debate over 
environmental and forest practices. It is not easy to explain this change in behaviour as an 
                                                 
10 Adams, Michael. Attitudes of Canadians Towards Forestry. Environics 
Research Group. Toronto, 1989. 
11 World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987.  
12 Environment Canada, Green Plan for a Healthy Environment. Supply and 
Services-Canada, Ottawa, 1990. 
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increased awareness and sensitivity to environmental matters. Perhaps the greatest 
concern for Nova Scotia's forest industry, and perhaps its greatest motivation, was its fear 
of European boycotts. During a press debate in 1990 Nova Scotian forest industrialists 
were tarred with the same brush as the old growth ‘forest mining’ companies of British 
Columbia.13 14 This growing corporate anxiety concerning the loss of potential markets 
created considerable concern and almost undoubtedly contributed to their recent ‘public 
outreach’ efforts. 
 
If recent rhetoric is a guide, Nova Scotia’s forest industry has abandoned its earlier 
indifference to environmental concerns to at least consider alternative forest management 
methods. Initiatives that provide evidence of this increased tolerance include the St. 
Mary’s River Forestry/Wildlife Project15 and the Nova Scotia Envirofor Process.16 On the 
surface, they appear to be concerted efforts for change. Unfortunately, as this study argues 
in the penultimate chapter, when examined within the broader margins of industrialists’ 
total forest management practices, there appears to be a large measure of ‘business as 
usual’. This lack of progress raises critical questions about how serious the forest industry 
really is about conservation and sustainable forestry. This study suggests that the 
industry’s interest in improved forest practices may be no more than public relations to 
placate environmentalists and European forest product consumers. 
 
The general lack of progress in the Envirofor Process and the St. Mary’s Project, for 
example,  reflect an age-old problem in Nova Scotia of carrying out forest conservation 
policy in a diverse and politically uneven forest sector economy. This study shows that in 
recent decades it has been relatively easy to build a consensus on broad forest 
management goals, even when multiple interests are involved. Forging agreement on 
                                                 
13 “Europe May Shun Canadian Timber: Reckless Destruction Cited.” Chronicle 
Herald, 25 May 1993, A3. 13 “Canadians Counter Boycott Threat.” Vancouver Sun, 
August 11, 1990, C-5. 
14 “Canadians Counter Boycott Threat.” Vancouver Sun, August 11, 1990, C-5. 
15 Hruszowy, Susan et al. A Model Forest Green Plan Proposal for the St. Mary’s 
River and Liscombe River Forest. St. Mary's River Forestry/Wildlife Project Steering 
Committee, Halifax, N.S. 1992. 
16 Herman, Tom and Soren Bondrup-Nielsen. Proceedings: Envirofor’92: A 
Provincial Dialogue on Nova Scotia’s Forests. Wolfville, NS. The Centre for Wildlife 
and Conservation Biology, Acadia University, 1992. 
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actual implementation practices, however, especially when that has meant loss of 
decision-making autonomy, remains elusive. For example, as early as 1965, E.D. 
Haliburton, the Minister of Lands and Forests, commented that although the different 
factions agreed a forest management problem existed, no one could agree on how to 
define or operationalise a solution at ground level.17 More recently, in reference to the 
Envirofor Process, Clancy and Sandberg argued that “continued superficial policy debate 
allows industrialists to appear committed to change but provides no accountability.”18 
Similarly, although the initial St. Mary’s project provided some technical ground level 
accomplishments, disappointingly, it provided few concrete answers to the conspicuous 
multi-agency and multi-interest forest management problem that dominates the Nova 
Scotia’s forestry sector (see figure 1.1).19 
 
In criticising the forest industry, however, it is important to recognise the complexity of 
effectively applying ground level forest conservation prescriptions. One forest 
management option examined later in this study is ‘landscape and ecology management’ 
(LEM). On the surface, this resource management strategy seems to hold promise for 
sustainable forestry and protecting other forest values such as outdoor recreation and 
ecotourism. The LEM process advocated by Wildlife Habitat Canada (1992) frames 
resource management decision-making and ground level action in a broad, more 
sustainable, and integrated management structure.20 While LEM is yet to be operationally 
defined for Nova Scotia, its fundamental precepts imply the maintenance of ecological 
integrity and the sustainability of other resource values. With evidence from the Envirofor 
                                                 
17 Interview with E. D. Haliburton Minister of Lands and Forests, July 1959 - May 
1968. Avonport, Nova Scotia. 19 April 1986. 
18 Clancy, Peter and L. Anders Sandberg 1992. Maritime Forest Sector 
Development: A Question of Hard Choices. In L. Anders Sandberg, ed., 1992. 
19 Canadian Institute of Forestry: NS Section. St. Mary's River Forestry/Wildlife 
Project: Technical Reports 1-19. Halifax, 1987-1992. 
20 Wildlife Habitat Canada Project Officer. Habitat Conservation, Restoration and 
Enhancement: Programme Funding Guidelines. Ottawa: Wildlife Habitat Canada, 1992. 
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Figure 1.1: Organisational Map of the Nova Scotia Forest Sector. 
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Process, the St. Mary’s Project and elsewhere, it is clear the forest industry concedes, at 
least in words, to the pre-eminence of natural processes in nurturing sustainable forest 
management. Evidently, although the forest industry appears willing to endorse multi- 
agency resource management processes like Envirofor, it has continually shied away from 
co-operative proposals when solid ground level commitment was required. When 
confronted in the St. Mary’s Project, for example, with the very real prospect of more 
democratic decision-making, the need for greater co-operation, and the prospect of 
devolving decision-making powers to a multi-agency ecosystem planning process, the 
multinationals retreated.21 22 
 
The Study Approach. 
 
The main purpose of this study is to identify the power relationships that exist within 
forest conservation decision-making in Nova Scotia and examine the potential for forest 
conservation in the future. Rather than rely on the ‘customary science’ of resource 
conservation that is largely based on biological and physical parameters, this study is 
steeped in the traditions of social science and policy decision-making analysis. It seeks 
insights into conservation issues and problems by focusing on resource management 
decision-making. This study approaches this challenge by examining the workings of 
Nova Scotia’s forest conservation policy and legislation, focusing largely on policy 
initiatives developed since the second world war. 
 
The central focus of this study is the Forest Improvement Act (FIA - 1962-1986).23 For 
organisational ease, forest conservation policies and legislative initiatives developed prior 
to FIA enactment are considered as the FIA’s gestation period. This analysis explores 
issues and problems that have firm roots in the Small Tree Act (STA) legislative process 
                                                 
21 Bissix, Glyn. Proceedings: St. Mary's River Project Goal Setting Workshop. St. 
Mary's River Forestry/Wildlife Project Steering Committee and Wildlife Habitat Canada. 
Halifax, N.S., 1993. 
22 Comozzi, Anne. Proceedings of the St. Mary's River Landscape and Ecology 
Management Steering Committee Second Goal Setting Workshop. Antigonish, Nova 
Scotia, April 1993. 
23 Statutes of Nova Scotia, c.5, The Forest Improvement Act, 1962. 
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(1942 - 1965)24 but also has lineage back to the eighteenth century.25 This initial hindsight 
review examines the legacy of early forest conservation policies and practices. From this 
analysis, this study develops insights that are useful for examining and exposing the more 
obscure policy workings of the FIA enactment process. The theoretical and practical 
insights gained from the FIA’s gestation process (the STA era) are used to assess the 
workings of the FIA. Later, this study repeats this process and combines insights from the 
FIA gestation and FIA legislative processes to examine contemporary conservation policy. 
This ‘experiential’ approach to analysis provides theoretical rigour as well as pragmatism. 
 
 The Study Format: 
 
While this chapter outlines the study’s overall thrust and direction, Chapter Two: The 
Geography of Nova Scotia's Forest Conservation provides a more extensive overview of 
forest conservation's context, problems, and challenges. This chapter sets the stage for 
understanding the intricacies of forest conservation policy and the mechanisms of power 
and decision-making. It briefly traces the history of human settlement in Nova Scotia and 
the relationship of human existence to its natural resources. This chapter also provides a 
synopsis of the forest industry and the forests as well as examines the interests of Nova 
Scotians that establish the need for a multiple values analysis. 
 
Chapter Three: The Theoretical Foundations of Resource Management examines five 
interrelated literatures. First, this chapter reviews the theoretical foundations of renewable 
natural resource management and then briefly reviews aspects of the ‘environmentalism’ 
literature. The third review examines the relationship between normative theories of 
multiple-use forest management and actual resource policy decision-making. Fourth, an 
overview of ecological modernisation is made that is followed by fifth, an examination of 
market and state failure. Finally, special attention is given to the concept of green taxes. 
Chapter Four: The Theoretical Foundations of Power and Decision-making summarises 
the vast literature on policy decision-making and relates this to the literature found on 
policy analysis. This review provides the basis for understanding the mechanisms of 
power and influence in the forest conservation policy arena. Here too, the various idioms 
                                                 
24 Statutes of Nova Scotia. The Small Tree Conservation Act.  c.6, 1942. 
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of analysis explicated by Weale are summarised.26 These idioms are used to help tie 
together the various conclusions drawn in the final chapter. Chapter Five: Review of 
Methodology overviews the research procedures used in this study and describe the initial 
analytical approach used to guide data collection and interpretation. 
 
Chapter Six: The Pre FIA Era traces the roots of forest exploitation in Nova Scotia and 
examines successive policy initiatives aimed at forest conservation. This chapter briefly 
touches on the use made of forests by early settlers but focuses mainly on the workings of 
the Small Tree Act. Chapter Seven: The FIA Legislative Process documents the 
chronology of the FIA’s legislative initiatives. It begins by peeling away various rhetorical 
veneers to expose much more invidious intentions. By focusing on the FIA’s irresolute 
and shaky political beginnings rather than its legislative content, this chapter intimates 
that the FIA was more ‘smoke and mirrors’ than real legislative substance. Interestingly, 
however, despite its inauspicious beginnings and its lack of real progress on any definable 
policy front, the FIA somehow survived several rewrites and amendments. The FIA 
eventually became the centrepiece of forest sector acrimony. It became synonymous with 
various environmental and woodfibre marketing controversies that catapulted forest 
policy and forest management from the back halls of government to front and centre in 
the provincial legislature, corporate boardrooms on two continents, the forefront of public 
debate, and acrimoniously to the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. Chapter Eight: Dimensions 
of Power in the FIA Implementation Process builds on the chronology provided in the 
previous chapter to re-examine the FIA legislative process. It provides a closer focus on 
how power impinges on the policy formulation process and how it affects 
implementation. 
 
Chapter Nine: Contemporary Forest Conservation Policy examines conservation policy 
in the aftermath of a highly charged period in Nova Scotia’s forest management history. 
This chapter begins by examining the legislative package that replaced the FIA with 
fanfare in 1986 and briefly reviews the scant workings of the Forest Enhancement Act. It 
continues by drawing policy lessons from this and earlier periods of Nova Scotia’s forest 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Johnson, 1986, 39-40. 
26 Albert Weale. The Politics of Pollution. Manchester University Press, 1992. 
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conservation history. This analysis creates a platform for evaluating various new 
approaches to dealing with the forest conservation problem. It concludes by briefly 
examining the provincial government’s latest foray in forest conservation policy. In 
October of 1997 the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources circulated a new 
proposed forest conservation policy for public input entitled Toward Sustainable 
Development. This policy proposal represents yet another attempt to cut through the 
organisational complexity and acrimony that embodies the Nova Scotia forestry sector. 
While its demise is yet to be determined, this chapter provides critical review of its 
proposals in light of what has been learned from the proceeding analysis. 
 
Chapter Ten: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations briefly reviews the findings 
of this study. It overviews the various dimensions of power on resource management 
decision-making in the context of the various idioms of analysis proffered by Weale. This 
concluding chapter discusses further the promise and concern of the government’s most 
recent forest conservation initiative and offers suggestions that can offer greater promise 
of success. In the context of cautious optimism, this study concludes that the industry, 
small woodlot owners, government and the public seem at last genuinely concerned that 
forest exploitation is no longer sustainable and that some substantive policy action must 
occur to avert impending industry catastrophe. It concludes, however, that the government 
must make concerted steps, ones it has avoided in the past and seems set to avoid in the 
future.  
 
In general, this study builds on detailed microanalyses of the policy process using 
purpose-built, mid-level analytical frameworks. These provide the basis for broader 
macro-level analyses offering a ‘condor’ view of this complex policy development 
process. Above various micro and macro analyses, however, the key theoretical 
contribution of this study is to stress a mid-level but broadly based, analytical framework. 
This approach accounts for its multi-agency natural resource management context, its 
consequential historical perspectives and its continuously evolving policy phases. 
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Chapter Two: 
 The Geography of Nova Scotia’s Forest Conservation. 
 
Nova Scotia is a peninsula shaped somewhat like a souring eagle. It juts into the North 
Atlantic and lies east of New Brunswick and north-east of the State of Maine in the USA. 
It is joined to New Brunswick and continental North America by a twenty kilometre wide 
isthmus known as the Chignecto Marshlands and is 55,491 square kilometres in area. To 
the north-east of Mainland Nova Scotia lies the Island of Cape Breton that forms one of 
the eagle’s wings; Cape Breton is joined to Nova Scotia’s mainland by a causeway. Nova 
Scotia is fundamentally a maritime province: no location in Nova Scotia is further than 
fifty-six kilometres from the sea (see figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Location of Nova Scotia. 
 
Nova Scotia’s landscapes are varied and dominated by forested plateaux and gently 
rolling hills. In the Annapolis Valley and the Colchester-East Hants region the forests give 
way to fertile farmlands. Nova Scotia's shores are swept by the Atlantic to the east, the 
Bay of Fundy in the west, and the Northumbrian Strait and Gulf of St. Lawrence in the 
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north. The Northumbrian Shore's fertile slopes and sandy beaches contrast markedly with 
the rugged, rocky shores of the Atlantic. The Bras D'or Lakes of Cape Breton, that 
attracted Alexander Graham Bell to a summer home early in the century, provide a 
spectacular frontispiece to the Appalachian uplands known as the Northern Cape Breton 
Highlands. 
 
Nova Scotia, sitting on the edge of the North American continent and straddling the 45th 
parallel, is geologically complex. It is made up of two remnants of distinct tectonic plates. 
Geologically, it is related both to the shores of Northwest Africa and to continental North 
America. Its soils are conditioned by high rainfall, a cool temperate and maritime climate, 
a predominantly forest vegetation, and highly acidic parent materials. Although its winters 
are cold with plenty of snow or freezing rain, the growing season is quite long. It varies 
from 190 days in Cape Breton to 210 days in Western Nova Scotia. In the western 
portions, it is possible to grow a variety of crops including tobacco, peaches, and grapes 
as well as corn, potatoes, and market vegetables. Agricultural soils, however, require lime 
and fertiliser to restore their pH and fertility to acceptable levels. 
 
Nova Scotia is the meeting place of the boreal softwoods from the north and the temperate 
forests of the south. Nova Scotia represents a transitional belt of hardwoods such as 
maple, ash, and beech, and softwoods such as pine, fir, and spruce. While the climax 
forest is often a mixed forest, the Labrador Current, the Gulf Stream, and elevation 
generally dictate forest type while soils, disease, and local conditions determine species 
mix. In the Cape Breton Highlands, for example, successive fir monocultures have been 
ravaged by the spruce budworm and replaced by yellow birch. As a part of a naturally 
restoring landscape, however, the birch, in time, again give way to firs. 
 
Nova Scotia’s population is dominated by an anglophone population with its roots in the 
‘Planters’ who moved from New England during the US War of Independence, and 
Scottish settlers whose Gaelic tongue eventually gave way to English. The first wave of 
settlers to Nova Scotia were the Algonquian speaking Mi’kmaq who moved in soon after 
the last ice age about 10,000 years ago.1 For the past thousand years Nova Scotia's shores 
                                                 
1 Johnson 1986, 15. 
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have ‘welcomed’ European settlers. Norse fishermen almost certainly fished off the 
shores of Nova Scotia a thousand years ago, hunted its shore hinterlands, and traded with 
the Mi’kmaq.2 John Cabot explored the shores of Cape Breton in 1497 and was followed 
by a succession of French and English explorers and settlers.3 
 
During the winter of 1604 Samuel de Champlain established the Ordre de Bon Champs or 
Order of Good Cheer on Ste. Croix Island in the Bay of Fundy. The next year he built 
L’Habitation at Port Royal that is considered the oldest continuous permanent settlement 
in Canada. In these first days of European settlement Champlain established the 
cornerstone of Europeans’ relationship with natural resources for work and leisure--Nova 
Scotians still seek food, shelter, and other sustenance from the land and rely on the forests 
recuperative powers for leisure and cultural identity. The fall of the French Fort 
Louisbourg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759 ended the proprietary role of France in Nova 
Scotia and Canada. Although the British laid claim to Nova Scotia in 1602, they waited to 
establish its first lasting settlement at Halifax in 1753. To help affirm English dominance, 
the Crown granted 1,450 German Protestants lands around Lunenburg. In addition, 
pressure brought about by the Seven Years War led to the expulsion of the Acadians in 
1755 from English ruled lands. Later many Acadians returned to settle in Nova Scotia and 
were joined by Yorkshiremen who settled mainly in Cumberland County, Scots who went 
to the Northumberland Shore, and 35,000 Loyalists (known as Planters) who spread 
throughout Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.4 As a result of this Loyalist migration, 
Shelburne for a short while became the fourth largest settlement in North America after 
New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. 
 
The physiography of Nova Scotia was substantially altered by the last ice age which 
determined the transportation patterns of early settlers. Glacial debris made inland traffic 
difficult but the Mi’kmaqs adapted by developing canoe routes that followed chains of 
                                                 
2 Davis, Stephen A. Early Societies: Sequences of Change. In Philip A. Buckner & 
John G. Reid (Eds.). The Atlantic Region [of Canada] to Confederation: A History. 1994, 
14. 
3 Pastore, Ralph. The Sixteenth Century: Aboriginal Peoples and European 
Contact. In Buckner and Reid, 22-39. 
4 Condon, Ann Gorman. 1783-1800: Loyalist Arrival, Acadian Return, Imperial 
Reform. In Buckner & Reid, 184. 
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lakes traversing the mainland. In contrast, European settlers concentrated their 
communities close to the shore and navigable rivers. At first, inter-settlement 
communication relied on coastal shipping and was later replaced by roads or railways that 
hugged the shoreline. In the last few decades the province has focused on building limited 
access, all-weather highways that have greatly improved road transportation but have also 
accelerated the demise of the railroad. 
 
Nova Scotia was one of the four original signatures to the Confederation of Canada in 
1867.5 Canada’s constitution, embodied in the United Kingdom’s North America Act, 
divided public policy responsibilities among the provinces and the confederation. Natural 
resource policy became the responsibility of provincial governments. Although not 
obvious at the time, the allocation of trade and commerce to the federal government was 
not a blessing to Nova Scotia. In time, the resultant east-west trading patterns established 
by the USA-Canada border and import duties sucked trade and commerce, and industrial 
development away from Nova Scotia to the hinterlands of Ontario and Quebec.6 Nova 
Scotia is now heavily dependent on federal transfer funds. Presently however, these 
payments, especially those for forestry are rapidly being reduced or curtailed by a cash-
strapped federal government.7 
 
 The Forests of Nova Scotia: 
 
The forest resources of Nova Scotia have been exploited to support settlement and 
exportable forest products for hundreds of years. The French, for example, started 
‘masting’ before the turn of the eighteenth century in Acadia (the former French territory 
now known as Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and northern Maine). 
The British similarly exploited the forests to serve British shipbuilding when it took 
territorial control. The French settlers of 1605, however, found a dense, largely primeval 
forest fragmented only by lakes, bogs, and ‘burns’ (the remnants of forest fires, some of 
                                                 
5 Buckner, Philip A. The Maritimes and Confederation: A Reassessment. In Philip 
A. Buckner and David Frank. Frederickton, Eds., Alantic Canada before Confederation. 
NB., Acadiensis Press, 1990, 370-395. 
6 Buckner, Philip A. An End and a Beginning. In Buckner & Reid, 385. 
7 Rau, Brian. "Forestry Sector Eyes ‘Crisis’ If Ottawa Doesn't Renew Pact.” 
Chronicle Herald, Dec 9, 1994 A5. 
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which burned 60-100 square kilometres).8  
 
The first forest inventory was done by Titus Smith in 1801-02. He ‘cruised’ the 
hinterlands of mainland Nova Scotia during two successive summers. Since then B.E. 
Fernlow inventoried the forests in 1912. He was the first to cover the whole province 
including the Island of Cape Breton. Hawbolt and Burgess completed a third inventory 
under a federal/ provincial agreement from 1953-57.9 Since then inventories have been 
made on cyclical bases, completing a few counties at a time. In 1981, for example, the 
sixth inventory was begun.10  
 
After the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the British Lords of Trade instructed the Governor of 
Nova Scotia to make free grants of land in Mainland Nova Scotia. This order also 
restricted occupiers of land in Cape Breton, where French settlers had a stronger presence, 
to leases relinquished upon the death of the original signature. After 1784 when Cape 
Breton was separated administratively from Nova Scotia, a substantial influx of people 
settled there.11 Although an Act to Facilitate the Perfecting of Titles in the Island of Cape 
Breton (known as the Squatters' Act) was passed in 1869, it is remarkable to note that 
many titles remained unclear until the early 1960s when the provincial government issued 
‘confirmatory grants’.12 
 
During colonisation on mainland Nova Scotia, large townships were granted especially to 
the Empire Loyalists who settled in Shelburne County. Grants were regularly assigned in 
multiple tracts. This process more equitably shared the better and closer lands and gave 
rise to place names like The Forties and Lower Lake Fifties that denoted distant lands. 
Some granted land, although clearly differentiated from Crown land in official 
documents, lacked specific and individual titles. To this day controversies occur over 
assumed ownership and cutting privileges creating difficulties for claimants in selling 
                                                 
8 Johnson, 25. 
9 Hawboldt, Lloyd S., and R.M. Bulmer. The Forest Resources of Nova Scotia. 
Halifax: Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests, 1958. 
10 Henley, D.L. Geo. A Submission to the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on 
Forestry. Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests. April 1983, 54. 
11 Johnson, 34  
12 Henley, 91-92. 
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‘their’ lands. Many lawyers refuse to sign transfers until the Crown officially relinquishes 
its interest. Even the management and stewardship of Crown lands was complicated by 
this imprecision in granting lands. Often Crown lands were isolated remnants after lands 
were granted and claimed, they were frequently the least accessible and the poorest 
quality lands around the townships. Since 1937, the Province has adopted a policy to 
purchase cutover lands, abandoned farmlands, and properties sold at municipal tax sales. 
On these lands the title is more secure. Interestingly, however, as late as 1983, the 
Crown’s title to 121,000 ha was still in question.13 
 
In 1875 the governor in Council was authorised to grant more than 800 ha to a single 
party for lumbering. Five years later this policy was amended to require a price of $10 per 
hundred acres (40 ha). This policy heralded the beginning of industrial land holdings that 
changed ownership and fortunes according to cycles in the forest industry. In 1899 Crown 
land policy was again changed by the Lease Act. This provided for large twenty-year 
leases at 16 cents per hectare but required no stumpage fees. The "Big Lease" in Cape 
Breton, for example, covered 251,100 ha in Inverness and Victoria counties, and 
interestingly, given the supposed maximum allowed in the legislation, was made for thirty 
years!14 
 
Nova Scotia had its own version of the southern carpetbaggers during the early twenties 
and the great depression of the thirties. Lean times in the early twenties resulted in large 
tracts and smallholdings to be sold at bargain basement prices largely to forest industry 
concerns in New England. Although the Great Depression began in 1929, it was not felt to 
any great extent in Nova Scotia until 1931 when it hit with great severity. Industrialists 
like Col. C.H.L. Jones and I.W. Killam of the Mersey Paper Company in Liverpool 
(Brooklyn) were able to exploit small landowners by buying cheap land, and in doing so 
consolidate larger land holdings. Woodlands in holdings of less than 400 ha were 
purchased for as little as $1.00 per standing cord of spruce and fir with no regard to the 
value of other species such as pine or hardwoods or the other forest values of the land.15 
                                                 
13 Connor, John et al. Forestry: The Report of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission 
on Forestry. Nova Scotia. Halifax. 1984, 80-102. 
14 Sandberg, L. Anders. In Sandberg, 1992, 65-66. 
15 Johnson, 235. 
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Three major land ownership groups now comprise the main bulk of forest owners in Nova 
Scotia. Twenty-four percent of the land is held by the province, twenty-one percent by 
large private or industrial concerns (holdings of over 400 hectares), fifty-two percent by 
small private owners (holdings of under 400 hectares), and three percent by the federal 
government. There are approximately 30,000 small woodlot owners owning 50,000 tracts 
of land, and over two thousand industrial owners.16 Such a large proportion of private 
ownership is not typical in Canada. In the provinces of Saskatchewan and Ontario, for 
example, over 98% and 90% respectively of land is owned by the provincial Crown.17 
This uneven ownership in Nova Scotia presents many problems for developing equitable 
forest management policy (see figure 2.2). 
 
Approximately 25% of Nova Scotia (1.4 million ha) is non-forested land. This includes 
inland lakes, bogs, barrens, agricultural land, and industrial and urban lands. Forty percent 
of Nova Scotia is softwood cover (2.2 m.ha), twenty-three percent mixedwood (1.2 m.ha), 
and twelve percent (0.7 m.ha) hardwood.18 A major problem from a sustainable industry 
perspective is, however, the age structure of Nova Scotia's forests. Table 2.1 shows that 
41% of the forests are in the mature (over 60 yrs.) to (so called) over mature forests with 
an additional 35% entering maturity before 2003. If most mature and over mature stock is 
harvested or decimated, there will be little to sustain the industry in subsequent years. 
Besides a possible onslaught from the forest industry, forest stocks are also susceptible to 
various natural risks. For example, over 71% of softwood volume in eastern Nova Scotia 
are made up of only two species--balsam fir and white spruce; and in Victoria and 
Inverness Counties on Cape Breton Island they comprise 90%. Both species are highly 
susceptible to spruce budworm infestations and vulnerable to blow-downs. 
 
                                                 
16 Wellstead, A. and P. Brown. 1993-4 Nova Scotia Woodlot Owner Survey 
Report. Halifax: Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources, 1994. 
17 Connor et al., 47. 
18 Henley, 55. 
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 Source: Nova Scotia Resource Atlas, 1986, 13. 
Figure 2.2: Land Ownership in Nova Scotia. 
 
Although susceptible to various market cycles, forest fibre production has increased 
considerably since the Second World War. The production of roundwood in Nova 
Scotia’s forest industry peaked in 1988 at 5,039,000m3 and steadily declined to 
4,211,000m3 in 1993. Since then yearly production has increased again. The five-year 
harvesting average for 1991-95 has far outstripped all previous five-year averages in 
response to a rebounding pulp industry and increased out-of-province exports. Average 
production for this period stood at 4.7 million m3.19 In 1993 the pulp and paper segment 
of Nova Scotia’s forestry industry comprised five mills: a Kraft pulpmill in Abercrombie 
Point, a sulphite pulpmill and newsprint mill in Point Tupper, a newsprint mill at 
 
                                                 
19 Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources. Toward Sustainable 
Development: A Position Paper – Working Paper, 1997-01. Halifax, Government of Nova 
Scotia. 
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Table 2.1: Age Classification of Nova Scotia's Forests. 
 
Brooklyn, a paperboard mill at Hantsport, and a hardboard plant at East River.20 The five-
year average production of pulpwood in Nova Scotia for the 1989-9 period was 
4,224,992m3 softwood and 503,332m3 hardwood21 (requiring some pulpwood imports). 
Since 1993, the paperboard mill in Hantsport has no longer operated a groundwood 
division. It relies on recycled corrugated cardboard for raw materials.22 In the sawmill 
sector, 254 sawmills of all types were in operation in 1993. This was down fifteen from 
1992. Thirty-five firms produced over one million board feet, up three from the previous 
year, while 218 firms (a reduction of thirteen companies) produced less than a million. 
These operations produced a mix of products including lumber, boxwood, ties, mine 
packs, laths, staves and headings, and shingles. Sawmills produced from 1989-93 an 
average of 216,176m3 softwood of which 212,934 was lumber, and 10,586m3 hardwood 
of which 7,204m3 was for lumber.23 Statistics have been available since 1977 on 
expenditures on forest management: silviculture, protection, resource access, and other 
                                                 
20 Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources. 1994 Nova Scotia Forest Production 
Survey. Halifax, Government of Nova Scotia, 1995, 1. 
21 1994 Nova Scotia Forest Production Survey, 46 
22 "Recycling Business Interests." Chronicle Herald. April 12, 95 C1. 
23 1994 NS Forest Production Survey. 46 
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expenditures such as inventory, research, and technology transfer. The 1977 total for 
Canada was slightly less than $800 million for the whole industry while the total peaked 
to somewhat less than $2,800 million (unadjusted $) in 1991. In Nova Scotia in 1977, the 
industry spent $18.9 million on forest management while the peak expenditure, again in 
1991, was $53.4 million.24 
 
 
Forest Conservation Policy in Nova Scotia: 
 
As will be seen throughout this study, there appear to be major chasms between 
conservation policy rhetoric, policy intentions, and management practice. The Broad 
Arrow Act, for example, became policy in America at the beginning of the reign of 
William and Mary in 1688. It was later embodied in the charter of New Massachusetts 
and Maine in 1691 and applied to Nova Scotia in 1728. Its objective was to preserve pine 
for masts for English shipbuilding when the Baltic supply was threatened by European 
wars. The Surveyor of Woods in America was ordered to preserve white pine 24 inches in 
diameter and twelve inches from the ground. Later, in 1774, the British Government 
adopted a more comprehensive conservation policy of reserving the whole of Cape Breton 
Island for ships’ masts. This policy was abandoned in 1775, however, on the eve of the 
War of Independence, to facilitate exports to the West Indies and accommodate refugees 
to Nova Scotia from New England.25 
 
The Broad Arrow policy was first applied to Crown lands and extended to grant-lands in 
1785--no suitable pine could be felled without a permit.26 Its application was not without 
problems, however. In fact resentment over this Act contributed to the rebel uprising in 
New England that led to the American War of Independence. In Nova Scotia, a much 
greater Loyalist stronghold, pines left in the middle of cleared fields provided continued 
frustration and a constant reminder of the government’s meddling in private land 
                                                 
24 National Forestry Database Program, Natural Resources Canada. Compendium 
of Canadian Forestry Statistics 1993. Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, Ottawa, 
1994, 121. 
25 Johnson, 39-40. 
26 Johnson, 39. 
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management affairs.27 In another convoluted attempt at forest conservation, the 
government enacted the Lease Act in 1899, which was primarily an attempt to stimulate 
industrial development. Policy architects included a diameter limit as a conservation 
measure; its intent was to limit the cutting of trees of less than 10 inches. According to 
Otto Schierbrook, the Chief Forester in the mid-twenties, the diameter limit was not 
enforced. Lessees systematically disregarded this policy’s conservation measure and as an 
added problem Schierbrook argued that revenues derived as a result of this policy were 
ridiculously small.28 
 
While forest protection was and remained only of limited concern in Nova Scotia from 
early colonial times to recent times, fire protection—an important forest conservation 
concern-- became a much bigger interest in the early decades of this century. In 1904, 
legislation was introduced requiring a chief fire ranger for each municipality and a paid 
watchman for all portable mills. This latter provision was a consequence of numerous 
forest fires that resulted from these mill operations.29 Until the sixties, when forest-
fighting methods greatly improved and public education reduced the risk, fire damage 
remained the major concern in forest management and conservation efforts. An unlikely 
champion but a major booster of forest conservation was F.J.D. Barnjum. He used his 
forest industry wealth to crusade for forest conservation throughout North America during 
the late twenties and thirties.30 To a large extent, in response to his efforts, the provincial 
government established a two pronged conservation programme in 1937: a programme to 
acquire lands and a policy to conserve forest stocks for future generations.31 The latter 
policy likely had little currency in forest management decision-making at the time, 
however. It received no attention in Creighton’s Departmental memoirs: Forestkeeping 
and received little at all in the Department of Lands and Forests review in their official 
Submission to the Royal Commission on Forestry (1983). The revision of the Small Tree 
Act in 1946 resulted from the increased concern of lumbermen to the rampant cutting that 
occurred during the Second World War. This initiative signalled the modern era of forest 
conservation and drew attention to the more contemporary problems of enacting workable 
                                                 
27 Johnson, 40. 
28 Sandberg, Forest Policy in Nova Scotia. 65. 
29 Johnson, 128. 
30 Johnson, 176-7. 
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forest conservation policy.32 Of some interest to this study, however, is that insect 
infestation became the major forest conservation problem in the sixties, seventies, and 
eighties. As will be seen in later chapters, this had a great bearing on raising interest 
among ordinary Nova Scotians in forest conservation. Presently, however, there seems to 
be little evidence that serious forest conservation policy exists in Nova Scotia.  
 
In Nova Scotia, western ways of life have had a profound affect on the biophysical 
landscape including the forests. On the mainland of Nova Scotia, for example, the forests 
are heavily fragmented and on the eastern mainland, where Stora and Kimberly-Clark 
(formerly Scott Paper) operate pulpmills, the forests are heavily exploited. No matter 
where one looks, it is difficult to find twenty hectares of continuous forest type anywhere 
on the Mainland.33 Currently, clearcutting almost entirely drives forest management in 
Nova Scotia. Despite its rampant use, minimal Crown land harvesting regulations do 
exist, having been established in 1989. Under these regulations clearcuts are not to exceed 
50 ha without the incorporation of wildlife corridors. According to the same regulations, a 
wildlife corridor of at least 50m is to be left between adjacent clearcuts or alternatively 
regeneration in the original cut must be at least 2m tall. Streamside corridors must also be 
incorporated in the cutting operations and other wildlife considerations must be included 
in harvesting plans. Interestingly, according to a 1993 statistical compendium, the largest 
private operators have voluntarily adopted Crown land harvesting regulations on their 
own lands.34 There is little ground level evidence, however, that these regulations add up 
to anything of significance. J.D. Irving, for example, the New Brunswick transnational, 
active in the province in this past decade, uses ‘fellerbunchers’. These massive harvesting 
machines cut large swaths through the forests with each pass leaving little or nothing 
standing in their wake.35 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
31 Henley, 88. 
32 Creighton, Wilfred. Forestkeeping. Department of Lands and Forests. Halifax, 
1988, 74. 
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Despite various technological developments, however, as will become clear throughout 
this study, failure to implement meaningful forest conservation policy at ground level is 
rarely about destructive technology on its own. It is much more about political will, 
political economy, and management ideology. To help cut through the complexity of 
forest management decision-making and policy events in Nova Scotia to assess how it 
impacts forest conservation policy and practice, the following two chapters review the 
theoretical basis of renewable resource management and policy decision-making. 
Throughout this study this discussion is used as an analytical framework to get at the heart 
of underlying mechanisms of power and influence within Nova Scotia’s forest 
conservation policy process. 
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 Chapter Three: 
 The Theoretical Foundations of Natural Resource Management. 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical bases of natural resources management. It focuses on 
the nature of renewable resource management and how management affects forest 
conservation. This chapter explores six key themes of the resource management literature. 
First, ‘renewable resource management’ theory draws attention to important 
characteristics of forest conservation management. Second, the study of 
‘Environmentalism’ focuses on policy tensions created between resource conservation 
and resource exploitation. Third, the theoretical implications of multiple-objective forest 
management are examined. Fourth, sustainability and ecological modernisation is 
considered. Fifth, the impact of trade liberalisation and market and state failure is 
examined. And lastly, the underlying applied theory of green taxes is considered. 
 
 Conceptualising Natural Resource Management. 
 
The roots of natural resource analysis are broad; a wide range of academic traditions and 
disciplines are used to build its theoretical underpinnings. As a starting point it is useful to 
refer to Mitchell. He explains that the geographer’s role in natural resource analysis is one 
that “seeks to understand the fundamental characteristics of natural resources and 
processes through which they are allocated and utilised.”1 To appreciate Mitchell’s point 
and lay the foundation for this study’s theoretical approach it is necessary to refer to 
Zimmerman. Zimmerman in 1933 provided an important insight into the fundamental 
character of natural resources that focused on its inherent subjectivity. According to 
Mitchell 
Zimmerman provided a functional interpretation of resources which is as relevant 
today as when first proposed in 1933. He argued that neither the environment as 
such, nor parts of the environment, are resources until they are considered to be 
capable of satisfying mankind’s needs.2 
 
This view has special significance for Canada and its forests. Initially the Canadian 
frontier was perceived as ‘wilderness’ or wasteland--an encumbrance to well being. In 
                                                 
     1 Mitchell, Bruce. Geography and Resource Analysis. London, Longman, 1979, 
3. 
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general forests had little value, they usually impeded agricultural and urban development. 
One important aspect of forests as a physical entity is that they evolve and change slowly. 
As a ‘resource’, however, their valuation is in constant and sometimes rapid flux that has 
a marked impact on resource management decision-making. For example, neither white 
birch nor other hardwoods had significant resource value in Nova Scotia until the OPEC 
Oil Embargo of 1973. This contrived supply crisis dramatically increased the price of 
world oil making scrub birch more attractive as fuelwood, and new technology made 
white birch a useful raw material in the pulping process. No dramatic physical changes 
occurred within the forests only subjective valuations altered. 
 
To better appreciate the subtleties of resource analysis, Mitchell defines the process of 
resource management as “the actual decisions concerning policy or practice regarding 
how resources are allocated and under what conditions or arrangements resources may be 
developed.”3 This definition embraces three important concepts. The first weighs the 
significance of actual decision behaviour on the resource management process. The 
second is the allocation process that results from these decisions, this establishes 
management ground rules and determines winners and losers. The third concept frames 
the ‘conditions for development’. These are concerned with the myriad economic, 
environmental, technological and social influences implicit in the resource exploitation 
process. Although this definition is useful in explaining the processes of resource 
management generally, it tends to under-explain the long-term implications of forest 
conservation policy. For example, technological changes and demand fluctuations make 
projections for forest products and amenity services risky over the long-term. In the 
forestry context, resource management involves ground level management activities 
accomplished over decades and even centuries. To partially address this concern, Mitchell 
defines another theoretical notion. He explains resource development as “the actual 
exploitation or use of a resource during the transformation of ‘neutral stuff’ into a 
commodity or service to serve human needs and aspirations”.4 At first glance this 
definition appears to narrow explanation to physical transformations of resources but 
interpretations can be ‘stretched’ to include the more subjective resource valuations 
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     3 Mitchell, 1979, 3. 
     4 Mitchell, 1979, 4. 
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alluded to above. Although the implications of this interpretation of resource management 
are broad, there remains a danger of underestimating the importance of long-term 
implications of resource demand on forest management. Although assessing future 
requirement for forest commodities is critical to forest planning, forest managers’ inability 
to accurately assess this makes strictly objective or rational forest management elusive. 
 
Beyond these more obvious conceptual problems in objectively managing natural 
resources, there are a number of theoretical and practical difficulties that stem from 
disparate ideological views of forest management. As will be seen throughout this study, 
ideology is critical in understanding many of the underlying motivations of forest policy 
action. It will also be seen, for example, that superficial agreement on forest conservation 
practices often fracture because of intractable and ideologically charged forest 
management beliefs and values. In general in natural resource management, major 
operational difficulties stem from incompatible human value systems. Varying interests 
calculate forest benefits differently, new forest uses emerge over time and changing 
concerns alter valuations. Unfortunately, the roots of these value systems are hard to 
detect or quantify and their influence pathways difficult to discern, even though their 
impacts are very real. These problems are apparent for both forest managers working 
within the management process and analysts observing from the outside. Often analysts 
must uncover ideological influences indirectly--trying at one and the same time to detach 
their personal value systems from the analytical process.5 6 7 Despite these operational 
problems, understanding values and management ideology are critical to understanding 
the workings of forest conservation policy. As a consequence, the impacts of contrasting 
ideological positions form a major part of this study of power and influence in resource 
and environmental management. 
 
  
Environmentalism. 
                                                 
     5 Djao, A.W. Inequality and Social Policy: The Sociology of Welfare. Toronto, 
John Wiley & Sons, 1983, 7. 
     6 Babbie, Earl R. The Practice of Social Research 2nd. Edition. Belmont, Cal., 
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Within environmentalism two distinct ideologies tug at natural resource management 
decision-making in essentially diametrical directions (see figure 3.1). The ecocentric 
mode as McConnell explains, rests 
upon the supposition of the natural order in which all things moved according to 
natural law, in which the most delicate and perfect balance was maintained up to a 
point at which man entered with all his ignorance and presumption.8 
 
In contrast the technocentric mode, according to Hays (1959 as cited by O’Riordan) was 
the application of rational and ‘value free’ scientific and managerial techniques by 
a professional elite, who regarded the natural environment as ‘neutral stuff’ from 
which man could profitably shape his destiny.9 
 
According to O’Riordan, 
 
ecocentrism preaches the virtues of reverence, humility, responsibility and care; it 
argues for low impact technology (but is not anti-technology) ... it seeks 
permanence and stability based upon ecological principles of diversity and 
homeostasis.10 
 
Technocentric ideology on the other hand is arrogant. It assumes that ‘man supreme’ is 
able to understand and control events for his own purposes. O’Riordan suggests the 
technocentric mode is 
identified by ‘rationality’, which is the objective means to achieve given goals by 
managerial efficiency, the application of organisational and productive techniques 
that produce the most for the least effort, and by a sense of optimism and faith in 
the ability of man to understand and control physical, biological and social 
processes for the benefit of present and future generations. 
 
As O’Riordan points out the common’s dilemma  
drives right at the heart of environmentalism ... it raises questions about ‘the 
important moral relationship between short-term selfishness and enlightened 
longer term community interest’.11  
He goes on to say that 
progress, efficiency, rationality, and control ... form the ideology of 
technocentrism that downplays the sense of wonder, reverence, and moral 
                                                 
     8 McConnell, G. The Conservation Movement: Past and Present. In I. Burton 
and R.W. Kates, Eds.; Readings in Resource Management and Conservation. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965, 190.  
     9 O’Riordan, Timothy. Environmentalism 2nd Edition. London, Pion Limited, 
1981, 1. 
     10 O’Riordan, 1. 
     11 O’Riordan, 36. 
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obligation that are the hallmarks of the ecocentric mode.12 
 
In theory these two ideologies are distinct and separable. In practice, however,  
 
Figure: 3.1: Concepts of Environmentalism. 
 
categorising forestry sector actors according to these ideological precepts is problematic. 
Most operational distinctions are blurred. In fact ideological manifestations often seem to 
shift over time within individuals and sub-sectors, especially as different forestry issues 
are examined. It will be seen in this study that when Nova Scotia’s forestry sector is 
examined no segment holds perfectly true to one ideological position. Some small 
woodlot owners, for example, are reputable forest stewards while others are notorious 
‘high graders’. The latter selectively ‘mines’ the best timber for short-term profits while 
leaving poorer quality trees to sustain the forest. Some industrialists on the other hand, 
who are intuitively classed as technocentric have carefully nurtured some of their forests. 
They have maintained buffer zones for aesthetic and wildlife purposes, for example; and 
                                                 
     12 O’Riordan, 11. 
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have established nature reserves and implemented extensive reforestation programs. 
Recreationists often thought of synonymously with ecocentrism, sometimes cause forest 
fires and inadvertently destroy wildlife habitat. 
 
A significant challenge to understanding the impact of ideology is the different decision 
rules applied by each faction. Bioethic advocates, for example, believe in the unliable 
rights of biotic matter. They find it difficult or impossible to bargain away such goods. 
This situation is exacerbated when ‘biotic rights’ advocates come up against market 
valuations. Marketers generally believe that most if not all things can be traded. The 
market process allows for generally free bargaining of any and all assets to secure the best 
possible economic and socially beneficial outcome. Marketers find negotiating with 
‘bioethic’ individuals frustrating, as they appear highly inflexible and unwilling to 
compromise. A fundamental dilemma is whether the idea of man’s control of the forest 
environment should prevail--to embrace and rely on technological innovations such as 
species selection and genetic engineering--or should forest management depend more on 
natural processes. The first option reflects confidence about man’s ingenuity; the second 
shows caution encouraging working more closely with nature, harmonising practices to 
maintain natural balances.13 
 
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons provides a forceful critique of technocentric ideology. 
The ‘commons’ dilemma emphasises that no truly rational solution to resource 
management problems exists. O’Riordan insists society has two basic choices: either we 
relate our activities to ecological imperatives so that inputs and outputs are more or less 
balanced, or we must develop an acceptable code of altruism and long-sightedness to 
regulate our actions willingly in the wider community interest. O’Riordan notes that most 
ecocentrists believe we should do both. He and other environmentalists caution that this 
will be accomplished sooner or later by ‘enlightened reason’, or will be thrust upon us by 
catastrophe. Many ecocentrists fear that man will ultimately run out of ingenuity. Nature’s 
dynamic balance will be stretched so far that it will be impossible to return to reasonable 
equilibrium. The inevitable consequence will be environmental catastrophe and 
widespread social upheaval. 
                                                 
     13 O’Riordan, 11-19. 
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The greatest concern for technocentrists is not so much the environmentalists’ attack on 
specific forest practices, but their challenge to industry’s basic role in society. 
Environmentalism’s basic goal as a social-political movement is to restructure society by 
challenging its basic values and institutions. Four elements characterise environmentalism 
as a social movement. The first challenges almost every aspect of Western democratic 
culture; the second offers no clearcut alternative to present practice; the third is about 
‘conviction’; and the fourth is distinctly a politicising and reformism movement. 
According to O’Riordan, environmentalism as a vehicle for social reform is fuelled by 
two complementary anxieties. The first is that “some thing must be done about 
humanity’s present style of using and abusing resources, and the planet”. The second 
reflects the “growing anxiety about the future pervasive uncertainty that has all but 
replaced the beguiling self-confidence of the ruling elite”.14 
 
The second point about environmentalism as a social movement is that it offers no well 
formulated political/economic alternative to present modes of doing business. The third 
premise is that faced with the conceptual and organisational dilemma of an environmental 
imperative without a clear prescription, environmentalists have relied on a strong sense of 
conviction to guides their actions. The fourth point not only relates to the politicising of 
environmental matters but to the advocacy of a reformism movement. As O’Riordan 
stresses, this movement is all about fairness, sharing, permanence, and humility.  
 
According to O’Riordan two scenarios purported by Falk, one of despair the other of 
hope, seem to pervade the policy process. In this context Lowi, and Pirages and Ehrlich 
conclude that the present system of liberal pluralist politics cannot be sustained over the 
long term for the following reasons:  
1. Interest group politicking undermines long-term policy formulation in the broader 
public interest.  
2. Political leaders rarely reach clear decisions; they frequently prevaricate in the face of 
conflicting evidence and issues. It generally needs a major calamity for governments 
to move on environmental issues, and the rush of action rarely brings about resolution 
of the problem at hand. 
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3. ‘Invisible’ lobbying and systematic regulatory practices systematically undermine 
legislative policies--authority is steadily eroded. 
4. The ruling oligarchies of government, corporations and organised labour have no 
countervailing equivalents. Citizen action will only have weight if it has reasonable 
access to an ombudsman and/or the courts. 
5. Pluralism is predicated on compromise, but scarcity encourages confrontation where 
the powerful not necessarily the most in need prevail.15 
As will be seen, FIA policy was initially predicated on woodfibre scarcity but eventually 
gave way to conflict over amenity values. Although the multinationals acquired 
considerable policy power, the question remains whether the policy process served the 
most in need. In Nova Scotia, a major issue is whether forests are primarily an industrial 
asset or a social amenity. This debate is about how the forests should be utilised, what 
objectives should be set, and what forest management practices should be followed. This 
brings us to a discussion on multiple-use forest management. 
 
 Multi-objective Forest Management. 
 
Multi-objective forestry is first and foremost a prescriptive tool that implies a broad socio-
economic role for the forests. As a prescription, it is used to guide decision-making by 
setting output objectives, selecting management strategies, and monitoring the actual 
outcomes of forest management. In the context of this study, it is used primarily to 
establish a set of criteria to assess the impact of technocentric / ecocentric decision-
making influences on the forest management process. In general, this study examines the 
extent to which multiple-objective principles were embodied in forest conservation 
legislation; how they were accepted by bureaucracy and forest managers; how they 
contributed to forest practices; how they contributed to legislative failure; how they 
affected broader forestry policy; and what relevance they have to today’s forest 
management. To address these questions, this study examines the normative principles of 
multiple-objective forest management and also considers their theoretical and practical 
shortcomings. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
     14 O’Riordan, 301. 
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Van Maaran provides a useful schema for multi-objective forest management that is 
adapted in this study to compare theory and actual practice.16 There are four essential 
elements to Van Maaran’s model (see table 3.1). The first argues for a systematic 
assessment of forest capacity for any given combination of multiple-objectives. The 
second appeals for a process for soliciting and gaining public approval of forestry 
objectives. The third implores that a public consensus be reached to determine how far 
conservation / recreation objectives be subsidised and by whom. The fourth dictates that 
landowners recognise forests as part of the national wealth where benefits should accrue 
not only to the landowner but also to all mankind. 
 
Rees provides cutting criticism of multiple objective prescriptions. She frames this 
criticism within the assumption that multiple-objective management is primarily to 
enhance forest conservation and augment resource flow decisions. As far as flow is 
concerned, Rees points to considerable difficulties resulting from the application of the 
‘economic net benefit maximisation’ concept. First, this relies heavily on abstract models 
of perfect competition that are impossible to mimic in actual practice. Second, it views the 
whole utilisation and recreation amenity question from the present perspective that 
assumes that present consumer preferences and behaviour will prevail. Third, even when 
pondering the future, ‘discounting’ to transform forecasted benefits and costs into present 
values inevitably skews resource use to the present. And fourth, using market prices to 
calculate benefits and costs twists the evaluation to those already able to pay.17 In 
addition, Rees challenges the notion of reserving areas for recreation amenity for the 
future. She argues that unless costless (unlikely in practice) “it can only occur through the 
sacrifice of other social welfare objectives.” Usually the hardest hit are the poorest and 
weakest segments of society which results in user benefit displacement and employment 
loss.   
 
Table 3.1: Multiple Objective Forest Management in Nova Scotia: Theory and 
                                                                                                                                                  
     15 O’Riordan, 302-303. 
     16 Van Maaren, Adriaan. Forests and Forestry in National Life. In F.C. 
Hemmel, ed. Forest Policy: A Contribution to Resource Development. Martinus 
Nijhoff/Dr.W. Junk Publishers, The Hague, 1984, 1-19. 
     17 Rees, Judith A. Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics and Policy. 
London, Methuen, 1985, 308-317. 
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Practical Implications. 
  
Theoretical Propositions  
 
 Conceptual Implications: 
 
1a. 
 
Systematic assessment of forest 
production capacity. 
 
 
Equal or ‘scientific’ weighting of forest 
management objectives. 
 
Management objectives are compatible at local, 
regional and provincial levels. 
 
The agreed combination can be meaningfully 
translated into management prescriptions. 
 
Capacity can be defined objectively and uses can 
be meaningfully compared. 
 
1b. 
 
Soliciting and gaining approval. 
 
Public approval is obtained through the political 
process. 
 
The public is involved sufficiently to effectively 
influence public policy and private sector 
management behaviour. 
 
2. 
 
Attainment of a political consensus to 
decide how far conservation/recreation 
objectives etc. should be subsidised and 
by whom. 
 
Assumption that cross-subsidisation is a viable 
option. 
 
Assumption that conservation /recreation is a 
legitimate and relevant forestry sector objective. 
 
3. 
 
Recognition among involved land 
managers that forests are part of national 
wealth. Understanding that rights, 
obligations, and benefits of forest 
ownership go hand in hand. 
 
Owners are not wholly rational managers 
maximising their own welfare. They are to some 
degree altruistic land stewards. 
Adapted from: Van Maaren, 1984, 1-19. 
 
Conservation in this context protects the interests of future generations by sacrificing 
potential benefits for the present generation. Rees also challenges the conventional 
economic approach to multi-objective management. She argues that while many 
economists insist that quality of life measures can be built into the assessment process, it 
is much easier said than done. Typically, in assessment processes such as cost-benefit 
analysis and environmental impact assessments, factors that can be easily quantified in 
monetary terms bias the assessment process.18 
 
When viewed in the context of Rees’ criticism, Van Maaren’s model appears on the 
surface to have limited practical application. The underlying assumption of Van Maaren’s 
                                                 
     18 Rees, 331. 
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schema and other multiple-objective prescriptions is an equal or constant weighting of 
management objectives. For instance, fibre production is considered on a par with 
recreation amenity, or they maintain some roughly constant valuation relationship. There 
is also an assumption that management objectives are somehow compatible when viewed 
from varying local, regional, provincial, national, and international viewpoints. Rees 
argues this assumption implies that ‘global to local’ resource use and various conceptions 
of spatial diversity can be easily integrated into all scales of forest management plans. It 
also implies that multiple-use capacities can be practically defined and applied 
objectively. 
 
Van Maaren’s second prescription presupposes policy approval by soliciting and 
involving the public. It assumes this will be done through political processes and that 
affected publics will impact both public and private management forest practices. 
Theories of power outlined in the next chapter raise serious doubt about this capacity. The 
third element assumes political consensus and land managers’ willingness to subsidise 
multiple-use. This implies that politicians and forest managers share multiple-use 
objectives and that they can muster sufficient resources to make an effective contribution. 
The fourth element implores landowners to view multiple-use forest management as both 
a private investment in their own welfare and an uncompensated public duty. At the very 
least this assumption denies the classic economic notion of a rationally acting man.  
 
As can be seen from Rees’ critique, it is much easier to talk theoretically about multiple-
objective management than put its principles into practice. Fortunately, it is not used in 
this study for that purpose. Here it is used as a yardstick or discussion point to assess how 
far multi-purpose principles were integrated into the decision-making process during the 
various legislative eras. Van Maaren’s model is used primarily to uncover the ideological 
underpinnings of resource decision-making and indirectly measure the effectiveness of 
legislation to attain broad forest conservation goals. 
 
Sustainability, Ecological Modernisation and Forestry: 
 
While the concept of conservation infers the sacrifice of present benefits for the welfare of 
future generations, and multiple-use management broadens the valuation of forest 
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resources beyond fibre harvesting, the idea of sustainable development gives these ideas 
new political and public prominence. The rise in this political attention was largely the 
result of the World Commission on Environment and Development--the Brundtland 
Report. This report defined sustainable development as “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs”.19 According to O’Riordan, the  
Notion of ‘sustainability’ applies most conveniently to the replenishable use of 
renewable resources. The aim is to benefit from the advantages provided by such 
resources to the point where the rate of ‘take’ equals the rate of renewal, 
restoration or replenishment.20  
 
Although O’Riordan21 suggests that  
It is tempting to dismiss the term ‘sustainable development’ as an impossible 
ideal…[however,] the phrase has stuck. …It was the central theme in the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 
June 1992 [and the follow-up New York City conference in 1997]. Like it or not, 
‘sustainable development’ is with us for all time. 
 
Notwithstanding this notion’s broad political and public acceptance, the Dutch economist 
Jan Tinbergen (1952) argued that “for every independent policy goal there must be a 
complementary independent enabling policy instrument.22 
 
Reflecting Tinbergen’s point, the Brundtland statement has undergone a broad range of 
criticism since its first publication, largely because of its inherent vagueness and 
operational imprecision. It has been interpreted--likely as was intended--in numerous 
ways according to many ideologies and circumstances. “A large and diverse literature has 
emerged in recent years … many definitions of sustainable development have been 
suggested and debated, thereby exposing a range of approaches linked to different world 
views.”23 The problem is that sustainability encompasses a wide range of “multiple and 
interrelated goals” including social-cultural, economic, political, environmental and moral 
strategies.  
                                                 
19 WCED 1987, 43. 
20 Timothy O’Riordan The Politics of Sustainability. In Turner, 1993, 43. 
21 O’Riordan 93, 37. 
22 Cited by Turner, 1993, 5. 
23 R. Kerry Turner (Editor) 1993.  Sustainable Environmental Economics and 
Management: Principles and Practice.  Belhaven Press, London. 3. 
  49 
Despite this inherent complexity and indistinct character, Turner suggests that the various 
definitions and their implications for implementation sort roughly into four sustainable 
typologies falling at one end of a sustainable / unsustainable continuum. The two extreme 
sustainable positions are labelled very weak sustainability (VWS) and ‘very strong 
sustainability (VSS), while the two intermediary positions are weak sustainability (WS) 
and strong sustainability (SS).24 Although the operational ideologies and strategies called 
for by these approaches vary widely, it is important to note that none to date are well 
represented, if at all, in practice in forestry as well as in other keys areas of sustainability. 
These typologies do, however, offer a useful modus operandi to assess present practice 
and to judge policy prescriptions. To fully understand these typologies, however, it is 
important to consider the concept of ‘sustainability inheritance asset portfolio’. This 
suggests that the full portfolio of assets and benefits available to mankind in establishing 
sustainability consist of man-made capital Km, natural capital Kn, human capital Kh, and 
moral or ethical capital Ke. Theoretically in each of the so-called sustainability paradigms, 
these assets are more or less traded-off each other. 
 
The Very Weak Sustainability (VWS) Paradigm. 
The VWS paradigm necessitates only that the overall stock of man-made, natural and 
human capital remains constant over time. This requires society to be as well endowed at 
the end of any period as it was at the start. The underlying premise is that there is perfect 
substitutability between capital assets. With this free-flow trading of capital assets, a 
nation or other jurisdiction merely has to save enough of its overall stock assets to offset 
depreciation. Transforming a forest by clearcutting and processing into chopsticks, for 
example, is justifiable under this scenario as long as the social value of the chopsticks is 
as great as the standing forest. 
 
Weak Sustainability Paradigm. 
Because the VWS paradigm appears to violate the basic and first law of thermodynamics: 
the conservation of energy, the second paradigm--the weak sustainability paradigm (WS)-
-modifies the first to provide both upper and lower limits to the exploitation of natural 
assets. This limitation accounts for the non-substitutability of certain natural capital assets 
                                                 
24 Turner, 3 
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such as keystone species and ecological processes, and the assimilative capacity of 
important life support systems. This approach presupposes some level of constraint on 
natural resource economic activity. It also implies limits to population growth and the 
exploitation of natural resource stocks consistent with “ecosystem stability and 
resilience.” The focus of this paradigm is not “preservation of specific attributes of the 
ecological community but rather the management of the system to meet human needs, 
[generally but not specifically to] support species and genetic diversity, and [to] enable 
the system to adapt (resilience) to changing conditions”.25 Turner also suggests that a “set 
of physical indicators will be required to monitor and measure biodiversity and ecosystem 
resilience,” thus invoking a system of safe minimum standards. He points out, however, 
that there is no scientific consensus over how biodiversity should be measured and hence 
what safe minimum standards are necessary. In a scenario drawn from this typology, there 
is clearly a limit to the amount of clearcutting permissible, and in addition, rules are 
necessary to ensure that minimal ecological processes are preserved. As will be seen in 
this study, developing a workable consensus on minimum rules for forest practices in 
Nova Scotia is no easy task because of a failure to agree for one on basic scientific 
definitions. 
 
Strong Sustainability Paradigm. 
While the first two paradigms allow varying levels of natural resource degradation as long 
as other forms of capital (predominantly man-made and human) are substituted, the strong 
sustainability (SS) view requires that natural capital must be protected. This view is 
premised on the realisation that at least part of our natural capital is non-substitutable. 
From a practical point of view this means that natural capital must remain a constant. 
While fluctuations in part--within strict limits--are permissible, the overall losses in 
natural capital must be compensated by gains elsewhere. Rather than a set of indicators 
taken in isolation, the focus of this paradigm is a combination of key factors such as 
irreversibility and uncertainty. Whereas in the weak sustainability paradigm trading of 
natural assets is acceptable when the social opportunity for development is large, the 
strong sustainability model says “whatever the benefits forgone, [natural capital] losses 
                                                 
25 Turner ‘93, 11 
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are unacceptable.”26 This model does not, in itself, argue against development, it 
contends, however, that gains in development must be decoupled (see below) from 
environmental degradation and/or is linked to meaningful strides in restoration ecology. In 
this scenario, forestry as an industry, is concerned with ensuring that any and all natural 
resource exploitation and degradation, is compensated for by gains in environmental 
quality and quantity elsewhere in the system. Allowing a clearcut in one area might 
require, for example, restoration and protected area designation elsewhere.   
 
Very Strong Sustainability. 
This fourth model of sustainability presupposes that the global macro economy has 
already exceeded its ecological limits necessitating strict limits on energy and mass 
throughput in the economy to minimise further environmental damage and stimulate 
global ecological restoration. This is known as the ‘scale effect’ and is most evident in the 
aggregate global impacts of the greenhouse gases, depletion of the ozone layer, and the 
widespread impacts of acid precipitation. This model does not presuppose the end of 
development but merely re-emphasises its root meaning in change of quality and function 
rather than growth. This steady state economy emphasises “that social preferences, 
community values and generalised obligations to future generations can all find full 
expression in the steady-state economy as it evolves. Within this paradigm considerably 
more emphasis is placed on ‘moral capital’. It is in this context that Trainer,27 in the 
process of invalidating free enterprise economics and big state socialism, offers the 
following observation: 
Conventional economics is totally indiscriminate. It does not care what is 
produced and sold. Much of what is sold is unnecessary, wasteful and luxurious. 
The rich countries already vastly overproduce, yet the main goal of all their 
economies is to increase production and consumption as fast as possible. It is very 
important that the ‘overdeveloped’ rich countries should greatly reduce their levels 
of production and consumption; but this is not possible in the present economic 
system.28 
 
This more radical scenario clearly requires a reduction in forest exploitation that is not 
matched elsewhere with increased production. In a moral and equitable world, this can 
                                                 
26 Turner 14. 
27 Ted Trainer  1996.  Towards Sustainable Development: The Need for 
Fundamental Change.  Jon Carpenter / Oxford, Envirobook / Sydney. 
28 Trainer 173. 
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only be achieved by a substantial reduction of ‘environmental’ consumption by the rich 
countries so that the poor have some room to improve their standard of living. 
 
Globalisation, Good Governance and Sustainable Development. 
 
Moving to any one of the aforementioned sustainable development paradigms is, 
unfortunately, problematic given the present focus of global trade that fosters ever-
increasing consumption to maintain financial capital growth. Trainer, for example, argues 
that the power of the multinationals, especially those controlling capital such as the large 
banks, and the conventional global investment of unearned capital (requiring largely 
unfettered growth) are the main forces driving unsustainable economic activity. At the 
heart of this issue, as Trainer insists, is the lack of incentive to recycle, conserve, and 
reduce, induced mainly by the failure of the marketplace to incorporate the real costs of 
production--largely environmental and social externalities--and the state’s failure to 
reorient the distortions caused by the marketplace. According to O’Riordan what “we 
witness here is the insensitivity of power, lobbying and closed thinking”.29 O’Riordan 
identifies other important and related issues including the lack of effort in economic and 
social forecasting to offer feasible options for reducing aggregate demand, and the 
incestuous linkages between government, industry and regulators that continuously favour 
production over conservation. 
 
In the United Nations “Agenda for Development” (1994), good government implies 
The wisdom and the historical responsibility to know when to let the market 
forces act, when to let civil society take the lead and when government should 
intervene directly.30 
 
The Graz (Austria) “Seminar on Sustainable Development, Human Rights and Good 
Governance” in 1994 for example, 
Gave expression once more to the fact that good governance, meaning sustainable 
management of resources in legal, institutional, political, economic, social and 
ultimately cultural terms, is difficult to translate into a concrete operational 
programme for the world as a whole.31 
                                                 
29 O’Riordan 93, 42. 
30 Cited in Konrad Ginther, Erik Denters & Paul J.I.M. Waart (Editors) 1995. 
Sustainable Development and Good Governance. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 4 
31 Ginther, 9. 
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What we have in reality is on the one hand a bulldozer of political resolve and 
multinational corporate power dismantling social welfare reform and environmental 
protection policy, and on the other, at best, a wounded warrior armed with a table spoon 
attempting to protect environmental quality and repair damage. Unfortunately, the danger 
of looking narrowly at international environmental policy and conventions is to miss the 
significance of its juxtaposition with international trade policy. Of great import in this 
analysis is the significance of the Rio Conference’s (the Earth Summit) “Agenda 21” 
commitment in 1992 to make trade and environmental management “mutually 
supportive”. This commitment called for the “environmental content of trade to be 
considered and for conscious efforts to ensure that the increasingly global and unregulated 
marketplace would not destroy the planet.”32 Examined on the surface and taken in 
isolation, this measure suggests that most trade related environmental destruction would 
soon be a thing of the past. As the Sierra Club of Canada notes, however, at about the 
same time of the Rio negotiations, “the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks was grinding 
ahead without any concern about the profound impacts trade liberalisation would have on 
the environment.” Overtime, according to the Sierra Club, it became increasing clear that 
trade liberalisation was moving much faster ahead and more effectively than any 
commitments made at the Earth Summit. In this general context of examining 
environmental policy Teeple asks whether capitalism, and by implication trade 
liberalisation, is indeed sustainable? In answer to his own question he remarks that 
The drive for continuous economic growth has always carried an implicit 
assumption, namely, the ability of nature to absorb the costs of this growth to 
withstand its flagrant misappropriation and irresponsible desecration. The 
ecological limits of industrial growth are everywhere now evident. Environmental 
degradation of the planet is proceeding at a pace that is not abating despite recent 
international accords and promises. And the effects, such as global warming, 
falling crop yields, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, declining or 
exhausted fisheries, ozone depletion, air and water pollution, and species 
extinction, all have an impact on the possibility for continued economic growth.33 
 
It should be noted that as part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) deliberations, 
Canada and the U.S. are actively negotiating the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
                                                 
32 Sierra Club of Canada: http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/rio/rio97-federal.html, 
August 1, 1997. 
33 Gary Teeple Globilization and the Decline of Social Reform. Toronto: 
Garamond Press, 1995. P140. 
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(MAI) concerning global trade through the OECD. According to the Sierra Club of 
Canada 
This agreement would extend the benefits of “like-product” trade disciplines to 
investments. It would be the first of the trade liberalisation agreements to 
explicitly convey rights to transnational corporations equivalent to rights of nation 
states. 
 
Teeple is also clearly concerned about this global trend, he states that 
Another factor in this present transformation [of the political economy from 
national capital and the nation-state to international capital and supranationalism] 
can no longer be ignored. If the decline of social reform is increasingly leaving 
social needs unanswered, there has never been much by way of environmental 
reform, national or international to confront the consequences of planetary 
pollution caused by decades of industrial production and consumption. … While 
critics agree that these effects can no longer be ignored, governments seek to 
minimize their import, mouthing concern but doing little to clean up or prevent 
further destruction; and corporations resist the idea of accepting responsibility for 
the external costs of their industrial processes.34 
 
Despite any local, provincial, national efforts to curb corporate destruction and clean up 
the environment then, there is the more pervasive and over-riding detrimental impact of 
world trade. In this light the Sierra Club argues that global trade rules have tended to 
undermine domestic environmental protection, for example, stripping some US Clean Air 
Act regulations to conform with GATT rules that have increased air pollution. 
And Teele elaborates that 
Despite the growing consciousness, protest, and resistance, the trends of planetary 
pollution worsen, and this continued degeneration brings the question of the 
sustainability of capitalism to the fore. The underlying issue is easily definable: 
unreformed capitalism destroys the bases of its own existence, namely, the 
reproduction of nature and labour power. The system has no inherent means of 
preventing this destruction, and in the past reforms have had to be imposed to save 
capitalism from its destruction of nature and labour power.35 
 
Although the federal role in forest management is indirect, having a particular mandate 
for science, research, data collection and international negotiations, it is on the 
international front that its influence is critical to forest enhancement or degradation. 
Recently, on the international front, Canada seemed proactive promoting a global forest 
convention before the IUCN. This initiative proved highly problematic with 
                                                 
34 Gary Teeple Globilization and the Decline of Social Reform. Toronto: 
Garamond Press, 1995. P73. 
35 Teeple, 140. 
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environmental groups, however. Prior to the Rio convention, the environmental 
community in Canada favoured a worldwide convention on forest practices but as time 
went on, and the Government of Canada’s true intentions became more transparent, they 
retreated from this position. It became clear that Canada had very little interest in 
improving global forest practices including their own, but was focused firmly on 
protecting Canada’s trade interests. The Sierra Club notes the remarks of Anne McLellan, 
former Canadian Minister of Natural Resources were particular illustrative.  
The negotiations leading to the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests to 
the UN Commission on Sustainable Development were immediately preceded by 
unfortunate remarks by [Mclellan]. In response to U.S. industry opposition to a 
Forest Convention, Minister Mclellan said the convention was needed in order to 
prevent Canadian trade being “held hostage to environmental terrorism”.36  
 
Although she later attempted to distance those remarks from environmental groups she 
did explain that her remarks were aimed at nation states who might use environmental 
criteria to hamper free trade in forest products. 
 
In their ‘report card’ five years after the Rio conference released on June 19, 1997, the 
Sierra Club of Canada, quoting Maude Barlow, Chairperson of the Council of Canadians, 
said:   
Canada has pursued one agenda relentlessly since Rio … But that agenda had 
nothing to do with the environment and everything to do with globalization of 
trade, loss of Canadian jobs and democratic rights. In hindsight, Canada’s Rio 
promises to make trade and environment mutually supporting are laughable. 
 
In the light of sustainable development models and the reality of global-wide neo-
liberalism, it is interesting to review what can be done so that forest policy in Nova Scotia 
and its conservation practices can be put into perspective. The following overviews the 
theory and practice of decoupling environmental degradation from development and the 
development of more specific strategies to abate environmental destruction. 
 
Decoupling Development and Environmental Degradation. 
 
It is clear that the forces degrading the environment are much stronger than those 
attempting to maintain or restore it. As will be seen in this case study, there appears to be 
                                                 
36 Mclellan. Cited in Sierra Club of Canada Home Page: http://www.sierraclub.ca/  
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a strong link between increased development, forest exploitation, production and 
environmental degradation. Pearce37 argues, nevertheless, that it is indeed possible to 
decouple the seemingly inseparable connection between economic growth and increased 
environmental impact. As one example he cites the reduction in energy requirements of 
certain OECD countries that accompanied real growth in GDP between 1970 and 1987.38 
He also describes several incentives for sustainable development. He includes incentive 
systems, pricing mechanisms, fiscal policies and information programmes. 
 
Incentive systems. 
Pearce supports incentive systems such as those financial subventions that reduce 
uncertainty about the future and also those that “send out the correct price and quality 
signals in the marketplace.” In the forestry sector, for example, many larger companies 
make considerable effort to reduce uncertainty with vertical integration and various other 
strategies nurturing self-serving monopsonies. For the Nova Scotia forestry situation, 
Pearce infers greater security of tenure as one way to increase sustainability. While these 
may be important to developing countries, it will be seen in this study, when considering 
Crown land licenses and their application by commercial operators, that long-term 
licenses have had disappointing results regarding forest practices and sustainability. 
 
Prices as incentives. 
Pearce emphasises that market failure has two underlying causes: goods rarely reflect the 
private costs of production because of inappropriate subsidies; and many goods, important 
for sustainable development and the maintenance of environmental quality, are not traded 
in conventional markets.39 This second factor is especially important in establishing 
sustainable processes, it means for consumers to make appropriate choices regarding the 
value of goods, artificial prices must be created for non-traded environmental services and 
benefits. To account for regular price distortions Pearce argues that as a first step price 
should be freed from inappropriate subsidies that artificially inflate demand. This artificial 
demand results in unnecessary use of natural resources and creates unnecessarily increases 
                                                 
37 Pearce, 1993, 90. 
38 D.W. Pearce. Sustainable Development and Developing Country Economies. In 
Turner 76-7. 
39  Pearce, 94. 
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in environmental destruction. This approach, he suggests, will move prices closer to the 
firm’s private marginal costs of production. As a second step prices should be moved 
closer to the marginal social and environmental costs of production which captures 
important externalities within the selling price. Although it is difficult to argue with 
Pearce’s general thesis, this study highlights the difficulty of implementing such 
principles when they must overcome entrenched socio-political inertia favouring Crown 
subsidy. 
 
Fiscal Policies. 
Since price is instrumental in changing consumer behaviour, it follows according to 
Pearce, that taxation policy (which indirectly affects price) will also be an important 
influence and can be applied by the state in a general or more specific way. As consumer 
behaviour ultimately impacts the exploitation of natural resources, this will in the end 
affect the quality of the environment. Pearce argues that “the scope for pollution taxes in 
developing countries is likely to grow in the future”, although, he points out that “taxes in 
the sense of damage-related charges are a rarity in the developed world.” He emphasises 
that although “present taxation policies are capable of adjustment” and “existing policies 
frequently discriminate against the environment”, governments frequently fail to act to  
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capture adequate rents from, for example, “existing valuable resources such as forests.”40 
Harvesting, for instance, might remove amenity--these assets are rarely traded in the 
conventional market and are rarely captured by the resource owner. Whether the removal 
of amenity, previously uncompensated, can be considered an act of pollution to be subject 
to tax when the resource manager is unable to exploit these resource assets for profit--
when in place--is a matter of debate. 
 
Information Systems: 
Pearce additionally argues that information is a major influence in sustainable 
development and suggests two important information strategies. The first modifies the 
“presentation of environmental and economic statistics so that environmental impacts of 
economic change can be discerned, and the ‘services’ of the environment highlighted”. 
The most important action in this regard is to build into a ‘GNPlike’ index that includes a 
negative calculation reflecting the depletion of natural assets as a result of the 
exploitation/production process. The second strategy involves the revising of “systems of 
appraisal for investments and policies so that they adequately reflect and integrate 
environmental impacts.” This will naturally be management resource intensive requiring a 
greater role for the state or for supranational organisations. 
 
Lessons regarding the environment-economy connection? 
According to Pearce one important lesson to be learned is that “environmental damage 
matters” it impacts the psyche of individuals, organisations, communities and nations. It 
adversely effects the non-economic welfare of the public. They lose amenity, health, and 
incur real costs in clean up and loss of value to their acquired wealth. Clearcutting, for 
example, can have very real impacts on the less tangible social-cultural welfare of an area. 
Neighbours may well feel a loss but little can be calculated in real monetary terms. 
Perhaps most importantly, from the viewpoint of selling sustainable development to 
mainstream industry, firms experience recognisable additional costs to production either 
from their own environmental misdeeds or those of others. From this Pearce deduces that 
“policies need to integrate the environment at all levels”. There is a “need to analyse 
under what conditions optimal growth coincides with sustainable growth”. And finally 
                                                 
40 Pearce, 96-97. 
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and most significantly for the ultimate ‘welfare’ of sustainable development strategies, 
any question of “raising per capita growth must require decoupling growth from its 
environmental impacts.” 
 
To conclude this discussion of sustainability and its relationship to forestry, it can be 
inferred from Pearce that priority policy areas lie in the following areas: 
 in the short-term, private cost pricing reform of existing tax policy is necessary;  
 in the medium-term, resource rights and land tenure must be clarified;  
 in the long term, social cost pricing must be instituted; and 
 as a continuous theme, there must also be a concerted information flow on sustainable 
development for households, productive units and government. 
 
Ecological Modernisation: 
 
The growing interest in sustainable development emanates from two social failures. The 
first is the failure of the market to limit environmental degradation (especially those 
activities that aggregate to destroy global life support systems such as clean air, potable 
water, stable climate, etc.). The second is the failure of the state to adequately monitor, 
control and remedy the market’s indiscretions (see Chapter Four). Despite these failures 
remedial and preventive environmental management have been tried by both the market 
and the state. It is possible to ascertain three rather distinct phases in the development of 
public policy concerning these efforts. 
 
The first phase, according to Weale, occurred in the late sixties and early seventies.41 This 
phase was characterised by ‘end-of-pipe’ strategies that served to clean up industrial 
damage after the fact rather than try to avoid problems in the first place. Administratively, 
environmental policy was considered an add-on function rather than one necessarily 
integrated through all facets of public policy. Typically agencies or departments of the 
‘environment’ focused on specific pollutants using command and control, or other 
regulatory strategies. Some aspects of forest conservation policy can be seen in this light. 
Once an area is clearcut, for example, and the soil base denuded by erosion, leaching and 
                                                 
41 Weale, 29-32. 
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hard panning, attempts are made to restore the forest with plantings, fertilisers, chemical 
weeding, and insect control. Whether in the forests or other areas of resource and 
environmental management, these add-on, after-the-fact strategies (whether voluntary or 
regulated) were largely ineffective on the broader scale because gains made on a per unit 
basis were often cancelled by continuously expanding, unrestrained exploitation 
elsewhere. 
 
The second phase which is termed by Weale as ‘ecological modernisation’, grew out the 
first phase but was based on the need in the 1980s for a more integrative approach that 
recognised the new scale of the pollution and environmental degradation problem. This 
new approach, which began to gel in the late eighties and early nineties, acknowledged 
the international dimensions of the pollution problem. It built on the emerging patterns of 
interactions among newly co-ordinated policy communities. This broadening and 
integration of the economy and environment grew in much the same way as advocated in 
the Bruntland Report. In time this provided “new intellectual and ideological conceptions 
of environmental policy issues”. This more integrative approach is epitomised in forestry 
by, for example, the ecosystem management philosophy. 
 
Ecological modernisation contends that  
Serious environmental problems are frequently not obvious and the link from 
cause to effect is often long and indirect. Fundamental problems of environmental 
protection cannot be dealt with by end-of-pipe technologies but need to be tackled 
at source. One reason for this is that from the perspective of the mass balance 
approach to pollution the solution of one disposal problem will merely displace 
the problem into another medium.42  
 
Weale contends that if anything forms the core of the modernist’s critique of the 1970s 
environmental policy, it is that the adopted policy strategies frequently resulted in 
problem transfer “across time and place, rather than problem solution.” A number of 
themes conceptualise ecological modernisation and the link between environment and 
economy, they are:  
 If the ‘costs’ of environmental protection are avoided the effect is frequently to save 
money for present generations at the price of an increased burden for future 
generations. In other words, the costs do not disappear they are merely pushed forward 
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and possibly magnified in the process. Thus, a failure to regulate industrial waste 
disposal or agricultural pesticide use in one generation will simply have the effect of 
creating soil clean-up costs for future generations. 
 Instead of seeing environmental protection as a burden upon the economy the 
ecological modernist sees it as a potential source for future growth. Since 
environmental amenity is a superior good, the demand for pollution control is likely to 
increase and there is therefore a considerable advantage to an economy to have the 
technical and production capacity to produce low polluting goods or pollution control 
technology. 
 This account of the relationship between economic competitiveness and 
environmental regulation is also linked to a view about the proper role of the public 
authorities in ensuring the condition for economic development. Public intervention, 
along with other decision processes, is an essential part of ensuring a progressive 
relationship between industry and the environment.43 
In discussing ecological modernisation it is also important to discuss the concepts of 
market and state failure, for it is these that have led to a movement of ecological 
modernisation in the first place. In discussing these concepts it is first useful to consider 
the characteristics of the market and the state as properly functioning institutions. 
 
Market and State Failure: 
 
A healthy market--largely hypothetical--produces goods and services usually for private 
demand at a reasonable price and quality, and distributes them in a more or less equitable 
way to all sectors of society to meet the need for a satisfactory quality of life. A healthy 
state (again largely hypothetical) produces collective goods such as security and public 
health, as well as maintains environmental attributes required by society that the market 
have no consistent interest or capability in producing. It does so at a reasonable price and 
quality, and distributes these goods equitably among its citizens.  
 
In contrast to this cornucopian world, state failure as Janicke puts it, “presupposes 
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previous market failure”44--market failure creates environmental problems and social 
needs and transfers the problems of production to the state. In this less than ideal world, 
environmental degradation and pollution are functions of both market and state failure. As 
will be seen in the following discussion, the state is invariably caught in an escalating 
cycle of attempting to address inherited problems. It often does so by expanding its 
bureaucracy to tackle these problems, spurring industrial growth to pay for this expansion 
that in turns creates new environmental and social problems for the state. The state is 
caught in a cycle where it is both a victim of market failure and a contributor of its own 
failed destiny. 
 
Market Failure. 
 
According to Janicke the market has “manifest imperfections” as society’s primary 
steering mechanism: 
 The market is frequently dominated by outmoded industries that are frequently 
monopolistic. Market forces, even those notionally responsive to contemporary 
society, have great difficulty in overcoming the inertia of established industries that 
have past their social optimum. A feature of established industry is its propensity to 
capture public sector subsidies at the expense of innovation and sustainable 
development. In Nova Scotia’s forest management this is seen, as this study suggests, 
by the continued support of forest practices that among other things continue to 
encourage disease susceptible monocultures and extensive clearcutting that is 
increasingly abhorrent to the contemporary marketplace.  
 When the market does provide direction it is often the result of crisis. This means, 
especially concerning environmental matters, that redirection comes too late, too 
bluntly, and with unreasonable social costs. In Nova Scotia’s forest management, the 
truth of forest practices is more of ‘crisis delayed’ than on crisis alone. Projections for 
wood supply and demand at present industrial capacity, inevitably means a substantial 
shakeout in the early decades of the twenty-first century and with it coincident 
employment fallout and social costs.  
 The market predictably has a medium-term outlook mirroring the business cycle. This 
                                                 
44 Janicke, Martin. State Failure. The Pennsylvania State Press. University Park, 
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myopic view is especially problematic in the forest industry. As such, the market fails 
to account for future, longer-term communal requirements. The relatively short 
investment cycles of three to five years of the typical business cycle fall considerably 
short of the time horizon necessary to sustain forests and forestry. In culturally 
shaping the forest through economically efficient harvesting techniques, and in 
species selection and distribution, the industry encounters the problem of adequately 
anticipating future generations’ needs. 
 With its focus on private demand and willingness (ability) to pay, the market 
continually fails to meet the public’s collective needs that cannot be efficiently traded 
in the traditional marketplace.45 This point is particularly relevant in forestry. The 
industry continually views the forest as an industrial installation--a source of raw 
woodfibre--while the public increasingly broadens its expectations for more far-
reaching amenity and environmental benefits. 
 
The failure of the market is closely related to the nature of industry and its underlying 
driving forces. Industry, as an institution, is fundamentally concerned with mass 
production requiring for continuance, a constantly expanding market. The twin axioms of 
industry--efficiency and effectiveness--necessitate a constant reduction in the ratio of 
expenditures over revenue, and the need for continuous innovation to create increasingly 
attractive products. The outcome of these elemental forces is the continued creation of 
fresh demand and the centralisation of capital that creates new problems for the state in 
promoting social equity and dealing with the fallout of an ever-expanding industry.  
 
A special feature of the dynamic of industrialism, according to Janicke, “is its bias 
towards external and internal totalisation”. Externally this is nurtured through the creation 
of global markets (“internationalisation”) while internal bias results from the 
“universalisation of industrial principles”--more efficient processes based upon short-term 
private, consumer assessment processes that replace traditional production methods that 
may be more socially and environmentally sustainable. Janicke argues that because 
industry has no centre, no focal point of responsibility and accountability, it is 
dispositioned to ignore ambient social conditions and the “consequences of its capital, 
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labour and technology policy practices”. The state, in contrast, is constantly saddled with 
its aftermath. Industrial power, especially in its international context, poses problems to 
sovereign entities. Nation states (and in this case study, the province) find it increasingly 
difficult to tackle problems created by international industries where such organisation 
reduces autonomy.46 
 
The State’s Function and the State’s Failure. 
 
According to Janicke there are two key functions of the state. They are the services it 
provides in advance of, and as a consequence of industrial development. The state has a 
number of key roles, many of which are derived from market failure. Primarily the state 
has a regulatory, a legitimisation, an infrastructure, and a nuisance abatement role. As 
industry specialises, so the connections between its respective parts become more 
complex requiring increasing regulation and legislation. As industry thrives on stability 
and predictability, created in large part by regulatory control, the state provides a major 
impetus for industrial growth. As industry grows, it increasingly transfers the problems it 
creates to the state. Perhaps unfairly, the government’s political wing is held accountable 
so reducing much of its essential role to legitimising what happens in industry--with its 
failures, and what happens with the civil service--and its shortcomings. Janicke 
emphasises that politicians usually have only a legitimising role in policy decision-
making, they neither design or implement policy but nevertheless bear responsibility for 
the process, justifying the decisions, and for the mistakes of civil servants. By and large it 
is the private sector, namely industry, that make most of the important guiding decisions 
in society but politicians generally get the blame for problems and failure in the 
economy.47 
 
Beyond this often rather shallow legitimisation role, the state nevertheless plays an 
important part in infrastructure provision. With the increased specialisation of industrial 
units, industry is, however, often unequipped or unwilling to produce many of its essential 
prerequisites such as skilled labour, basic research, transportation networks, and 
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financing. In terms of industry’s role in nuisance abatement, this is not always a case of 
industrial ineptitude. It is often rather one of reluctance to accept responsibility for the ill 
effects of the industrial process such as displaced labour, pollution, the inequitable 
distribution of wealth; and its indirect consequences such as crime, social alienation, and 
the intensifying need for job retraining. 
 
While the market is clearly unable or unwilling to provide all society’s requirements, the 
functional characteristics of the state, in its responsibility, show considerable failings. 
 It suffers from lack of sophistication in intervening in the marketplace to minimise the 
market’s failures. 
 It too adopts a medium-term horizon corresponding to the election cycle, which in the 
case of forestry falls far short of reasonable forest renewal planning cycles. 
 It fails to adequately foresee and avoid devastating culturally induced experiences 
such as wars, environmental catastrophes or wanton corruption.48 
 
The Public Interest. 
 
As Janicke affirms, in social analysis of the market, the impact of only two steering 
mechanisms in capitalist industrial systems is usually considered--the market and the 
state. In this context, the overriding conclusion is that the market fails to adapt and the 
state fails to act effectively in compensation. In these analyses, the polity or the public 
interest usually acts on the periphery of the political system to counter market and state 
failures. As Janicke suggests, the work of this third dimension “has a certain reflex action 
on the other two”. Despite this present marginalised role of the public, Janicke sees the 
need for a substantially elevated role for civics and decentralisation in future socio-
economic processes: 
Only thoroughgoing innovations in society will avail to overcome the present 
‘institutional sclerosis’, and the most of these innovations will consist in 
comprehensively strengthening the decentralised level in the Western 
constitutional states adumbrated here and giving it entrenched institutional form.49 
 
This subject has a central place in this case study’s analysis as it documents decades of 
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failed experience in bringing about a more decentralised decision-making process in 
forest practices policy. Mostly, as this study attests, this failure to effectively decentralise 
decision-making (with accompanying sustainable forest practices) is because policy-
makers failed to address the entrenched inertia of corporate power. In the more 
contemporary analyses of the later chapters of this study the normative idea of 
decentralised decision-making is visited once more, but with a stronger vision of what 
constitutes a sustainable forest management regime. 
 
Green Taxes. 
 
The message in the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ was “one for government coercion”.50 
Twenty-five years ago when Hardin wrote the “Commons” paper, according to Anderson, 
there was confidence in the ability of government to control pollution”. The more recent 
history of market and state failure, however, paints a rather different picture suggesting 
that growth in the economy almost invariably accompanies ecological degradation and 
unfortunately, the state seems ill equipped to do much about it. However, Anderson 
believes, as Pearce inferred above in his optimism concerning the need for decoupling 
development and environmental degradation, “there is a growing understanding of both 
the necessity of and the options for a more positive integration”. He points out that both 
concepts: economy and ecology derive from the same etymological root: the Greek word 
Oikos meaning home.51 One way he believes this link is being renewed and strengthened 
is with green taxes. According to Anderson, the interest in the use of economic 
instruments and green taxes to address pollution problems has increased with the rise of 
neo-liberalism.52 Increased interest is also no doubt, a result of the more enlightened 
efforts in sustainable development to decouple economic growth from environment 
degradation. 
 
Although green taxes have enjoyed considerable support in economic textbooks, 
Anderson notes there is yet to be found a coherent theoretical understanding of how they 
                                                 
50 Mikael Skou Anderson 1994.  Governance by Green Taxes: Making Pollution 
Prevention Pay. Manchester University Press, New York, 10. 
51 Mikael Skou Anderson. Governance by Green Taxes: Making Pollution 
Prevention Pay. New York : Saint-Martin's-Press-Incorporated, 1994, 9. 
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can be applied in the world of existing regulatory policy. Neo-classical economists 
theoretically place a tax on externalities commensurate with the size of damage caused by 
pollution. If it is possible to accurately estimate the cost of pollution then it is possible to 
set a reasonable green tax. And for each firm it is then possible to estimate the break-even 
point where too much pollution results in unbearable costs to the firm. Acting rationally, 
it then takes steps to reduce pollution thereby reducing taxes to a more optimal level. The 
practical difficulty in applying neo-classical economics is the problem of accurately 
identifying ‘ever fluctuating’ values of the environment. In revisiting the work of the 
economist Pigou--credited with the market externality concept--Anderson suggests that he 
always envisioned the market acting within the context of a state regulatory framework. 
Pigou appeared to advocate, as Anderson argues, a pragmatic ‘earmarked tax’ where 
revenue is dedicated specifically to measures that reduce pollution.  
 
Political scientists, Anderson points out, are especially sceptical about economists’ 
assumptions. Anderson suggests that economists’ starting point, the ‘failed market’, is a 
false premise. It is not just the free market that explains accumulated pollution but the 
complicated interplay between the market and the state. He continues, applying Janicke’s 
thesis of state failure that the eco-industrial complexes that have evolved from the 
entrenched regulatory regime tend “to help maintain rather than prevent pollution”. This 
and other forms of policy inertia will certainly be, he contends, a formidable force in 
applying more enlightened pollution abatement strategies in the future.53 
 
The earmarked tax, Anderson argues, avoids the problem of precisely calculating the 
value of the environment in each pollution context. Instead, it simply offers a tax that 
improves the pollution problem by sending the right directional signals to the firm while 
providing dedicated funds to directly combat the pollution source. Anderson also argues, 
citing evidence from a series of case studies, that it makes a difference what combination 
of policy instruments are adopted and whether economic instruments such as green taxes 
are included in the policy mix.54 Anderson cautions, however, that without hard evidence 
from the real world as to what precisely works and what does not, a blend of different 
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strategies should be explored including sector studies as applied experiments or 
demonstration projects. He argues that comprehensive policy designs that include 
regulatory, fiscal green taxes, and dedicated green tax methods “may turn out to be more 
effective than those that do not” because the market distortions already apparent in 
environmentally sensitive sectors render the outcome of green taxes alone, uncertain. 
 
A serious complication in considering forestry as a candidate for green taxes is the 
relationship of forests and the industry to pollution. The standing forest is, in itself, an 
environmental good--a positive externality. It provides a broad set of communal benefits 
(not easily priced and sold in the conventional marketplace) that accrue in addition to any 
industrial (private) value. The forest provides, for example, air purification and clean 
water, it regulates water flow and has spiritual, cultural, aesthetic, recreation, wildlife and 
biodiversity values. The removal of a tree, forest stand, or forest does not in the regular 
sense cause pollution but there is nevertheless, a loss of environmental benefit. The 
question that looms in forestry is therefore, to what extent should a private forest manager 
be expected to provide environmental services (common goods) at the expense of private 
gain from woodfibre exploitation? A second related question is should, and if so, how can 
a forest manager be compensated for providing these communal goods? Anderson appeals 
indirectly to this issue when he states: “In the case of pollution, the problem is that the 
environment is a public good to which there is free access.” Anderson advises, when 
considering the broader issues of the interplay between the environment, the market and 
the state, that government intervention alone often fails to address the pollution problem 
at the source. Two frequent examples are displacement and dilution. In forestry, 
pinpointing the source of pollution is especially problematic because of the forests’ 
production of environmental benefits. Forest product consumers (pulp producers, 
fuelwood users, etc.) obviously produce pollution whereas the actual extraction process 
on site, using appropriate forest practices, may have negligible direct impact (on soil 
erosion, stream siltation, etc.). There will, nevertheless, be a loss of environmental quality 
because of lost capacity to produce environmental benefits--trees, a positive externality. In 
this case reduced demand can have positive effects on the environment--fewer trees are 
harvested. Often, however, the ‘pollution’ source is considered within the forest itself and 
the loss of positive externality is often the issue that stirs controversy.  
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In considering the problems of dilution and displacement in forestry it is again useful to 
consider the controversial forest practice of clearcutting. In general a green tax on 
clearcutting, because it causes identifiable pollution and environmental loss, may in time 
deter clearcutting in a heavily taxed jurisdiction but encourage other forms of forest 
practices such as selection cutting to maintain production. This tax may very well reduce 
the direct pollution problems associated with clearcutting in the immediate area but 
simply displace production, pollution and environmental services loss to a broader forest 
region through dilution. The broader area needed for production will require increased 
forest roads and harvesters will incur extra extraction costs. The clearcutting problem may 
also be displaced to other jurisdictions that apply less punitive restrictions on clearcutting 
as in the recent migration of forestry activity from British Columbia to Alberta. In 
summary then, restrictions on clearcutting may be seen as a failure in pollution reduction 
because of dilution (spreading the cut over a wider area) and/or displacement (moving to 
other jurisdictions or changing its form). 
 
In pursuing remedies to the perceived pollution problem there is little or no agreement 
within the Nova Scotia’s forestry sector on what actually constitutes pollution (forest 
degradation). Concerning the broader environmental policy arena, Anderson notes that 
government rarely follows a rational process (from science to decision-making) in 
establishing pollution control.  
Rather, strategies of government intervention have been changed as a result of 
sudden catastrophes, when years of state failure have accumulated pollutants to the 
level where the balance of the environment has tipped. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the four basic means that governments have at their disposal in pollution 
control. This conceptualisation illustrates the problem of comparing forest practices and 
forest degradation with other forms of pollution. 
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Table 3.2: Environmental Management Strategies--principal types and 
examples (adapted from Anderson p18.). 
 
REMOVAL 
 
 
PREVENTION 
 
Dilution 
 
End-of-Pipe 
Strategies 
 
Cleaner Technologies 
 
Structural Changes 
 
Sewer Networks 
 
Sewer Treatment 
 
Water Recycling 
 
Dry Processes 
 
High-stack Policy 
 
Fluid-bed 
 
Energy Efficiency 
 
Demand Policy 
 
Waste Sites 
 
 
Incinerator 
 
Recycling 
 
Packaging Policy 
 
Forest Practices 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
 
As Anderson notes, the early phase of environmental policy (especially in the late sixties 
and early seventies) focused largely on the most obvious forms of pollution--the point 
sources of effluents. Then later in the eighties, attention was given to the more serious 
non-point, plural sources of pollution. In a sense, Nova Scotia’s forest conservation has 
had a similar but asynchronous development. Forest conservation legislation was in 
Colonial times first concerned with individual trees--the Broad Arrow Act. Then concern 
moved more to forest stands with the Small Tree Act and the Forest Improvement Act but 
concern remained largely with point sources. And more recently, attention has moved 
more broadly to three-dimensional concerns of larger ecosystems. As will be seen in this 
study, environmental quality per se is a relatively recent concern of forest conservation 
policy. Unlike early pollution abatement strategies most of Nova Scotia’s forest  
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conservation legislation focused on the prevention of woodfibre quality and quantity loss 
rather than was concerned with environmental degradation or reduced amenity. In 
comparison most forest policy (as opposed to legislation), especially that associated with 
subsidies, was concerned with ameliorating strategies after the damage was done using 
poor forest practices.  
 
In a similar vein, Anderson emphasises a point relevant in applying forest conservation 
legislation to Nova Scotia’s forestry sector. It is that “preventative policies are difficult to 
standardise”. He states: 
To prevent pollution requires detailed insight into the technologies of the various 
sectors of industries. Such insight has only rarely been available in the 
environmental administration, and it has been absent as well in considerable 
sectors of industry. 
 
Citing Majone, Anderson adds that the fundamental problem of acceptance with green 
taxes is that they must be accepted by the same political system that embraced command 
and control policies. They must also be implemented in a political system heavily 
influenced by those most likely to be adversely affected by such taxes. This is the point 
where the problem of forest practices is reduced to one largely of power: who has it and 
how is it wielded? This leads to the discussion of the theory of decision-making that 
follows in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: 
 Theoretical Foundations of Power and Decision-making. 
 
Given the complexities of natural resources management and the intricacies of the 
legislative and policy process, it is critical to grasp the way decisions are made in this 
management process. It is important to know, for instance, how the legislative framework 
impacts the decision-making process at various levels and conversely, how various 
resource management decisions impact the legislative process. To facilitate this process, 
this chapter overviews theory on power and decision-making. In conjunction with the 
theory on natural resources presented in Chapter Three, these theories are used throughout 
this study to help explain policy-making during the various eras of Nova Scotia’s forest 
conservation legislative process. 
 
 Decision-making Models: 
 
There are four prevalent theoretical models that help explain the decision-making process. 
Although they see decision-making quite differently, they can be usefully viewed as 
complementary rather than competing models. Two ‘rational’ models emphasise 
individual or ‘individual like’ decision-making; they contrast with the more discordant 
models of ‘organisational’ and ‘political bargaining’ decision-making (for a summary see 
Tables 4.1a & b and Appendix A1). 
 
The Basic Rational Decision-Making Model. 
 
The basic rational decision-making model implies key assumptions about the unit of 
analysis and factors that guide decision actor behaviour. McGrew and Wilson explain that 
“For a decision to be rational implies that it can be both explained and justified relating it 
to the objective of the decision maker”.1  
 
                                                 
1 McGrew, Anthony G. and M.J. Wilson, eds. Decision-Making: Approaches and 
Analysis, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, 7. 
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For an individual resource manager this implies that when faced with a problem, the 
manager ranks his/her objectives and examines all possible means to achieve desired 
goals. The decision-making process either maximises outcomes or minimises the costs of 
failure. In practice, this model’s greatest weakness is its implied assumption that a 
collection of individuals, whether a group, organisation, government, or a set of inter-
relating agencies make decisions in much the same way that an individual does. The 
rational model simply redefines the collective process as a monolithic and coherent entity 
with a single, individual consciousness. It assumes that individuals share common 
motivations, use similar methods of analysis, have similar goal setting procedures, and 
invoke similar methods of implementation. Decisions tend to be explained as a unified 
conscious choice to attain a single calculated objective.2  
 
This basic rational model is fundamentally a normative model and often is advocated as 
the process of choice for management decision-making. The evidence from the 
descriptive literature, however, paints a rather different picture from that found in many 
business management textbooks. This evidence argues that such an idealised process is 
impossible to achieve in practice, and is most obvious when decisions are more complex 
than simple routines. In Nova Scotia’s forest conservation policy arena, for example, the 
decision-making process is highly complex involving a broad array of actors, agencies, 
and decision influences. In such circumstances rational decision-making is rare, and as 
will be seen, the following decision models have greater currency for Nova Scotia’s forest 
conservation policy situation. 
  
The Procedural Rationality Models: 
 
Because the basic rational model tends to idealise decision-making, the scientific 
literature has explored more descriptive models. Simon, Lindblom, and others, for 
example, conducted an extended debate in the scientific literature concerning the nature of 
actual policy decision-making.3 4 5 While they substantially concurred on the nature of      
                                                 
2 McGrew and Wilson, 8. 
3 Simon, H.A. Administrative Behaviour. N.Y.: MacMillan, 1947. 
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actual decision-making practice they differed on ways decisions ought to be made. In 
general they stressed that decision-makers’ skills, technical knowledge, and habitual 
modes of thought bound rationality. They emphasised that goals were dynamic and set 
subjectively based on values, experience, and knowledge. Simon emphasised that goals 
and expectations were lowered with policy experience, while Lindblom stressed that 
policy makers simply muddled through. 
 
While the idealised rational model suggests a whole host of possible solutions should be 
considered in formulating a decision, procedural rationality models stress that only a 
narrow range of options are ever considered. Policy alternatives are limited by the 
decision-maker’s training, areas of interest, and conventional modes of operation. 
Bounded rational models on the other hand reflect more accurately the actual policy 
decision-making context. For example, risk is avoided if possible throughout the decision 
process and potential consequences are ignored or underestimated. Typically politicians 
advocate incremental changes to present practice while professionals rely on established 
codes of conduct and rules of thumb. Each, however, seeks compromise to limit the type 
of solutions implemented. In resource management such limiting behaviour tends to 
favour physical solutions to most social problems. Decision-makers less frequently 
consider behavioural change as a possible policy option. Decision-making practice 
suggests that limited effort be made to find the best solution. It is more often confined to 
selecting a solution that will do--in essence—‘satisficing’.6 
 
Organisational Models: 
 
The organisational models infer profound differences in individual and collective 
decision-making behaviour. Unlike the rational models there is no implied assumption 
that a group acts as a ‘super’ individual capable of greater information handling and 
                                      
4 Simon, H.A. A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics Feb. 1955, 69. 
5 Lindblom, C.E. The Science of “Muddling Through”. Public Administration 
Review, 19, 1959, 79-99. 
6 Rees, Judith A. Natural Resources: Allocation, Economics and Policy. London: 
Methuen Press, 1985, 387. 
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calculation than an individual acting alone. There is neither an implication of a single set 
of goals, or agreed upon priorities and procedural means. Rather, the decision process is 
conceptualised as an aggregate of disjointed actions dispersed unevenly throughout the 
organisation. The organisational models stress that within a group, different processes and 
influences come into play. These processes lead to substantially different decisions and 
very different results from those made by individuals. Because groups within 
organisations or between organisations deal with society’s most important issues, it is 
vital to distinguish between the way individuals and groups, different individuals within 
groups, and different groups within different sectors make decisions. As group complexity 
increases, either through size or administrative intricacy, it is increasingly problematic to 
assume that sub-units will share priorities or agreed methods. Organisational officers, for 
example: senior managers, field supervisors, and ground level workers tend to value more 
personal goals such as security, professional status, recognition, and professional 
networking as well as personal risk avoidance above organisational goals. These personal 
motivations interfere with and shape organisational decisions. To complicate matters 
further bureaucracies rarely officially recognise such decision-making influences even 
though agency members know consciously or subconsciously of their importance. From 
an analytical perspective it is important to recognise the capacity of individuals to control, 
manage, suppress, and otherwise distort decision-making processes within an 
organisation. 
 
Political Bargaining Models: 
 
Both the rational and organisational models neglect the impact of political bargaining 
with its own implicit rules on the decision process. This process gives rise to political 
bargaining models. Political bargaining outcomes are determined by the relative policy 
resources applied by each individual unit to the achievement of some ‘individually 
satisfactory’ solution. Although individuals or separate decision-making units may define 
their position in the policy process by some rational calculation or by organisational 
criteria, the decision in fact rarely utilises the most advantageous methods and procedures 
to reach policy objectives. The final outcome of a collective decision is dependent on the 
interplay of power and what amounts to a politically viable solution. The underlying 
principle of the political bargaining decision process, whether concerned with individuals, 
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groups, organisations, or nations is that each has self-defined interests to protect. 
Bargaining continues at all levels for as long as possible to ensure that individual or unit 
interests are least compromised by the final decision. The major forces acting on the 
decision process and its final outcome are the underlying informal structure of power, the 
resources that individuals are willing to devote to the issue and the negotiating skills that 
each bargainer possesses. The potency of each is contingent upon the identification of 
‘key issues’ and a general process of trade-offs between participants. Political bargaining, 
once the analysis is broadened beyond the scope of the individual or isolated decision, 
rarely is rational nor does it appear to follow established routines.7 Bargaining clearly 
adds a new dimension to the decision process placing considerable emphasis on 
individuals within an organisation or unit and the informal power that an individual or 
unit holds. Because of this continued bargaining process, all manner of distortions can be 
expected to affect a decision throughout its life which frequently leads to concerns about 
policy or decision-making consistency. Substantial inconsistencies can be expected even 
with decisions in relatively small organisations and seemingly straightforward policy 
areas. 
 
Multi-agency Decision-Making. 
 
Notwithstanding this intra-organisational complexity, the distortions found within 
organisations seem minor compared to those where decisions flow across organisational 
boundaries. This is especially so in multi-agency policy environments such as those in 
Nova Scotia’s forestry sector. The relative autonomy or interdependency that one agency 
holds in relation to others has considerable bearing on the nature of the decision-making 
process (see table 4.2).8 While none of the foregoing models explicitly preclude multi-
agency decision-making as a context for policy development, each on its own fails to 
adequately explain its complexity. 
 
There are few multi-agency decision-making models in the scientific literature, although 
                                                 
7 McGrew and Wilson, 7. 
8 O'Toole, Lawrence J. and Robert S. Montjoy. Interorganisational Policy 
Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective. Public Administration Review, Nov/Dec 
1984, 491-503. 
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in the late eighties-early nineties the strategic planning literature paid greater attention to 
this decision-making situation. Bozeman and Straussman, for example, provide an 
overview of factors affecting inter-organisational management processes.9 They first focus 
on ‘alternative inter-organisational relations’ by examining the impacts of competition, 
coercion, collusion, and co-operation. They also look at ‘barriers to effective inter-
organisational relations’ and examine the concepts of resource allocation, mission conflict 
and ambiguity, sectoral differences in inter-dependence as well as political obstacles to 
co-ordination such as partisanship. They also consider the management tensions among 
political executives and civil servants, legal and constitutional barriers to effective policy, 
and the impact of statutory restrictions. They offer possible strategies to address these 
management difficulties. They consider the advantages of ‘creative collusion’, the 
principles of ‘comparative advantage’, ‘creative turf defence’, the ‘paradox of 
dependency’, and conceptualising the ‘payoff matrix’. As prescriptive guidelines they 
suggest mapping the inter-organisational environment, evaluating the need for co-
ordination across organisations, creating linkages with the most compatible network 
partners, providing adequate support for joint ventures, working for quick tangible results, 
anticipating negative co-ordination side effects, and recognising limits to co-ordination. 
 
A more in-depth review of the multi-agency milieu is given by Mandell, 1989.10 She 
emphasises that 
the idea of having to manage within a network of organisations means that 
managers must be able to deal with the patterns of interactions within an entire set 
of organisations. Strategic management under such circumstances requires the 
ability to manage interdependencies so that both the goals of the individual 
organisation and the goals of the network as a whole can be achieved.11 
                                                 
9 Bozeman, Barry and Jeffrey D. Straussman. Public Management Strategies: 
Guidelines for Managerial Effectiveness.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991. 
10 Mandell, Myrna P. Organisational Networking: Collective Organisational 
Strategies. In Jack Rabin, Gerald J. Miller and W. Bartley Hildreth, Eds., Handbook of 
Strategic Management. Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, 1989, 141-165. 
11 Mandell, 142. 
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Table 4.2: The Multi-agency Analytical Framework 
 
Multi-agency 
Component: 
 
Component Description: 
 
Agency Character: 
 
Concerns an agency’s internal workings and its impact on the outside 
world. This includes autonomy, goal centrality, authority, internal 
decision style, resource control, and managerial style. The multi-
agency context is concerned with the aggregate impact of constituent 
agencies and organisations. 
 
Agency 
inter-relations. 
 
Involves the dynamics between two or more agencies. Associated 
variables include information management and communications, 
relationship propriety, delegation, co-option, corporatism, agency 
capture, relationship stage, resource flow, and communication patterns. 
 
Multi-agency Ecology. 
 
Concerned with the broader policy environment, especially how 
agencies inter-relate in a complex resource management sector. This 
includes field complexity--the quantity and the diversity of agencies 
involved; programme and policy complexity; and the sector’s dominant 
ideology, traditions, and policy inertia. 
 
External and 
Environmental Factors. 
 
These influences include myriad pre-conditioning factors and ex post 
changes, especially political changes, paradigm shifts, and natural 
resource transformations impacting policy workings. 
 
In reviewing the multi-agency literature Mandell quotes Van de Ven et al who describe 
three basic analytical perspectives.12 First the management environment is treated as an 
external constraint where an “organisation is seen as a largely autonomous entity needing 
to manage relations with external contingencies.” At the second level, the management 
environment is seen as a “collection of interacting organisations, groups, and persons.” 
The analysis is centred on a focal organisation and all interactive analyses are referred to 
that agency. At the third level, the multi-agency environment is viewed broadly as a social 
system: 
                                                 
12 Van de Ven, A.H., D.C. Emmett, and R. Koenig Jr. Framework for 
InterOrganisational Analysis, Organisational Theory and InterOrganisational Analysis. 
In A.R. Negandi, ed., Comparitive Administration Research Institute, Kent State 
University, Ohio, 1973, 19-38, cited in Mandell, 141.  
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Studies at this level focus on behaviour ‘within and among’ collectives of 
organisations functioning as social systems within the aggregate environment. At 
this level there is a shift away from ‘relationships between agencies’ to 
‘relationships among agencies’.13 
 
This third approach is most useful in examining Nova Scotia’s forestry sector. It treats the 
Department of Natural Resources as one of several key agencies and sub-sectors in the 
policy development process. In Nova Scotia, conservation legislative and policy decisions 
must be implemented if not always formulated through a myriad of diverse and interacting 
agencies. This creates a policy decision complex with unique characteristics and policy 
processes. Although the Nova Scotia provincial government ostensibly has sovereign 
power over forest resources management, in reality power is devolved unevenly among 
landowners, forest operators, wood product processors, forest users and the government. 
Market dynamics dominate much of the decision milieu and form an important aspect of 
Nova Scotia’s forestry multi-agency decision-making environment. Government 
apparatus responds reactively to market and other external political pressures. This 
process is consistent with the notion of state failure explained in Chapter Three. The 
extent to which decisions can or even appear to be rational as implied in rational decision-
making models is highly problematic within this multi-agency environment. The amount 
to which individuals or individual agencies, with the possible exception of the large 
multinationals can control the policy process as implied in the organisational decision-
making models, is quite insubstantial. Similarly, bargaining processes as emphasised in 
basic political bargaining models are often muted in the complexities of the multi-agency 
decision-making apparatus. This complexity renders decision-making in Nova Scotia’s 
forest sector particularly problematic. Identifiable patterns of decision-making and ground 
level influence by government are often blurred and appear in broad analysis to have little 
goal-oriented direction. From the broader analytical perspective however, there are 
overarching processes that help define the policy process. The following section considers 
three macro theories of decision-making and power. Each is scrutinised here for its 
usefulness in analysing the multi-agency decision-making and forest conservation policy 
environment found in Nova Scotia. 
 
                                                 
13 Mandell, 143. 
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 Power and the Decision-making Process. 
 
Earlier in the chapter decision-making was viewed from the perspective of a 
normative/rational model and three largely complementary descriptive models: the 
procedural-rational, organisational, and political bargaining models. Political scientists 
have however, considered decision-making from a more ‘macro-oriented’ perspective that 
takes account of the way power impacts the broader policy process. While early policy 
studies focused on legislative and regulatory content to explain the decision process, their 
general failure to account for informal power and implementation distortions led to the 
emergence of several competing theories of power and influence. There are three 
fundamental groups of theories: the pluralist, elitist, and structuralist theories of power 
(see table 4.3 and appendix A2). 
 
Pluralism as advocated by Dahl and others postulates power as a subjective preference.14 
15 16 It assumes that individuals, groups, and social movements have the capacity to shape 
the policy process by gaining access to decision-making apparatus through open and 
responsive policy mechanisms. Elitism while recognising subjective interests, concedes 
that real power is concentrated among powerful groups in society.17 The power of elites, 
‘elitists’ argue, derives from superior resources such as economic wealth and class 
position. Elites gain special access to government’s decision-making apparatus by using 
their superior policy resources. In exerting power they often claim to represent the broader 
interests of society although this is rarely justified by case evidence. They are usually 
over-represented in the middle and upper classes and are generally unable or unwilling to 
act on behalf of the under-classes. 
                                                 
14 Dahl, Robert A. Modern Political Analysis, 4th. ed. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 
1984. 
15 Polsby, Nelson. Community Power and Political Theory. Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1980. 
16 McFarland, Andrew S. Power and Leadership in Pluralists Systems. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1969. 
17 Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1959. 
  
83 
 
Structuralism views power and influence from a rather different perspective. 
Structuralism is not only a descriptive theory, explaining how power impacts the decision 
process, it is also prescriptive: it implores decision-makers to pay attention to the 
objective and inequitable outcomes of the policy process.18 Structuralists appeal to 
decision-makers to make policy adjustments to ensure the under-classes receive their fair 
share of policy benefits. Structuralism, both as a theory and a prescription is concerned 
with how various ruling class interests serve themselves by exploiting available policy 
machinery. Structuralism is especially interested in the way power percolates through the 
capitalists’ system from international, national, regional, and local political economies to 
ensure that society’s most powerful receive more than their ‘reasonable’ share of public 
policy outcomes. 
 
Assessing decision-making processes from a multiple theoretical perspectives provides 
augmenting rather competing explanations of power. This approach promoted by Blowers 
in the early eighties in his analysis of air quality problems created by the London Brick 
Company,19 contends that single analytical perspectives used in earlier studies were based 
on rather narrow and value laden analytical positions. As a consequence Blowers argued 
that the resultant interpretations failed to recognise important aspects of the policy 
decision-making process. He maintained that a multi-theoretical approach treats these 
theories as more or less complementary views of the policy process. They provide a 
‘more’ neutral perspective and perceptive view of the policy process than any single 
theoretical analysis can provide. 
 
As a multifaceted technique Blowers’ analytical approach teases out policy dynamics that 
otherwise might be left obscure or hidden. Despite this analytical advance, Blowers’ study 
anchored his investigation on a succession of rather isolated policy events that tended to 
under-explain various shifts in policy influence over time. This study consequently puts 
greater emphasis on transitional policy phases and processes continually relating the 
                                                 
18 Sandbach, F. Environment, Ideology and Policy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, 135. 
19 Blowers, Andrew. Something in the Air: Corporate Power and the 
Environment. London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984, 8-9. 
  
84 
Table 4.3: Dominant Macro-Theories of Power: a Comparison. 
 
 
 
Pluralism 
 
Elitism 
 
Structuralism 
 
Dominant 
Assumptions & 
Concerns 
 
Broad access to policy 
decision-making. 
 
Concentrated power, 
Non-representative 
leadership. 
 
Class interests, 
capital & power 
links.  
 
Focus and 
Character 
 
Observable events, 
concrete decisions. 
 
Limited input, 
disproportionate elite 
control & continuity 
of power. 
 
Objective needs and 
outcomes. 
 
Socio-political 
Dynamics 
 
Political mediation of 
aggregated interests. 
 
Non-visible key 
issues, bias by d.m. 
rules, safe visible 
policies. 
 
Class power, 
influence of capital, 
limited local 
influence. 
 
Nature of Power 
 
Shared among an 
interested and 
involved community. 
 
Usually brokered 
behind closed doors. 
 
Class rather than 
expressed interests-- 
outcomes 
concealed. 
 
Functional 
Underpinnings of 
Political Style 
 
Identifiable 
preferences, active 
participation, 
representational & 
responsive. 
 
Favours already 
powerful, able to 
withstand challenges 
by controlling rules. 
 
Neo-Marxism, the 
autonomous state & 
intertwined political 
economy. 
 
Political 
Strategies 
 
Responsive 
administration, open 
& democratic 
decision-making. 
 
Prevention/ 
suppression of issues 
and corporatism. 
 
Business defines 
overt & covert 
agendas, capital 
benefits 
disproportionately. 
 
Policy Outcomes 
& Conclusions 
 
Power is diffuse, 
relative equality, no 
lasting bias.  
 
Influence beyond 
public arena--a 
compromise of elites. 
 
Preferences change, 
obscure & 
imperfectly 
communicated-- 
need for 
prescription. 
 
Theoretical 
Limitations 
 
Skirts disproportionate 
distribution of power, 
ignores non-decisions. 
 
Non-decisions are 
latent issues that 
eventually arouse 
public interest. 
 
If business is all-
powerful, then its 
effects should be 
easily discernible. 
 
Research 
Strategies 
 
Documents explicit 
decisions of the state--
identifies winners & 
losers. 
 
Conceptual dilemma: 
objective needs vs. 
subjective preferences. 
  
 
Documenting the 
role of capital in 
social policy. 
 
evidence to continuing fluxes in policy conditions. The major advantage in this study’s 
approach is that power is explained both as reflecting changing policy and environmental 
conditions, and is an agent of change. 
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Idioms of Analysis. 
 
According to Weale the literature on power and decision-making has been applied in 
many ways in resource management over the past couple of decades.20 He suggests that 
these approaches fall into four general groups of inquiry that he calls ‘idioms of analysis’; 
each idiom provides a rather broad-brush view of the resource management policy 
process. In applying these idioms generally Weale notes that 
We cannot hope to understand these changes [policy developments] in their full 
detail, so we shall inevitably have to simplify the story and abstract from this 
complexity. … An idiom is a way of speaking, comprising a set of terms 
structured into various patterns of relationships. … Idioms provide a way of 
talking about, and therefore understanding political processes, but there is no 
assumption in referring to an idiom that its component parts are particularly tight 
or elaborate.21 
 
While Weale suggests that “there is no perfect fit between the account given by an idiom 
and our observations of how policy is in practice made”,22 they are, nevertheless, useful 
ways of viewing the policy world. They are used in this study as complementary 
approaches to analysis drawn from more detailed micro and meso-analyses. 
 
Rational Choice-Public Choice Theory. 
 
The rational choice idiom can concern a range of individual entities from the individual 
actor to the individual firm, province, or nation. Consistent with the rational models of 
decision-making, this idiom of analysis assumes that each ‘individual’ has specific 
preferences and acts (essentially) rationally to optimize its own welfare while all other 
singular agents attempt to rationalize theirs. Fundamentally, an invisible hand that 
accounts for the outcomes of complex, aggregate dynamics explains interaction between 
agents. A rational choice is seen as the course of action that most efficiently allows an 
individual agent to attain its desired outcomes. Given this backdrop for rational choice 
decision-making, Weale explains further that two questions are typically posed 
concerning environmental protection policy. The first asks why there is a politics of 
pollution in the first place--why is it necessary to have the political system intervene in the 
                                                 
20 Weale, 1992. 
21 Weale, 37-38. 
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market to maintain environmental quality? The second question inquires that “given that 
there is a politics of pollution, why does it take the form that it does?”23 
 
To help explain the first question it is necessary to look at the hypothetical world of neo-
classical economics. In this largely hypothetical economy a Pareto optimum is achieved 
when market players reach an equilibrium where no additional trading makes any player 
better off. In real world markets, however, factors such as transaction costs and 
externalities hamper optimal conditions. While transaction costs refer to the costs of 
doing business, externalities are those byproducts of trading that create third party costs or 
benefits; for example, pollution or improved flowerbeds resulting from a neighbor’s 
beehives. Such externalities, because the benefits are not traded in the conventional 
marketplace lead to market failure. In environmental management the greatest concern is 
with the negative aspects of market failure. As Weale suggests, it is tempting to think that 
communities, for example, a group of small woodlot owners would rally to combat a 
common threat to amenity. But, according to Weale, “it is at this point that the 
characteristic logic of rational choice theory comes into play.”24 Combating pollution, say 
to improve forest practices to reduce stream siltation--a public good, gives rise to the 
‘free-rider’ effect. 
 
The free rider invokes the logic of the “prisoners’ dilemma” where separate strategies 
within a community of interest can lead to joint losses, or individual gains at the expense 
of neighbors, or mutual gains resulting from cost-incurring co-operation.25 Typically the 
free rider effect encourages some if not most to rely on neighbors to do the right thing by 
incurring the costs of pollution abatement. The problem is, as far as stopping stream 
siltation is concerned, that a critical mass of potential participants are unlikely to 
subscribe to cleanup measures thinking that enough others will do so to get the job done. 
Left to market forces then everyone is left to suffer from continued exposure to pollution 
because everyone is acting to rationalize their own costs. The likely prospect that a critical 
                                      
22 Weale, 60. 
23 Weale, 39. 
24 Weale, 41. 
25 Deutsch, M. Trust and Suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 265-279. 
Cited in Johnson, David W. and Johnson, Frank P. Joining Together: Group Theory and 
Group Skills. Allyn & Bacon. Needham Heights, Ma., 1997, 366. 
  
87 
mass cannot be persuaded to participate in pollution abatement--because they are acting 
rationally--provides the raison d'etre for a ‘politics of pollution’. Even when expected 
failure move some to seek state intervention, there is no assurance that these ‘movers’ 
will agree on an appropriate form of intervention. Such disunion leads to a discussion of  
‘public choice’ theory. 
 
According to Weale, the most natural way to pose the question of how seemingly rational 
agents would structure state intervention to correct market inadequacies is to “ask how we 
should expect rational agents to behave when they participate in policy-making processes 
in liberal democracies.” Weale considers the following groups: politicians, the citizenry, 
industry, environmental advocacy groups, and government bureaucrats. He suggests that 
no matter how altruistic politicians may be initially they tend to focus in the end on 
ensuring their own re-election.26 They are not generally interested in issues for their own 
sake but mostly as a means to win future votes. Politicians are, however, sensitive to 
public opinion but never commit fully to any one issue should the public change its mind. 
Consequently there is little utility for politicians in supporting one narrow set of issues 
such as the environment; they are more likely to find success in supporting “a package of 
policy measures”. 
 
Citizens too are less interested in environmental issues that have broad application and 
implications, much because of the free-rider effect. The benefits of energy expended by 
interested citizens on broad issues will be however, if successful, distributed broadly to 
include those who provided little if any support during the policy formulation stage. 
Lamentably for the typical citizen, there is little potential to influence broad national and 
international issues. It makes greater ‘rational’ sense at this level to take a ‘free ride’. In 
general then, citizens are more likely to become involved in environmental issues with a 
narrow, local interest that suggests a rewriting of the environmental adage of ‘thinking 
globally and acting locally’ to construct a more realistic maxim of ‘think locally and act 
locally’! 
 
Weale suggests that those most likely involved in the details of policy are producer groups 
                                                 
26 Weale, 42. 
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(industry) who are likely to be faced with increased costs and reduced profits as a result of 
strengthened environmental policy. Because they are fewer in number they are, according 
to Weale, less likely to experience collective opposition than the citizenry. Adam Smith 
summarized the firm’s motivations when he wrote that its interest is always different and 
regularly opposite that of the general public. He argued that for politicians to uncritically 
follow the will of the firm results in “an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow citizens”. 
Smith cautioned that any recommendation forthcoming from industry should be 
scrupulously and suspiciously examined!27  
 
Weale continues to explain that other interest groups, for example, environmental 
advocates, also suffer from the free rider effect; and as a general rule have far less 
capacity to influence the policy process directly. Frequently they depend on highly 
motivated individuals, and as Weale refers to them, political entrepreneurs who seek out 
vote producing issues. Consistent with the model of organisational processes, the final 
group, bureaucrats and public officials, are motivated most by a need to protect their 
territory and expand it. They do this in the pursuit of status and salary, and not as it might 
be hoped by the heavily taxed polity, in the pursuit of cost-effective policy. Weale argues 
that typically bureaucrats are assumed to raise the size of bureaucracy above a social 
optimum but this of late seems less relevant. Many western democracies including the 
Canadian and Nova Scotian governments have substantially reduced their bureaucracies 
over the past five years or so in the interests of efficiency. 
 
According to Weale these rational motivations of various actor groups coalesce into a 
more or less general account of the politics of pollution. This politic concerns agenda 
formation, policy development, and policy implementation. The agenda depends upon 
some interdependence between public preferences and political opportunities available. 
Within the rational choice idiom it can be expected that environmental issues will have 
relatively low salience for the general electorate.28 At the policy formulation stage the 
range of actors change and with it, their basic motivations. Here rational choice typically 
infers that policy choice will be heavily symbolic rather than focussed necessarily on 
important issues--little account will be taken of social opportunity costs that can avoid 
                                                 
27 Cited in Weale, 44. 
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“perverse or counterproductive effects”. In policy implementation “firms have an 
incentive to resist profit reduction” and will pursue a course that minimises individual 
loss within the limits of policy design.”29 
 
Social Systems Idiom. 
 
A second broad view of the policy process is the social systems idiom. This approach sees 
the complex interaction of policy forces from various subsystem perspectives; the most 
obvious of which are the economic subsystem, the political/administrative subsystem, and 
the normative or civic subsystem. This second idiom of analysis then examines the 
interrelationships of various systems as they impact the policy decision process. Weale 
asserts that in a democracy the political system must continuously relate to the normative 
claims of society in order to achieve or maintain legitimacy. Another of its major 
functions is to manage public expenditures. Here it must balance the public’s demand for 
economic and social security with the seemingly contradictory public expectation to bridle 
tax expenditures. A third function is to regulate or guide the market. As is seeks to do this 
however, there is the recurring problem of over-regulation as the political system attempts 
to exert its influence over economic agents. The crucial challenge for the political system 
however, as seen by the systems approach, is concerned with the fundamental origin of 
environmental problems. The main source of these problems “is to be found in the 
contradiction between the private ownership of the means of production and the social 
nature of production.” This incongruity pits the needs of capital against social needs 
where typically the needs of capital dominate. 
 
In the political system’s function of managing the environment, it must continually deal 
with the problem of private actors: householders, manufacturers, travelers, etc., 
‘expropriating’ common goods such as clean air and water for their own private purposes. 
A second problem stems from a tendency for economic agents to transfer what is 
essentially a political decision to one of technical rationality. In attempting both to serve 
capital and to maintain political legitimacy, governments typically fall in line with 
economic agents to redefine and present problems of political values as one of technical 
                                      
28 Weale, 45. 
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rationality. This is most clearly seen in this study in the Forest Improvement Act’s 
implementation process. As will be seen, the policy actors’ continually sought ‘scientific 
measures’ to solve the forest conservation problem when the conservation problem could 
best be defined as a political issue--a problem of conflicting political values rather than 
clashing scientific theories. 
An important perspective of the systems idiom is its window on industrial/government 
relations. Frequently it identifies close links between industry and government that tend to 
shield key environmental issues from public scrutiny. These links influence the programs 
designed to combat environmental degradation: the state invariable selects subsidies over 
polluter pay strategies. If as Weale explains, the state by chance selects strong legislation, 
as might be presumed in the 1965 FIA, then implementation will be predictably weak. A 
second key feature is that environmental representatives are regularly marginalised in 
setting environmental standards. This study illustrates this as a recurring feature in Nova 
Scotia’s forest conservation policy history. This theme was also interestingly most 
symbolic in the recent attempt by the forest industry, aided by the provincial government, 
to make an ‘end run’ around environmental interests in 1996. Their goal, in this latter 
case, was to codify weak conservation practices in the hope of placating foreign markets. 
Despite this failure to shape government policy in this instance, Weale contends that the 
fundamental conclusion of this neo-Marxists’ analysis remains which is that any attempt 
to environmentally regulate will be bounded by the influence and power in the prevailing 
political economy.30 
The Idiom of Institutions: 
Whereas the rational choice analysis focuses on individuals and is concerned with their 
interactions, and the systems approach first takes a broad view of the whole social system 
and then examines its interrelated components; the institutional analysis provides an 
intermediate level of analysis. According to Weale institutions are present in the two 
aforementioned analyses but appear “obliquely”. For rational choice theorists institutions 
are seen as ‘aggregated preferences’, they serve to constrain the behavioural options 
available to office seekers (politicians), bureaucrats, and industry. From the systems 
                                      
29 Weale, 46. 
30 Weale, 51. 
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perspective, institutions are seen as the component parts of a broader set of 
interrelationships. Their significance is explained by their role in that wider political 
system. In the case of Nova Scotia’s forest management, land ownership may be seen as 
an overarching institution while small woodlot owners, multinationals, commercial 
owners and the Crown may be seen as lower order institutions with their own dominant 
set of roles and preferences. A glaring omission using other modes of analysis, according 
to institutional analysts, is that institutional “motivational characteristics assert an 
independent role on the nature and form of public policy.” In its broader sense then an 
institution is “a system of rules governing electoral practices, the practices of investment 
and market exchange, regimes of international cooperation governing the use of 
resources”.31 In the Nova Scotia forestry context this can be seen as rules governing the 
policy development process, the mechanisms by which constituent institutions exchange 
political and market resources, and the ways that they cooperate or co-exist to impact the 
use of forest resources. 
Young (cited by Weale) emphasises “that institutions should be distinguished from 
organisations that ‘are material entities’.” Those favouring the institution approach argue 
that “public policies need to be understood in the light of the specific configuration of 
institutions and organisations that exist within the political system.” Some institutions, as 
the argument goes, create conditions that lead to one type of policy configuration while 
another pattern of institutions leads to others. The case is made in this study that the 
particular configuration of land management and its associated capital and political-
economic influence created a policy environment where both policy makers and policy 
influencers were circumspect. They were always mindful of the capitalists’ potential (the 
multinational institution) to flee ‘over-regulated’ policy conditions at the expense of 
socioeconomic disruption. The multi-agency analysis outlined earlier in this chapter 
mimics much of the thrust of this institutional idiom but maintains a greater emphasis on 
the interactions of component actors, agencies, organisations and sub-sectors. 
The Idiom of Policy Discourse. 
The discourse idiom views the policy world quite differently from the push and pull of 
key policy actors, institutions, or systems. Without dismissing the analytical approaches 
                                                 
31 Weale, 52. 
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of the forgoing idioms, policy discourse focuses its explanation of the policy process on 
the cognitive developments, key understandings, or social learning that leads to new or 
different approaches to problem solving. Within discourse theory there will be policy 
actors with different points of view but their motivations will centre on beliefs rather than 
self-interests. In this sense we see policy solutions explained best by the dominant beliefs 
systems of the era. Neo-classical theory, for example, dominated economic policy 
between the two wars. In environmental management end-of-pipe strategies guided late 
sixties policy. In contrast more integrated approaches were used in the late eighties; and 
now in the late-nineties, ecosystem approaches begin to influence forest policy and land 
management largely because, as this idiom would suggest, of a better understanding of the 
importance of biodiversity and global pollution processes. Why policy discourse theory 
may be more amenable in environmental theory in general is because of the field’s heavy 
reliance on science to explicate key policy conditions. Weale32 explains for example, that 
good science was required to understand the effects of acid precipitation in Northern 
Europe, it was not necessarily explainable by rational choice, social systems or 
institutions. And as will be seen later in this study, understanding the migration of the 
spruce budworm in Nova Scotia challenged the efficacy of a ‘natural’ budworm control 
policy. But in addition, the science that documented the incomplete eradication of the 
budworm from chemical spraying also brought into question that policy’s validity. 
 
The danger of an idiomatic approach to analysis, whether one mode is explored or 
whether a number are integrated, is that the case study evidence when broadly interpreted 
can be ‘forced’ to fit the model rather than allow that data speak for itself (see Chapter 
Five). Even in combination with the decision-models and the macro-theoretical 
approaches to power outlined in the beginning of this chapter, the idiom approach under-
represents the nuances of the complex interactions between policy, the policy phases, and 
the policy sector. These, as will be seen in the subsequent chapters, are critical in 
understanding the policy process. In general, these postulates fail to provide the firm 
anchors upon which this study’s data, analysis and methodology can be built. This 
idiomatic approach to analysis is seen, however, as a useful way to draw the conclusions 
of this study together. The remainder of this chapter describes in some detail various 
                                                 
32 Weale, 60. 
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approaches to policy analysis that in the end, form the main theoretical and procedural 
structure of this study. 
 
The Policy Process: 
 
Having discussed at some length the decision-making process and various mechanisms of 
power, it is useful to focus attention on the very nature of policy itself. Kruger and 
Mitchell integrate three dimensions of natural resource policy analysis (see figure 4.1).33 
They recommend an examination of relevant biophysical and socio-economic factors. 
They also focus on the interplay of local, regional, national, international, and global 
influences and an examination of changing policy influences over time. O’Riordan takes a 
complementary tact that highlights three crucial policy components that is largely 
consistent with the institutional idiom of analysis previously outlined (see figure 4.2). 
First, O’Riordan emphasises policy actor personalities and their various interactions. He 
points to the way key actors conceptualise the management problem, especially how they 
deal with integrative complexity and external pressures. Second, he emphasises the 
importance of the institutional environment including resource management goals, 
institutional norms, and mandates and institutional strategies for dealing with inevitable 
policy inconsistencies. Third, he emphasises the necessity of understanding basic 
renewable resource and environmental issues. In his discussion he highlights 
measurement problems using different rules, and indeterminacy where issues are never 
fully resolved. He also stresses uncontrollable externalities as well as time and fiscal 
restraints. 
 
O’Riordan emphasises key resource management processes, his analytical approach tends 
to under-emphasise the long-term aspect of forest management issues. As it happens, the 
necessity of a long-term outlook to examine the problems of forest conservation was 
emphasised by several key actors in Nova Scotia’s forestry sector, 34 35 36 and is borne out 
                                                 
33 Cited in Mitchell, 6. 
34 Interview with Dave Dwyer, Forester and Secretary of the Provincial Forest 
Practices Improvement Board, Department of Lands and Forests, Wolfville, NS., March 
1986. 
35 Interview with W.I. Creighton: Deputy Minister of Lands and Forests, February 
1949 - March 1968. Halifax County, NS., August 1987. 
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by other documented evidence presented in this study.  Despite this limitation to 
O’Riordan’s model, it usefully frames the overall resource management process. It 
stresses the complex interactions of key actors, institutions and most importantly for this 
case study; it draws attention to the physical changes that occur with the resource over 
time that alters its valuation. 
 
Figure 4.1: Dimensions of Policy Analysis. 
 
Addressing this temporal weakness Rees proposes an analytical approach that focuses on 
the distinctiveness and inter-relatedness of various phases in the resource policy process. 
She identifies four key policy phases: policy as intended, policy as written, policy as 
interpreted, and policy as practised. Rees argues each perspective is critical to policy 
analysis. While her framework appropriately suggests a temporal outlook by drawing 
attention to transitional policy processes, her framework still downplays critical concerns 
for Nova Scotia’s forest conservation policy process. Rees for example, gives only 
                                      
36 Interview with Murray Prest, former Sawmill Owner and Present Land Owner, 
Middle Musquodoboit, NS. April 1986. 
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cursory attention to the gestation and reassessment policy phases that are important 
aspects of the FIA policy process; in Nova Scotia’s forest conservation policy process 
both incremental and iterative policy processes play a crucial role in policy development. 
 
Figure 4:2: Policy Interactions. 
 
Generally, the policy literature focuses on only a single legislative phase, for example, 
policy formulation or implementation. To adequately analyse the FIA policy process, 
however, a more comprehensive and flexible framework was necessary to reflect the 
profound shifts in this policy process over time. To accomplish this, useful components of 
a number of theoretical approaches were integrated into a composite framework. From the 
evidence amassed, four inter-connected policy phases were seen as critical constituents 
for analysis. These were policy gestation, policy design, policy implementation, and 
policy impact (see figure 4.3). To examine key aspects of the policy gestation phase a 
framework developed by Phoebe Hall et al. was found most useful. 
Actor 
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Figure 4.3: The Policy Cycle. 
 
This framework highlighted evidence for two competing policy agendas: forest 
conservation and industrial development. Although these agendas were claimed to be 
compatible, the evidence indicates that was never really the case. For legislative design 
insights, theoretical insights were borrowed from Maytnz. Her focus on policy form drew 
attention to questions concerning the FIA’s potential to address conservation problems. 
To focus on implementation, concepts largely taken from Rees were used. This overall 
approach merged two analytical processes. It considered various policy ‘phases’ in the 
context of critical policy ‘insights’ such as historical constraints, post-legislative changes, 
and evolving organisational influences. To build a satisfactory policy assessment 
framework several sources were used. Its most noteworthy aspect was that it altered the 
unit of analysis from a concentration on policy processes to a review of policy outcomes. 
 
Policy Gestation. 
 
Hall et al’s policy gestation process highlight two interrelated influences they call 
Policy
Gestation
Policy
Formulation
Policy
Implementation
Policy
Impact
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‘general’ and ‘characteristic’ factors.37 They contend that the general concerns of 
legitimacy, feasibility, and support are most frequently significant aspects of the policy 
gestation process. The characteristic variables, although often important and sometimes 
crucial to the policy gestation process, do not as regularly play a significant part. Hall et al 
explain that both sets of variables interact to determine a policy issue’s passage through 
the policy gestation process or decide its subsequent demise (see figure 4.4). 
 
Legitimacy refers to how policy actors and the politically potent public perceive an issue 
to be logical, reasonable, and fair. Feasibility depends on the current policy context. It 
reflects the aggregate pressures on policy decision-makers and the impact of technical 
knowledge supporting or refuting an issue. Support refers to the amount, type, and 
distribution of policy backing among key policy actors, organisations, and institutions. As 
a rule, for an issue to remain on the policy agenda it must have appropriate support, be 
considered feasible, and be perceived as a politically legitimate concern. The 
characteristic variables (association and scope, policy crisis, trend expectation and 
prevention, issue origin, policy information, and management ideology) have varying 
impact on an issue’s eventual fate according to its unique political and policy 
circumstances. Association refers to the individuals, agencies, and organisations identified 
with a policy initiative. Issue scope refers to how broadly an issue is defined that 
ultimately attracts support or opposition from various influential sources. A policy crisis 
can either be spontaneous as in an environmental catastrophe or engineered as in the 
OPEC oil embargoes. A crisis often affects the speed of adoption and the care with which 
policy or legislation is developed. Crises occurring in other policy areas also regularly 
affect non-related agenda items. In this case issues otherwise destined for adoption may 
be derailed temporarily or lost from the policy agenda forever. 
 
 
                                                 
37 Hall, P., H. Land, R. Parker and A. Webb. Change, Choice and Conflict in 
Social Policy. London: Heinemann, 1972, 505. 
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Figure 4.4: The Policy Gestation Process. 
 
Trend expectation and prevention highlights the policy maker’s need to juggle scarce 
resources in response to ever-changing priorities. The more the decision-maker sees an 
issue as an emerging and strengthening concern the more attention it will get. In making 
an assessment of importance policy makers tend to consider its source or origins. When 
issues emanate from respected institutions, powerful groups or respected individuals, they 
are more likely to get serious attention. If the proposed solutions fit the decision-maker’s 
basic ideological position, the chance of adoption is enhanced. Issue information provides 
a key dimension to the policy adoption process by supporting or refuting policy claims. 
Information in of itself is not value free. In fact the weighting given information is often 
due to its source rather than inherent merits. As discussed in Chapter Three management 
ideology plays an important but rather obscure role in the policy gestation process. It is 
often easier to identify its impact after the fact. Rarely during the gestation period itself is 
its influence obvious. 
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Policy Formulation. 
 
In discussing policy form Mayntz first focuses on the broad principles of legislative form. 
As background she points to the early laws in Western Civilisation that were based on 
Judeo-Christian traditions and later codified from existing social practices. This practice 
of legitimising present practice is especially relevant to the 1965 FIA because in contrast, 
this legislative version as written departed radically from previous legislative approaches. 
This policy appeared on the surface to wrestle the de facto control of forest practices from 
the industry’s established centres of power. This disruption of previously entrenched 
government and industry relations, as will be argued in later chapters, was pivotal in 
contributing to the FIA’s implementation problems and its eventual demise.  
 
Mayntz continues in her discussion of policy form by pointing out that as society becomes 
more complex, the state responds with increasingly sophisticated legislation and public 
policy. Consistent with the theories of market failure-state failure, she contends that the 
interface of the state and the private sector becomes increasingly complex making 
additional legislative intervention more tenuous. She draws special attention to the causal 
interdependencies of the state and the marketplace and the policy knock-on effects that 
become increasingly difficult to manage or predict. To exert influence on private sector 
behaviour Mayntz also argues that governments adopt a variety of policy models. These 
include regulatory norms, financial incentives, public provision, procedural regulation, 
and public information and education. Regulatory norms she explains govern participation 
in a policy sector or enforce conditions of conduct. Financial transfers and incentives are 
used to distribute wealth from one policy or geographical area to another. Public provision 
of goods and services is a third type of intervention while a fourth, procedural regulations, 
establish rules of play. Government, as Mayntz points out, is also able to play a significant 
role in changing public behaviour through information, persuasion, and education.  
 
In respect to the effectiveness of various legislative and policy interventions Mayntz notes 
five basic observations. First she argues that 
The effectiveness of a program depends to a large extent on the motivating, 
facilitating and structuring capacity of its provisions - not only with respect 
to target group behaviour but also with respect to the behaviour of 
implementing agents. 
  
100 
 
In this respect the various provisions of the ‘65 FIA inferred substantive changes in forest 
management behaviour. Second, Mayntz contends that “to change such behaviour one has 
to know the basic behavioural predisposition and reaction tendencies of the target group 
and the implementation agents.38 Third, she cautions against legislative meddling. She 
wonders whether contextual changes “over time, and independent of the specific 
problem(s) to be solved, justify or even necessitate changes in instrument choice and other 
aspects of design?39 Fourth, she implies that once legislation is in place, policy efforts are 
best directed to implementation rather than legislative tinkering. And finally, Mayntz 
argues that 
it seems indeed quite characteristic of many of today’s problems that their 
solution depends on the positive motivation and voluntary collaboration of 
the target population.40 
  
Policy Implementation. 
 
In grasping the central theme of this case study it is important to realise that the FIA 
policy process was as much about non-implementation as it was about implementation. 
This was largely the outcome of the interplay between continuously murky policy 
objectives and frequent legislative tinkering. Despite this irresolution, the FIA’s twenty-
four years of policy experience provides considerable insight into the practical problems 
facing the implementation of forest conservation policy. To better understand the process 
of implementation a second, more specific theoretical framework is borrowed from Rees. 
She recommends focussing on three distinct but inter-related policy implementation 
influences. The first, past performance, which Rees refers to as ‘pre-conditioning 
elements’ includes the impact of agency character, conventional operational methods, and 
degree of responsibility. The second, ‘internal factors’, refers to the policy processes that 
interplay during the implementation process. This includes an agency’s administrative 
character such as the degree of centralised and decentralised decision-making, its 
decision-making style, and its intervention forms. The third, external factors, Rees calls 
ex-post changes. These include the bio-physical variables that impact the resource and the 
                                                 
38 Mayntz, Renate. The Conditions of Effective Public Policy: a New Challenge 
for Policy Analysis. Policy and Politics, Vol. 11 No.2, 1983, 128-9. 
39 Maytnz, 129. 
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social, political, economic, technological factors that impinge more directly on the policy 
process (see figure 4.5).41 
 
Policy Impact. 
 
The continuous renewal process found with the FIA legislative process calls for an 
iterative policy assessment approach to be used rather than a single summative evaluation. 
Three dimensions need to be emphasised. First attention is paid to the policy’s ground 
level forestry impacts, the second measures specific outcomes on conservation and forest 
management, and the third assesses the influences on subsequent policy events and 
processes. Aucoin (1979) argues that public policy must “encompass the actual activities 
undertaken by a government, whether or not a government’s objectives and strategies are 
explicit or are congruent with its activities”.42 
 
For analysis of the FIA, Aucoin’s point draws attention not only to explicit policy 
behaviour but to hidden aspects and the more ambiguous as well as incompatible 
legislative processes that were characteristic of this legislation’s workings. To better 
understand the ground level impacts of forest conservation policy Carley (1980) also 
emphasises the importance of measuring both direct and indirect policy effects.43 To 
complement this, Crane (1982) also provides an assessment framework that stresses 
‘actual’ versus ‘intended’ outcomes that focus on the extent to which targeted populations 
are actually impacted by policy outcomes, the opportunity costs involved, and the actual 
benefits received.44 This assessment approach attempts, in a rudimentary but systematic 
way, to get to the core of the market failure-state failure problem by assessing both the 
impact of a policy and its value. Unfortunately, despite Aucoin’s contention that 
                                      
40 Mayntz, 138. 
41 Rees, 1985, 346-376. 
42 Aucoin, Peter. Public Policy Theory and Analysis. In: G. Bruce Doern and Peter 
Aucoin eds. Public Policy in Canada: Organisation, Process, and Management. 
MacMillan of Canada, Toronto, 1979, 1-26.  
43 Carley, Michael. Rational Techniques in Policy Analysis. London, Heinemann, 
1980. 
44 Crane, John A. The Evaluation of Social Policies. Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 
Boston, 1982. 
  
102 
 
Figure 4.5: The Policy Implementation Process. 
 
it is now increasingly accepted that our concept of public policy must also 
include the impacts which result from a government’s actions or from the 
lack of the same,45 
 
this study shows that there is little evidence to support the notion that government is or 
was at anytime effective in evaluating its own legislative programmes. 
                                                 
45 Aucoin, 1979, 1-26. 
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Chapter Five: 
Review of Methodology. 
 
Over the course of this study, methodology was adopted and adapted to meet the specific 
opportunities, requirements, and constraints of the research problem. The overall method 
used was an investigative strategy.1 This approach supplemented by methodological 
strategies advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967),2 Glaser (1976),3 Charmaz (1983),4 
Katz (1983)5 and Coffin and Newman (1996)6 continually evolved as new 
conceptualisations of the research problem, the case study, and the theoretical framework 
developed. In the early stages, this study was driven by an initial conception of Nova 
Scotia’s forest conservation problem as a rather straightforward land-use conflict pitting 
industrial interests against amenity values. As the study progressed and as evidence 
accumulated, its scope was broadened, its conceptual underpinnings were refined, and it’s 
various research questions, methodologies, and theoretical understandings were 
sharpened. In the end, this study reflects a rather complex analysis of two interlocking 
policy agendas: the first for forest conservation, the other for resource exploitation. 
 
 The Methodological Approach.  
 
This study developed much like a rolling snowball. First, a central question and core of 
information was developed, then succeeding layers were added. At times layers of data 
and analysis ‘fell away’ or were set aside as new points of interest were identified. As a 
clearer picture of the research problem emerged, it was possible to subject the data to 
                                                 
1 Douglas, Jack D. Investigative Social Research: Individual and Team Research. 
Volume 29, Sage Library of Social Research, Sage Publications; London, 1976. 
2 Glaser, Barney G and Anselm L. Strauss. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: 
Strategies for Qualitative Research. Aldine Publishing Co., New York, 1967. 
3 Glaser. Theoretical Sensitivity. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press, 1978.  
4 Charmaz, Kathy. The Grounded Theory Method: An Explication and 
Interpretation. In: Emerson, Robert M., Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of 
Readings. 109-126. Prospect Heights, Il: Waveland Press, 1983. 
5 Katz, Jack. A Theory of Qualitative Methodology: The Social System of Analytic 
Fieldwork. In Emerson, 1983. 
6 Coffin, Tom and David Newman. NFMA/RPA: ‘Bottom-up’ Versus ‘Top-down’ 
Power. Paper presented at The Sixth International Symposium on Society and Resource 
Management: Social Behaviour, Natural Resources, and the Environment. Pennsylvania  
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increasingly more rigorous theoretical examination. Interim analyses, although not 
necessarily reported in this study, proved to be essential steps in defining the final study 
questions as well as selecting the final theoretical framework and presentation format. 
 
Early research was geared towards identifying the essential nature of the forest 
management sector, developing a coherent theoretical context to assess forest 
management issues, and delimiting the study scope. Much of the background information 
provided in Chapter Two was the starting point for conceptualising this study’s research 
focus. This initial conception provided a basic understanding of the forests’ physical 
structure and spatial distribution, identification of key stakeholders and policy actors, and 
the basic values that drove forest use and consumption. What was lacking from this initial 
overview and what subsequently became this study’s central focus was a clear 
understanding of the underlying influences on forest conservation decision-making. To 
better appreciate policy workings in this area, a clearer picture was needed of how forest 
management actors and institutions as well as external and environmental factors shaped 
policy outcomes and ground level conservation practices. 
 
Douglas begins his book on Investigative Social Research by emphasising that “The goal 
of all social research is to discover, understand and communicate truth about human 
beings in society.” His work largely studied social settings in real time, infiltrating the 
social setting, acquiring direct field experience by gaining trust and opening up 
respondents or social setting actors by using friendly and trusting relations to get at 
reality. In Douglas’ case, evidence accumulated was crosschecked by verifying evidence 
with additional sources such as other field actors whenever possible. For the early phases 
of this study, direct field immersion was inappropriate. Initially this research project relied 
heavily on documented evidence and oral histories provided in semi-structured interviews 
with key policy actors. In the later stages of this study, however, a more direct, 
‘immersed’ form of investigation and data collection was possible. This later approach 
differed from Douglas’, however, in that field immersion was the result of invitations 
from the forest sector to become directly involved in policy forums and programme 
proposals. With these invitations there was both implicit and explicit recognition of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
State University, PA., 1996. 
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role of academics as policy analysts, process evaluators, facilitators of debate, and as 
developers of theoretical prescriptions. Douglas’ most important contributions to this 
study’s methodology, however, were the ideas of building and using a web of research 
contacts to continually construct an increasingly rich picture of the social phenomenon 
under examination; and the cautions provided regarding subconscious and self-deceptive 
experience.7 These cautions centred on misinformation, evasions, lies, and fronts. 
 
In some contrast to Douglas, Glaser and Strauss argue that methodology and the 
theoretical framework be developed in tandem to reflect the special circumstances of the 
research problem. This approach contrasts markedly from more formalised approaches 
relying on well-established routines and frameworks from the outset. These more formal 
approaches, as Glaser and Strauss argue, tend to force the data to ‘fit’ preconceived 
theoretical and methodological notions rather than let the case facts speak for themselves. 
Employing Glaser and Strauss’ research philosophy led to progressively more 
sophisticated research that reflected an increasingly defined study area, data collection 
process, and analytical strategy. This approach incrementally got to the root of a number 
of interesting policy issues concerning Nova Scotia’s forest conservation management. 
 
In Charmaz’ explication and interpretation of Glaser and Strauss’ “pioneering” book The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory, she argues that 
any researcher who claims to use the grounded theory approach endorses the 
following fundamental strategies. First, discovering and analysing social and 
social psychological processes structures inquiry. Second, data collection and 
analysis phases of research proceed simultaneously. Third, analytic processes 
prompt discovery and theory development rather than verification of pre-existing 
theories. Fourth, theoretical sampling refines, elaborates, and exhausts conceptual 
categories. And last, systematic application of grounded theory analytic methods 
progressively leads to more abstract analytical levels. 
 
This study’s methodology adhered closely to the first two precepts, but departed in 
significant ways from the last three. In this study there was a conscious effort to first 
ground theory from the evidence but when theoretical concepts emerged, there was a 
concerted effort to match these with established, published theories rather than try 
                                                 
7 Douglas, 207-210 and 83-106. 
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 ‘reinventing the wheel’. For example, the recognition that the conservation agenda was 
intricately tied and subservient to the forest production agenda was conceded after lengthy 
and extensive data collection and analysis. Once this was recognised, however, this 
theoretical notion slotted nicely into pre-developed--not preconceived--theoretical ideas 
such as that recorded by O’Riordan.8 This study lays claims to two novel theoretical 
conceptions. The first relates to ‘accumulative manifestations of power’, this builds on 
Blower’s notion of complementary theories of power (see Blowers, Chapter Four). The 
second relates to the notion of four inter-related components of multi-agency 
management. Even here, however, the published literature provided--sometime after this 
framework was first presented publicly9--a theoretical exposition of three of its most 
cogent elements (see Mandell, Chapter Four). 
 
The emphasis of Glaser and Strauss’ work on studying actors of similar occupation and 
role lends itself to the development of increasing ‘exhaustion of conceptual categories’ 
through expanded sampling. In a policy study such as this, however, the emphasis is on 
elaboration of the policy process to elicit greater understanding of that process rather than 
the development of theory for its own sake. Grounding theory is very much a means to an 
end rather than an end in itself. Although this study did, as in Charmaz’ fifth point, 
develop increasingly more abstract theory, the immediate goal of its development was to 
turn that theory back on the data to gain greater insights into the policy process. As relief 
from this methodological imprecision Katz suggests that evidentiary criticism directed to 
more loosely structured qualitative research methods and qualitative research in general is 
largely unfounded. He points mainly to criticism directed at representativeness, reactivity, 
reliability, and replicativeness. He argues, without wanting to demean quantitative 
methods, that quantitative methods have many of these same problems. He argues that 
their critical rebuttals are simply tied to statements of probability rather than claims of 
infallibility.10 
 
                                                 
8 O’Riordan, 1981, 20. 
9 Bissix, Glyn. Pre-workshop Readings #4: Multi-agency Strategic Planning for 
National Parks and State Outdoor Recreation Agencies. Workshop by Glyn Bissix and 
Lyle Davis for the US. National Parks Service and US. State Outdoor Recreation Planners 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, May 1990. 
10 Katz, 127. 
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In data analysis, this study focused mostly on identifying policy processes by combining 
oral histories from key actor interviews and from forest sector document analyses. Each 
interview was analysed for new data that enhanced the contextual picture and for insights 
into the policy development / decision-making processes. While memo writing--focusing 
on emerging theory grounded from the evidence--was done, greater emphasis was placed 
on writing ‘cameos’ or isolated pictures of particular policy events and their decision-
making dynamics. These were continually updated as new evidence was accumulated. As 
the study progressed so these cameos were integrated with one another to build an ever 
enriched and more comprehensive picture of the policy process. These broader pictures 
were then examined for new theoretical insights. 
 
As more and more layers of analysis were added and policy misconceptions peeled away, 
it became increasingly evident that a major bane of forest conservation management was a 
rather superficial articulation of forest conservation issues within the forest sector. This 
superficiality and ambiguity largely masked the impact of entrenched and disparate 
management ideologies. To help clear this haze, an increasingly comprehensive picture of 
Nova Scotia’s forest conservation problem was developed by progressively adding 
successive layers of evidence and analysis. In the early stages, an analysis of relevant 
forest management monographs and government documents was combined with an initial 
round of key-actor interviews. This developed a ‘basic feel’ for this policy area’s power 
and influence dynamics. From this preliminary overview an initial list of key issues was 
developed. 
 
In practice Glaser and Strauss recommend that preliminary analyses explore emerging 
areas of concern or interest that is followed by the testing of tentative hypotheses. At 
various junctures dead-end leads are redirected or eliminated. This accumulative and 
selective approach continually reformulates theoretical and empirical directions. As new 
data is amassed and conceptual innovations are developed, Glaser and Strauss advise they 
be woven into richer understandings of the policy process. Fresh or refreshed conceptual 
pictures of the policy process are then used to formulate new investigative directions. 
Although, as inferred above, some preliminary analyses are put aside, none are necessarily 
discarded permanently. Second thoughts on some data lead to re-analysis using more 
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refined analytical approaches.11 The resulting insights, whenever appropriate, are 
integrated into a revised policy picture. 
 
The initial research questions led to the preliminary round of investigation. This 
exploration included a cursory review of forest legislation, a survey of relevant 
Department of Lands and Forests circulars and publications, and the carrying out of six 
loosely structured key actor interviews. These initial interviews were conducted with 
forestry sector actors drawn from the private sector, recreation interests, and government. 
This early phase also included an overview of policy literature from resource management 
and other social science disciplines. In addition this initial analysis included popular press 
accounts of forestry issues. The research objective was to develop a chronology of 
significant forest policy events (see Appendix B), an inventory of significant document 
sources, and a list of key forest sector actors and institutions (see Appendix C). This phase 
also began the task of sifting through possible elements for a functional theoretical 
framework. 
 
It was during this first phase that the Forest Improvement Act emerged as a useful focus 
to examine decision-making and power. An initial overview of the various versions of the 
FIA, assorted departmental circulars and publications, and interviews highlighted the 
struggle in balancing industrial development objectives with workable forest conservation 
policy--that is, policy that would protect the forest resource for the foreseeable future and 
balance increasing expectations for enhanced environmental quality, recreation amenity, 
and economic wellbeing. In this early phase it became increasingly obvious that attacking 
the industrial installation / forest amenity issue directly presented several practical 
research problems. It became apparent from the interviews, for instance, that industrial 
actors considered the question of industrial versus amenity use as largely a non-issue--
they perceived no real conflict. This widespread perception or perhaps posturing created 
practical investigative challenges that made teasing out underlying policy issues difficult. 
Instead, for a number of reasons, the policy issues surrounding FIA implementation 
became the new focus. First, this legislation had on paper at least a mix of amenity, 
conservation, and forest fibre exploitation objectives. It was also widely perceived as a 
                                                 
11 Charmaz, 132. 
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source of conflict between industrialists and environmentalists; and despite being on the 
statute books for over twenty years it was never made to work at ground level. The FIA’s 
protracted policy workings also gave a fertile context to examine decision-making 
dynamics and power. 
 
This shift to the FIA also had practical research implications. When the focus of key actor 
interviews switched to the FIA policy process, interviews became less guarded. A more 
relaxed atmosphere was possible between interviewer and interviewee because a less 
confrontational approach was feasible. This investigative phase was guided by the central 
question of what the policy problems and issues were in implementing the Nova Scotia 
Forest Improvement Act. This focused attention more on FIA workings rather than the 
obviously ideological divisions surrounding forest exploitation and forest amenity. While 
this new approach again solved some problems it created at least one other. Several 
interview respondents in this second phase claimed the FIA was never implemented--they 
questioned why a study would be made of the FIA’s ‘implementation’ when in their 
minds it was never implemented. Although these respondents were partially correct, 
especially at ground level, this perception was not valid at the policy workings level. In 
fact several FIA provisions requiring regulatory definition were painstakingly pursued 
over decades.  
 
In response to this misperception or disagreement over the nature of the FIA’s workings, 
the study was again refocused to emphasise decision-making leading to ‘non-
implementation’ of the FIA. Later, the approach was once again revamped to 
accommodate a longer time frame and broader socioeconomic analysis. This latter 
approach was considered necessary by several key actors in the forestry sector to get to 
the root of Nova Scotia’s forest conservation issues. With an expanded document search 
encompassing a broader time frame and socio-economic scope, a further round of semi-
structured interviews was conducted. As new data was added and new insights emerged, 
the methodology and research questions were again refined in the way Glaser and Strauss 
advocated. Occasionally, reference to an issue in one document or interview led to re-
examination of previous interview data and / or documentation. These additional reviews 
sometimes led to further insights occasionally leading to new questions and the necessity 
for further data collection or clarification. 
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A major analytical challenge was viewing the evidence from the context of explicit as 
well as less conspicuous policy objectives. Some interview respondents, for example, 
claimed that the most compelling evidence leading to FIA adoption, legislative 
structuring, and subsequent implementation problems was the government’s essentially 
covert industrial expansion agenda. These individuals argued that the best evidence for 
FIA non-implementation was to be found in examining the policy influences behind 
industry growth prior to FIA enactment. Reflecting this, the scope of analysis was 
stretched to encompass the era of pulp sector expansion and its relationship to the 
workings of the Small Tree Act (1942-1965). Later, to better understand some of the 
nuances of the STA, it was necessary to delve into earlier forestry policy workings. As a 
result, the scope of analysis was broadened yet again to consider Nova Scotian forest 
conservation legislation and forestry development more generally.  
 
Broadening the area of study in this way not only extended the time frame for analysis but 
widened the socioeconomic focus. In widening the analytical approach and study scope, it 
was necessary to refocus decision-making analysis to include the impact of non-decisions 
and negative decisions as well as hidden agendas. In the end, to accommodate all this, a 
broad array of evidence from the private and public sectors was examined. This included 
departmental publications and records, legislative assembly records, newspaper accounts, 
and texts of various legislative enactments. This documented evidence was combined 
with over sixty key actor interviews and a number of case studies. These were examined 
in a generally iterative manner. 
 
The research interviews included active and past Department of Lands and Forests (now 
Natural Resources) ministers, deputy ministers, and senior and middle managers from the 
provincial government. They also included federal forestry officials and quasi-
governmental officers, including the chair of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Forestry (1984). In addition, senior managers from the woodlands division of 
multinational pulp companies as well as sawmill owners, woodland owners and operators, 
members of various forest improvement boards, and recreation, parks management, and 
amenity interests were interviewed. Their responses to semi-structured interviews 
provided an enriched database that supplemented documented sources and contemporary 
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conservation oriented case studies. Together they formed the evidential base for this 
study. The evidence from the FIA and STA and earlier conservation policy was 
subsequently analysed in the context of the theoretical framework presented in this study. 
This framework focuses on the multi-agency dynamics of power and influence and 
considers the policy process as two overlapping cycles. These policy cycles emphasise 
both the transitions of successive legislative eras such as the STA to the FIA and the shifts 
within particular legislative eras such as policy gestation to formulation, formulation to 
implementation, and implementation to impact. As was explained in Chapter Four, each 
of these interlocking phases had particular policy dynamics that required distinctive 
analytical approaches (see Figure 4.3). 
 
 The Analytical Approach: 
 
Generally, analysis follows a chronological order. While Chapter Two provided some 
background on early forest conservation policy, the more in-depth and initial case 
descriptions are given in Chapters Six and Seven. These chapters trace the workings of 
two consecutive forest conservation eras. Chapter Six focuses on the final years of the 
Small Tree Act that leads to its rescission in 1967. This, in effect, treats this part of the 
STA legislative process as the FIA’s gestation process. Chapter Seven covers various FIA 
policy phases from its several formulation and implementation stages through a 
succession of amendments and implementation processes to its review in the 1984 Royal 
Commission on Forestry. In both Chapters Six and Seven special attention is given to the 
significance of agency and organisational character, their complex and evolving inter and 
multi-agency relationships, and the intricacy of the resource management context 
impinging on conservation management decision-making. 
 
Chapter Eight follows a similar chronology but focuses more on the specific role of power 
and influence on policy decision-making within the FIA era. This analysis shift gears to 
emphasise market influences, biophysical impacts, the significance of management 
ideology, and the rise and fall of other influences such as multiple-use forest management 
and environmentalism. This chapter steps beyond the initial descriptive approach found in 
Chapter Seven to ground theory from the case evidence and reapply it to make better 
sense of policy workings. The analyses made possible from this essentially iterative 
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analytical approach attempts to offset the theoretical limitations found in the policy 
literature. 
 
A somewhat different track is taken in Chapter Nine. Rather than continue with a 
hindsight review of forest conservation policy, this study refocuses as a contemporary 
programme assessment. A cursory review of the early workings of the Forest 
Enhancement Act (FEA) necessitated this revision. As will be seen in this chapter, the 
FEA added up to little more than a policy palliative. As a result, it was necessary to look 
beyond present legislation and policy to examine other alternatives for nurturing forest 
conservation. Six conservation strategies are examined. It will be seen that the 
methodological approach for analysing these case studies was again fashioned by 
opportunity and circumstance. For two of the cases examined, the author observed 
decision-making in less than a detached way. As advocated by Spradley,12 Schatzman and 
Strauss,13 and similarly used by Blowers;14 the author became both participant and 
observer. In the case of the Nova Scotia Envirofor Process, the author was first invited to 
participate in this provincial forum on forest practices as a representative of the academic 
sector. That involvement became more intense later as part of this continuing forum’s 
provincial steering committee. In the case of the St. Mary’s Wildlife/ Forestry Project the 
author was initially more detached, relying only on documented evidence and casual 
discussion with involved actors. Later, however, the author became more closely involved 
when invited to help launch a second phase for the St. Mary’s project. Data collection for 
the four other cases contrasted sharply from these two. As in the examination of the STA 
and the FIA the field research was once more removed, relying on semi-structured 
interviews and document analysis. First, the Central Region Integrated Resource 
Management Project was examined. Then as a possible model for landscape scaled 
ecosystem management in Nova Scotia, the embryonic Northern Breton Highlands 
Greater Ecosystem Management proposal was reviewed. Third, the Coalition of Nova 
Scotia Forest Interests initiative was considered. And fourthly, the concept of Forestry 
Certification was examined. Chapter Nine concluded with a brief overview of the recently 
                                                 
12 Spradley, James P. Participant Observation. Holt, Rinehart and Winston: 
Toronto, 1980, 51. 
13 Schatzman, Leonard and Anselm L. Strauss. Field Research Strategies for a 
Natural Sociology. Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1973, 61. 
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announced Department of Natural Resources position paper on forest management and 
conservation. In the concluding chapter, the lessons from these various legislative and 
policy eras are reviewed and examined in the context of various idioms of analysis 
explicated by Weale (see Chapter Four).  
 
Finally, it is important to stress that the empirical evidence was collected over an 
extended time period and initially analysed in the context of theoretical approaches seen 
useful and pertinent at that time. Evidence was painstakingly pieced together in the 
investigative research tradition from numerous and previously obscure sources including 
the ‘basement archives’ of retired political, bureaucratic and industrial actors located 
throughout Nova Scotia. After two years of prodding, the Nova Scotia Archives finally 
rescued and catalogued critical evidence concerning the forest practices improvement 
boards deliberations from the attic storage of a remote Lands and Forest district office. 
The existence and location of useful data was often only made clear from the extensive 
face-to-face interviews conducted for this study. The explanation of this case and its 
various dimensions of power were refined by continuous interactive analyses of key-actor 
evidence and unearthed document evidence.  Much of the more recent data was amassed 
through participant observation of various forest conservation policy initiatives. This 
often required intensive and extensive daylong and weekend meetings and workshops 
requiring substantive pre and post-preparation spread over months and years. In the end, 
this study amounts to a concerned and insightful analysis of a hitherto, little understood 
policy development problem. It brings light to the challenges that beset Nova Scotia’s 
forest management milieu and offers useful methodological and theoretical approaches to 
the analysis of multi-agency, forest resource management problems found elsewhere.   
  
                                                                                                                                                  
14 Blowers, 1984. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Pre-FIA Era. 
 
This chapter examines forest conservation legislation prior to FIA enactment 
concentrating on the complex web of socio-economic factors influencing conservation 
policy and forestry development. It specifically focuses on the workings of the Small Tree 
Act in the nineteen fifties and early sixties, reflecting on influences that pushed for its 
rescission and the countervailing drive for renewed forest conservation legislation. This 
chapter provides evidence that on the one hand appeared to bolster ground level forest 
conservation regulations but on the other hand, given the brute force of economic 
imperatives, drastically undermined them. What is especially interesting in this discussion 
of legislative rescission are the multinationals’ and government’s efforts to rescind the 
STA: even though it was no longer enforced. It is also interesting to examine why their 
efforts failed to dominate the policy agenda given their combined economic and political 
strength. In the discussion that follows it will be seen that pulp-processing expansion was 
fundamental to the government’s forest management policy and broader industrial 
development. It will also become obvious that the government’s principal concerns were 
to accommodate pulp sector interests rather than acknowledge deepening forest 
conservation problems. In addition it will be seen that throughout this pulp sector 
expansion period the multinationals were viewed largely as white knights by the 
incumbent administration: they were seen as the only viable option for industrial 
transformation and prosperity. Interestingly, despite the new multinationals’ influence in 
shaping forest policy, the sawmillers and professional foresters somehow combined forces 
to pressure DLF to replace rather than rescind the STA--a measure that was not their 
original intent and seemingly not a preferred choice. 
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The Socio-political Context: 
 
Since early colonial times in Nova Scotia, forest conservation policy was marginalised by 
a pervasive forest exploitation/production imperative.1 This undermining of forest 
conservation objectives began with the Broad Arrow Act in the early eighteenth century, 
continued with the implementation of the Small Tree Act and characterises present day 
conservation legislation.2 3 4 Despite steadily declining forest quality, it is important to 
note that production continued to climb throughout the twentieth century. This was 
largely made possible by ‘mining’ immature stocks and harvesting previously inaccessible 
areas.5 It was not until after the Second World War, however, that unprecedented 
exploitation generated sufficient concern about a degrading forest resource that measures 
were taken to enact specifically dedicated forest conservation legislation. A revision of 
the Small Tree Act, first introduced in 1942, was proclaimed in 1946 and enforced on a 
limited scale during the late forties and early fifties. 
 
Despite its limited application, the STA had potent support as it was considered by some 
key forest managers to be the only forest conservation policy in the history of Nova Scotia 
to have appreciable ground level impact.6 Lloyd S. Hawbolt, for example, wrote in the 
Canadian Geographic Journal that: “This Act ... has altered the course of forestry in the 
Province. ... Despite its many problems ... the indirect results and benefits have been 
tremendous.”7 Don Eldridge, a former woodlands manager with the Eddy Company 
during the early sixties, suggested that: 
Had they left the Small Tree Act in place it would probably have been 
                                                 
1 Goldsmith, F.B. An Evaluation of a Forest Resource - A Case Study of Nova 
Scotia. Journal of Environmental Management, 10 (1980). 83-100. 
2 Creighton, Wilfred I. Forestkeeping:  A History of the Department of Lands and 
Forests in Nova Scotia  1926- 1969. Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests, 1988, 
47. 
3 Goldsmith. 
4 Hawbolt, Lloyd S. and R.M. Bulmer. The Forest Resources of Nova Scotia. 
Halifax: Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests, 1958. 
5 Goldsmith. 
6 Interview with Robert (Bob) Burgess: Deputy Minister of DLF, 1969-1977; 
August 1987. 
7 Hawbolt, Lloyd S. Forestry in Nova Scotia. Canadian Geographic Journal. 
August 1955, 5&14.  
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better than the Forest Improvement Act. ... But it would appear that two 
pulp companies [Stora and Scott] were coming on stream and they were 
going to have to cut small trees.8 
 
Robert Burgess, who succeeded Creighton as deputy minister of Lands and Forests, 
believed the STA was the first forest conservation act in Nova Scotia to positively affect 
ground level forest conservation. The STA succeeded, he suggested, by “slowing down 
the exploitation of immature forests.”9 
 
Given the STA’s apparent ground level proficiency when implemented, the question 
looms why there was an attempt to replace it with rather innocuous legislation in 1962. 
The answer appears tied not so much to the STA’s technical attributes or imperfections 
but to the government’s industrial expansion objectives. The prevalent economic and 
social conditions in the fifties made forestry expansion appealing: an economic 
development report by Arthur D. Little Incorporated in 1956 in fact cited few viable 
alternatives. It should be noted that at this time Nova Scotia’s steel industry was nearly 
bankrupt and the coal industry was in a serious slump.10 The coal industry’s weakness 
was especially significant in forestry expansion calculations. From 1958 to 1959 coal 
production declined from 50 million to 40 million tons putting miners out of work and 
creating considerable pressure to bolster forest industry employment. The completion of 
the Canso Causeway in 1955 (a large public works project employing previously 
unemployed miners) also added to this pressure.11 The setbacks of these traditional 
industries persuaded the Nova Scotia government to vigorously pursue pulp industry 
expansion that led eventually to a series of negotiations with ‘out-of-province’ 
multinationals. 
 
The Pulp Enhancement Programme. 
                                                 
8 Interview with Don Eldridge: Commissioner, Nova Scotia Commission on 
Forest Enhancement and Formerly Deputy Minister of Lands and Forests; September 
1987. 
9 Burgess interview. 
10 Little, Arthur D. Inc. Industrial Development in Nova Scotia. NS Department of 
Trade and Industry, January 1956.  
11 Department of Trade and Industry, Nova Scotia: An Economic Profile. Province 
of Nova Scotia, 1963. 
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As an outgrowth of the relative optimism for the pulp sector, the government courted a 
whole string of multinationals in the mid-fifties where initial negotiations were rather one 
sided. The government in its wisdom provided the multinationals a string of concessions 
setting the seeds for future discontent throughout the forest industry.12 This 
dissatisfaction, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, eventually led to both market and 
state failure. 
 
National and international competition to attract multinational investment, combined with 
the dismal performance of traditional Nova Scotian industries and the performance of 
non-Nova Scotian investors within the province, gave the multinationals ‘testing Nova 
Scotia’s waters’ a substantial negotiating edge over the government. Beyond the basic 
limitations of inter-provincial and global competition, the province had other notable and 
significant bargaining weaknesses: it had little ready cash, there were serious 
unemployment problems, and Nova Scotia had a history of poor labour relations--
especially in industrial Cape Breton. To cap these general investment problems Nova 
Scotia had cumbersome, county based forest taxation that made prospective woodfibre 
processing investors apprehensive over forest operations that crossed county boundaries 
(see table 6.1).13 Adding to these difficulties, it was a matter of public record that the 
government came tantalisingly close to signing a deal with Scott Paper in 1956. Rather 
than establish a pulpmill in Nova Scotia, however, Scott called an abrupt halt to 
negotiations and chose instead to locate in British Columbia.14  Unfortunately for Nova 
Scotia, this publicised bargaining failure revealed how far the government was prepared 
to go to accommodate foreign investors, especially in their demands for legislative change 
and infrastructure support. 
 
                                                 
12 Burgess interview.   
13 Creighton, 1988, 101. 
14 Creighton, 101-2. 
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Despite its rather dismal bargaining posture, the provincial government was never 
completely without its own bargaining resources. A key attraction was Crown forests--this 
proved to be a major selling point.15 The two multinational companies that finally settled 
in Nova Scotia in the fifties and sixties secured significant economic concessions. Both 
received mill construction subsidies and tax holidays as well as extensive infrastructure 
support including access roads to their mills. Scott Paper also secured what was later to 
become a very controversial and politically costly pollution treatment concession. Stora, 
on the other hand, obtained long term, low cost Crownland stumpage guarantees. In 
addition to these allowances, both multinationals gained generally inexpensive, compliant 
and unorganised woodlands labour as well as favourable marketing arrangements. From a 
forest conservation perspective, each of these concessions proved to be significant, 
although unfortunately their impacts were generally negative as far as forest conservation 
was concerned. Despite all these benefits for the multinationals, it was freedom from 
unwieldy forest practices legislation and regulations embodied in the STA that was the 
trump card in their arsenal.16 
 
Table 6.1: Variation of County Land Tax Assessments-circa 1951. 
 
 
Land Classification 
 
Assessment per Acre 
 
Minimum County Rate 
 
Maximum County Rate 
 
 Cultivated 
 
 $ 1.00 
 
 $75.00 
 
 Pasture 
 
 $ 1.00 
 
 $15.00 
 
 Timber I 
 
 $ 1.00 
 
 $60.00 
 
 Timber II 
 
 $ 1.00 
 
 $30.00 
 
 Woodlots 
 
 $ 1.00 
 
 $ 7.50 
 
 Cutover 
 
    - 
 
 $ 6.75 
 
 Waste 
 
    - 
 
 $ 1.00 
Source: Ralph S. Johnson, 1986, 297. 
 
                                                 
15 Creighton, 101. 
16 Interview with George Henley, Minister of Lands and Forests. Oct. 1978 - 1983; 
August 1987. 
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There is little doubt that Stora: a Swedish based multinational, took full advantage of the 
Province’s bargaining weaknesses before building a pulpmill on Cape Breton Island. The 
evidence indicates that the province went to great lengths to attract Stora after its earlier 
setback with Scott Paper.17 As Burgess, a former deputy minister put it: 
We tried to get Scott to come in to start off with and they wanted to come 
in the fifties. But when they turned us down ... we turned to Nova Scotia 
Pulp [Stora]--the Swedish outfit. We worked tooth and nail to get them to 
set up a Kraft process to handle our poor quality material we had up there 
[on Cape Breton Island].18  
 
Despite the Provincial Government’s eventual successes in attracting investment, 
it is clear that it bent over backwards to entice the multinationals to Nova Scotia. 
And in doing so it compromised future policy options, distorted pulpwood and 
lumber markets, and compromised much of the future potential of forest 
conservation legislation. Later in the mid-fifties as Burgess alludes, the Provincial 
Government began negotiations with Stora with considerable zeal. They in fact 
went to extraordinary lengths to court Stora and in doing so risked considerable 
financial resources and alienation of the sawmillers as well as Bowater’s Mersey. 
It seems that both the Nova Scotian Government and Stora were rather cavalier in 
their negotiations, they followed few standard negotiating practices. Soyez 
recounts in this regard that the provincial government failed even to check the 
credentials of ‘Stora’s agent’, to whom they eventually paid millions in consulting 
fees.19 Soyez explains that in the early stages of negotiations this so-called 
‘official representative’ had no negotiating authority from Stora although the 
provincial government assumed he had. It is interesting to note that even without 
official blessing, Stora gave no order for this individual to desist. When 
negotiations finally got on-track ‘officially’ and agreements were finally 
negotiated, it became quite evident that the government had taken substantial 
political as well as financial risks to keep Stora’s interest. Among others things it 
expended considerable financial resources and staff time to reclaim the Oxford 
                                                 
17 Creighton, 101. 
18 Burgess interview. 
19 Soyez, Dietrich. Stora Lured Abroad? A Nova Scotia Case Study in Industrial 
Decision-making and Persistence. The Operational Geographer. September 1988. #16. 
11-14. 
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Lease on Cape Breton Island so they could reallocate this stumpage to Stora on 
very favourable terms.20 21 Although this so-called ‘give away’ worked for the 
government’s short term interests by convincing Stora to build a Kraft pulpmill, in 
time its favourable concessions built considerable resentment within the forest 
sector. 
 
One clear measure of how far government was willing to go to support its pulp 
enhancement policy can be gauged from the following meeting of government 
officials. According to Haliburton, Premier Stanfield was desperately keen on 
swiftly sealing the deal with Stora with minimal political fallout. Haliburton 
recalled that the Premier wanted: “this declaration from the Department [of Lands 
and Forests] expressing their confidence that we could support a [second 
multinational] pulp mill.”22 Resistance from certain elements within the DLF 
bureaucracy, however, was politically embarrassing. The most damaging 
opposition came from credible senior DLF civil servants such as Creighton and 
Hawbolt.23 24 Both Creighton: the deputy minister, and Hawbolt: the Department’s 
senior entomologist were concerned that Stora’s mill would over-stretch what was 
widely perceived as a badly depleted forest resource. This ‘depleted’ view had 
gained credibility with the publication of the province’s forest inventory.25 Outside 
government, Bowater’s had also made public overtures concerning forest over-
exploitation that had stirred public interest. In response to Bowater’s fretting, 
Burgess later complained that (Bowater’s) Johnson continually: “preached that 
you're going to ruin the province bringing another company in, we're going to be 
out of wood.”26 Burgess recounted that in response to these constant overtures: 
One day in exasperation, Stanfield said, you get those people of yours ‘thick and 
sweat’ down to the [Hotel] Nova Scotian and lock em up until they come up with 
                                                 
20 Johnson, 272. 
21 Sandberg, The Big Lease, 1992, 89. 
22 Interview with E. D. Haliburton Minister of Lands and Forests, July 1959 - May 
1968; April 1986. 
23 Interview with W.I. Creighton. Deputy Minister of Lands and Forests, February 
1949 - March 1968. Halifax County, Nova Scotia. August 1987. 
24 Hawbolt interview. 
25 Hawbolt and Bulmer 1958. 
26 Burgess interview. 
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an answer.27 
 
G.I. (Ike) Smith: a lawyer by profession, subsequently called this meeting and according 
to Haliburton drilled the DLF staff for answers about the adequacy of Nova Scotia’s forest 
stocks to sustain an additional mill. In the end when forced to back up their opposition to 
industrial expansion with ‘irrefutable’ evidence on woodfibre shortages, the bureaucrats 
present conceded. Interestingly Haliburton admitted that neither Creighton nor Hawbolt 
were at this meeting. This was odd given that Creighton was the DLF’s senior manager 
and a highly respected professional forester, and Hawbolt was the senior author of the 
province’s 1958 forest inventory study. To leave out either made little sense except 
perhaps to skew the final analysis! Whether Creighton and Hawbolt were left out 
purposely or not, the conclusions drawn, not surprisingly, led to a subsequent invitation to 
Stora to establish a pulpmill. The results from this meeting successfully counteracted, at 
least for the time being, Bowater’s, Creighton’s, Hawbolt’s and others’ opposition to pulp 
sector expansion.28 29 The subsequent announcement of newly found forest reserves was 
understandably met with some derision by sawmillers who dubbed this declaration as G.I. 
(Smith)’s ‘new forest’!30  
 
Despite this undermining of forest conservation concerns there were successful counter 
pressures. One effort made by the two senior professional foresters from Bowater’s 
Mersey, championed a legislative renewal initiative to replace the STA. Although the 
government’s forest policy initiative seemed at first glance to favour the whole pulp 
sector, the new policy of pulp-industry expansion was vigorously opposed by the 
Bowater’s Mersey Pulp and Paper Company. This state of affairs set one multinational 
against the others. Bowater’s opposition seemingly stemmed from the prospect of 
increased competition for pulpwood as well as its inauspicious treatment at the hands of 
government in executing the details of its pulp expansion policy. In this circumstance 
Bowater’s was pressured to give up a lease on Cape Breton Island to make way for Stora’s 
new, forest operations. While there may have been some concern about Bowater’s 
                                                 
27 Haliburton interview. 
28 Haliburton interview. 
29 Creighton interview. 
30 Interview with Murray Prest, former Sawmill Owner and present land owner; 
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motives in supporting forest conservation legislation both Ralph Johnson’s and Lief 
Holt’s  professional reputations quelled most of them. Under the auspices of CIF:NS they 
worked diligently to promote renewed forest conservation legislation. Johnson claims that 
he actually introduced the idea of new forest conservation legislation to replace the 
increasingly maligned STA to the CIF:NS membership.31 Whatever Bowater’s primary 
motivation and whoever was the initial architect of this initiative, it is clear that 
Bowater’s, as a corporation, found it increasingly difficult to directly influence provincial 
forestry policy. Not only was the repossession of the lease on Cape Breton Island a major 
irritation and clear evidence of their loss of government favour, but a promised 
compensatory Crown land license closer to home-base never materialised either.32 
 
The government facilitated its new pulp expansion policy by fending-off opposition from 
established forestry interests whenever possible. Eventually, however, it succumbed to 
pressure and ‘officially’ supported CIF:NS’s legislative renewal initiative. This was to 
replace the so-called ‘outdated’ STA legislation with more ‘technically sound’ 
conservation provisions. What is so baffling in this whole process of legislative renewal, 
however, was the substance of the replacement legislation: the 1962 Forest Improvement 
Act. Its provisions and subsequent workings quickly put into question the legitimacy of 
the whole legislative renewal process. George Henley, a member of the Progressive 
Conservative caucus at the time was one who questioned the government’s real 
intentions. He claimed: 
We took the STA out as the pulp mills were coming in. And he [G.I.Smith] 
just thought there would be some kind of act that would appease the 
[lumber trade]. The lumber trade was still large at that time and he thought 
he would appease the lumberman and lessen the tension between the 
pulpmill operators and the lumber mills.33 
 
Although the government’s bargaining efforts were protracted and often arduous, 
it eventually led to pulp sector expansion. By 1959, pulpwood production ranked 
second in importance to lumber products in the province and by 1961 pulpwood 
                                                                                                                                                  
August 1987. 
31 Johnson interview. 
32 Johnson and Haliburton interviews. 
33 Henley interview. 
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volume actually exceeded lumber production.34 35 Notwithstanding this rather 
impressive economic performance, it was the pulp sector’s ability to shape forest 
practices policy that is especially significant to this study. As will be seen 
throughout the next section and the following two chapters, on the surface the 
multinationals appeared to support forest conservation efforts. As the evidence 
will unfurl, however, it will become clear that the new pulp companies, aided by 
the government, continually undermined ground level conservation by persistent 
criticism of forest conservation legislation. 
 
 The Small Tree Act. 
 
For the most part the STA’s strength was its simplicity. The Act’s main stay was a girth 
limit of 10inches diameter below which felling targeted species was either prohibited or 
controlled. Despite the advantage of simplicity the Act had technical limitations: for 
example, as written it did not allow for clearing scrub trees. Another alleged but 
unfounded weakness was its supposed disregard for Balsam fir: the dominant species of 
Cape Breton Island. This particular species was not covered in the Small Tree Act: its 
omission was not a legislative oversight, however, but a well-calculated exclusion.36 At 
the time of STA formulation the Cape Breton Highlands contained one of the world’s 
largest overmature although natural monocultures of Balsam fir.37 As overmature Balsam 
fir forests are highly susceptible to disease infestation, especially from the spruce 
budworm, forest managers were freed to harvest when and basically how they pleased.38 
According to Creighton, the incumbent deputy minister, this species was purposely 
omitted from the STA to stimulate harvesting activity.39 Despite this apparently sound 
rationale for exclusion this issue was oddly challenged by the incumbent administration 
during the 1962 FIA legislative debates. 
 
                                                 
34 Nova Scotia: An Economic Profile, 1959 and 1963.  
35 Canadian Pulp and Paper Association. Reference Tables: 1984. 5. 
36 Creighton interview.  
37 Hawbolt, 5&14. 
38 Creighton interview. 
39 Creighton interview. 
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In addition to this rather curious tactic the administration also made several other obtuse 
efforts to discredit the STA. One alleged weakness identified in the 1962 legislative 
debates, for example, was the STA’s inability to curtail extensive clearcutting. Approvals 
for clearcutting were, however, the discretion of the minister rather than a general 
enabling section in the STA.40 41 Interestingly in 1958 only 146,752 hectares (362,752 
acres) or just 4.2 percent of forest land was examined under the STA from 1952 - 57. 
Although this inspection rate was not impressive, theoretically taking over a hundred 
years to examine all private forestlands, the rate of clearcutting approvals was of most 
concern. The minister approved clearcuts on 56.6 percent of the lands examined under the 
STA and only 11.6 percent were actually restricted to the 10inch limit. If there was a 
problem, it appeared to be that the minister failed to fulfil a duty to restrict clearcutting! 
Despite these seemingly dubious grounds to oppose the STA, the administration 
successfully deflected the blame for excessive clearcutting from its own discretionary 
powers to the STA’s specific provisions. It remains quite puzzling, however, why it used 
this strategy at all. The provision to omit Balsam fir clearly supported the pulp expansion 
agenda, and raising the second issue was in danger of drawing attention to the minister’s 
record on clearcutting approvals. 
 
Aside from these rather irksome criticisms, the STA did have legitimate technical 
weaknesses that limited its effectiveness. One was that it “apply only to a lumbering 
operation involving more than fifty thousand board feet measure or its equivalent.”42 
Although no doubt included as an administrative convenience to bolster bureaucratic 
efficiency, this provision eliminated considerable aggregate areas of private forestland 
from the STA’s purview. This provision, therefore, limited both its scope and 
effectiveness.43 A more reasoned criticism was that the STA prohibited removal of scrub 
                                                 
40 Interview with Ron Day, former Department of Lands and Forest Extension 
Forester; March 1986. 
41 Interview with Dave Dwyer, Department of Lands and Forests Extension 
Forester; March 1986. 
42 Department of Lands and Forest. The Small Tree Act: An Act to Amend and 
Consolidate Chapter 6 of the Acts of 1942, April 1946. Province of Nova Scotia, 1950. 
43 Sandberg, L.  Anders. Swedish Forestry Legislation in Nova Scotia: The Rise 
and Fall of the Forest Improvement Act, 1965-1986. In D. Day, ed. Geographical 
Perspectives on the Maritime Provinces. Halifax, 1988, 184-196. 
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trees or ‘sylvian junk’. In this regard some industrialists argued that it would have been 
better to legislate their removal rather than to safeguard their protection, arguing that this 
measure would be much more effective in raising forest quality than any cutting control.44 
Instead, because scrub trees rarely grew beyond the 10inch STA limit, theoretically at 
least, the STA ‘protected’ low quality forests in perpetuity. In practice, however, foresters 
administering the provisions of the STA invariably allowed scrub tree removal. Beyond 
the government’s concerns over the issues of clearcutting and Balsam fir, it was also quite 
baffling why the administration complained of an ‘overwhelming bureaucratic workload’ 
with the STA during the initial FIA debates.45 It was similarly puzzling why the 
opposition never challenged this criticism given that the STA was hardly enforced after 
Hurricane Edna in 1954 and not implemented at all after 1957.46 Haliburton, the 
incumbent Minister of Lands and Forests laid additional criticism on the STA. He cited 
political interference during the Liberal’s tenure that proceeded this administration’s 
term.47 Again this assertion seemed to have little substance: it was neither corroborated by 
senior career civil servants such as Creighton and Hawbolt, by DLF extension workers, or 
by prominent landowners such as Prest48 and Wilber49. In fact Ralph Johnson, who was 
prominent in the CIF:NS. felt political interference with the STA was never a problem 
until the early sixties!50 
 
Notwithstanding the government’s attention to both real and contrived problems of the 
STA during the FIA legislative debates, the real issues in forestry, especially concerning 
the indigenous industry, reflected the growing apprehension about a pulp dominated forest 
industry and its concomitant lack of concern for forest conservation. These underlying 
anxieties were brought to the public’s attention first by the publication of the province’s 
                                                 
44 Haliburton interview. 
45 NS. Legislative Debates, April 9, 1962, 1361. 
46 Haliburton interview. 
47 Johnson, Ralph S. The Forests of Nova Scotia. Four East Publications, 1986, 
291-292.   
48 Prest interview. 
49 Interview with James Wilber, Mill Owner and Commercial Forest Owner; 
September 1987. 
50 Johnson interview. 
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forest inventory in 1958 that revealed the general malaise of Nova Scotia’s forests51. 
Second, attention was drawn by sawmillers’ scepticism that the sawlog industry could 
withstand the increased competition from pulpwood production, and third the start-up of 
the Stora Kopparberg pulpmill in 1961 created a sense of inevitability that pulp 
processing expansion would indeed overrun the forests. It was not so much a matter of 
STA inadequacy that bothered the incumbent government than it was the potential 
backlash from pulp sector expansion. From the government’s perspective industrial 
expansion raised the likelihood for additional clearcutting applications that were 
ultimately the DLF Minister’s responsibility under the STA. The political risks in keeping 
the STA were clear. It was untenable for an administration portraying itself as a 
responsible forest steward to be seen as the major agent of clearcutting. No matter how 
well the STA had worked previously the government’s political vulnerability became a 
major motivating force for legislative change.52 53  
 
In this political manoeuvring and issue obfuscation, Haliburton acted as ‘frontman’ for 
Premier Robert Stanfield and G.I. (Ike) Smith. Although the government’s worry over 
political fallout was serious, this was not ‘the stuff’ to try to publicly legitimise legislative 
change. They were forced, therefore, to undermine the STA’s credibility indirectly rather 
than openly and positively promote its pulp sector enhancement efforts. Haliburton 
deflected possible criticism by directly attacking the overall worth of the STA. When the 
indigenous forest industry countered, the government reluctantly backtracked and 
endorsed the CIF:NS’s initiative for renewed forest conservation legislation. In this regard 
in February 1959 the CIF:NS passed a resolution urging the provincial government to 
‘replace’ the STA. Its proposed initiatives were clearly focused on enhancing forest 
conservation practices rather than simply liberalising cutting restrictions as the 
government had hoped. In time this initiative received support from the Nova Scotia 
Forest Products Association (an organisation dominated by sawmiller interests) and the 
Nova Scotia Resource Council. This broadening of support increased political pressure on 
                                                 
51 Hawbolt and Bulmer, 1958. 
52 Johnson interview. 
53 Interview with Lief Holt, Woodlands Manager for Bowater’s: 1965 - 1983; 
April, 1986. 
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the incumbent administration to pursue legislative renewal.54 By endorsing the CIF’s 
initiative, the government subsequently championed two related but arguably opposing 
forest management initiatives. In doing so it walked a precarious line of advocating forest 
conservation legislation on the one hand--this they did mostly with rhetoric, and on the 
other hand they backed pulp sector expansion--which they accomplished with substantial 
material and political support.  
 
Although Haliburton, the Lands and Forests minister, argued that the pulp enhancement 
objective was never purposely hidden from the public eye, he also conceded that it was 
never clearly delineated either.55 As a result of these overlapping and incongruous 
policies, forestry policy was rather ambiguous leaving both sides of the 
conservation/expansion question believing they enjoyed the government’s full support. In 
this context of uncertainty and conflicting interests, the following discussion examines the 
underlying influences of power on this policy sector during this legislative renewal period. 
This is followed by an examination of this policy process in the contexts of market and 
state failure. This complete chapter’s analysis then acts as the frontispiece to examine in 
depth the Forest Improvement Act--the act replacing the Small Tree Act. As will be seen, 
the socio-economic dynamic created by this process built a rather tenuous political and 
bureaucratic foundation for the FIA that impeded its implementation throughout its 
tenure. 
 
 The Transition of Power--the FIA Gestation Process. 
 
This section attempts to unravel the linkages in forest conservation and resource 
exploitation policies during the STA’s final years by applying Hall et al’s framework to 
tease out key power relationships.56 One difficulty in applying this framework to the STA 
rescission process was determining how forest conservation policy related to the pulp 
processing expansion agenda. A recurring analytical problem was whether to take the 
obvious evidence at face value or delve deeper to search for hitherto hidden policy 
                                                 
54 Johnson, 1986, 300. 
55 Haliburton interview. 
56 Hall et al., 1972. 
 128 
significance. In the end case evidence was evaluated in the context of both overlapping 
policy agendas. This initial look at apparently rival forestry objectives was then reviewed 
in the context of management ideology and multiple-objective forest management; and 
finally in the context of how these influences contributed to market and state failure. 
 
The FIA Policy Gestation Phase: 
 
Although spiralling demand for forest products raised concerns about forest capacity in 
Nova Scotia, ‘doing nothing’ never seemed viable as job creation was the Progressive 
Conservatives’ ‘ticket’ to power in 1956. What swayed decision-making more than 
possible wood fibre shortages some indeterminate time in the future was the expanding 
global pulp market. In this context, pulp expansion was ‘more feasible’ than other 
industrial development options and job creation was viewed as more important than forest 
conservation. The main unit of analysis for government decision-making was not, 
therefore, long-term forest sustainability but shorter-term economic development 
potential. Given the pulp agenda’s strong socioeconomic weighting, it is not initially clear 
why then forest conservation reappeared on the legislative agenda in the late fifties. The 
best evidence for its legitimacy stems from the groundwork of the professional foresters 
association: the CIF:NS. In this respect and in retrospect, Haliburton: the DLF minister 
and Henley: a caucus member, later concurred that the government lacked the necessary 
confidence to openly defend the pulp expansion agenda in the face of growing forest 
conservation concerns, especially those voiced by the CIF:NS. Once support began to gel 
around the CIF:NS’s legislative renewal initiative, however, the government found itself 
lodged between ‘a rock and a hard place’. On the one hand it wanted to fast-track pulp 
expansion but on the other it was unwilling to challenge the forest conservation lobby 
head-on. 
 
One recurring factor dampening the government’s zeal for pulp sector expansion was its 
dismal record with foreign investors. With the exception of Bowater’s, which bought into 
an already going concern, the electorate was wary of outsiders storming the province with 
great fanfare and government funding, and then taking the government’s money and 
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running.57 58 59 If the pulp agenda’s multinational connections attracted greater public 
attention its tenuous support would be eroded further by the public’s distaste for publicly 
financed mega-projects. This combined context of soured multinational alliances and the 
renewed interest in conservation created a dilemma for the incumbent administration. The 
government had few, if any economic development options to draw on and revamped 
forest conservation legislation was a major disincentive for forest industry expansion.  
 
The CIF:NS, with members drawn from the forest industry, government, and academia 
was a highly credible organisation that gave the forest conservation issue stature. 
CIF:NS’s policy initiative progressively attracted other influential organisations that 
increased its credibility. Even the Nova Scotia Resource Council, that was notoriously 
resource exploitation oriented, was swayed by CIF:NS’s position and offered its 
endorsement. This growing support eventually tipped the government’s hand despite the 
risk of alienating its newly found and hard won multinational pulp processing 
partnerships. 
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Although Hall at al. emphasise the importance of a crisis in policy gestation, its impact on 
forestry appears much more convoluted than they envisioned. Except during pest 
infestation, forest fires, or major windthrows in hurricanes, ‘acute’ crises in forestry are 
rare, problems are usually more insipid. The incremental effects of over-exploitation, for 
example, can be cushioned by adaptive practices such as price adjustments, importation, 
technology advances, pioneering virgin forests, or simply adapting to economic 
slowdowns. Although quite convincing arguments can be made of impending doom, 
‘gradualism’ continually encourages policy makers to put-off forest conservation 
initiatives. 
 
Information management was particularly important in this policy gestation process. As 
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seen earlier, the administration resisted opposition to pulp sector expansion and put-off 
conservation by ‘massaging’ information to suit its political needs. The government went 
to extraordinary lengths to discredit forest inventory ‘soothsayers'. Once the ‘consulted’ 
DLF officers at the Hotel Nova Scotian were brought on board and ‘sufficiency’ was 
demonstrated, it mattered little that the same data previously discredited pulp sector 
expansion. The important point was that DLF officers were seen to accept the efficacy of 
industrial expansion, not that the detailed data necessarily did so. In a similar way, skilful 
information management undermined the STA’s credibility in the FIA legislative debates. 
Rather than argue directly against the STA’s ground level performance, the government 
made a shrewd flank attack, effectively rewriting history. Its claim that the STA created 
an ‘overwhelming bureaucratic burden’ could not be substantiated by hard evidence but 
by obfuscating the record on the STA’s ground level performance; the government 
created an effective smokescreen around the truth of ministerial clearcutting permits.
 
In assessing the policy impact of management style in forest management it is often 
difficult to classify many forest practices; their ideological underpinnings are frequently 
obscured by ambiguous rhetoric and ground level strategies. The expansion of the pulp 
processing industry in the fifties and early sixties, however, brought new approaches that 
increasingly sharpened the ideological manifestations of forest management. These pulp 
processors were increasingly driven by technology and efficiency that required greater 
reliance on clearcutting, faster growing trees, shorter harvesting cycles, and more species 
and age uniformity. As their policy influence grew, they threatened the political power-
base of the indigenous industry. Although forest practices such as clearcutting were more 
visually obvious, ideologically earmarking any forest strategy was risky. The counter 
argument that clearcuts degraded the environment, for instance, was that they would rid 
the province of ‘sylvian junk’.60 Unfortunately, as time would tell, increased pulpwood 
production did little to tackle this problem which was a major selling point for pulp 
expansion and undermining the STA--it turned out there was no economic incentive to 
harvest poor quality resources, so sylvian junk remained. 
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In this growing era of increased standardisation, the indigenous industry pushed for 
greater industrial and biological diversity to combat what they perceived to be an 
increasing reliance on artificial means to sustain what was previously a largely naturally 
occurring, self-perpetuating system. They focused on attaining forest practices codes that 
restricted harvest exploitation to mature forest stands. This strategy, although couched in 
conservation rhetoric also clearly favoured sawlog production that was the mainstay of the 
indigenous industry. Despite this rhetoric, the government and the new industrialists 
viewed the indigenous industry as ‘Luddite’. They were seen as outdated, obstructive, and 
incapable of stimulating a depressed provincial economy. The new alliance of government 
and imported industrialists on the other hand were seen, or advanced by the indigenous 
industry as cavalier interested only in short-term profit and forest exploitation rather than 
as stewards of a sustainable forest and industry.  
 
In support of the multinationals, it is interesting to note that although extensive pulpwood 
processing activity was new within the province, large amounts of pulpwood was 
previously exported by Hollingsworth and Whitney and others to New England for 
decades prior to the construction of Stora and Scott’s new pulpmills.61 62 It was not 
necessarily the production of pulpwood per se and its associated forest practices that 
bothered traditional operators therefore, it was more likely that increased roundwood 
competition concerned them most. Nevertheless, the pulp industry’s ever-increasing 
appetite for clearcutting undermined the Small Tree Act’s philosophy and this became a 
symbol for pulp sector opposition although not necessarily a cause celebre for 
conservation. 
 
Importantly for increased conservation support and during this era of pulp sector 
expansion, other forest uses such as countryside travel, aesthetics, recreation, and water 
conservation gained greater political significance. The post-war emergence of the 
automobile led to improvements of the Trans-Canada Highway as well as provincial 
highways that brought the urban population closer to the forest environment.63 With 
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increased concern for forest amenity, those advocating more diversified forest 
conservation policy gained political allies. This demand caused Creighton, who was the 
DLF deputy minister at the time, to write that the parks’ programme “proved so popular 
that every MLA was clamouring for a park in his constituency, whether along the Trans-
Canada or not".64 In response to this increased demand, federally funded Trans-Canada 
Highway camping and picnic parks and later provincial parks were built leading 
eventually to the establishment of a Parks Division (later incorporated into the DLF in 
1959 and now transferred to the Department of Environment).65 
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Despite the growing demand for amenity services in forest management, it remains 
difficult to explain why successive versions of the STA’s replacement legislation--the 
FIA--were framed around multiple-use concerns when overwhelming socio-political 
support centred on industrial development. One explanation lies with the indigenous 
forest industry’s strategy to obstruct pulp sector expansion and the emergence of 
advocates such as Creighton who championed the rising tourism industry. A more 
plausible and perhaps more cynical view, however, is that the political administration 
simply paid lip service to these interests.  
 
Rather than wondering just how much multiple interest values drove the design of forest 
practices policy then, a more appropriate question is whether their inclusion in any way 
shaped policy workings or moulded management options? The answer to this question is 
clearly yes, but the degree of influence is difficult to quantify. The support for forest 
conservation legislative renewal and multiple-objective forest management came from 
wide interests. Some of these ‘conservation’ supporters were hardly expected to benefit 
directly from legislative renewal such as staff from Bowater’s and several prominent 
sawmillers. Although their support was likely motivated by competition for scarce 
resources rather than a legitimate desire for more ground level regulations, their efforts 
were instrumental in persuading government to enact new forest conservation legislation. 
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The STA: Market or State Failure? 
 
The workings of the STA, as with the FIA that followed, were highly convoluted and tied 
to the pulp expansion policy in complex and sometimes quite obscure ways. Whereas 
STA establishment can be viewed as the state responding to the market’s failure to 
conserve forests during the Second World War, its demise can be considered as a state 
correction to re-establish better market conditions. Consistent with this scenario, the 
STA’s existence and partial implementation created inertia that impeded market 
innovation. Continuing with this perspective, the expansion of the pulp processing 
industry can be seen as a natural evolution of the free-market whereby outmoded 
industries such as the sawmill industry are replaced over time by more efficient and 
socially beneficial industries such as pulp processing. Pulp expansion’s justification was 
that it provided value-added economic growth substituting pulpwood exports (where 
previously most jobs were created in New England) and increased production to provide 
highly paid jobs in pulpmills within Nova Scotia as well as increased economic activity 
within the woods themselves. On a provincial scale these new jobs could also be seen as 
compensating for market and state failure in the steel and coal industries. From an 
environmental viewpoint, this expansion was also justifiable because wood shortage 
projections could not be substantiated by indubitable evidence. In addition, the increased 
clearcutting necessary for an enlarged industry was warranted because it would rid the 
province of sylvian junk making room for future, more vibrant forest plantations.  
 
This view, however, ignores, the massive subsidies that each new mill garnered, the 
environmental side effects of pulp processing expansion, and the important role of the 
state in moderating market forces to maintain social stability, environmental quality and 
ensure the long-term interests of future generations. The greatest need for jobs, for 
example, was in the industrial area of Cape Breton around Sydney but the establishment 
of Stora in Port Hawksbury within the Straight of Canso, some 140 kilometres away, 
required a new town and the importation of labour. This did little to alleviate Sydney’s 
unemployment problem. Pulp expansion failed therefore to provide social stability, 
whereas it created pollution at the mill site and additionally denuded a forest already 
heavily stressed by industrial activity. While time would tell that conventional market 
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forces were incapable of solving the sylvian junk problem, this was not however evident 
at the time. The culmination of large subsidies to finance the pulpmills, the establishment 
of pulpmills away from areas of employment need, and the deliberate attempt to remove 
forest conservation safeguards can be seen then as a combination of state and market 
failure. It was in essence the outgrowth of short-term business cycles coinciding with 
short-term political horizons and expediency to the detriment of environmental quality. 
 
It is interesting in this context to consider where the STA stood on the sustainable 
development continuum. The STA was largely about conserving wood or future harvests 
for the woodfibre processing industry. There is little or no evidence that it was conceived 
to preserve forests with multiple values and benefits. Consistent with the Strong 
Sustainable Paradigm (SS) an argument can be made that had the STA been fully 
implemented throughout the province, no net loss of woodfibre might have occurred, 
although some change in the forest structure, in terms of species and age-classification 
would likely have happened. Full implementation would, by and large, have maintained 
the forests--as natural capital--within reasonable limits but would have transferred some 
natural capital to manufactured capital. The STA without its concession for clearcutting 
might have kept the maintenance of natural capital within reasonably well-defined limits--
allowing only the harvesting of mature forests. The STA’s patchy implementation, 
however, and its frequent resort to ministerial permits when implemented, clearly 
positioned the STA lower on the continuum. There was little effort by government, for 
instance, to decouple environmental degradation from production. In fact quite the 
opposite, there appeared to be conscious decision-making by the state  (the provincial 
government) to trade natural assets for manufactured capital. Such a practice relegated the 
STA, as implemented, at least to the weak sustainable paradigm (WS). Once, however, 
efforts were made to rescind the STA altogether--initially without replacement--forest 
practices clearly fell within the very weak paradigm (VW), if they fell on the continuum at 
all. 
 
In this era--predating both major phases of ecological modernisation--it is also interesting 
to assess the impact of fiscal policy on environmental management. Taxation of 
forestlands, as seen in table 6.1 was at best haphazard. The range of taxation differed 
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widely from one jurisdiction to the next, providing little conformity for large operators 
doing business across county lines. This on the one hand created market uncertainty that 
might be seen as a factor contributing to state failure. The incentive systems on the other 
hand distorted markets; for example, infrastructure (its provision being one example of 
evidence for market failure) was provided to favoured multinationals to induce them to 
the province. Perhaps more critically, as far as forest degradation was concerned, cheap 
Crown land stumpage fees another industrial development incentive, greatly distorted 
markets and encouraged forest exploitation beyond sustainable and otherwise optimal 
levels. The idea that security of tenure leads to enhanced environmental management 
seems to be counteracted here by its combination with extensive licensing arrangements 
that include low stumpage fees.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting departure from Pearce’s thesis on decoupling growth from 
environmental degradation was the way information was handled. Contrary to his point 
that “environment matters” and there is a need to decouple production and environmental 
pollution, there is little evidence that any roots of this philosophy existed then in Nova 
Scotia’s forest conservation policy. Quite the contrary, the government seemed intent to 
manipulate information that supported environmental protection to expedite its industrial 
expansion agenda. This action of course is more consistent with the theories of state 
failure. There seems no doubt in referring to Weale’s discourse on ecological 
modernisation that the state was well aware of the links between resource exploitation and 
forest degradation but chose to ignore them. In this regard they were quite content to 
burden future generations for the gratification of the present. Furthermore, they saw 
environmental protection as a burden on society and made deliberate efforts to reduce 
this.  
 
In general it is clear that at this time the government’s actions were ambivalent in terms of 
state intervention. They felt on the one hand it necessary to intervene in the market to 
enhance the means of production but on the other thought it necessary to back-off when 
that effort was directed to environmental protection. It is quite clear, nevertheless, from 
this legislative and policy experience, that optimising the state apparatus and the market 
was not a prime concern of the state. It was much more their interest to stimulate 
 136 
production and directly serve the industry, especially the multinationals. It was their view 
that this should be done at the expense of the environment, if need be. While there was 
good evidence that forestry production was previously unsustainable and pulp processing 
expansion would simply accelerate the industry’s demise; it is clear that opposition to 
expansionary forest policies was never strong enough at any stage of this process to 
completely derail the pulp expansion agenda. It was, nevertheless, sufficient to create a 
number of policy obstacles along the way.  
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The FIA Legislative Process.  
Chapter Seven: 
 
This chapter examines the workings of the Forest Improvement Act (FIA), 1962-86. The 
government enacted the initial FIA legislation in 19621 with a provision to rescind its 
predecessor: the Small Tree Act (STA 1946) upon proclamation (see table 7.1).2 They 
never implemented the first version, however, as a second version was introduced in 1965 
without the first ever being proclaimed.3 As will be seen, the first FIA had little 
substance, raising questions about its purpose; in contrast, the second version was detailed 
in the extreme. 
 
Table 7.1: The “Forest Improvement Act” (FIA) - SNS Chapter 2, 1962. 
 
Full Title  
 
An Act Respecting the Improvement, Management and Conservation of 
Forest Products. 
 
Significant Dates  
 
Assented to: 13 April 1962 
Proclaimed: Never (authority with Order in Council). 
 
Important Definitions 
 
A “Commercial Forest Operation” refers to the production of 50 cords or 
more or equivalent (Note: no time frame included). 
 
Explicit Regulations  / 
Requirements. 
 
Operators: to report 1 week prior to harvesting and annually. 
Buyers: to purchase licence and follow reporting procedures. 
 
Buffer Zones 
 
Restrictions on cutting within 100’ either side of the centre line of the 
highway--includes specific exemptions. 
 
Procedure for Adopting 
Regulations 
 
By Order in Council--restricted to the regulating of forms, timing of 
reports, the nature of the buyers licenses and the restrictions to be 
imposed on buyers. 
 
Implicit Results of 
Legislation 
 
Repeal of the Small Tree Conservation Act. 
 
Sanctions 
 
No specific sanctions provided. 
 
The 1965 FIA too had serious conceptual problems, however, which precipitated several 
policy confrontations throughout its twenty-one year history (see table 7.2). The different 
approach of this second legislative version also raised questions about its underlying 
motives. During its tenure, the FIA underwent fundamental as well as many minor 
changes as successive legislatures struggled to find a workable legislative arrangement. 
                                                 
1 Statutes of Nova Scotia. The Forest Improvement Act. Chapter 5, 1962, 238.  
2 Nova Scotia Consolidated Statutes 1950. The Small Tree Conservation Act. 
Chapter Six of the Acts of 1942. 
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Despite its protracted workings that involved continual tinkering at the legislative level, 
the FIA was never fully implemented at ground level. In the end, the FIA was replaced by 
the Forest Enhancement Act (FEA) in 1986 with few, if any, key forest conservation 
issues resolved or workable forest practices developed.4  
 
According to the preamble of the 1965 FIA, its purpose was to 
 provide continuous and increasing supplies of forest products thereby maintaining 
industries and providing continued employment; 
 conserve water and prevent or reduce floods; and 
 improve conditions for wildlife, recreation and scenic values. 
 
Ostensibly the 1965 legislative provisions were designed to monitor and control 
harvesting operations as well as stimulate reforestation on private lands. As private lands 
constituted seventy-three per cent of Nova Scotia’s forests, the FIA was potentially far 
reaching. One of its most innovative features was the provision of district forest practices 
improvement boards (DFPIBs) to guide local implementation. This provision, along with 
a later amendment to establish an ‘overseer’ Provincial Forest Practices Improvement 
Board (PFPIB) unfortunately encountered problems that eventually led to the FIA’s 
downfall. 
 
Initially the local boards were conceived as a vehicle to build trust and cut red tape. They 
included representatives of the forest industry and the local community and were to be 
assisted by a professional forester from the Department of Lands and Forests. Their 
representation “as far as practical” was to include a small woodlot owner, the 
municipality of the forest district, an owner of woodlands of a thousand acres or more, 
and a member at large.5 The specific mandate of the board was to: 
                                                                                                                                                  
3 Statutes of Nova Scotia. The Forest Improvement Act. Chapter 7, 1965, 39.  
4 Government of Nova Scotia. The Forest Enhancement Act. 2nd. Session, 54th 
General Assembly, Queen's Printer for Nova Scotia, 1986.   
5 The Forest Improvement Act. Chapter 7, 1965, 39-49. 
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Table 7.2: The “Forest Improvement Act (FIA)” - SNS. Chapter 5 1965. 
 
Full Title 
 
An Act Respecting the Improvement, Management and Conservation 
of Forest Practices. 
 
Significant Dates 
 
Assented to: 30 March 1965. 
Proclaimed: Sections at a time. 
 
Important Definitions 
 
"Commercial Forest Operation” redefined to exclude owner / 
operator who employs less than two helpers in cutting operations of 
less than 25,000 feet board measure or 50 cords in a calendar year. 
 
Buffer Zones 
 
 
Explicit Regulations  / 
Requirements. 
 
Extended to include designated rivers, buffer extended to 200’ from 
centre line of highway, thinning of buffers permitted. 
      
Buyers are required to have a Certificate of Registration and keep 
records. Powers extended to prescribe amounts of loans to be made 
by Timber Loans Board (see below). 
 
Implicit Results of 
Legislation 
 
Repeal of the Small Tree Conservation Act. 
 
Sanctions 
 
First offence: costs of proceedings and made ineligible for funding 
under various programs. Second - subsequent offence: penalties 
under Summary Convictions Act. 
Forest Improvement 
Boards (District) 
 
Minister may designate Forest District Boards to consist of a District 
Forester and four others representing small woodlot owners, 
municipalities, industrial owner and member-at-large. 
 
Purpose of Boards 
 
To work in co-operation with representatives of Lands and Forests, to 
encourage better forest management practices, to prepare a manual of 
good forest practices, to prescribe, advise and make recommendations 
concerning cutting practices. 
Timber Loans Board To be implemented through Part XIX of the Agriculture and 
Marketing Act. 
Tax assessment 
Concessions 
Planted lands to have a 20-year moratorium on real tax increases. 
 
Felling of Immature 
Trees 
 
Generally prohibited except for brow sites.  The boards to define 
immaturity and permitted exemptions after consulting commissioned 
research. 
Injunction Interventions Board empowered to apply for injunction to halt inappropriate 
harvesting. Board may proceed with previously approved but 
uncompleted harvesting operations. 
 
Work closely, and in co-operation with local representatives of the 
Department of Lands and Forests: to do everything to encourage better 
forest management practices through education, persuasion and the 
enforcement of the FIA; to prepare and distribute a manual of good forest 
practice to local woodlot owners; to distribute to operators and buyers the 
forms prescribed for making reports and returns; and to prescribe, advise, 
and make recommendations concerning cutting practices and reforestation 
procedures.6 
 
                                                 
6 Sandberg, 1988, 184-196. 
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Section nine provided the major conceptual challenge to the local boards charged with 
implementation. This provision called for forest practice regulations to be based upon a 
“scientifically determined” definition of forest maturity. Although seemingly 
straightforward, in time this provision forged and then drove a major wedge between 
various forestry sector factions. The failure to resolve this debate continually frustrated 
the district and provincial boards’ deliberations. Section twelve--a provision that provided 
for the “preservation of green belts on highways and rivers”--also created considerable 
controversy and opposition within the industry. 
 
The FIA Legislative Workings: 
 
The chief forester and woodlands manager of Bowater Mersey, Ralph Johnson and his 
successor Lief Holt actively supported the initial drive for conservation legislation 
renewal. Both sat on a draft legislation advisory committee with CIF:NS. Holt points out 
that the original draft from CIF:NS was much like a wish list: “don't ruin growing 
capacity--allow for ownership autonomy--allow owner to harvest when he sees fit--the 
owner defines maturity--no regulations!” It was to be enabling and motivating rather than 
constraining and coercive.7 Initially Johnson and his colleagues working through the 
CIF:NS, proposed this ‘minimal’ legislation to control forest cutting practices. This was 
to be implemented in much the same way as the STA had before it, by working out 
specific cutting plans with forest operators on the ground. This Act was necessary “to 
prevent extensive devastation of ... remaining forests resources."8 Despite these seemingly 
good intentions, however, this proposal failed to get full support throughout the CIF:NS. 
The Eastern Section argued, for example, that these regulations would be “onerous” given 
the situation of poor markets and prices for wood products. Without clear support and in 
light of the government’s pulp development oriented forest management agenda, the 
government backed off and tabled alternative legislation. This revised legislation was 
devoid of any real ‘forest conservation’ teeth. It did, nevertheless, have two key 
provisions. The first focused on registration, the second on greenbelts. 
 
                                                 
7 Interview with Lief Holt, Woodlands Manager for Bowater's Mersey: 1965-
1983. Liverpool, NS., April 1986. 
8 “Memorandum to Members of the Nova Scotia Section of the Canadian Institute 
of Forestry: Proposed Forest Legislation for Nova Scotia", MG 1, vol.2862, no 
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While the debates concerning the 1962 FIA focused on the alleged political and technical 
shortcomings of the STA, the enacted FIA legislation had few positive conservation 
attributes of its own. After enactment, opposition to the 1962 FIA was widespread. 
Johnson, for instance, advocated immediate rescission saying “there was nothing in the 
Act that would lead to better forest management". He suggested that the greenbelts were 
“grossly unfair” as they effectively took the most accessible and the most profitable 
forests out of production. In addition, Jan Weslien, Stora’s chief forester argued that 
while registration “might be a good thing", he could not see how it would directly lead to 
better forest management. This criticism from the government’s industrial partners led 
Haliburton, the Lands and Forests minister, to publicly admit that the green belt provision 
“was drafted too vigorously” and subsequently invited CIF:NS to offer possible revisions 
to the act.9 10 As a result, the 1962 Act was never proclaimed and the STA was not 
officially rescinded. 
 
In contrast to the negative tone of the 1962 FIA debates denouncing the STA, the 1965 
legislative debates were more forthright. The government concentrated more on 
promoting and defending what they considered the FIA’s decided attributes. As with the 
1962 FIA, the administration sold its new legislative package as an educational initiative. 
This was rather puzzling as the 1965 Act only briefly touched on education within the 
overall context of “persuasion and enforcement". This tactic in the legislature seemed as 
much an afterthought than an integral part to the government’s promotional strategy. In 
actual fact, rather than have an educational tone the 1965 FIA provisions were decidedly 
intrusive. This aspect was played down, however, by the administration and perhaps more 
interestingly, was totally overlooked by the official opposition.11 Nevertheless, compared 
to the initial 1962 FIA, the 1965 version was assuredly more authoritarian. While the 
FIA’s provisions for DFPIB’s and its proposed harvesting restrictions did create some 
interest among opposition members, these same provisions created quite a stir at the law-
amendments committee hearings. There, the FIA proposal received considerably rougher 
treatment than in the legislature; its widespread opposition accented the inconsistencies 
between what was literally written, what was supposedly intended and what the act’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
21, PANS 
9 NS Debates, 9 April 1962, 1367. 
10 Haliburton interview. 
11 NS Debates, February 22, 1965, 29. 
 143 
practical implications were. Haliburton, the minister, reportedly sat through three hours of 
lively criticism.12 
 
At first glance the sawmillers opposition appeared misplaced. They, after all, provided the 
initial impetus for revamped legislation. The views expressed at the hearings 
nevertheless, contrasted markedly with the picture that Haliburton tried to paint in the 
legislature at second reading--immediately before these hearings. Haliburton argued that 
The legislation itself is no more drastic or dictatorial than the Small Tree 
Act which it replaces, except that it carries the further requirements of 
replanting and licensing. 
 
He said that the objectives of the FIA would be brought about “through the medium of 
democratic bodies representing the forest industry and the woodlot owners themselves, by 
the appointment of local forest practice boards."13 Although Haliburton tried to dispel the 
notion of intrusiveness, it is clear from the law-amendment hearings that few present were 
convinced. By comparing their respective provisions, it is also clear that the l965 version 
had substantially more forest practices controls and reporting stipulations than either the 
STA or the ‘62 FIA before it.14 
 
During these hearings Clarence Porter, past president of the Nova Scotia Forest Products 
Association testified that the bill was “dictatorial and coercive". He also complained to 
the committee that “in the past ten years, large areas of Crown lands had been allocated 
by the government to companies producing and manufacturing pulp and paper products.” 
The bill, as Porter inferred, “would not regulate or govern the cutting or the culture of 
these lands, nor those held by the Crown.” As the FIA applied to only private lands and 
not to Crown land or to licensed Crown land, it was according to Porter, unlikely to be an 
effective tool for forest conservation. Although the FIA’s specific application to private 
lands was true and emphasised the seeming immunity that Stora would enjoy as managers 
of extensive Crown licenses, Porter overlooked its relevance to Scott Maritime and 
Bowater’s Mersey freeholds. These forestlands were substantial and were to be included 
under FIA regulation. In another attack on the minister, David Barrett, treasurer of the 
Nova Scotia Forest Products Association said, “the bill would spell death to local saw 
                                                 
12 Deakin, Basil. “Forest Conservation Bill Draws Criticism.” Chronicle Herald, 3 
March 1965, 3. 
13 NS Debates. Feb 22, 1965, 528. 
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mills, woodlot owners, sportsmen and to personal freedom.” Although his thesis appeared 
to ignore the legislation’s preamble, this view better reflected the literal thrust of the 
FIA’s legislative provisions. In general the concerns expressed reflected the sawmillers’ 
apprehension that the forests managed primarily for the pulp sector would injure their 
interests. Overviewing the specific provisions of the FIA, it is difficult to see how it could 
have served the multinationals’ interests either--as written the 1965 FIA was 
overwhelmingly restrictive. 
 
It is interesting to note that few provisions of the 1965 FIA had lineage in Nova Scotian 
forestry practices or legislative traditions. For the most part they were parachuted from 
Swedish legislative practices, the home of Stora Kopparberg.15 It appears that the 1965 
FIA was largely the creation of Stora’s chief forester, Jan Weslien. Weslien, a Swede 
quickly gained stature in the Nova Scotia forestry community by taking on the CIF:NS 
legislative committee’s chair after Johnson and Holt. Weslien worked hand in hand with 
Haliburton, the DLF minister during the final stages of this legislative drafting process.16 
The CIF:NS apparently lost control of the consultative process, despite the initial 
endorsement by the CIF:NS, the NSFPA, Voluntary Planning, and others. The finally 
tabled FIA received little support from professional foresters or sawmillers. Most support 
came, not surprisingly, from Stora and inside government the most ardent backing came 
from cabinet ministers. Support from the other major pulp processing interests was 
decidedly luke-warm, if not antagonistic. Scott seemed disinterested at first and based on 
public records Bowater seemed only mildly opposed. Lief Holt, Johnson’s successor at 
Bowater’s attested later, however, that his company opposed the 1965 FIA from its 
inception--despite the fact that Bowater’s played an active role in the 1962 FIA’s early 
development.17 This lack of support by the other multinationals was understandable given 
their extensive and dispersed forest operations--under this legislation they would be 
required to negotiate on forest practices with several district boards. 
 
At first glance, reading ‘within’ the lines, there appeared to be little logic in Stora’s 
support for this legislation. From an efficiency perspective, the 1965 FIA was likely to be 
                                                                                                                                                  
14 Holt interview. 
15 Stjernqist, Per. Laws in the Forests. Lund, 1973. 
16 Interview with Jan Weslien by L. Anders Sandberg: Spring, 1989. Summary 
relayed by Sandberg in a letter to the author June 24, 1989.  
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administratively cumbersome because of costly red tape. On closer examination, 
however, Stora’s support makes more sense because of the nature of its forestlands’ 
tenure, its provincial loan obligations and its Crown land licensing arrangements. Stora’s 
loan conditions, for example, required them to buy from small woodlot owners. The FIA, 
if implemented and successful, would stimulate small woodlot production to make it 
easier and cheaper to fulfil its contractual obligations. In addition, because Stora had little 
or no freehold and the FIA was directed specifically at private lands, there was little in the 
1965 FIA that would directly encumber it! On closer examination, the FIA seemed to be 
made-to-measure to benefit Stora--this was not surprising given the allegiance of its 
primary architect. 
 
Understandably the multinationals were never unified in their support for the FIA, but 
interestingly, all three later coalesced their opposition to the FIA’s greenbelt provision. 
Hans Linberg, Stora’s woodlands manager referred to this provision as the “green lie”--
referring to its propensity (or potential) to mask forest operations from the public eye. 
Interestingly Creighton, the DLF deputy minister was very much in favour of this 
provision--as it turns out it was he that spearheaded its inclusion in the 1962 FIA. This 
requirement was necessary, according to Creighton, to enhance the emerging tourism 
industry and protect general landscape values for the general public. Unfortunately, 
greenbelts were viewed not only as an economic encumbrance but a threat to ownership 
sovereignty. Consequently it engendered the industry’s vigorous opposition. 
 
While greenbelt support was always narrowly focused within a small faction of DLF 
personnel, support within the DLF generally for the FIA was initially weak and grew 
increasingly so. Successive deputy ministers: Creighton and Burgess considered the 
DFPIB’s policy-making provisions to be both awkward and unnecessary duplication. 
They argued that these provisions took power and responsibility away from elected 
politicians. In reality, however, the more likely reason for their opposition was that 
deputy-ministers would loose substantial influence if the PFPIBs were successful. It was 
clearly against their interests to actively support the FIA’s provisions; consequently, they 
impeded FIA implementation whenever they could.18 19  
                                                                                                                                                  
17 Holt interview. 
18 Creighton and Burgess interviews. 
19 “Board's Goal is Increased Forest Yields: Forest Improvement Act More 
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Despite senior bureaucratic indifference, the political administration fostered wider 
acceptance of the FIA after acknowledging its fragile industrial support during the 
enactment period. In a February 1966 DLF publication, authored by the minister, 
Haliburton not only extolled the FIA’s virtues but also interestingly claimed widespread 
forest sector backing. Since the time of enactment it was clearly gaining converts within 
the forestry sector--the government was able to boast support from organisations 
previously opposed to the FIA at the law-amendments committee hearings.20 In this 
publication he claimed that the DLF was “urged to adopt (FIA) forest conservation 
legislation” by the Institute of Forestry, the Forest Products Association, the Federation of 
Agriculture, and other interested bodies. Even if this was only token support by these 
forest sector players, this reflected an impressive public relations improvement. Being 
able to demonstrate this support publicly, the DLF was now able to demonstrate that it 
was serious about forest conservation. 
 
Implementing the various provisions of the Act was notoriously slow. FIA supporters 
were nevertheless appeased for a while by a demonstration DFPIB in Colchester County 
that served as a model for other areas.21 When other district boards were established, they 
enthusiastically embraced the act’s co-operative philosophy and attempted to settle basic 
procedural issues. Although enthusiasm at these meetings was at first high, optimism 
slowly gave way to frustration as recommendations continually fell on the DLF’s deaf 
ears. Although the DFPIBs’ debates were complex, much of the delay in implementing 
local recommendations could be attributed to the indifference of senior DLF officers and 
the concomitant lack of implementation resources.22 Two other factors, however, 
significantly slowed down FIA implementation. The first was that successful FIA 
enforcement was contingent upon developing a consensus on ‘forest maturity’ and its 
elusive scientific definition. The second, which was outside the confines of the FIA’s 
workings, was the ground level impact of federal-provincial forestry funding agreements. 
These agreements between the Governments of Canada and Nova Scotia made dedicated 
                                                                                                                                                  
Positive Approach.” Chronicle Herald, April 4, 1966. 
20 Haliburton, E.D. A Look at the Forest Improvement Act. Nova Scotia 
Department of Lands and Forests, February 1966, 2. 
21 “Provincial Forest Practices Improvement Board Appointed.” Chronicle-
Herald, December 2, 1965, 7. 
22 Creighton and Burgess interviews. 
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conservation legislation increasingly less potent in shaping ground level forest 
management practices. 
 
The relative potency of federal-provincial funding in shaping forest practices was 
illustrated as early as 1952 in Nova Scotia. Then a federal-provincial agreement 
supported forest inventory work as well as miscellaneous forest improvements.23 Later, in 
1962, a federally funded project to tackle unemployment in Industrial Cape Breton was 
undertaken. This agreement was used primarily to cut woods roads, beautify public 
highways, and conduct thinning and cleaning in young forest stands. In a similar 
programme in 1966, the highway from Louisbourg to Sydney was cleaned-up primarily 
as a ‘make-work’ and tourism development project. This accord also had the 
supplementary objectives of forest-stand thinning around Mabou, Cape Breton Island and 
undertaking Crown land improvements including access roads, stand improvement, forest 
inventory, and reforestation. While these agreements were stimulated by employment 
crises outside forestry, they had substantial and specific forest ‘improvement’ 
components24. Although their major goal was to create employment and facilitate short-
term woodfibre flow, they proved to be effective in making ground level changes. Unlike 
any forest legislation before them, they mobilised the private sector by cutting through 
ideological divisions and galvanising otherwise disparate interests to a common goal. 
Interestingly, with these funding agreements, the DLF was able to promote a 
predominantly technocentric forest management agenda to small woodlot owners under 
the guise of forest practices improvement grants! This was something they were unable to 
do with legislation alone. 
 
In contrast to this ground level action, forest conservation advocates focused on 
legislative initiatives, but they were left wallowing in endless debate about scientific 
measures of forest maturity and other, more esoteric issues. As a result of this 
irresolution, the FIA, starved of political and financial resources was increasingly viewed 
by the forestry sector as imperious, inhibiting and threatening. The federal-provincial 
agreements on the other hand were viewed--rightly or wrongly--as ideologically neutral 
and forest improvement positive. As a consequence these agreements developed a 
pragmatic consensus on what constituted acceptable forest practices! These bountiful 
                                                 
23 Creighton, 1988, 94. 
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policies were in practice much more acceptable to commercial and small woodlot owners 
alike--a key to their acceptance was clearly voluntary and not coerced participation. 
 
The difficulty of finding consensus on forest maturity within the DFPIB process should 
have been no surprise to the forestry sector. In drafting the 1965 FIA legislation, for 
instance, the DLF originally planned an operational definition of forest maturity but 
reneged when this proved elusive. With no internal DLF agreement legislative architects 
simply entrusted this problem with the DFPIBs--to be worked out in the FIA regulatory 
process.25 Unfortunately, once delegated to the wider forest community at the various 
district levels, it became increasingly difficult to resolve because increasingly more and 
disparate ideological interests were represented. 
 
The ongoing debate concerning acceptable forest practices and their ecological 
consequences and their implied ideological antecedents increased the policy-makers’ 
dilemma. It is important to note that no forestry faction was obviously or necessarily 
more conservative or exploitative than another. From a policy maker’s perspective, 
determining what set of forest definitions and ground level forest practices was in the 
province’s best environmental and economic interests for the immediate or longer terms, 
was conceptually complex and practically perplexing. In this indistinct policy context, it 
was difficult to either define or categorise forest conservation goals and it was 
problematic to prescribe appropriate forest management practices when no overarching 
agreement could be reached on acceptable philosophy and underlying principles. 
Nevertheless, once the 1965 FIA was ratified the immediate problem for Lands and 
Forest was to determine when and how various FIA provisions might be proclaimed, 
enforced, or alternatively deferred. Because of this philosophical and practical confusion, 
only three concrete outcomes emerged from the initial FIA implementation period of 
1965-8. As Sections 5A, 9, 10, and 18 were proclaimed in 1965 but not enforced, this was 
enough to ensure that the STA was finally repealed.26 With STA rescission there was now 
no statute restricting clearcutting because the FIA, to that date, had no operational 
regulations. A significant outcome of this minimal legislative action was that political 
                                                                                                                                                  
24 Creighton, 122 & 128. 
25 Haliburton interview. 
26 “Sections of Forest Improvement Act Passed by Order in Council.” Chronicle 
Herald, 29 Sept 1965, 3. 
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pressure from Stora and others to proceed quickly with FIA implementation dissipated--
urgency was now no longer necessary given the STA’s rescission. 
 
Within this more liberal regulatory environment Scott responded quickly in 1966 by 
revamping its standard ground-level forest practices. From this time on Scott almost 
entirely confined its harvesting practices to clearcutting. Johnson pointed out that at this 
time, Bowater’s Mersey was also under increasing pressure from its parent multinational 
to adopt a more far-reaching clearcutting policy. As their chief forester, with considerable 
professional status in the province and with the legislative weighting of the STA, he had 
previously been able to resist this pressure.27 It was not surprising then that Bowater’s 
Mersey’s change in policy coincided both with Johnson’s retirement and FIA’s 
proclamation. Indeed during this period, Bowater’s converted entirely to clearcutting after 
meticulously practising shelterwood forestry for most of the STA period.28 In contrast to 
what was happening at ground level, conservationists’ expectation that the FIA would 
soon produce workable ground-level regulations effectively dissipated political 
opposition to clearcutting. Most conservationists thought the battle was won but 
clearcutting was now standard practice in Nova Scotia and was also clearly a legitimate 
practice--interestingly not by overt adoption of new legislation but by indirect regulatory 
elimination. 
 
A second development surrounding the FIA’s proclamation concerned the workings of 
the DFPIBs. The establishment of several operational DFPIBs throughout the Province 
created a need for greater provincial co-ordination. This was subsequently addressed by 
an amendment in 1968 which authorised a Provincial Forest Improvement Board (see 
table 7.3). 
 
                                                 
27 Johnson interview. 
28 Johnson interview. 
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Table 7.3: The “Forest Improvement Act” (FIA) - Chapter 28: Assented to 11 April 
1968. 
 
Buffer Zones 
 
Buffer zones were extended to include ‘designated lakes'. Cutting and 
thinning within the buffer area became more restrictive essentially 
eliminating selective cutting within these areas. 
 
Provincial Forest Practices 
Improvement Board 
 
The addition of a Provincial Forest Practices Improvement Board 
(PFPIB) was made with duties to further the purpose of the Act and to 
co-ordinate the work of the District Forest Practices Improvement 
Boards (DFPIB). 
 
A third outgrowth was that forest maturity and related forest practices problems 
continually resurfaced as a conceptual block to FIA and DFPIB implementation progress. 
As a result, any real hope of implementing the FIA at this time began to seriously fade. 
When George Snow, a Progressive Conservative, inherited the Lands and Forests 
portfolio in 1968, however, he re-energised the FIA process. Urged on by forestry 
interests in his own constituency, Snow, rather naively it seems, pursued the spirit of 
forest conservation as explicitly written in the FIA. Snow not only rekindled the FIA 
policy process but he amended its structure and created the Provincial Forest Practices 
Improvement Board. He quickly appointed members to the PFPIB and took personal 
control as chairman.29 
 
The revised act as written, even with these amendments was still ambiguous, however. 
The most significant functions of the PFPIB as stated in section 5A(4)b were to: “cause to 
be prepared a manual of good forest practice” and in section 5A(4)e to: “prescribe, advise 
and make recommendations concerning cutting practices and reforestation procedures in 
the Province.” Section 9(1) stated, however: 
Except for the purpose of providing necessary roadways or brow or 
campsites, no person, as part of a commercial forest operation, shall fell 
healthy immature spruce, pine, hemlock or yellow birch trees in an 
immature stand of any such species unless he has first obtained permission 
to do so from the Board of the District in which the Stand is situated.30 
 
This latter section clearly implied regulation rather than recommendation or guidelines as 
section 5A(4)e inferred.  
 
For a while, Snow was able to build momentum with his provincial board and various 
                                                 
29 Interview with George Snow: Lands and Forests Minister, 1968-1969. Port 
George, Nova Scotia, September 1987. 
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joint meetings of district board chairmen. Snow’s progress was short lived, however, as 
the Progressive Conservatives were defeated in a provincial election in l969. It was 
necessary to wait until l971 before Dr. Maurice Delory, the Liberal Lands and Forests 
minister, named a successor PFPIB. He likewise responded to his own community 
pressure but surprisingly named most of Snow’s previous (partisan) appointees. By 
choosing an apparently more apolitical route, Delory tried to quickly regain the ground 
covered by Snow. Initially, reinstitution of the PFPIB created widespread support for the 
FIA. The PFPIB itself provided the promise of better co-ordination that for a time seemed 
to satisfy the industrial operators who had initially opposed the county structures. 
Unfortunately, according to Delory, this process befell the whims of “single minded 
environmentalists” who side tracked the process.31 Whether this was the reason for failure 
or not, it is clear that the FIA was beset with controversy and jurisdictional problems that 
lasted well into the seventies.32 Unluckily, this PFPIB stumbled over many of the same 
conceptual and practical issues its predecessors and the DFPIBs had experienced before 
it. 
 
Interestingly, in the early PFPIB years, an anti-multinational stance was taken by small 
woodlot and sawmiller concerns. This intra-organisational tension was exacerbated by the 
largely serendipitous appointment of an ‘environmentalist’ chairman: Hugh Fairn. Fairn’s 
appointment was a key turning point for the PFPIB. His initial appointment to the PFPIB 
as a loyal Progressive Conservative was under the auspices of the neophyte Nova Scotia 
Voluntary Planning Board. By his own admission he was not an expert in forestry; it was 
his lifelong interest in wildlife that dominated his policy sympathies.33 As time went on 
Fairn was increasingly in conflict with industrialists. He was never isolated, however; he 
continually got support from the ‘official’ wildlife representative added to the board in 
1972, and other interests such as sawmiller and small woodlot representatives (see Table 
7.4).34  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
30 1965 FIA. 
31 Interview with Maurice Delory: former Minister of Lands and Forests - early 
seventies. Bridgewater, August 1987.  
32 Sandberg, 1988, 185. 
33 Interview with Hugh Fairn: Chairman of the Provincial Forest Improvement 
Board, 1971 - 1984. Wolfville, Nova Scotia, 18 February 1986. 
34 “Forestry Board Not Backed by Authorities, Says Fairn.” Chronicle Herald, 
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In the mid-seventies conservation initiatives were buoyed within the PFPIB by growing 
public interest in environmental issues. The overall shift in the PFPIB towards 
environmentalism paralleled an equally strong but opposite move towards technocentrism 
within DLF that added considerably to PFPIB woes. The DLF’s ideological shift resulted 
from a calculated strategy of recruitment and promotion of those supporting technocentric 
forest policies and practices. This departmental policy had its roots in Haliburton’s era.35 
This ideological transformation gradually bred a ‘pulp culture’ within the DLF from the 
deputy minister down to its lowest managerial and technical ranks. While working under 
Haliburton: the minister and Creighton: the deputy minister Burgess, then the chief 
forester fostered closer ties with the major industrial concerns in the province. One way 
was by encouraging exchanges of personnel. 
So we told our staff, if you have an opportunity to go with a pulp and 
paper company or a sawmill industry, we will give you a year’s leave of 
absence. And at the end of the year, if you don’t want to stay with them or 
they don't want you to stay, you can come back and you haven’t lost a 
thing.36 
 
Table 7.4: The “Forest Improvement Act” as Amended - Assented to: 15 May 1972 
 
Membership of Forest 
Improvement Board 
 
Increased from six to seven members beside the chairman to include a 
member of the Nova Scotia Wildlife Federation. 
 
Function of Board 
Redefined 
 
a) Focus on Education, Persuasion and Enforcement of the Act. 
b) Prepare a manual of good forest practice - originally assigned to each 
district board. 
c) Assist and initiate activities in the (District) Forest Practices 
Improvement Boards. 
d) Establish Educational Programs. 
 
Forest Improvement 
Boards Structure 
 
Enables each district board to be enlarged up to ten people to represent 
industries and municipalities. 
 
Powers of (District) 
Forest Practices 
Improvement Boards 
 
Governor in Council may delegate or retract powers of provincial board 
to the district boards as necessary. 
 
Consultation on Research 
 
The deletion of the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture and the 
addition of the Nova Scotia Wildlife Federation. 
 
The pressure to conform to this growing pulp culture was pervasive. In several interviews 
with Department personnel it was clear that senior management was increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                  
February 25, 1984. 
35 Haliburton interview. 
36 Burgess interview. 
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intolerant of opposition to its pulp agenda.37 Some interviewees admitted that they owed 
professional advancement to either embracing or sharing this departmental ideology.38 As 
the DLF became increasingly enamoured with this pulp culture and technocentrism it 
became less tolerant of traditional and typically softer technology forest practices, and 
environmentalists’ arguments against these increasingly more radical forest practices.39 
Although by the seventies this ‘pulp culture’ pervaded most of the DLF bureaucracy it 
was from time to time at odds with political administrations and was increasingly at odds 
with growing public sympathy for environmentalism. 
 
The FIA was fully proclaimed in 1976, some eleven years after its enactment. 
Proclamation partly came about by continued pressure from the ‘soft industrialists’--
mostly old-guard sawmillers--who favoured old style forest stewardship and from 
environmentalists. Together they lobbied for full FIA implementation. Full 
implementation, at least full proclamation was, however, more directly the result of the 
Nova Scotia - Canada Forestry Agreement negotiated in the mid-seventies and signed in 
1977 rather than the result of a strong will by the provincial government. The 1977 inter-
governmental forestry agreement was made contingent on the FIA’s full proclamation 
within eighteen months of its signing by the federal government (see table 7.5).40 
Although it was (later) argued by federal officials that this agreement’s stipulation 
ensured the provincial government ‘got serious’ about forest conservation, the irony was 
that the full force of technocentric forestry practices was unleashed on Nova Scotia’s 
forests as a result.41 42 43 Increased funding enabled small and large forestry operations as 
well as Crown lands’ managers to finance ‘modern’ technocentric forest practices. Many 
small woodlot owners were in fact willing but likely unwitting participants in this 
                                                 
37 Dwyer interview. 
38 Burgess interview. 
39 Clancy, Peter. The Politics of Pulpwood Marketing in Nova Scotia, 1960-1985. 
In Sandberg, 92. 
40 The Provincial Forest Practices Improvement Board. Submission to the Royal 
Commission on Forestry. Halifax, April 1983, 23 and Appendix E. 
41 Interview with Ian Miller: Chief Implementation Officer, Forestry Canada-Nova 
Scotia Office, Truro, July 31, 1989. 
42 Interview with Andre H. Rousseau: Senior Development and Analysis Officer, 
Forestry Development and Communications, Forestry Canada, Ottawa, October 
1986.  
43 Interview with Johannes Ottens: Chief Policy Officer, Policy Planning and 
Economics Branch, Forestry Canada, Ottawa, October 1986. 
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technocentric ‘forestry conversion’ programme. 
 
One concession to environmentalists and soft industrialists on the PFPIB was the funding 
of a manual of “good practices”. This provision had been initially included in Section 9(i) 
of the FIA without financial appropriation. Eventually in 1980, “The Trees Around Us” 
was published and included a set of ground level prescriptions.44 Unfortunately from the 
environmentalists’ viewpoint, their inclusion as recommendations within this text rather 
than ‘stand alone’ regulations, as had been originally implied in the FIA text and implied 
in an earlier news release by the board chair,45 meant business as usual for industrialists. 
With recommendations and guidelines as opposed to regulations, there was no explicit 
threat of sanction as was implied, if not enforced, with the STA. 
 
Table 7.5: The Forest Improvement Act as amended - cited in RSNS Consolidated 
Legislative Reports, May 1984. 
 
Duty to Maximise Wood 
Harvests. 
 
The operator must make every effort to harvest all saleable wood of 
commercial value. 
 
Guiding Legislative 
Principles. 
 
Give appropriate weight to the principle that all trees cut will be used 
as far as reasonably practicable for the purpose to which will best 
contribute to the sustained development of the economy of the 
Province. 
 
Summary of 
Proclamations. 
 
Proclaimed (except 5A, 9, 10, 11 & 18) June 4, 1968). In force (except 
5A, 9, 10, 11 & 18) Feb. 21, 1969. Proclaimed (Sections 9, 10, 11, & 
18) Nov. 16, 1976. In force (Sections 9, 10, 11 7 18) Dec. 8, 1976. 
 
Legislative Notes. 
 
Note #1: Chapter 114 of the Revised Statutes, 1967 was, with the 
exception of Section 5A, 9, 10, 11, and 18, in force on February 21, 
1968. 
Note #2: Section 5A was enacted by Chapter 28 of the Acts of 1968 
which was not subject to proclamation, said chapter was assented to 
April 11, 1968. 
 
By this same period, the DLF’s predominant forest management ideology had become 
diametrically opposite to that of the increasingly powerful environmentalists. This 
ideology also contrasted starkly with the majority sentiment of the PFPIB. Interestingly, 
opposition within DLF aimed at the FIA--initially based on distrust of pulp interests; was 
replaced by an impassioned dislike and distrust of environmentalists.46 This shift in 
                                                 
44 Provincial Forest Practices Improvement Board. The Trees Around Us. 
Government of Canada/Province of Nova Scotia, 1980. 
45 Wylie, Don. “Implementation of N.S. Forest Management this Fall.” Chronicle 
Herald, July 18, 1979, 21. 
46 Burgess interview. 
 155 
rationale if not in policy allegiance also led to the increasing alienation of senior DLF 
personnel from the FIA implementation process--this antagonism was mostly embodied 
within the PFPIB process. This entrenchment of disapproval towards the FIA fostered 
greater behind-closed-doors ties between DLF and industrialists at various levels of their 
organisations. Although the PFPIB process for a while had brought public attention to the 
forest policy debate, substantive discourse on forest practices policy once again retreated 
out-of-site. Despite this withdraw to the backrooms of policy development, industrialists 
maintained representation on the PFPIB47--as one multinational woodlands manager put 
it--as a “damage control” measure!48 
 
The philosophical chasms that were becoming more apparent during the extensive PFPIB 
deliberations were suddenly wrenched apart by unexpected policy events. A major crisis--
a spruce budworm infestation that concentrated largely on the Cape Breton Highlands--
pitted environmentalists against industrialists. Spruce budworm, it should be noted, had 
been part of the natural forest ecology for centuries in Nova Scotia prior to this outbreak. 
Its periodic outbreaks naturally culled overmature forests to make way for new ones. The 
combination of prevailing winds from New Brunswick (to the west) which carried the 
spruce budworm moth and New Brunswick’s decades old policy of insecticide spraying 
kept spruce budworm populations in a prolonged ‘take-off’ and fast growing population 
growth stage. This was particularly frustrating because Nova Scotia maintained a ‘no 
spray’ policy that depended on natural spruce budworm population collapses. 
Unfortunately, the highly technocentric strategy to protect New Brunswick’s forests 
prevented Nova Scotia from successfully executing its preferred, more ecocentric 
approach.49 50  Lucklessly, Nova Scotia’s strategy was never really tenable given the 
influx of new moths from New Brunswick every year. This failure was the direct result of 
New Brunswick’s technocentric spray policy. The resultant unnatural and prolonged 
infestation that regular spraying brought had devastating effects on the overmature 
Balsam fir (the Spruce budworms’ preferred food) forests in Cape Breton’s Highlands. 
                                                 
47 Various interviews with Multinational Pulp and Paper Company officers. 
48 Interview with Jack Dunlop: Woodlands Manager, Bowater Mersey; February 
1986. 
49 “Cape Breton Group Lashes NB Spray Plan.” Chronicle Herald, Jan 13, 1979, 
17. 
50 “NB Blamed for Increase in Budworm Infestation.” Chronicle Herald, Mar.1, 
1979, 9. 
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These persistent infestations systematically defoliated Nova Scotia’s forests. Since there 
was no effective natural means to control spruce budworm growth in Nova Scotia--as 
long as New Brunswick continued to spray--the Highlands eventually died first followed 
unexpectedly by Cape Breton’s Lowlands. As this infestation became more severe 
throughout the seventies more drastic, more technocentric, and more controversial 
remedies were called for by the forest industry. Eventually the patience of the Nova 
Scotia’s forest industry ran out--but not with New Brunswick’s forest industry who were 
the real cause of this prolonged and severe problem but with Nova Scotia’s 
environmentalists who opposed spraying both on environmental and health grounds! 
Member industries called forcefully for a large-scale spray programme to control further 
budworm damage. This strategy appeared, according to industrialists, to be the only 
commercially viable solution as long as New Brunswick sprayed its forests. Despite 
widespread defoliation, environmentalists nevertheless argued that the budworm 
population should be allowed to continue to take its ‘natural’ course--even though there 
was no guarantee the forests could be saved. This difference of opinion between 
technocentrists and ecocentrists set the stage for a divisive conflict where neither party 
scored a satisfactory victory. 
 
Notwithstanding the ire of industrialists, the budworm spray conflict dramatically 
increased the PFPIB’s public profile. It moved from relative obscurity to the forefront of 
public interest and debate in the late seventies. Much of the ‘credit’ for this raised public 
profile goes to the PFPIB chairman: Hugh Fairn. He capitalised on any brief moment of 
board consensus to raise the public profile of the spray issue and to forward the 
environmentalists’ argument. For industrial representatives on the PFPIB such 
pronouncements regularly proved embarrassing, resulting in awkward retractions by 
parent organisations, especially the multinationals. This eventually led Hank Howard 
from Scott, a long standing member of the PFPIB, along with Hugh Ross of Stora to 
publicly call for the board’s dismantling at the 1984 Nova Scotia Forest Products 
Association annual meeting.51 During the PFPIB’s later years, Fairn became even more 
outspoken and as one might expect, board deliberations continued to be acrimonious. As 
interpersonal animosity grew an increasingly large rift developed between the 
industrialists and the environmentalists on the PFPIB. This conflict and debate over forest 
                                                 
51 Dyck, Hattie. “Forest Industry Officials Want Improvement Board Abolished.” 
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practices took place both within and outside the workings of the Board. Eventually it 
erupted into a full blown political crisis--as the spruce budworm infestation peaked so the 
environmental confrontation escalated. 
 
In the mid-seventies, Vince Maclean, the Liberal DLF Minister presided over this 
intensifying controversy. Although not directly responsible for the initial and 
controversial decision to halt spruce budworm spraying, he took the brunt of its political 
fallout as DLF minister. It was Alan Sullivan: the Minister of Health, however, who 
actually banned spruce budworm spraying. Although Sullivan did this for ‘reputed’ health 
reasons, unfortunately for Maclean, this fact went largely unnoticed by forest industry 
opponents, the press, and seemingly the general public. Maclean later claimed that he had 
been unfairly accused of buckling too easily to pressure from his home constituents--a 
predominantly urban riding that had little forestry expertise or direct interests. He 
counter-claimed that banning spraying was a carefully calculated decision by his cabinet 
colleagues.52 His Liberal cabinet colleagues, Maclean argued, were under intense pressure 
to approve Stora’s request to spray thousands of acres of infested Highland forests. To 
allow spraying, Maclean insisted, was the easier of the political options. 
 
In response to a growing political controversy Maclean spearheaded a joint committee of 
the Departments of Health, Environment, and Lands and Forests. Its purpose was to study 
this issue and make recommendations to cabinet. Numerous groups including the PFPIB 
and the Environmental Control Council made representation at these committee hearings. 
Surprisingly, both groups, especially given the ideological divisions within the PFPIB, 
advocated the no-spray option. In the end, the Joint Committee recommended to not 
restart spraying and Maclean took this to Cabinet. Maclean recalled that this was closely 
scrutinised and debated by Cabinet--it was an agenda item “at least a dozen times” before 
the final decision was reached. According to Maclean, the most persuasive scientific 
evidence was that the infestation was so intense on the Highlands that even a very 
successful spray program would leave sufficient budworm to “leisurely eat the remaining 
forests". Although the final decision was contrary to the pulp companies’ wishes and the 
recommendations of senior DLF management, the industry, at least openly, capitulated--
                                                                                                                                                  
Chronicle Herald. Feb. 4, 1984, 19. 
52 Interview with Vince Maclean: Minister of Lands and Forests, 1976 - 1978; 
May 1987. 
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on the surface the industry seemed resigned to salvaging what they could from budworm 
damaged forests. For good reason or not, cabinet’s decision increased the animosity 
between the various PFPIB factions. Whether or not the provincial cabinet’s decision 
could be attributed to the lobbying efforts of the PFPIB chairman and his majority 
supporters, the PFPIB and with it the FIA lost further credibility among industry and DLF 
bureaucrats. 
 
When the Liberals lost the l978 election, the multinationals seized the opportunity to 
regain influence with the Progressive Conservatives. Government sympathy gradually 
shifted back to the multinationals and support for their technocentric forest practices. 
Although the Progressive Conservatives seemed happy to renew their ties with the 
multinationals, at first they stepped cautiously so as not to raise the ire of the increasingly 
distrusting public and the buoyant environmentalists. From time to time, the government 
announced limited and experimental spray programs to test the waters in the hope of not 
inciting another forestry controversy:53 
The spray program was a brand new program and of course they [the 
Cabinet] were all terrified that they were going to get into the ill will of the 
public and they wondered if there was any need for spraying. You were 
sort of being cross-examined by the Cabinet and by everybody opposed to 
forest development.54 
 
By this time, however, much of the steam had dissipated from the environmental lobby, 
especially after environmentalists had claimed victory after the ‘no spray’ decision. The 
reintroduction of experimental spraying was accomplished with little environmentalists’ 
protest.55 56 Although it is clear that the industry was upset that they were not allowed to 
launch a full-scale chemical spray program, there was little public forewarning of the 
industrial / environmentalists dispute that erupted in 1982.57 58 Having lost fifty percent of 
softwood cover to budworm infestation and having begun a large- scale reforestation 
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program with ‘industrial’ softwood species, Stora unilaterally announced a massive 
program of phenoxy herbicide spraying. This forest protection program was designed to 
combat the extensive hardwood competition to their softwood plantations. While 
technically a separate spray issue from the spruce budworm controversy, history suggests 
it closely intertwined politically.59 Although perhaps justified from an economic 
standpoint, Stora’s proclamation to spray was a public relations disaster. Stora’s 
announcement apparently caught both the DLF and the remaining forest industry off-
guard. The Department of Environment, despite being under considerable pressure from 
environmental groups subsequently issued Stora a license to spray. This defeat was 
devastating to the environmentalists, they considered this an industry-wide precedent. As 
a result of the environmentalists’ concerns, this controversy escalated into a major court 
battle in 1983 gaining international attention--especially in Sweden, Stora’s parent 
company’s home-base.60 61 The ensuing court proceedings tore Nova Scotia’s forest 
community apart; it more sharply divided environmentalists and industrialists than any 
issue before it.62 63 While the plaintiffs, the Cape Breton Land Owners Association lost 
their suit on appeal to Nova Scotia’s Supreme Court; Stora (and the pulp industry 
generally) suffered considerable public relations damage. 
 
During this period the Progressive Conservatives and the Department of Lands and 
Forests found themselves in a particularly tenuous position. Hugh Fairn further exploited 
this vulnerability--he used the PFPIB process as a voice once again to foster public 
sentiment for the environmentalists’ forest practices position. The question of whether 
Nova Scotia’s forests were to be predominantly an industrial installation or serve as a 
much broader cultural amenity became a central political issue. As this debate persisted, 
the provisions of the FIA--as written--gained greater relevance as did the explicit mandate 
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of the PFPIB. One of the outgrowths of this controversy was a rather bizarre public 
debate between George Henley, now the DLF minister, and Hugh Fairn.64 65 66 Attempts 
by Henley to neutralise Fairn only exacerbated political tensions and did nothing to 
alleviate the growing public ill will towards the pulp industry. Eventually, to quell this 
raging debate, the government called for a Royal Commission Inquiry to sort out the mess 
precipitated originally by Stora’s unilateral actions. 
 
George Henley, in a later interview, was candid about the Royal Commission. Although 
publicly the enquiry was to make an in-depth analysis of the forest industry in general, 
Henley explained the real reasons 
What it is, is an exercise in self-survival, isn’t it? And if you can get 
something going that will carry the heat for you, you’ll always go and do 
that ... Royal Commissions really are a way of getting out from under the 
heat for a while.67 
 
As will be seen in Chapter Nine, the Royal Commission proved very successful in taking 
the wind from the environmentalists’ sails. This inquiry also undermined the PFPIB 
process, silenced the PFPIB chairman, quelled the howling political storm, and provided a 
politically palatable avenue for rescission of the now highly controversial FIA. Most 
importantly, the Royal Commission gave the pulp industry time to reconsolidate. In due 
course, this respite from public controversy allowed the pulp industry to resume business 
largely as usual without either the encumbrance or threat of restrictive forest conservation 
legislation or regulations. Before examining contemporary issues in Chapter Nine, 
however, the following chapter revisits the workings of the FIA to gain a clearer 
understanding of the dynamics of power in the policy process. These insights provide a 
more intelligible explanation of the underlying dynamics of the forest conservation 
problem and a sharper lens with which to assess present policy practice and proposed 
future directions for forest management in Nova Scotia.        
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 Chapter Eight: 
 Dimensions of Power in the FIA Implementation Process. 
 
This chapter covers two broad themes concerning policy power and influence during the 
FIA legislative era. It first explores the dimensions of multi-agency power including the 
underlying influences on agency character, inter-agency relationships, and organisational 
ecology. This is followed by a more macro analysis of power impinging on forest 
management decision-making. This second analysis initially focuses on pluralist, elitist, 
and structural influences pervading the policy process and then examines the policy 
process in the context of ecological modernisation, and market and state failure. 
 
 The Early Multi-agency Management Context. 
 
1. Agency Character: 
 
As explained in Chapter Four, understanding the inner workings of key forestry agencies 
within Nova Scotia’s forest management sector gives valuable insight into the sector’s 
overall capacity to accomplish forest conservation goals. This key-agency approach 
provides insights into habitual styles of operation that helps to gauge future agency 
responses to assorted management dynamics. Although Nova Scotia’s 30,000 small 
woodlot owners controlled some 50,000 woodlots and accounted for about 50% of 
forested land during the FIA implementation period, their woodlots were generally simply 
managed. Planning was characteristically done on the “back of cigarette packages” at the 
kitchen table.1 Forest operations were a sideline for many woodlot owners; the woods 
were worked in downtime from fishing, farming, and other livelihoods or when additional 
cashflow was necessary. Despite this ancillary role for forestry, woodlot owners were seen 
as an “an independent lot who resented anything that restricted his personal right to run 
his business and control his property.”2 Woodlot owners characteristically valued 
management sovereignty and typically distrusted and resisted government intervention. 
 
                                                 
     1 Creighton interview. 
     2 Deakin, Basil. “Forest Conservation Bill Draws Criticism.” Chronicle 
Herald, 3 March 1965, 3. 
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Despite the woodlot owners’ usual political impotency, efforts to handcuff or manipulate 
the small woodlot owners through forest management policy had little success. An 
unsuccessful Bill 151 in the late twenties, for example, proposing to embargo exports 
from private lands to ensure adequate supply for Nova Scotia’s wood producers failed to 
get enactment after woodlot owners opposed it. Regional opposition to the STA in the 
forties and fifties, which some small woodlot owners characterised as a “largely socialist 
measure” also demonstrated the difficulty in trying to corral small woodlot owners 
without their expressed consent. In addition, the subsequent watering down of the 1962 
FIA from that proposed by CIF:NS, to some extent showed the small woodlot owners’ 
resolve when faced with intrusive state intervention.3 Unfortunately, for small woodlot 
owners, their public defence of management autonomy rarely reaped lasting social or 
economic benefits. Their lack of managerial sophistication and generally weak political 
bargaining position continually reinforced their domination by the more powerful 
woodfibre processors.4 
 
In the face of more intense political influence as well as increasing market domination by 
the pulp sector in the late sixties and early seventies, small woodlot owners began a more 
concerted attempt to gain more power by organising at the provincial level. In 1969 they 
organised under the Societies Act as the Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners Association 
(NSWOA). This organisational drive attracted over 1,200 members. They first lobbied for 
collective marketing and focused their initial policy efforts on broadening the scope of the 
already operational Natural Products Marketing Act. This act’s provisions were 
considered too narrow by government to be applied to pulpwood, however, and a 
Pulpwood Marketing Act with considerably less leverage was proposed instead in 1972.5 
Although offering considerably less than small woodlot owners hoped for, the Pulpwood 
Marketing Act provided the means for registration as bargaining agents and the creation 
of a Pulpwood Marketing Board. In implicit recognition of their market domination, the 
                                                 
     3 Cameron, John S. to Angus L. Macdonald, MG 2, vol. 970, file 25, PANS, 28 
June 1952 . 
     4 Clancy, 142-167. 
     5 SNS, 1972, C.15. 
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boundaries of bargaining groups were drawn around the effective monopsony boundaries 
of the three major multinational pulp processors.6 
 
Although the small woodlot owners initially made headway in addressing the 
asymmetrical market power of the pulp companies, intra-sector disunity and apathy as 
well as the continued resistance of the pulp companies generally hindered them. Although 
a membership of over a thousand might seem impressive for the small woodlot owners 
group, compared, for example, to CIF:NS with fewer than a hundred members their 
potential membership exceeded thirty thousand. This organisation’s inability to represent 
and speak for all small landowners or a sizeable minority severely weakened its political 
influence. Any suggestion that this organisation was speaking for all landowners on forest 
policy was strongly resisted by the multinationals. In the marketplace where the small 
woodlot owners’ influence really mattered, they were continually frustrated by the failure 
to implement the provisions of the Pulpwood Marketing Act. During this period they were 
also marginalised by the multinationals who gradually shifted their reliance for raw 
products from the small woodlot owners to alternative pulpwood sources such as their 
own forest holdings, the other large commercial holdings, and Crown licences. For the 
most part then, the small woodlot owners were politically fragmented and economically 
weak. 
 
In contrast most sawmill operations ranged in size from small family operations to 
medium sized companies of fifty to a hundred--often seasonal employees. Several 
sawmills operations were vertically integrated with woodlands to ensure a continued 
sawlog supply; these supplies were also used for market leverage with the small woodlot 
owners. For many years the sawmillers were largely the beneficiaries of the woodlot 
owners’ organisational and marketplace ineptness. Before and during the early years after 
the Second World War, the sawmillers were well positioned to influence forest policy 
through NSFPA that was established in 1934.7 However, the dynamics of the fifties and 
early sixties seriously undermined the sawmillers privileged access to policy formulation. 
The DLF minister, during the FIA ratification process, for example, characterised them as 
                                                 
     6 Curtis, David S. Toward an Effective Marketing Structure for Woodlot 
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     7 Clancy 
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“the most difficult people in the world to get together", suggesting of course a less than 
harmonious relationship of the government with sawmillers and among sawmillers.8 
 
For the most part, each sawmill established a small monopsony for forest products in its 
local area. Although developing technology increased some mills’ capacities and made 
others uneconomic, NSFPA’s collective voice generally worked to maintain forestry’s 
status quo that favoured the sawmillers in general. While the sawmillers’ resistance to 
pulp expansion in the fifties seemed quite rational, their active support of forest 
conservation legislation seemed somewhat out of character as some sawmillers were 
actively opposed to the STA; many had a legacy of highgrading and others opposed 
conservation measures as too costly. On the surface their support for legislative renewal 
seemed against their basic interests. Their support for legislative renewal could best be 
seen as a political bargaining tactic--a rearguard action to bolster their decaying policy 
influence as the multinational pulp companies became more powerful. 
 
As land managers the two thousand or so commercial landowners (those owning over 400 
ha) were more managerially sophisticated than the small woodlot owners; they were by 
and large more focused on economic efficiency. Several commercial landowners had 
integrated sawmills and some were also involved in sawlog and pulpwood exports. A few 
could claim a solid history of forest stewardship using relatively soft forest management 
practices. Most commercial operators, however, practised widespread clearcutting. 
Several were actively involved in NSFPA and a few exerted influence in the CIF:NS 
through their professional foresters.9 The largest commercial operator in the fifties was 
the Bowater’s Mersey Paper Company. In some ways Bowater’s was an enigma among 
the large industrialists who operated during the FIA era. It might have been expected to 
oppose strengthened ground level forest conservation regulations, and it might have been 
widely distrusted by sawmillers as an integral part of the pulp expansion programme. This 
view did not, however, take into account Ralph Johnson’s (Bowater’s chief forester) 
unyielding forest management philosophy or Bowater’s determination to undermine 
potential competition from the new multinationals. Instead of falling in line with the new 
pulp sector, Bowater’s initially championed conservation legislation renewal and 
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vigorously opposed pulp sector expansion. Its public position emphasised the perceived 
insufficiency of Nova Scotia’s forest inventories to support substantial industrial 
expansion. 
 
Although Scott’s pulpmill was a new addition in the sixties, its woodland operations in 
Nova Scotia were purchased much earlier from the US based Hollingsworth and Whitney 
Company. Using its freeholds and Crown land licenses Scott increasingly focused on 
commercial efficiency at the expense of forest conservation. In its defence, however, its 
new pulpmill redirected pulpwood destined for New England pulpmills to Nova Scotia. 
Scott was most forthright about its forest practices and preferred policies; it clearly 
favoured minimal state intervention in forest management operations and made that 
public knowledge. In contrast, when Stora settled in Nova Scotia, it advocated 
fundamental changes to Nova Scotia’s forest policy and management practices. As one of 
the oldest corporations in the world and one of the world’s largest forest products 
companies, it not only brought capital to Nova Scotia but also a well established and a 
somewhat alien forest management philosophy. Stora advocated a more systematic and 
classically Swedish approach to ground level forest management.10 
 
While the multinationals were often divided as a sub-sector, DLF was often split within 
its own organisational ranks. Its broad legislative mandate dictated three largely 
incompatible goals.11 First as Crown lands’ manager, DLF was charged with revenue 
generation through the sale of its land holdings and Crown stumpage sales. Along with 
various taxes, fees, and Crown royalties, DLF’s stumpage sales provided an important 
contribution to provincial conifers. Second, Lands and Forests was also accountable for 
the ‘responsible’ management of private lands. This frequently set DLF in conflict of 
interests attempting at one and the same time, for example, to improve the economic 
viability of small woodlots and also offering substantial competition through its Crown 
land sales. Third, DLF had a significant but much less extensive role in wildlife and 
aesthetics management as well as forest recreation development; these objectives were 
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     11 Creighton, 1988, 27-35. 
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frequently at loggerheads with its forest exploitation objective. Although wildlife 
management and forest management conflicts periodically surfaced in the legislature, 
rarely did any significant changes materialise in ground level practices to accommodate 
these concerns.12 13  
 
A number of provincial organisations also influenced this public policy process. Before 
pulp expansion, NSFPA represented the sawmillers, many larger landowners, and 
Bowater’s. During the early years, NSFPA’s primary role was set on safeguarding the 
indigenous forest industry’s established interests; it provided little support for the 
government’s forestry transformation agenda. Evidence from key actors suggests that 
NSFPA traditionally promoted its interests through close ties with the Liberal 
administration prior to 1957. A change to the Progressive Conservatives, however, 
threatened these links and its traditional political influence began to erode.14 While 
NSFPA’s response to the pulp expansion agenda was largely reactive, offering no 
alternative economic development agenda, CIF:NS played a more proactive role. As an 
organisation of professional foresters drawn from government, the pulp processing 
interests, and the sawlog industries, their broad ‘professional’ view was found to be 
particularly credible on forest management matters. As already explained, the CIF:NS’s 
policy efforts was largely responsible for the initial political interest in renewed forest 
conservation legislation. 
 
2: Inter-agency Relationships. 
 
Prior to pulp expansion the most significant forest sector market relationship was the 
small woodlot owner/sawmiller association. Most small woodlot owners sold stumpage 
infrequently which limited their market wherewithal. This marketing deficiency 
significantly advantaged the sawmillers who regularly scheduled woodlands operations; 
controlled aggregate flows from small woodlots, Crown holdings, and freeholds; and 
generally controlled prices by their superior knowledge and integrated forest management 
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operations.15 These structural advantages fostered rather paternalistic forest management 
relationships between sawmillers and small woodlot owners. Consequently, harvesting 
returns for individual small woodlot owners were often low providing little economic 
surplus to reinvest in forest management in general and forest conservation in particular. 
 
As the need for more pulpwood became increasingly critical in the sixties, sentiment for 
policy intervention on small woodlot lands gained popularity among the multinationals, 
economic advisors, and government. The earlier lessons in attempting to directly interfere 
with woodlot owners’ decision-making autonomy were forgotten. The Voluntary 
Economic Planning Board, for example, suggested that “ownership of forest lands entails 
an obligation of responsibility for keeping land productive and from becoming a public 
nuisance”.16 Premier Stanfield also commented that 
we are either serious about making the most of our forests or we're not ... I think if 
we are serious we have to carry through, and encourage our people [private land 
owners] to follow certain practices that will mean a great deal to our province in 
the future.17 
 
The DLF bureaucracy was dominated in the sixties and early seventies by returning 
veterans trained in crash courses in forestry and allied professions after the war. They 
were generally sympathetic to sawmillers and small woodlot owners needs. However, the 
DLF bureaucracy increasingly favoured the pulp agenda. As time passed DLF became less 
sensitive to small woodlot owner and sawmiller concerns and by the mid-seventies acted 
largely as the multinationals’ agent state. During this period, sawmillers as well as small 
woodlot interests were increasingly subserved by the pulpwood agenda.18 Pulpwood 
production from Crown licensed lands, for example, increasingly distorted markets 
against the interests of small woodlot owners; and the multinationals with aid from 
government, also built three of the largest sawmills in the province. Although pulp sector 
expansion (Stora, for example, expanded from 135,000 - 175,000 tons per year and 
                                                 
     15 MacQuarrie, Peter. A Survey of Private Woodland Owners in Nova Scotia. 
Forest Planning Division, Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests, Halifax, April 
1981, 24. 
     16 Nova Scotia, Voluntary Economic Planning Board. Submission of Forestry 
Section to Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning Board. RG 55, series “VP", vol.3, no. 14, 
PANS, Halifax, 1964, 61. 
     17 NS Debates, 22 February 1965, 536-7. 
     18 Bissix, Glyn and L. Anders Sandberg. The Political Economy of the Nova 
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installed a 160,000 ton newsprint facility in 1969)19 should have been good news for the 
small woodlot owner because of an expanding pulpwood market, Crown licence renewals 
(Stora’s provided a top-up to 81,000 ha and a rise in the allowable cut from 12 - 25 cubic 
feet per acre per annum) generally suppressed private woodlot production and open 
market demand.20 
 
DLF efforts to acquire more Crown land in 1974 were a further threat to small woodlot 
owners. Even though total woodfibre production increased from 90 million cubic feet in 
1964 to over 135 million in 1974, the woodlot owners share got progressively smaller and 
their bargaining power was continually eroded.21 During this period it should be noted, 
Crown lands’ production rose to 21% and larger freehold production increased to 43%. 
The remaining 36% for small woodlots were a far cry from the 70% share this segment 
held in the late fifties.22 As a result of undermining their bargaining power and policy 
influence, it is clear that in the late STA period and throughout much of the FIA period, 
the provincial government had a deteriorating relationship with both small woodlot 
owners and sawmillers. In this policy environment none of the key inter-agency 
relationships--sawmillers and woodlot owners, woodlot owners and multinationals, or the 
provincial government with any of these sub-sectors--seemed conducive to the 
development and implementation of sound forest conservation practices. 
 
3: Multi-agency Organisational Ecology. 
 
In the context of inter-agency relationships that provided little incentive for implementing 
forest conservation policy, it is not surprising that aggregate multi-agency processes 
provided no additional basis for optimism in forest conservation management. In general 
inter-agency processes aggregate in complex ways where the sum of the parts rarely 
reflects total individual or accumulative organisational inputs. This is what Nozick in his 
                                                                                                                                                  
Scotia Forest Improvement Act, 1962-1986. In Sandberg, 1992, 178. 
     19 Johnson, 1986, 272. 
     20 Bissix and Sandberg, 178. 
     21 Department of Lands and Forests. Nova Scotia Forest Production Survey: 
1987, 1988. 
     22 Nova Scotia, Annual Report: Department of Lands and Forests - Fiscal year 
ending March 31, 1975. Halifax. 
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discussion of the multi-agency policy context referred to as the ‘invisible hand’.23 
Although organisational complexity was apparent in the STA legislative era, this era’s 
multi-agency dynamics were much simpler than its successor. During the STA era 
existing sawmills monopsonies effectively dictated market patterns as well as forest 
practices. These de facto sawlog markets were later destabilised, however, by pulp sector 
expansion. Over time, as the pulp sector markets grew and sawmills evolved and 
expanded in response to technological innovations (see table 8.1), previously quite stable 
sawmill monopsonies gave way to larger, more pervasive, and more complex pulpmill 
focused, multi-organisational monopsonies. In time, existing relationships between 
sawmillers and small woodlot owners transformed to more onerous paternalistic pulp 
sector dominated political economies. In this multi-agency context two things became 
clear. The first was that DLF and the provincial government could do little to promote 
forest conservation without the expressed will of the sector’s constituent agencies, 
especially the multinationals. The second was that the multinational pulp companies, over 
time, developed a foreboding political economy that created a policy momentum all of its 
own. This momentum aimed at forest exploitation rather than forest conservation created 
considerable policy inertia that would require substantial managerial and political 
resources to overcome. 
 
4: Macro Dimensions of Power: the FIA’s Early Years. 
 
Although multi-agency insights are useful in explaining internal forest sector dynamics, 
this alone tends to under-explain the impact of broader socio-political influences. This 
analytical approach fails, for example, to provide critical insights into the way forest fibre 
production and forest conservation policy adapted to and was influenced by national and 
international political and economic issues. Macro theories of power, such as structural 
analysis derived from classical Marxism is more useful. Structuralism purports that the 
                                                 
23  Weale, 39. 
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Table 8.1: Concentration of Sawmill Production during the Pulp Expansion Period.  
 
Year 
 
# of Mills 
 
Value 
 
Year 
 
# of 
Mills 
 
Value 
 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
 
610 
598 
600 
594 
675 
732 
667 
643 
582 
526 
467 
486 
462 
264 
 
$16,743,884 
$13,562,282 
$15,772,588 
$21,534,108 
$20,162,764 
$19,055,939 
$17,406,816 
$23,057,000 
$19,319,000 
$17,579,000 
$14,131,000 
$15,720,000 
$15,985,000 
$11,568,000 
 
1964 
1965 
1966 
 
1984 
1985 
1986 
 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
 
239 
206 
196 
 
353 
360 
350 
 
341 
333 
279 
306 
 
$15,609,000 
$16,708,000 
$18,265,000 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
Unadjusted dollars. 
 
Sources: 
Provincial Distribution of Forty Leading Industries [Nova Scotia]. Cat. 31-209; Annual Reports - 
NS. Dept. of Lands and Forests; NS Forest Production Survey (1987, 1992, 1994 and Calendar 
Year 1994); NS. Resource Atlas, 1985. 
 
 “class interests of capital continually achieve goals through the realisation of profit.” For 
Nova Scotia’s forest sector, the Structuralist interpretation focuses on three dominant 
factors. The first concerns the policy resources available to various forest sector interests; 
the second explores the nature of those interests and how they translate into concrete 
policy preferences, and the third scrutinises their outcomes.24 
 
Some evidence in this study suggests that concentrated capital exerted influence over 
provincial forestry policy machinery early in the century and exploited the structurally 
weak small woodlot owners. For the most part, however, the evidence suggests that 
political and economic influences were broadly distributed during this period.25 A number 
of transnational interests, mainly from Maine, were active in Nova Scotia in the nineteen 
                                                 
     24 Blowers, 1984, 8-9. 
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twenties, thirties, forties, and fifties. The purchase of the Mersey Paper Company by the 
North American based Bowater’s in 1956 was, however, the first substantial evidence of a 
concentration of multinational power in Nova Scotia’s forest sector.26 Nevertheless, it was 
not until the provincial government courted other international forest sector interests that 
the full weight of the multinationals’ structural power was felt. 
 
Scott Paper, which had purchased the extensive freeholds of Hollingsworth and Whitney 
in 195627 was an early beneficiary of this consolidated power. As previously outlined, the 
government bargained fervently although not successfully to secure Scott’s pulpmill 
investment during this period. Consistent with Structuralist discourse, however, these 
aborted negotiations had little lasting impact on Scott’s corporate affairs but were costly 
to government. It exposed government’s bargaining hand reducing its effectiveness in 
subsequent multinational negotiations. The previously influential sawmillers were largely 
swept aside in this fervour for multinational capital. While this favouritism prompted 
sawmillers to mobilise their remnant structural influence their efforts amounted to little. 
The government worked relentlessly, if not always deliberately, for the interests of the 
greater concentrations of capital--the multinationals. As a case in point, government 
undermined the STA and introduced toothless forest conservation legislation in its place 
in 1962; later the government substituted unworkable forest conservation legislation in 
1965. 
 
The multinationals’ structural power went well beyond direct public policy influence. 
Bowater’s, for instance, dominated the CIF:NS legislative committee in the late fifties and 
was succeeded by Stora in the early sixties. This allowed them to more indirectly 
influence private and public policy. Very early in its corporate life in Nova Scotia, Stora 
impacted forest conservation policies through its associations with government. While 
Stora’s Crown license and loan stipulations notionally made it accountable to the 
government and small woodlot owners, the reality was that the close ties necessary with 
DLF personnel to implement these agreements in time gave it privileged influence over 
policy machinery. 
                                                                                                                                                  
     25 Clancy, 1992, 145. 
     26 Johnson, 1986, 274. 
     27 Creighton, 1988, 101. 
 172 
 
As explained in Chapter Four, Elitist interpretations of the policy process overlap 
Structuralism in fundamental ways. The essential difference, it should be remembered is 
that Elitist power focuses on the competitive outcomes of subjective interests rather than 
structural bias. There were two dominant elites competing for influence in Nova Scotia’s 
forest sector prior to FIA enactment. The first was the indigenous industry that included 
sawmillers and Bowater’s Mersey; the second was the expanding pulp processing 
industry. As a policy alliance, the indigenous industry tried to exploit the fledgling pulp 
processors’ reliance on clearcutting and other technocentric practices. The indigenous 
industry’s call for legislative renewal in this context, however, can best be seen as a tactic 
to frustrate pulp sector expansion--there appears to be little merit for its support 
otherwise. 
 
Despite the indigenous industry’s success on the legislative front, the superior power of 
the multinationals was generally used for more direct economic advantage. In time, their 
more direct economic policy efforts overwhelmed opposition from the indigenous 
industry. For example, the new pulp processors sought and won major infrastructure 
concessions that increased their production capacity and increased the demand for higher 
levels of harvesting.28 29 30 This largely served to thwart any attempt to implement forest 
conservation legislation. Interestingly, in this context of competing elites, the new pulp 
processors initially bargained for the complete withdrawal of conservation legislation but 
later conceded to the toothless FIA legislation in 1962. This legislative enactment 
provided a rather shallow policy victory for the indigenous industry because the 1962 FIA 
had few ground level teeth to affect forest practices. Later, although the indigenous 
industry appeared to gain a second legislative victory with the formulation of new 
legislation in 1965--after their disappointment with the first FIA enactment--it was Stora, 
one of the two new multinationals that seemed destine to win most from this legislation, if 
implemented. Notionally, as argued in Chapter Seven, the 1965 FIA imposed rather 
                                                 
     28 Canada-Nova Scotia Pulp and Paper Modernization Agreement. Cited in 
Canada / Nova Scotia Forest Resource Development Agreement. August 31, 1982. 
Government of Canada / Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests, Halifax, 13-14. 
     29 Johnson, 1986, 269-280. 
     30 Canadian Forestry Service. Federal-Provincial Development Agreements: 
Overview. June 17, 1986, Ottawa.  
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onerous regulations on all but Stora. Scott and Bowater’s were likely to have been the 
most adversely affected by the FIA’s full implementation.31 
 
Although this study provides broad evidence of structural and elitist influences, it 
identified only sporadic signs of Pluralism. Pluralists argue that individuals in society are 
able to aggregate their policy interests to present a coherent position to an interested and 
responsive democratic government. The state responds by mediating competitive interests 
to formulate an equitable policy position reflecting the overall public interest. Despite 
enthusiasm for the democratic process, Neo-pluralists concede that capital and other elites 
frequently overlook various underclass interests. Although unemployed miners and 
steelworkers as organised labour elites exerted pressure for industrial development to 
compensate for their ailing industries, their individual, pluralistic, locational, social, and 
cultural needs were largely ignored in this policy process. The pulp sector deliberately 
settled far from industrial Cape Breton to avoid pockets of organised labour. Convincing 
the pulp sector to locate close to Industrial Cape Breton was, it appears, too hard a sale for 
the provincial government in light of this region’s history of labour unrest. Just as the 
unemployeds’ interests were spurned, so were the needs of small landowners in setting up 
collective pulpwood marketing arrangements. The internal divisions among small 
woodlot owners worked against the small woodlot owners combined interests; their 
divergent opinion continually played into the hands of the more focused and pervasive 
capitalists’ interests. 
 
Dimensions of Power during the Late FIA Period: 
 
During the seventies, the multinationals strove to consolidate their initial structural power 
over the forestry sector. They did this by building paternal market relationships with the 
sawmillers; campaigning against collective bargaining for the small land owners; 
developing strong corporatists’ ties with the Lands and Forest bureaucracy; stalling 
implementation of the FIA and frustrating the PFPIB process; and attempting to 
undermine environmentalist opposition to their technocentric forest practices. The early 
seventies saw the sawmillers gradually lose control of their local monopsonies to be swept 
                                                 
     31 Dave Dwyer interview. 
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up by the more pervasive market power of the multinational pulp companies. By the early 
eighties, the three major multinational pulp companies had firmly established their 
dominance over the forest sector’s political economy. Three complementary 
monopsonies, each controlled by a single multinational, was resolutely entrenched in the 
political economy of the province. With their combined political/economic influence, the 
pulp companies dominated forest policy decision-making. Each monopsony was only 
marginally impacted by market leakages such as cross-haulage, road and sea pulpwood 
exports, the influences of the two smaller pulp processing companies, and other local 
distortions such as the larger integrated sawmills. Each monopsony effectively controlled 
forest products markets and, in time, controlled associated political resources (see figure 
8.1). With decreasing policy influence from other segments of the forest sector the only 
serious challenge to the pulp agenda came from environmentalists based inside the 
province. 
 
An important question in understanding the pulp sector’s power was how the 
multinationals developed such overriding power in what appeared, superficially at least, 
to be a free market system. A related and central concern of this study was how could 
forest conservation policy possibly work in such a resource exploitation slanted 
management and marketing system. Figure 8.2 schematically shows the marketing and 
production influences of a single multinational pulp processor. The basic components of 
this market system are its land tenure, its forest management regime, its ground level 
forest operations, its haulage and distribution network, and its fibre 
processing and product marketing processes. Each of these sub-systems contributed to the 
overall power and influence of the three dominating multinationals. 
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Figure 8.1: Map to Show Forest Products Monopsony Regions in Nova Scotia. 
 
The general picture within this political economy depicts a tightly controlled flow of 
forest products to a single corporation that either directly controls production, or 
indirectly controls the marginal production and profits of spatially restrained forest sector 
agencies. Although land tenure was dominated territorially by small landowners that 
comprised approximately 50% of forestlands, the multinationals wielded far greater 
influence than their direct land ownership implied.32 Although commercial freeholds, 
including those of the multinationals accounted for a quarter of the forests, their ground 
level operations were supplemented by extensive, long-term Crown licences that 
effectively gave the multinationals and the other commercial operators control over nearly 
50% of Nova Scotia’s forests. This extensive control over woodfibre supply that was 
largely established by the mid-sixties gave the multinationals market domination and 
nurtured numerous other avenues of policy and market influence. 
 
                                                 
     32 Sandberg, 1988, 184-96. 
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Two relatively small but nevertheless significant forest management innovations added to 
the multinationals policy and market influence. Scott, for example, developed long-term 
management agreements with a number of small woodlot owners; this effectively shifted 
forest management control to Scott. In exchange for guaranteed pulpwood markets, these 
woodlot owners gave up ground level control of their lands creating in effect a ‘client 
landlord’ relationship that encouraged a strong reliance and political affinity with the pulp 
sector.33 Interestingly the development of group ventures or forest management co-
operatives, the second innovation, were first seen by the multinationals as a threat to their 
overall market control. Largely funded by successive federal/provincial subsidiary 
agreements and to a lesser extent by levies from individual woodlot owners, the 
government’s wider public policy goal for group ventures was to encourage more 
intensive and efficient ground level forest practices. Contrary to the multinationals’ initial 
fears, this more intensive forest management of small woodlots actually increased and 
stabilised pulpwood flows rather than necessarily elevated prices. Although favouring the 
multinationals, this collective action of a relatively small number of small woodlot 
owners further eroded the bargaining position of the independent small woodlot owners.34 
 
Although this analysis of land tenure and forest management begins to explain the 
multinational’s structural power, there were other factors that contributed to their overall 
influence. For example, while the multinationals tolerated unionised labour at their 
pulpmills, these companies systematically contracted-out most of their ground level forest 
operations and vigorously opposed any attempt by small operators to form collective 
bargaining units. This strategy provided both political as well as economic benefits for the 
multinationals. By regularly contracting out to small owner-operator concerns, the 
multinationals avoided extensive capitalising of their ground level forest operations. This 
maintained a politically fragmented, heavily indebted, and inexpensive source of 
production. Over time this organisationally subservient underclass of capitalists provided 
socio-political support because of their reliance on the pulp sector for economic welfare.35 
                                                 
     33 Interview with Bill Goodfellow, Woodlands Manager, Scott Maritimes. 
Abercrombie, Pictou County, May 1986. 
     34 Dave Dwyer interview.  
     35 Clancy, 1992, 142 
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Figure 8.2: Market Structure of a typical Nova Scotian Forest Sector Monopsony 
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day-to-day transactions between woodlands’ operators and woodlot owners. The pulp 
companies established these arrangements in exchange for guaranteed delivery and 
stumpage prices. This arrangement not only kept labour costs down but also eliminated 
expensive field management and capital costs. It also reduced the threat of collective 
action by woodlands’ operators. This strategy also deflected responsibility for poor forest 
practices on private lands away from the multinationals. The haulage operators, who were 
also heavily indebted (to finance expensive skidders, trucks and hoists), interacted directly 
with the pulp company woodyard managers to schedule a steady flow of woodfibre to the 
pulpmill.36 Interestingly, this dispersed capitalising of woodlands’ operations made local 
financial institutions, such as credit unions, highly susceptible to the vagaries of the pulp 
sector. This also effectively expanded the multinationals’ political constituency beyond 
the forest sector directly to community based financial institutions. 
 
A key to the pulp companies’ market control was their ability to support open markets and 
collective bargaining when it suited them. The multinationals projected pulpmill and 
sawlog needs prior to each cutting season, set stumpage rates, and assigned haulage rates 
and contracts. The haulage contractor, with ‘advice’ from the woodlands’ manager, 
negotiated directly with woodlands’ operators and small woodlot owners in scheduling 
pulpwood deliveries. These haulage contractors regularly operated within a clearly 
defined boundary established by haulage subsidy rates. While individual woodlot owners 
were theoretically free to have wood cut by whom they pleased and sell to whom they 
pleased, realistically there was no guaranty that pulpwood would ever leave roadside 
unless scheduled by the pulp company’s compliant haulage-contractors. Woodyard 
managers, as a rule, only accepted stumpage delivered by authorised carriers--woodlot 
owners or other hauliers could not deliver directly to the pulpmill gate. Monopsony 
boundaries, therefore, were effectively drawn at this level. Although the pulp companies 
set haulage subsidies that increased with distance from the mill, there was a set maximum. 
This clearly encouraged haulage contractors to stay within these boundaries unless 
compensated by lower stumpage prices from woodlot owners. These arrangements 
effectively defined each of the multinationals’ markets for wood products and quite 
                                                 
     36 Interview with a Pulpwood Haulage Contractor; New Ross. 
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effectively reinforced their monopsonies.37  
 
The multinationals’ ground level freehold and Crown license operations also intensified 
their control over forest operators and haulage contractors. On Crown lands DLF foresters 
and technicians notionally supervised harvesting; however, woodlands operators and 
haulage contractors petitioned rather than competed openly for woodlands contracts. 
Using contractual labour freed the multinationals from capital investment and further 
sustained a heavily indebted and compliant sub-class of small private capitalists which 
extended the multinationals political constituency. Although small woodlot owners 
theoretically had other options, for example, they could sell to other pulpmills or diversify 
their product line, few, if any alternatives were realistic. The cost of cross hauling from 
one monopsony region to another was often prohibitive and haulage contractors were 
reluctant to haul to a competing pulpmill for fear of reprisal. Selling stumpage as sawlogs 
rather than pulpwood was a further possibility if markets were available. Even here 
market effectiveness was limited by the woodlot owner’s capacity to identify competent 
and willing woodlands’ operators and haulage contractors. In an effort to maintain the 
remnant power of their secondary level monopsonies, some sawmillers also insisted on 
using their own woodlands’ contractors and haulage vehicles. In a similar way, 
conversion to Christmas tree operations was difficult. Such a market conversion required 
ground level expertise, substantial knowledge of Christmas tree marketing, and 
considerable capital investment. 
 
The multinationals gradually increased their hold on the forest products market by 
diversification such as entering the Christmas tree business. In an expanding market this 
had little impact on small producers, but in economic downturns the multinationals were 
better able to weather economic turbulance. The multinationals exerted most influence, 
however, in wholesaling forest products. While some sorting of more valuable sawlogs 
from pulpwood was made at roadside to benefit the woodlot owner directly, considerable 
sorting was done in the pulpmill woodyard. Although this alleviated the sawlog scarcities 
forecast by sawmillers in the late fifties and better ensured that stumpage would be used 
for a higher economic value, this also strengthened the multinationals’ grip on the wood 
                                                 
     37 Nova Scotia. Royal Commission on Prices of Pulpwood and Other Forest 
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products market. 
 
The sawlogs harvested from the multinationals’ own freeholds and Crown licences were 
perhaps of greater significance to the play of power. Rather than participate in a free and 
open sawlog market, the multinationals mindfully nurtured a closed system of compliant 
forestry sector agents. The multinationals rationed their more or less guaranteed supply of 
sawlogs to several sawmills in relatively small amounts rather than sell on the open 
market. This ‘marketing’ of sawlogs was first used to gain the sawmillers’ goodwill. By 
providing a steady trickle of sawlogs to many sawmillers, the multinationals showed that 
increased pulp production would not necessarily diminish sawlog supply. In fact, the 
multinationals by their actions convincingly argued the contrary. By offering carefully 
limited quotas, the multinationals effectively controlled the sawmillers’ marginal profits 
that made many acquiesce to the pulp agenda. While one sawmiller claimed that one 
multinational kept his operation afloat during lean times, he also conceded that the same 
multinational “cut off” his rationed supply for several years in retaliation for publicly 
denouncing the multinationals’ clearcutting practices.38 In time, this practice of careful 
rationing reduced the sawmillers disdain for the pulp agenda.39 
 
Pulpmill co-optation of its constituent agencies did not end with sawlog rationing. As 
time went on, the pulpmillers consolidated their hold over the sawmillers by capitalising 
on various technical innovations and other marketing innovations. With relatively minor 
adaptations in the pulping process, pulpmills were able to utilise woodchips. The 
pulpmills developed a closed market in woodchips--a by-product of the sawmilling 
process and a valuable raw material for the pulpmills--in exchange for sawlogs. Although 
this clearly improved the sawmillers’ profitability and eliminated a bothersome waste 
product, the market and political pay-off was that the sawmillers became more reliant on 
the pulpmills for profitability. This was not necessarily a symbiotic relationship. The 
pulpmillers preserved their market flexibility by retaining their capacity to easily switch 
from pulpwood to woodchips for raw materials. It is important to note that this technical 
                                                                                                                                                  
Products, Report. 1964, Halifax. 
     38 Interview with a small, independent sawmiller, Western Nova Scotia, Aug. 
1987. 
     39 Clancy, 1992, 151. 
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innovation further compromised the marketing power of the small woodlot owners; their 
profits were marginalised by the pulp sector’s ability to easily change to an alternative 
pulpfibre substitute. 
 
As the market for ‘secondary’ sawlogs and woodchips matured, the multinationals 
tightened their grip on the forestry sector’s political economy. The pulp processors’ 
market dominance not only drew the smaller independent sawmills into this heavily 
contrived and controlled market but also pulled in the larger integrated sawmills. While it 
was still possible for the integrated sawmillers to supplement their sawlog supply from 
small landowners and their own freeholds, they too traded with the pulpmills in 
woodchips. By the early eighties rather complex closed markets flourished providing 
some economic advantage to all but the small woodlot owner. The trade-off for this 
greater economic prosperity was; however, that the remaining industry became players, 
perhaps unwittingly, in a political economy increasingly defined and ruled by the 
multinationals. These tentacles of power to a large extent explain the influence that the 
multinationals had over the forest sector and their ability to forestall or dampen political 
opposition. 
 
Elitist and Pluralist Manifestations: 
 
By the late seventies and early eighties, open opposition to the pulp sector’s political and 
market domination from indigenous industry elites had all but dissipated. Pulp sector 
interests now heavily dominated the wood producers’ provincial organisation--the 
NSFPA--that had been earlier heavily influenced by sawmill interest elites.40 41 
Technocentric foresters also supported the pulp agenda substantially controlling the 
membership of the CIF:NS--24 of its 92 members came from DLF (many were now 
integral to this department’s emerging pulp culture) and a further 30 represented the pulp 
industry directly.42 The “Look into the effectiveness of the FIA Committee” of the 
CIF:NS--struck in 1980--also mobilised concerted opposition to the FIA and particularly 
                                                 
     40 Clancy, 155. 
     41 Wood Products Manufacturers’ Association Submission to the Royal 
Commission on Forestry 1984, 90, RG44, vol 158b, no 3, PANS.  
     42 Bissix and Sandberg, 189. 
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the PFPIB process.43 This committee’s effort to derail the FIA dissipated, however, when 
CIF:NS’s combined membership unexpectedly rallied in support of “enforceable 
regulations” and the DLF minister, who received a Committee delegation, declined to 
endorse FIA rescission.44 Despite the domination by this pulp culture there were 
nevertheless, remnants of traditional influences struggling to redefine details of forestry 
policy. The most consistent opposition to the pulp agenda within the forest industry came 
from the PFPIB made up of representatives of various forest sector policy elites including 
pulp interests, sawmills and woodlot owners. Despite the indigenous industry’s clear 
majority sentiment, the pulp sector managed to undermine this group’s political efforts. 
 
The PFPIB’s major drawback as an effective voice against the pulp agenda was its own 
internal squabbles that reflected its disparate ideological factions. Minority positions that 
were conveyed through corporatist back alleys by the multinationals continually 
undermined the PFPIB’s majority voice that was usually communicated in open 
discourse. Despite its internal bickering, the PFPIB somehow remained a threatening 
political entity by continually thrusting contentious positions on government. These often 
had public but little or no industry support. Regardless of these efforts and increasing 
support for stronger forest practices regulations, the government continued to back the 
pulp agenda by appointing a known technocentric sympathiser to the PFPIB and later by 
attempting to replace Hugh Fairn as chair. 
 
Although structural and elitist influences dominated the forests’ policy agenda, two 
pluralist upwellings of support were politically significant. A relatively weak woodlot 
owners group, now known as the Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners and Operators 
Association (NSWOOA) represented the first, and the second was a more persuasive 
grass roots opponent to areal herbicide spraying in Cape Breton. In the long run each 
illustrated the problem of making a concerted challenge to the pulp sector’s structural 
power.  
 
Despite their rather large numbers, for the most part NSWOOA’s plea to bolster wood 
products marketing legislation fell on deaf ears. The combined force of pulp and 
                                                 
     43 Nova Scotia Section, CIF, Report of the 24th Annual Meeting. 1981, 21. 
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sawmiller interests and the persistent failure to attract support from a politically sufficient 
representation of small woodlot owners continued to haunt organisers.45 The political 
fallout from herbicide spraying, however, especially the protracted hearings within Nova 
Scotia’s Supreme Court, shook if not rocked the structural underpinnings of the 
multinationals’ power. Stora’s attitude toward landowners in Cape Breton created 
substantial public indignation; the political fallout forced the pulp sector to acknowledge 
the importance of outside influences. Although none of these upwellings of pluralism 
persisted long enough to undermine deep rooted structural forces they forced the 
provincial government to seek refuge in a Royal Commission of Inquiry. This signalled a 
desperate attempt to stave off grassroots pressure and preserve the multinationals’ 
structural power. 
 
The FIA and Ecological Modernisation. 
 
As with the analysis of the STA legislative process it is interesting to re-examine the FIA 
workings in the light of contemporary ecological modernisation analysis, the critical 
theories of market and state failure, and the various paradigms of sustainable 
development. It will be seen that the FIA was a precursor of some aspects of Ecological 
Modernisation as well as a harbinger of various non-integrative approaches to forest 
management. It was in many ways a trap for state intervention failures. Had the 
government implemented the FIA at ground level, as argued in this chapter, it might have 
been a working model for at least Turner’s Weak Sustainability (WS) paradigm. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
     44 Bissix and Sandberg, 189. 
     45 Clancy, 142-167. 
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State and Market Failure: 
 
One possible view of the 1962 FIA, based on a rather literal interpretation of the 
legislation as written, is that this FIA was conceived as a regulatory correction designed to 
mitigate combined market and state deficiencies. In this scenario the extant mix of policy 
tools with the STA as the most aberrant, must be seen as threatening woodfibre supplies, 
increasingly important amenity values and future supplies of both. A rather more cynical 
but perhaps more tenable view given the evidence from Chapters Six and Seven was that 
this act--although couched in conservation rhetoric--was largely a legislative ruse. It can 
better be seen as a veiled attempt to strip away restrictive forest practices regulations to 
clear the market of obstructive controls. Whether deliberate or not, proclamation of the 
1962 FIA would have clearly legitimised clearcutting by removing practically all forest 
management restrictions. It is reasonable to conclude therefore, that the thrust of the 1962 
FIA was clearly focused on the perceived short-term economic development benefits that 
further pulp industry expansion was envisioned to bring. The logical inference is that the 
state held no serious concern for the inevitable forest degradation to ensue from unabated 
clearcutting exploitation—it was clearly not concerned with this market failure at the 
time. 
 
Reflecting the growing concern among parts of the bureaucracy over forest exploitation 
and the forest environment, the 1965 FIA inherited a wider and more sophisticated range 
of forest management and amenity objectives. This legislative approach, as written, 
embraced greater conceptual sophistication but also implicated more skilful policy 
pragmatism that was destined to require a more extensive state presence. Despite its 
seemingly greater environmental awareness and considerably more conceptually refined 
underpinnings, the 1965 FIA fell considerably short of what Turner later envisioned as 
enlightened environmental policy.46 While the revised FIA considered broader multiple-
objectives, it remained fundamentally about woodfibre production as opposed to holistic 
forestry necessitating integrative environmental management strategies. As conceived the 
1965 FIA provided rather mixed insights about how these complex social and 
environmental goods might be better integrated. The district forest improvement boards, 
                                                 
46 Turner, 1993, 3. 
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for example, were clearly an innovative attempt to devolve power and decision-making to 
a level where environmental consequences could be best understood and integrated into 
ground level management. The Act’s focus on harvesting coercion and economic 
sustainability suggested, however, greater decoupling of environmental and economic 
benefits. This continued essentially exploitive approach contrasted fundamentally with 
Turner’s ‘Modernist’ concept of nurturing the environment to provide broad social 
benefits. 
 
One of the greatest market/state failures of the FIA era was the industry’s failure to focus 
on the growing vulnerability of the Cape Breton Highlands fir monoculture. This forest’s 
vulnerability to spruce budworm infestation should have been no surprise to foresters as 
the budworms’ infestation patterns had been confirmed for many centuries. Left to natural 
successional processes nature would in time rebuild the forest. Considering this forest as 
an industrial warehouse, however, budworm infestation was a possible economic 
adversity. Stora, who had been awarded the long-term management license on these lands, 
however, acted as a rational, short-term market actor directing its management efforts to 
meet contractual obligations to buy from small woodlots and to harvest economically 
more attractive Crown Lands elsewhere. The operative mix of incentives and tax 
concessions clearly failed to guide Stora to harvest the Highlands even though this was 
supposedly a major provincial priority. Once the insecticide and herbicide crises hit 
however, the question of what constituted appropriate environmental management then 
became a controversial issue. The key issue was whether it was better to spray trees to 
sustain foliation and tree life but rely on insecticides of uncertain environmental impact; 
or was it preferable to allow substantial defoliation and tree mortality but let the budworm 
take its natural course?  The general question was one of which scenario was best, given 
that the trees would temporally disappear from the highlands eventually anyway.  
 
Pulp sector expansion nevertheless, could have represented erosion of an out-moulded 
industry--the previously dominant sawlog industry--that had long developed its own 
small-scale monopsonies. This industrial expansion also represented a transition, 
however, from one scale of market failure to monopsonies exemplifying greater scale and 
deficiencies. The pulp industry’s monopsonies were not only peremptory, but were 
heavily dependent on massive subsidisation both for wood stumpage and infrastructure. In 
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addition to inefficient subsidies, the market failed to protect a bio-diverse forest and its 
associated biomass and the state compounded this by replanting disease susceptible 
monocultures. As a result, failure to implement the environmental management 
components of the 1965 FIA and its successors, and take care of the broader market 
failures, can be better seen then as a failure to provide state corrections for a heavily 
distorted market that encouraged over-exploitation of a natural resource. 
 
In summary, it is important to remember that the state has two basic roles, it regularly acts 
in advance of industrial development and then acts as a consequence of it. In forest 
management, where short-term market failures can be cushioned by increased exploitation 
of immature stocks, measures of both state failure and market failure are difficult to assess 
directly. Forest degradation is unlikely to have much market impact as long as sustained 
yield, as opposed to sustainable forestry is feasible. In addition, money markets are 
unlikely to be affected unless impending woodfibre shortages are clearly and definitively 
forecast within the normal business cycle and in the case of multinational corporations, 
they exhibit little flexibility to gain sufficient supply elsewhere—unlikely in practice. The 
state may be seen as acting prudently by bringing Stora, a market agent to the Oxford 
Lease to harvest the mature monoculture but then it failed to follow through with 
adequate incentives or directives to ensure this policy’s proper implementation. As Weale 
implies, the state failed to adequately foresee and avoid culturally induced experiences 
that are environmentally damaging. In practice, in this overall market/state interaction 
there was no apparent concern to maintain natural capital (Kn) as Turner’s Weak 
Sustainability paradigm implies but there seem to be a concerted effort to transfer 
environmental capital to other forms more readily marketed in this mixed but distorted 
economy. 
 
Sustainable Development: 
 
While the FIA does not necessarily measure-up well against ‘Ecological Modernists’ 
benchmarks, it is interesting to more closely estimate where the FIA stood in relation to 
Turner’s sustainable development paradigms and Pearce’s decoupling conception of the 
economy and the environment. It is also interesting to determine what lessons can be 
drawn from this discussion for the future of sustainable development in Nova Scotia’s 
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forest sector (see Chapter Three). 
 
The FIA’s focus as written on forest restoration might lead to casual analysis that the FIA 
fitted the Strong Sustainable paradigm (SS) with its apparent concern for reforestation. 
Unlike modern conceptions of forest conservation, however, the FIA as written, took little 
account of the holistic forest with its broad reforestation prescriptions. The FIA largely 
considered that ‘a tree was a tree was a tree’ as long as it had predictable marketable 
value. More accurately as written, although not in practice, the FIA with its interest in 
multiple-use forest values appears set more closely to the level of the Weak Sustainable 
paradigm (WS). The key to attaining this level, as Turner suggests, is the maintenance of 
natural capital (Kn) within well-defined limits. In the modern ecological context that limit 
is defined by an agreed understanding of key natural indicators (still largely to be agreed 
upon, defined and made operational in the practical world). The call for a scientific 
definition of forest maturity in the 1965 FIA and its inherent assault on established ways 
of ground level decision-making might well be seen, however, as a precursor to the 
problems of implementing even this weak sustainability conceptualisation more broadly.  
This maturity criterion within the FIA had at least two substantive procedural flaws. This 
concept implied foregoing harvesting until an industrial and biological (biomass) 
optimum had been achieved. The first problem with this was that the economic or social 
optimum, especially that of the individual small woodlot owner, rarely coincided with the 
forest’s biological optimum or indeed the industry’s optimum. It seems clear then that 
premature harvesting, based primarily on biological optima, will continue to be the bane 
of sustainable development strategies until compensations can be routinely built into the 
rational and largely shorter-term calculations of natural resource managers. A second 
concern with the FIA was that the culturally engendered distortions previously ingrained 
in the forest such as its uneven age structure, would be further entrenched with rigid 
adherence to biological maturity principles applied largely at the forest ownership unit or 
forest stand level. The FIA, for example, took no practical account of wider spatial 
considerations that transcended ownership boundaries. This meant of course that close 
adherence to criteria measuring biological optima at the woodlot level ignored the more 
integrative need for broad forest age classes over a wider, perhaps regional scale.  This 
state intervention approach based on narrow forest maturity criteria focused largely on 
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individual woodlots could easily lead then to market failure by perpetuating previous 
cultural distortions.  Such a policy would lead to woodfibre shortages during particular 
phases of a predominantly uneven-aged regional or provincial forest.  
To some extent, at least theoretically, the concept of ecosystem management addresses 
this concern as adjustments in harvesting can be made at the individual woodlot level to 
compensate for the greater ecosystem condition.  Although the ecosystem approach 
appears theoretically sound from a biological production perspective, there is yet to be 
developed a workable forest management regime that accommodates multi-ownership 
needs and transcends ownership boundaries within the context of a free and competitive 
market. If the controversy surrounding the implementation of scientific measures of forest 
maturity within the FIA process is a guide, the challenges of actually developing 
acceptable ground level criteria in the political reality of natural resource management is 
immense. 
 
While the FIA as written, in both its 1962 and 1965 versions may have been forerunners 
of sustainable forest practices, if implemented as written, as practised the 1965 FIA held 
in stark contrast to the subsequent thinking of the Brundtland Commission on sustainable 
development. The 1965 FIA, in conjunction with the broader policy strategies of the pulp 
enhancement program that included various federal/provincial agreements, the Wood 
Products Marketing Act, and miscellaneous federal infrastructure programmes frustrated 
attempts to implement more conservation oriented forest practices. Rather than promote 
forest conservation, the ground level implementation of these policies aggregated to 
enhance the technocentric and the resource degrading pulp expansion agenda. It is in this 
context then that the FIA provides its most important lessons. 
 
Importantly it is crucial to understand that the FIA alone, even if fully implemented was 
not enough to overcome the inertia of strong price signals resulting from indirect 
subsidies including low Crown land stumpage fees. This ‘give-away’ of Crown assets, 
while creating increased supply certainty for the multinationals also depressed prices 
obtainable by small woodlot operators. These market distortions induced over-
exploitation, especially among small woodlot owners who required greater production for 
any target income. In addition to direct and indirect subsidy, the woodland tax structure 
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introduced during the STA increasing certainty, especially for the larger producers, 
discouraged optimal land-use. A productive forest in close proximity to a major road 
arterial, for instance, was taxed similarly to a landlocked woodlot. Similarly, a woodlot, 
close to an urban centre that’s most optimal land-use might be tourism and outdoor 
recreation, was taxed at the same rate as rural and more isolated woodlots. 
 
In arguing for the decoupling of environmental degradation from development, Pearce 
contends that appropriate information regarding environmental degradation must be made 
available to policy actors. At face value the 1965 FIA appeared to be an important 
initiative in this regard. According to contemporary legislative debates, for instance, the 
FIA was posed as an educational tool to foster improved forest management and the 
implementation of district boards (DFPIBs) and woodlot reporting systems were -
considered integral to this objective. Unfortunately, the district boards with appointed 
membership and their successor provincial board, the PFPIB, failed to engage wide 
enough debate on forest practices to develop sufficient interest in forest conservation. 
From the small woodlot owners’ perspective especially, one detached bureaucracy--the 
DLF merely replaced another. Interestingly, the FIA’s reporting provisos might have led--
had they been implemented--to more informed debate on forest practices, but they were 
also just as likely to lead to crippling red-tape for the small woodlot sector. Despite these 
procedural problems, the FIA’s information dissemination process was seriously flawed. 
The legislature apparently, and the public undoubtedly, were unaware of the connection 
between FIA proclamation and clearcutting liberalisation.  This consequence of 
proclamation was likely counterintuitive to anyone but the most involved and perceptive 
policy actor and in this context Pearce’s cry for effective information seems rather mute. 
 
On a more illustrative note, as pointed out in Chapter Three in regards to the 
environmental decoupling process, Pearce argues that involved populations suffer from 
environmental losses and as a consequence of resource exploitation “policies need to 
integrate the environment at all levels”. In the case of local populations that traditionally 
benefit from the forest’s positive externalities this initial premise likely holds fast. 
However, the multinational companies and their detached shareholders are unlikely to feel 
the direct impacts of environmental degradation and likely benefit only from the spoils of 
direct natural resource exploitation. In the widespread use of clearcutting, for example, 
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which the removal of STA restrictions and the failure to replace them with FIA 
regulations clearly encouraged, the most measurable loss to local populations was in 
future environmental, recreation, tourism, wildlife, and other amenity and environmental 
benefits. Given extant property rights, none of these were easily traded in conventional 
markets so few of these benefits demanded serious management or marketing attention. 
For commercial forestry to be more involved in these areas corporate objectives need to 
be broadened and reward systems need to be adjusted. For this to occur in Nova Scotia’s 
forestry sector, natural resource property rights legislation needs to be revised to provide 
more direct rewards for amenity provision. To make a more concerted effort at moving 
towards sustainable development, it is necessary to calculate under what conditions 
optimal environmental conditions are balanced against sustainable resource exploitation. 
In the short-term this inevitably means calculating the value of amenity provision and 
providing appropriate market adjustments such as tax measures or subsidies. In the mid-
term, it requires the re-examination and adjustment of resource rights and land tenure to 
make it easier to transact amenity values. In the longer-term, social cost pricing must be 
introduced alongside some reasonable resolution of the market distortions that trading 
fibre and amenity benefits from Crown Lands create. 
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Chapter Nine: 
 Contemporary Forest Conservation Policy.  
 
This chapter examines contemporary forest conservation policy in the aftermath of the 
spray wars that disrupted the forestry sector in the early eighties. It enquires into the 
nature of contemporary forest legislation, draws the lessons from this and earlier 
legislative eras, and assesses the impact of moderns trends on forest policy. This analysis 
reviews the workings and the outcomes of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Forestry, 
examines the last days of the Forest Improvement Act, and examines the structure and 
implications of its replacement: the Forest Enhancement Act. This chapter then reviews 
several forest conservation initiatives of the last decade that have all but replaced 
legislative efforts to improve forest practices. Finally, this chapter examines the latest 
effort by government to enact workable policy to provide for a sustainable forest. 
 
The Royal Commission of Enquiry: 
 
In May of 1982 the government called for a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Forestry 
and assigned it a broad remit to examine the forestry industry in Nova Scotia. Dr. John 
Connor from Acadia University eventually led the inquiry. Newspaper accounts of the 
Royal Commission hearings, especially those of the Chronicle Herald, typically 
summarised submissions and provided daily quotations from the commission chairman.1 
Connor was a neo-classical economist. It was not surprising, therefore, that he gave a 
sympathetic ear to capitalists’ testimonies before the commission and gave a much harder 
ride to those with alternative, state intervention viewpoints. One alternative view to the 
industry’s came from the Rev. Don MacDougal who presented on behalf of Recreation 
Association of Nova Scotia (RANS).2 RANS implored the commission to treat the forests 
as a multiple-use resource and consider softer forest management strategies. The 
Commission chair compelled MacDougal, as he did others who opposed technocentric
                                                 
     1 Royal Commission on Forestry. Transcripts of Hearings. Provincial Archives 
of Nova Scotia RG 44, Vol 158a. 
     2 Bissix, Glyn; Charles Ballam and Don MacDougall. Values and Patterns in 
Recreational Use of the Forest Environment. Brief to the [Nova Scotia] Royal 
Commission on Forestry: Recreation Association of Nova Scotia. Halifax; April 19, 1983. 
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methods, to defend this submission in considerable detail, especially any point that 
challenged the spray and clearcut options.3 The Commission’s preferred forest 
management option presented in November of l984 largely reflected the multinationals’ 
standard operating procedures. Support for the Commission’s report clustered around the 
large industrial firms and other sectors under its paternal influence.4 5 6 Opposition 
predictably came from more disenfranchised segments of the industry such as the Nova 
Scotia Woodlot Owners Association,7 8 individual sawmill operators such as Clemont 
Comeau of Saunierville9, various wildlife associations, and environmentalists and 
woodlot owners such as Dr. K.D.C. Haley.10 
 
Although the Commission recognised the structural advantages enjoyed by the 
multinationals and recognised the inherent marketplace disadvantage of the small woodlot 
owners, the report states for example that “the financial return to privately-owned 
forestlands appear to be negligible. ... This creates little, if any, incentive to the landowner 
to manage land for fibre production.”11 The Commission however, offered no concrete 
proposals to rectify this inequity. It accepted instead that the pulp sector’s apparent 
economic success was sufficient to continue the organisational status quo. The 
Commission also reaffirmed the basic notion of forests as an industrial installation 
                                                 
     3 Interview with John Connor: Chairman of the Royal Commission Inquiry in 
Forestry, August 1985. 
     4 Abbass, David. “Industry Applauds Forestry Report.” Chronicle Herald, 
1985. 
     5 Schneidereit. “Forestry Commission ‘Pro-multinational’.” Chronicle Herald, 
13. 
     6 Butters, George. “NSFI [Stora] Supports Commission Report.” Chronicle 
Herald, Jan. 24, 1985, 26. 
     7 Abbass, David. “N.S. Woodlot Owners’ Spokesman Concerned.” Chronicle 
Herald, Dec.21, 84, 5. 
     8 Dunlop, Malcolm. “NSLFFPA [Nova Scotia Landowners and Forest Fibre 
Producers Association] Suggests Owners Organise.” Al Kingsbury. “Kings Woodlot 
Owners, Operators Reject ‘50-year Rotation Plan’.” Paul Schneidereit. “Report Should 
Have Stressed ‘Marketing’.” Chronicle Herald, March 18, 1985, 20. 
     9 Interview with Clemont Comeau, E.M. Comeau and Sons (1977) Ltd., 
District of Claire, Sept 3, 1987. 
     10 Haley, K.D.C. “The Royal Commission Report on Forestry and You.” 
Chronicle Herald, Feb. 27, 1985. 
     11 John Connor, G.A. MacKinnon and D. Lewis Matheson Forestry: Report of 
the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Forestry. Nova Scotia, 1984, 39. 
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epitomised as monoculture plantations, chemical treatments, and clearcutting and gave 
only lip service to more environmentally sensitive approaches to forest management and 
amenity values. The Commission euphemistically termed their preferred strategy the 
“conservancy option”. They contended that large increases in production were possible 
from more intensive management and improved silviculture. The report alluded to a 
programme of forest restoration, conservation and improvement that would “make the 
volume of fibre available of 7,770,000 m3 (3,600,000 cords) by the years 2030-40.”12 
Among the report’s other recommendations was a call for a comprehensive revamping of 
forestry agreements and legislation including the repeal of the Forest Improvement Act “at 
the earliest opportunity”.  In a more positive step for forest conservation the Commission 
proposed an independent “Inspector of Woods” reporting directly to the legislature and a 
controversial differential tax designed to reward active forest managers. Interestingly, 
none of these recommendations subsequently found favour with government. 
 
Despite the official justification for the Royal Commission, George Henley, the DLF 
minister later admitted that its real purpose was to douse the raging political fire over 
herbicide spraying. In this role it was most effective although its scope and scale grew 
well beyond Henley’s original intentions. “If I had any idea the Royal Commission was 
going to cost as much as it did, I’d have been reluctant to go that way at all.”13 The 
inquiry’s broad remit forced the environmentalists, whose emotional resources had 
already been stretched by the spray wars to divide their energies across a broad range of 
forest management issues. Their once tight resolve dissipated among numerous market, 
wildlife, recreation, forest practices, organisational, and environmental concerns. 
Although expensive, as the government hoped the Commission process led to an almost 
complete cessation of political pressure. The commission’s broad remit sufficiently 
diluted debate on the herbicide spraying issue to allow the forest industry and the 
government, that had previously been on the defensive, to regroup as a coalition and allow 
the industry to re-establish its standard forest management practices without fear of 
                                                 
     12 Connor et al., 1984, 15. 
     13 Henley interview. 
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public repercussion.14 15 The inquiry itself lured the environmentalists into thinking that 
their battle was won; they fell serenely in step to present their positions before the 
Commission and wait for its final report. In the end, the inquiry’s report, much as was 
expected, reflected the industrialists’ long-time position and summarily rejected any 
notion of the soft industrialists’ and environmentalists’ views.16 17 18 19 
 
The Dying Days of the FIA: 
 
Action on the FIA front did not end with the announcement of the Royal Commission 
process. The FIA process laboured on as technocentric forces re-consolidated their 
influence over the various forest improvement boards formed as part of the FIA process. 
As already alluded to, in an obviously aggressive action in November of 1982, the 
minister appointed Laurie Ledgewick as sawmill representative to the PFPIB to replace 
Murray Prest a long standing member and supporter of the FIA process (see Chapter 
Eight). In contrast to Prest, Ledgewick had been a strong advocate of the pulp agenda and 
frequent critique of the FIA. In retaliation of the minister’s actions Fairn appointed Prest 
as a PFPIB consultant but the Cabinet’s Management Board had the last word: they 
simply refused to ratify the expenses that went with this appointment and Fairn’s strategy 
was lost. 
 
Ledgewick with his anti-FIA sentiments joined forces with L.G. ‘Hank’ Howard, the CIF: 
NS representative. The government appointed Howard, a senior manager with Scott 
Maritimes to the PFPIB in March of 1983. Despite his later assertions, the evidence 
shows he was no friend of the FIA process.20 For instance, he often attacked the PFPIB 
process and FIA directly including its greenbelt provisions. In one outcry over the FIA he 
                                                 
     14 Connor et al., viii.  
     15 Connor interview. 
     16 Taylor, Wilkie. “Woodlot Owners Angry with Policy.” Chronicle Herald, 
March 16, 1985, 25.  
     17 Honey, Kim. “Woodlot Owners Reject Report.” Kentville Advertiser, 
January 16, 1985, 3A.  
     18 Schneidereit, Paul. “Forestry Commission ‘Pro- multinational’.” Chronicle 
Herald January 4, 1985, 6.  
     19 Haley, 7. 
     20 Interview with L.G. ‘Hank’ Howard, Manager of Lands, Scott Maritimes 
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exclaimed that the FIA advantaged recreationists rather than encouraged forest 
improvement.21 Together with the pulp and paper industry’s representative on the PFPIB, 
Vincent Clark who was the woodlands’ manager for Scott Maritimes, Howard formed 
ominous opposition to the FIA process within the PFPIB structure. At the district board 
level both he and Clark found strong support from Hugh Ross of Stora. Besides their 
opposition to the greenbelt provisions, Howard and Clark continually undermined the 
PFPIB’s majority supported position on herbicide spraying. This continual undermining 
of the PFPIB’s position drove Fairn to call for Howard’s resignation for misrepresenting 
the Board at the CIF: NS annual meeting. In Howard’s rebuttal he was curt, he simply 
argued that his actions were consistent with the spirit of the FIA as “contributing to 
education”.  Fairn’s frustration came to a head in a letter to the Lands and Forests 
Minister, Ken Streatch, where he exclaimed 
Time and time again we have been encouraged to “get on with the Act”, to quote 
the Premier, only to find roadblocks, procrastination and outright sabotage to set 
the Board and its work back again. 
 
Fairn also complained about the government’s appointments to the PFPIB of members 
hostile to the Act—“who would do whatever they could to undermine its workings”. 
Eventually Fairn took a ‘leave of absence’ to allow the Minister to “move ahead” with the 
Act. Fairn’s leave effectively halted the FIA process. Although on record as supporting 
the FIA and promising to move ahead, the Minister simply held on for the Royal 
Commission’s report released in December, 1984. 
 
After the Royal Commission Report, Connor, the chair of the Royal Commission, toured 
the province to explain and defend its recommendations. This turned out to be politically 
astute, it allowed the government to test the political waters and use the Commission’s 
report as a haven for retreat when issues were contentious. Although the government said 
that it would take its time to formulate workable policy proposals this was not always the 
case, it very quickly dropped the Commission’s tax proposal, for example, when the 
political heat was raised.22 23 In due time the government set about formulating new 
                                                                                                                                                  
International; September 1987. 
     21 Howard, L.G. to Hugh Fairn, 14 February 1984; L.G. Howard to Members of 
the Provincial and District Boards, 14 February 1984, PANS RG 81, vol.3. 
     22 Jeffers, Alan. “Nova Scotia Not Introducing New Forest Policies.” Chronicle 
Herald, February 22, l985, 1&26. 
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forestry policy. After listening to twenty-three separate interest groups Ken Streatch, now 
the incumbent DLF minister met behind closed doors with a departmental steering 
committee. This committee included Don Eldridge, the deputy minister and Alan Shaw, a 
policy advisor and representatives from Touche-Ross and Associates--a management 
consultant firm. They prepared draft policy and a comprehensive legislative package. 
According to Streatch, once he got appropriate input he was determined to keep his policy 
team away from “high priced lawyers and lobbyists” 24  
 
The government tabled its new policy entitled, Forestry: A New Policy for Nova Scotia to 
the Cabinet on February 3, 1986 and presented it to the legislature the next day.25 Their 
strategic goals clearly took a more balanced view of forestry than the Royal Commission. 
This proposal focused on a higher quality and quantity of forest products, a strengthening 
of the private sector, job creation and improved productivity, and interestingly the 
maintenance/enhancement of wildlife, water quality, recreation, and associated resources. 
Although this policy statement gave some sense that the administration was now ready to 
redress the imbalance between industrial and environmental values, its timetable for 
legislative reform and detailed policy development still reflected a heavy bias towards 
industrial priorities. 
 
In April of l986 the government tabled its promised forest management legislative 
package in the legislature and it was enacted on the 26th May 1986, a full four years after 
the crisis that precipitated reform erupted. This policy development process again 
effectively separated many environmentalists and industrialists in the policy development 
process. Although the resultant legislative enactment processes were uncharacteristically 
civil, this policy development tactic repressed rather than resolved many important forest 
conservation issues such as the questions of forest maturity and acceptable forest 
practices. On some issues it was rather emphatic about what was acceptable and what was 
not. For example, it endorsed clearcutting as an essential plank of forest management. 
                                                                                                                                                  
     23 Dyck, Hattie. “Forestry Report Being ‘Undermined'.” Chronicle Herald, 
Feb. 23, 1985, 21. 
     24 Interview with Ken Streatch, Then Incumbent Minister of Lands and Forests. 
September 1987. 
     25 Department of Lands and Forest. Forestry: A New Policy for Nova Scotia. 
Government of Nova Scotia, Halifax, February 4 1986. 
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Nevertheless, for environmentalists it was disappointingly vague, for instance it was most 
unclear on what the limits were to be on insecticide and herbicide spraying.26 
 
Environmentalists’ values were again downplayed when government adopted a staggered 
timetable to implement its legislative agenda. The first round of legislative reform focused 
only on industrial and land-use issues. At convenient intervals, the government addressed 
wildlife and finally considered parks and recreation issues. Although new forest policy 
was announced in February 1986, the government did not introduce wildlife policy 
legislation until 198727 and parks and recreation policy waited until 1988.28 This 
staggered approach effectively diverted conservationists’ attention away from amenity and 
environmental concerns imbedded in the mainstream forest legislation such as the impacts 
of clearcutting and spraying on the forest resource; and focused their attention instead on 
the legislation to follow, believing any short-comings would be taken care of there. This 
provision for handling forest industry concerns first clearly reflected the administration’s 
bias towards the production process. Rather than integrate the handling of interrelated 
policy issues as its initial policy statement suggested it would, the government first set 
industry prescriptions in place to advantage the industry, leaving amenity issues to be 
fitted in wherever possible later. Although at all times throughout this policy process the 
government’s rhetoric reflected an integrated forest management philosophy, the 
government’s planning and policy development was clearly more pragmatic, simply 
reflecting the power and influence of the large forest industry concerns. 
 
The first legislative package contained four separate bills; one bill concerned Crown 
lands, the second forestry, the third wood products marketing, and surprisingly given the 
Royal Commission’s recommendations, the fourth concerned forest conservation. Given 
that the Royal Commission previously called for the FIA’s rescission and that any of its 
more ‘acceptable’ provisions be incorporated in a consolidated forestry act, and given that 
political pressure for dedicated forest conservation legislation had all but dissipated, few 
anticipated a new and separate conservation act. Interestingly in the new Forestry Act--the 
                                                 
     26 Streatch, Ken. Forestry: A New Policy for Nova Scotia. 1986, 6 & 8. 
     27 Streatch, Ken. Wildlife: A New Policy for Nova Scotia. Government of 
Nova Scotia, Halifax, 1987. 
     28 Streatch, Ken. Parks: A New Policy for Nova Scotia. Government of Nova 
 198 
flagship legislation--several sections were streamlined from the old Forest Improvement 
Act. This Act also encompassed many conservation oriented provisions previously found 
in the Lands and Forest Act. 
 
The Forest Enhancement Act Era: 1986 - the Present. 
 
The Forest Improvement Act as the Royal Commission before it, was in reality a clever 
palliative to once more contain environmentalists’ concerns. Unlike Ike Smith’s first FIA 
palliative in the early sixties, this obfuscation however, was directed to policy influencers 
outside the forest industry rather than to those increasingly disenfranchised sub-sectors 
within the industry, as the 1962 FIA had been. The FEA’s basic intention focused on 
neutralising opposing ideological views rather than providing a forum to nurture the 
development of workable ground level forest practices. In the legislative vacuum that was 
to result, the onus for meaningful conservation practices returned squarely to ground-level 
forest managers. For small woodlot owners the FEA provided few practical incentives to 
enhance conservation; for the large industrialists it provided no mechanism to temper 
their usually uncompromising approach to forest exploitation. Significantly, the FEA 
offered nothing to resolve the environmental issues that precipitated the initial policy 
crisis and brought on the Royal Commission in the first place. At best, the placation of 
environmentalists by this overall legislative formulation process bought time to cool 
frayed tempers and focus policy thinking on ways to stave off future forest management 
crises. 
 
The FEA had no regulatory teeth and to a large extent this explained why the 
administration was prepared to proceed with dedicated forest conservation legislation in 
the first place. The FEA in many ways reverted to the 1962 FIA approach that supposedly 
emphasised education but in truth was without any real regulatory or incentive substance. 
If it did anything, the FEA by default initially reaffirmed the principle of landowner 
sovereignty--the idea that landowners could decide for themselves what to do on their 
lands. By dropping the formal corporatist forest improvement board structures of the FIA, 
the FEA reaffirmed the legislative tradition of policy development by politicians, policy 
                                                                                                                                                  
Scotia, Halifax, 1988. 
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stewardship by the bureaucracy, and token compliance by the forest production sector. 
The proposed forest conservation advisory committee might have tempered this 
philosophy, had it been given some regulatory teeth and broader committee 
representation. However, by restricting this committee’s membership to the mainstream 
forestry industry, the government hoped to avoid the intransigence caused by 
environmentalists, as it perceived the case to be with the PFPIB process. This shift in 
policy form away from the rather stringent regulatory approach inferred in the 1965 FIA 
process, was clearly designed to foster the industry’s acceptance of the FEA. It was 
unmistakable that even if fully implemented, the FEA was unlikely to have any 
meaningful impact on ground-level forest practices. Although the FEA included a 
provision for a “Commissioner of Forest Conservation” that on the surface seemed a step 
forward to ensure ground-level accountability, this measure was a far cry from the 
independent “woods inspectorate” envisaged by the Royal Commission. In its legislated 
form the commissioner was destined to be political henchman of the Minister of Lands 
and Forests and the incumbent Cabinet. The inevitable partisan scrutiny of the 
commissioner’s findings behind closed doors was likely to ensure that controversial 
recommendations would never see the light of day in a public forum.29 
 
Although toothless, the FEA was not a neutral policy instrument as long as it remained a 
statute and its incapacity went unnoticed. Without meaningful state intervention, the 
maintenance of forest management standards applied to Nova Scotia’s forests is devolved 
to individual forest management and marketing agents. The result, consistent with the 
analysis of Chapter Eight, reaffirms the power of the larger market agents--the 
multinationals--that control the political economy of large territorial monopsonies. In this 
seemingly innocuous form, the FEA in its early years clearly favoured business as usual, 
reaffirming the dominance and the long tradition of unfettered forest exploitation over 
forest conservation efforts. 
 
In this manner, the FEA like the FIA before it, defies its title as a tool for forest 
conservation and thrusts its potential policy outcomes far from the sustainability 
paradigms outlined by Turner as reviewed in Chapter Three. For the FEA to continue as a 
                                                 
     29 Statutes of Nova Scotia. Forest Enhancement Act. Chapter 9, Acts of l986. 
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palliative and not serve as a minimalist instrument to stimulate forest practices debate, it 
required a largely disinterested public, a non-effective environmental lobby and an 
unconcerned consumer. This may well have been the case in the early years of the FEA 
but conditions changed somewhat with the renewed provincial, federal and international 
interest in environmental matters resulting from the Bruntland Commission. As 
‘implemented’ the FEA with its laissez-faire forest conservation prescriptions, puts 
complete onus on the private sector and market dynamics to alleviate environmental 
degradation. The history of the STA and the FIA attest that the industry has no track 
record in this regard, and is instead a prime archetype for market failure. The forest 
products market in Nova Scotia with its preoccupation on production continually lead to 
forest degradation to meet escalating demand. This is true even when there appears to be 
substantial public support for forest conservation. 
 
Without concrete evidence of over-zealous or inefficient interference, the government’s 
disinterest in state intervention as a conservation tool soon became apparent after the 
FEA’s enactment. The government appointed the DLF’s former deputy-minister who 
recently had been made redundant. Eldridge, trained in the industrial forestry mould of 
large-scale efficiency and technocentric forest practices was an unlikely candidate for 
‘guardian’ of forest conservation. To add to his ideological limitations, his office was 
situated in Truro some 120 kilometres from the legislature and distant from mainstream 
policy-making. He was given few resources for his supposed watchdog role. After the 
commissioner retired eighteen months later without tabling a single public report, there 
was no replacement named nor were any appointments made to the FEA’s advisory board. 
Documented evidence suggests that no other direct FEA action was taken beyond the 
short-term appointment of a commissioner.30 Nevertheless, during the late eighties and 
nineties there was rising support for neo-liberalism that manifested as decreasing 
bureaucracy, fewer research funds, increased production and reduced provincial transfer 
payments at the federal level. These trends may well have compounded the detrimental 
effects of the FEA’s hands-off approach were it not for important countervailing forces in 
Nova Scotia. Despite the forest sector’s ongoing effort to trivialise conservation worries, a 
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rising concern among domestic environmentalists, soft industrialists, and foreign 
consumers calling for better forest practices brought new forest sector responses. These 
influences had repercussions first on rhetoric and subsequently on the way government 
and industry approached conservation concerns. The following section reviews six 
separate forest and environmental management responses to this growing conservation 
interest. 
 
Six Forest Conservation Case Studies: 
 
As was previously alluded to, within a couple of years of FEA enactment, the government 
had implicitly if not openly dismissed forest conservation legislation as a useful tool to 
shape forest practices. During the FEA’s early years both government and industry went 
about their forestry business largely unobstructed by environmentalists and those with 
similar sympathies. Because the technocentric factions of the forest industry were 
opposed to forest practices restrictions; the de facto hibernation of the Forest 
Enhancement Act appeared to serve both this sub-sector and government well. Gradually, 
however, external developments in global markets, greater concern among domestic 
environmentalists and internal transitions in the industry began to shift the prevailing 
rhetoric concerning acceptable principles underlying forest practices. One important 
factor was the increasing criticism of clearcutting of virgin temperate rainforests in British 
Columbia from Greenpeace, native groups and various other environmental coalitions. 
This serious negative publicity had fallout in other Canadian provinces including Nova 
Scotia. A second major influence was various international, bilateral, national and inter-
provincial agreements and treaties arising from the Bruntland Commission and the 
follow-up Rio de Janeiro Conference. This brought pressure on the Nova Scotian 
government and its forest industry to rethink at least the public relations consequences of 
their forest practices. The most influential force of change that was an outgrowth of the 
first two, was the threat of a forest products boycott in Europe. If successful this was 
surmised to have serious consequences for the forest industry. 
 
Given this triple threat to the forest industry, not only did forest conservation, under the 
guise of sustainable development become respectable as a topic for debate within the 
industry but so did the concept of preservation. This latter shift was particularly 
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interesting because the idea of preserving a forest, setting it aside with no industrial 
activity was clearly repugnant to the industry in the eighties. Out of this concern for its 
future profitability came a number of forest industry initiatives. These ranged from 
initiatives solely involving the forest industry concentrating exclusively on forest 
practices issues to ones led by preservation agencies involving conceptually complex 
biophysical and socio-economic dimensions. Perhaps the least conceptually complex was 
an initiative recently led by the forest industry; this “Coalition of Nova Scotia Forest 
Interests" hoped to garner support for a set of forest practices principles. Another was a 
government led initiative to test Integrated Resource Management (IRM) on Crown lands. 
A third concerned Forestry Certification. This initiative had two manifestations: the 
Canadian Standards Association led the first and the other was a more grassroots, but 
nevertheless internationally scoped initiative. A fourth was a Model Forest/ Landscape 
Management initiative and a related initiative was an Ecosystem Management proposal. 
Perhaps the most practically complex initiative was the Provincial Envirofor Process. This 
initiative was dependent on the continued maintenance of a province-wide consensus 
among industry, environmentalists, government and native groups in establishing 
environmentally based and acceptable forest practices. 
 
1. The Provincial Envirofor Process: 
 
The Nova Scotia Envirofor process was a consensus building process drawing 
representatives from a broad set of interests in forest management as well as 
environmentalists. This initiative grew out of a National Envirofor exercise led by the 
Canadian Forestry Association in Toronto in 1990. It attempted to draw various interests 
to the discussion table to develop codes for mutually acceptable forest practices. Notably, 
for the first time in Nova Scotia’s history, the 1991 Envirofor forum drew together the 
forest industry, native interests, environmentalists, government, NGOs and academics to 
discuss the principles of good forest management and the development of minimal forest 
practices standards. The outcome for the 1991 Envirofor, although modest 
(recommending a second forum the following year and giving unanimous support to 
implement the Special Places Act) signalled a new willingness by the industry to actually 
listen to the environmentalists’ point of view. Despite this cordiality, the press release that 
followed masked some concerted opposition to sidetrack Envirofor’s goals. Most of this 
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opposition came from DLF bureaucrats, which was rather reminiscent of the bureaucrats’ 
treatment of the Forest Practices Improvement Boards’ process.  
 
Bureaucratic opposition was not, however, its only source of criticism. The Envirofor 
process was notably criticised by two attending academics: Peter Clancy from St. Francis 
Xavier University in Antigonish and L. Anders Sandberg from St. Mary’s University in 
Halifax. They argued that 
there is a danger that environmental issues will be defined superficially and 
descriptively, in an effort to avoid policy debate and to deny power relationships. The 
underlying premises are that direct personal contact among stakeholders promotes 
reasonable dialogue, and that the missing link is communication and education.31 
 
While the 1991 Envirofor was criticised both during and after its forum, the second, the 
1992 Envirofor was denounced even before it began. For one, the steering committee 
found it difficult to maintain native representation during its planning phase resulting in 
no representation at the actual forum. Secondly, a number of key environmentalists 
refused to participate allegedly over a travel funding issue. The key outcomes were 
nevertheless, a set of forest management values. Ecological integrity topped the list; and 
agreement to urge the government to speed-up adoption of legislation to limit owner 
liability on private lands and to modify trespassing legislation was next. This forum also 
agreed to meet again within two years to ratify acceptable forest practices. Because of its 
less than ideal representation, the second Envirofor might have been considered fatally 
flawed. In its defence, however, it was for the first time in a public forum where senior 
DLF representatives and industry officials publicly endorsed environmentally friendly 
forest practices without direct coercion from environmentalists. Nevertheless, because of 
outside events this expression of environmental sensitivity could also be seen more 
cynically as a ploy to placate foreign interests. This Envirofor was coincident with the 
visit of a German television film crew to Nova Scotia to investigate forest practices. 
Despite this rather misanthropic view, the normally critical Clancy and Sandberg 
conceded that “industrial representatives [were] certainly more environmentally sensitive 
than in former years”. Within a month or so, the 92 Steering Committee reported on the 
1992 forum’s consensus to the incumbent minister: the Progressive Conservative John 
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Leafe. Two committee members: Gerry Jodrey of DLF and Chris Clarke of Bowaters also 
made a commitment to spearhead the formation of a new committee to plan the next 
Envirofor. The new steering committee was charged with forging draft forest practices 
guidelines and calling the next forum to ratify them. The momentum for the Envirofor 
process seemed to get lost along the way, however, and without public explanation the 
proposed 95 Envirofor conference designated for Cape Breton was cancelled.  
 
Although the Envirofor process is apparently ended there are lessons to be learned. The 
key to Envirofor success was the building and maintenance of a consensus among 
historically disparate interests. This was a very tall order for this forum included 
essentially the same groups that fought vehemently in the spray wars and over FIA 
implementation. For consensus to prevail, one or more factions would necessarily need to 
drastically shift position. While there was clearly a greater sensitivity by industrialists 
toward softer forest practices--at least in their rhetoric--there was little evidence of any 
fundamental paradigm shift. Regardless of underlying motivations for participation, the 
Envirofor process was implicit recognition of market failure. From various discussions it 
was clear that some state intervention was necessary to either repair the industry’s 
shortcomings or perhaps more realistically, to promote it’s prevailing practices more 
favourably. The first scenario was a potentially serious production challenge requiring 
substantive ground level change; the second was more cosmetic--a promotional concern. 
This second view was incidentally the position of the Canadian Forestry Association and 
was a central focus of their public relations efforts. Beyond this rather solicitous possible 
motivation, the Envirofor was also questionable as it involved quasi-representational 
democracy to mediate resource management interests. Envirofor implied from the 
beginning, as Clancy and Sandberg noted, that dialogue could somehow work out the very 
real differences in power and belief about how forest management should be conducted. 
In addition, if successful, Envirofor would devolve power from the industry’s real locus 
of power in the international marketplace and from its vestige in the provincial 
bureaucracy to a self-appointed advisory group whose advice the government would be 
obliged to accept--presumably because of its wide and prestigious representation. 
 
The Envirofor idea was, again in theory, that as consensus was developed the government 
could ‘ratchet-up’ forest practices regulations to provide an even playing field and more 
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sustainable forest practices. This of course disregarded the impact of corporate power that 
stealthily works behind closed doors to distort explicit policy prescriptions. No matter 
how well meaning, any ‘representative’ consensus built over a weekend was likely to 
have a rough ride gaining legitimacy from the disparate miscellany of Nova Scotia’s 
forest sector. No one would be legally bound unless it was finally codified in regulation 
and steadfastly implemented. 
 
2. The St. Mary’s Model Forest/ Landscape Management Project: 
 
This project grew out of the model forest programme of the federal Green Plan and the St. 
Mary’s River Forestry-Wildlife Project. This was a co-operative IRM venture between the 
Canadian Institute of Forestry: Nova Scotia Section (CIF: NS), Scott Paper, Stora, various 
federal and provincial agencies and the St. Mary’s River Association (see Figure 9.1). The 
St. Mary’s River/ Liscomb Model Forest Proposal was one of two Nova Scotian based 
proposals submitted for funding under the model forests program. The old IRM project 
focused on specific stands of forests and tested various ground level forest management 
methods focusing largely on woodfibre and wildlife production. The general purpose of 
the St. Mary's/ Liscomb model forest as stated in their proposal was, however, much 
broader. It was to 
act as a prototype to test sustainable, landscape-based integrated forest resource 
management principles, and to disseminate the results. It will be managed for multiple 
benefits, including economic, environmental, recreational, aesthetic, social and 
cultural. The Model Forest will take an innovative approach to resources management 
and will be a vehicle not only for testing new concepts and decision-making 
techniques, but a source of information to benefit other resource managers locally, 
nationally and internationally. 
 
The proposed model forest comprised 198,000 hectares of which 156,000ha were forest. 
It was located on Nova Scotia’s eastern mainland. The proposed model forest was 
composed of the entire St. Mary’s watershed, some 113km long, and much of the 
Liscomb. The project had four primary goals:
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Figure 9.1: Location of Saint Mary’s River / Liscomb Model Forest Program.  
 
1. To foster increased public support for and understanding of forest management 
practices by involving community and non-timber user groups in a partnership to 
co-operatively develop integrated management objectives with industry and 
government. 
2. To implement sustainable integrated management on a forest landscape basis 
through enhanced co-operation among landowners and those with expertise in 
forestry, wildlife, fisheries, hydrology and recreation planning. 
3. To maintain a healthy, productive forest generating economical and 
sustainable yields of timber and fibre without detriment to other forest-based 
economic, environmental and social values. 
4. To develop and implement a communications strategy that allows for optimal 
transfer of information and technology to share the knowledge and other 
deliverables derived from the Model Forest.32 This will include the use and 
dissemination of knowledge gained from the St. Mary’s River Forestry-Wildlife 
Project.33 
 
As it turned out, Nova Scotia was the only forested province not to have at least one 
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Project: Technical Reports 1-19. Halifax, 1987-1992. 
 207 
model forest project funded. Once rejected, the project members immediately turned 
elsewhere for funding and this study’s author agreed to co-ordinate the search for new 
funding. An interim grant was awarded by Wildlife Habitat Canada (WHC) with a 
directive to focus objectives more precisely; clearly establish commitment and agreement 
from present project partners; and widen partnerships to include small woodlot owners 
and additional non-forestry partners. Meeting these conditions was necessary if additional 
and substantive funding from WHC was to be secured. It should be noted that Wildlife 
Habitat Canada had quite compatible objectives to the model forest program. This 
organisation was established in 1984 as a public/ private partnership dedicated to 
conservation, restoration, and enhancement of wildlife habitat in Canada. The concept of 
Landscape and Ecology Management (LEM) was adopted by WHC to address some of the 
practical shortcomings it perceived with the Integrated Resource Management concept 
such as overlooking practical solutions to larger scale wildlife management and 
biodiversity concerns. According to Wildlife Habitat Canada, LEM recognises 
the reality that wildlife habitat is found not only in natural areas but also in areas 
where the primary land-use may be economic, social or cultural. The ecology of a 
landscape includes areas of pristine wilderness as well as culturally modified 
lands: agricultural, forested, industrial, urban and recreational. Landscape 
management takes an ecosystem approach to decision-making at a regional scale, 
with consideration for both wildlife and human values.34 
 
In practice the Landscape and Ecology Management approach encourages a pragmatic 
integration of cultural and biophysical values in resource management to promote overall 
sustainability. In reference to forest landscapes specifically, WHC points out that 
the forested landscape is the most important natural resource in the Canadian 
economy. At the same time, there is a realisation that the varied resources from the 
forest are not unlimited, that long-term planning and management are necessary if 
we are to achieve sustainable development based on ecological parameters. 
Further, the public is increasingly demanding that forestry be accountable to 
environmental concerns. Non-timber values such as wildlife and its habitat, 
recreational and tourism opportunities, hunting and trapping and native land-use 
are recognised as an integral part of future forestry decision-making. 
 
This project as envisioned in its mature state was to be a major step in devolving decision-
making to more community based resource management entities. The key to its success 
was the readiness of multinational corporations and government to devolve power for 
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forest management standards to local community based entities. Two goal-setting 
workshops were held with the original project signatures with a view to securing 
additional partners (including small woodlot owners and other community members) and 
funding; but as the process proceeded so the real fissures in their fragile consensus 
appeared and the project eventually died. Although at this time and place this project was 
a failure, like the Envirofor process, there are lessons to be learned concerning the 
viability of similar forest conservation programmes.  
 
Similar to the Envirofor process, the viability of this project depended on continued effort 
to maintain any established consensus among its initially asymmetrically powerful and 
diverse actors. Although all available historical evidence pointed against such groups 
building a workable and lasting consensus, there was considerable hope for success this 
time because this was largely the initiative of the two major multinationals operating in 
the area. As conceived this project combined ecological, social and community 
imperatives of the local, landscape based community but focused primarily on the forest 
ecosystem and the needs of the forest industry. While as a landscape management process 
to be co-funded by WHC its emphasis was on landscape protection and restoration, this 
project in practice was mainly centred on the long-term needs of the forest industry and 
wildlife management rather than general sustainable development per se. While in an 
environmental management sense it was integrative of all resource demands specific to 
the forest and the forest industry, it initially fell short of full environmental and social 
integration. It did, however, if it was implemented, hold the promise of considerable 
restorative ecology and more integrative management as more interest groups became 
involved. As such it was likely a model for Turner’s strong sustainable (SS) paradigm 
rather than indicative of the very strong typology (VS) that in time it had the potential to 
become. 
 
As envisioned the St. Mary’s landscape management process was to devolve much 
decision-making authority to a regional, quasi-democratic decision-making entity of 
forestry, social and environmental interests, and other regional elites. Like the Envirofor 
process it too was to periodically enshrine or ‘ratchet’ consensus on forest practices and 
other aspects of sustainable development in public policy regulation. The resultant land-
use and resource management processes and regulations were to be applied first within its 
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own jurisdiction and then as wider acceptance was built, its principles were to be adapted 
to other ecosystems and ecoregions. Interestingly, the multinationals’ motivation for 
involvement was unabashedly the international market pressure that threatened boycott of 
their forest products. It was also implicit recognition of market failure. In addition, clearly 
implicit in this initiative was a lack of faith in ‘broad brush’ state intervention like the FIA 
that was designed to correct the industry’s misdemeanours. In this landscape scaled and 
more adaptive management approach, the state’s role was seen here--much like the 
Envirofor process--as co-operating with and following the lead of the private sector to 
correct specific market failures. If this was to be successful, the state was to be cautiously 
constrained by an involved, interested and effective private sector acting in the public 
interest to safeguard the environment and the future viability of the industry. In the best 
case scenario, successfully applying this model required the sophisticated understanding 
of multi-agency dynamics including the disparate interests and goals of its various actors. 
Without an overwhelming and concerted effort by the public through democratic and 
market regulation processes to dismantle the multinationals asymmetric power, however, 
there was unlikely to be sufficient motivation for the multinationals to devolve its 
considerable power voluntarily. This uneven power in the end served as the major demise 
of this project. Although the multinationals inferred they had learned a great deal from the 
first St. Mary’s project and wanted to take time to apply its lessons elsewhere, it was clear 
they had little to immediately gain from voluntarily giving up power to make this project a 
success.  
 
The Central Region Integrated Resource Management Project: 
 
The Colchester/Cumberland Counties Integrated Resource Management Pilot Project was 
announced in January 1996 (see Figure 9.2). Its scope initially involved all the Crown 
lands of these two counties but was expanded to adjoining counties when the Department 
of Natural Resources revised its Central Region structure. According to McCullum (1995) 
reporting on the findings of a Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices struck in 
British Columbia in 1994 surrounding the Clayoquot Sound controversy, the overall 
objectives of integrated resource planning are: 
 to maintain the productive capacity of interlinked land, freshwater, estuarine and 
marine ecosystems; 
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 to maintain biodiversity of land and water ecosystems; 
 to include First Nations’ spiritual and other values; 
 to maintain heritage, recreation and scenic values; and 
 to sustain levels of commercial resource use. 
 
The specific objectives of this project, however, appear much less ambitious and more 
pragmatic than those implied in Clayoquot. Here, the emphasis is to develop a process 
that allows for a wide range of renewable and non-renewable values and interests to be 
considered and harmonised into an overall land-use management process. This project’s 
main management interests are categorised as the forest industry, mineral interests, 
recreation, the energy industry, and wildlife. The management team drawn entirely from 
DNR, includes foresters, geologists, biologists, recreation planners, and land managers. 
According to a January 1996 press release public input is critical to the welfare of this 
project, its overall goal is to develop guidelines that can be applied to all provincial 
Crown lands in Nova Scotia. From the Information Paper for Public Discussion 
concerning this project, it is evident that a major objective is to identify and provide 
strategies to resolve competing land-use interests.35 The management team believes it can 
minimise conflict by first identifying the critical natural and cultural resources on each 
piece of land utilising GIS and then by comparing with various land-use demands, provide 
a workable prescription that can optimise land-use over space and time as well as 
minimise conflict. 
 
                                                 
35 Department of Natural Resources. Information Paper for Public Discussion. 
Truro, January 1996. 
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Cumberland
County
Colchester County
 
Figure 9.2: Location of the Colchester – Cumberland Counties Integrated Resource 
Management Project. 
 
From public consultations concerning this project several additional land-use issues 
became evident. One was the question of native issues, seemingly ignored in the first 
instance. This involved treaties that entrenched native rights to harvest wildlife as well as 
the management of a Paleo-Indian site. A second issue was water quality and quantity 
concerns especially those regarding marshlands, fish habitat and beach management. A 
third was road access and the concern for maintaining or re-establishing wilderness values 
once forest or mineral operations were complete. A fourth concern was adjacent private 
property considerations, and also of concern were economic interests such that Crown 
lands be managed to favour local populations and not compete with private interests. In 
addition, there was a concern that previously agreed leases and licenses should be 
honoured in any new integrated planning process. With general regard for the 
environment, the public showed most concern over the externalities of Crown lands 
operations, especially those adjacent to private property. 
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Although this project may well be able to develop innovative bio-physical land-use 
prescriptions, incorporating the juxtaposition of several complex dimensions of forest 
management, in many respects it fails to address the prevalent complexities and realities 
generally inherent in Nova Scotia’s forestry sector. It de facto assumes a disinterested 
polity and consumer, for example, that the polity is content to be consulted periodically 
but claims no active role in Crown land resource management and that consumers have no 
overall interest in how Nova Scotia’s forestlands are managed. This focus assumes they 
are merely concerned with Crown lands. As emphasised in earlier chapters, the prevalent 
realities of forestry in Nova Scotia include, however, various multi-agency, multi-interest 
and various multi-political concerns, whereas this project delimits decision-making to a 
single, possibly rationally acting actor or agency. The success of this project’s decision-
making is based primarily on an intra-organisational structure and substantially ignores 
most of the inherently complex, natural and cultural ecosystem management dynamics 
widespread in Nova Scotia’s forest management. Despite these glaring simplifications, 
this project may still provide a useful template for developing ground-level management 
prescriptions and a basic framework for building on more complex multi-agency 
management dynamics in later projects. This project does for instance, consider the 
complex dimensions of multiple forest resource values in the management calculation but 
their resolution is ultimately simplified as the decision of a single bureaucratic power. It is 
likely to provide few insights how biophysical lessons might be applied in more complex 
organisational structures. This project integrates the management of selected resources in 
a specific, largely single-owner management regime but disregards the integrity of natural, 
ecosystem management units. In its basic form its focus is on identifying possible forest 
resource uses and optimising benefits for a highly visible client group. It largely ignores, 
however, the management of non-forest resources such as air and water and their more 
dispersed interest groups as well as all the resource benefits and the demands on adjacent 
private lands. Because of its lack of integration and comprehensiveness, as a model of 
sustainability this project falls somewhere between weak sustainability (WS) and strong 
sustainability (SS). On a landscape or ecosystem scale incorporating adjacent private 
lands and multi-environmental media, the sum total of forest practices may well violate, 
however, the basic law of thermodynamics and may systematically reduce biodiversity. 
 
In widely assessing the worth of this project it is important to note the province’s rationale 
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for maintaining Crown lands. In maintaining its ownership and attempting to raise its 
share of land-tenure since the nineteen twenties, the government can be seen as attempting 
to rectify several market failures. By aggregating and making available large tracts of 
forests to multinational corporations, that would not otherwise be available in sufficient 
quantity, the state has been able to attract large industrial players to the province. In 
solving this problem of the market so that Nova Scotia could boost its pulpwood 
production, it has created others. It has, for example, distorted the relatively free 
marketing of wood products from small woodlot owners and other commercial suppliers, 
and in its place provided a steady supply of heavily subsidised woodfibre from Crown 
lands. This has had the effect of noticeably reducing the price of pulpwood in Nova 
Scotia, visavis New Brunswick--reducing the price beyond which it is possible to cover 
ongoing management overheads and gain sufficient surplus from fibre sales itself to make 
forest management attractive. Thus, when a forest management project on Crown lands 
ignores its impact on the economic wellbeing of private lands, it also ignores its overall 
impact on the potential for sustainability. Although there can be no guarantee that small 
woodlot owners will invest in conservation, as explained in Chapter Seven, the corollary 
almost undoubtedly means they have no economically sustainable choice to do so. 
Perhaps the most that this IRM project can hope for then with respect to market failure is 
to reduce the failure of its lessors. It can do this first by insisting that lessors maintain 
high levels of forest practices to enhance biological sustainability; but also by various 
restrictions on harvesting and by demanding adequate rents, minimise the market 
distortions felt by resource managers on private lands.  
 
Seen simply then as one form of state intervention, this Crown lands based IRM project 
can serve largely as a biophysical model and as a simplified management tool to mediate 
various forest resource demands. Without appropriate economic checks and balances, 
however, it is in danger of inflating costs well beyond those feasible in the private and 
commercial sectors and thus likely to contribute further to state failure.  
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3. The Cape Breton Highlands Greater Ecosystem Management Model: 
 
In contemporary history, the primary mandate of Parks Canada has been to maintain 
“ecological integrity through the protection of natural resources”. In recent years, 
however, Parks Canada has recognised the futility of this objective without close co-
operation with neighbouring land, water and environment managers.36 This has resulted in 
a specific system wide, national park policy to promote ecosystem management. In 
parallel, in Canada’s Green Plan, the federal government committed Canadians to 
sustainable development that ideally ensures present resource utilisation will not endanger 
prospects for future use.37 Integrating both, the broad vision for maintaining park 
ecosystems states that 
national parks will be part of interconnected systems of protected areas surrounded 
by lands which provide for the well being of local inhabitants while contributing 
to the maintenance of ecological integrity. Sustainability of the ecosystem will be 
addressed through cooperative ecosystem-based management involving 
landowners, managers, agencies and interest groups.38 
 
National Parks’ policy also proposes that 
cooperative arrangements for complementary use and management of lands 
adjacent to national parks will be pursued with government and non-government 
agencies at the local, provincial territorial and federal levels in order to maintain 
ecosystem integrity and to foster sustainable development.39 
 
Bridgland and Marineau, two National Park managers concerned specifically with 
CBHNP, suggest two important objectives to steer this project’s human dimensions: 
1. to work formally and informally with land managers in Cape Breton to foster 
regional sustainable resource use to maintain and enhance park ecosystem 
integrity and biophysical diversity; and 
2. to educate people about the park’s natural heritage and resource management 
issues and encourage a positive attitude towards the park’s ecosystem management 
(see figure 9.3).  
 
Although much of the theoretical literature concerning ecosystem management appears 
                                                 
36 National Parks Act, Canada, 1988. 
37 Government of Canada. Green Plan for A Healthy Environment. Ottawa, 1990. 
38 Environment Canada. Toward Sustainable Ecosystems, A Canadian Parks 
Service Strategy to Enhance Ecological Integrity. Environment Canada, Parks Service, 
Calgary. Final Report of the Ecosystem Management Task Force, 1992. Cited in 
Bridgland and Marineau, 1995, 2. 
39 Canadian Heritage. Parks Canada Guiding Principles and Operational Policies. 
Canadian Heritage, Parks Canada, 1994. Cited in Bridgland and Marineau, 1995, 1. 
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unrealistic in a complex land tenure system, Irland appears to offer a rare but more 
realistic perspective that is useful in the Cape Breton perspective. He identified several 
practical difficulties in applying the ecosystem concept to the eastern USA--an area with 
similar land tenure to Nova Scotia. According to Irland  
 
Figure 9.3: Location of the Northern Cape Breton Greater Ecosystem. 
 
ecosystem management seems to be a wave of the future. Yet the concept of 
ecosystem management is virtually untested within the ownership pattern that 
dominates the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic United States: a matrix of non-
industrial private forests (NIPF) [small woodlots] with just a sprinkling of public 
lands and large industrial holdings.40 
 
While this project is still in its infancy, Irland’s view raises interesting questions whether 
this process can serve a useful and practical purpose in forestry conservation and in the 
promotion of ecological modernisation generally in this region. 
 
For one thing, this project has considerable socio-political baggage to overcome. 
                                                 
40 Irland, Lloyd C. Ecosystem Management on NIPFs. J. of Forestry. August 
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Historically the federal government through the auspices of the Nova Scotia government 
carved the Cape Breton Highlands National Park from a combination of provincial Crown 
lands under de facto multiple-use management and expropriated private lands. Sixty years 
after its establishment, the Park continues to engender strong anti-park feelings, especially 
among locals compelled to give up their land for a ‘playground’ and denied traditional 
access to Crown lands for wildlife and woodfibre resources.41 Although the Park has had 
formal and informal arrangements with its neighbours, particularly the Nova Scotia 
Department of Natural Resources and Nova Scotia Power, generally its record of co-
operation with adjacent landowners has been strained.  
 
Aside from any practical biophysical challenges of ecosystem management, this project 
requires first and foremost forgiveness by all the Cape Breton Highlands National Park’s 
traditionally alienated and often slighted neighbours. This apart, the success of this project 
calls for a substantially elevated recognition among these same groups that development 
must be decoupled from environmental degradation, if this region is to enjoy lasting 
socioeconomic prosperity. This may in itself be sufficient cause to bury past grievances 
and begin co-operative resource management initiatives. If successful, this project 
potentially integrates almost all aspects of environmental quality management with 
development, and by nestling within larger ecosystem management systems theoretically 
tackles global pollution threats and externally induced environmental destruction. There is 
of course the barrier of human resentment to overcome and the mammoth countervailing 
forces of market forces that threaten to undermine its success each step of the way. 
 
Despite the rather chequered history of co-operation Cape Breton Highlands National 
Park managers hope to establish a multi-agency, ecosystem management approach for the 
Cape Breton Highlands Greater Ecosystem.42 At the landscape scale to which this project 
is initially focused, however, this approach potentially suffers from all the power 
distortions inherent in multi-agency management and all the inequities made evident in 
the FIA’s analysis. Nevertheless, although at present the national park is seen as taking a 
                                                                                                                                                  
1994, 14. 
41  Colleen Anderson. Public Reaction to Protected Area Establishment and 
Management: The Northern Cape Breton Greater Ecosystem. BRM Honours Thesis, 
Acadia University, Nova Scotia, 1997.  
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key co-ordinating role initially, theoretically, like the St. Mary’s project, it envisions the 
devolution of decision-making authority to a regional quasi-democratic decision-making 
process made up of various regional and resource management elites. This may be more 
politically palatable than the Park maintaining a key co-ordinating role. Theoretically in 
this management system, periodically emerging consensus will be enshrined in regulation. 
Similar to the Envirofor process and the St. Mary’s project, the government is expected to 
ratchet-up the regulatory framework to reflect any new political equilibrium.  
 
In its envisioned theoretically mature form, this project fully integrates environment and 
economy. Within its spatial boundaries, this project integrates social processes and 
economic development with the management and restoration of environmental media. 
One important assumption is that the market will be much more cognisant and responsive 
to its own failures at the local level. This assumption is predicated on local interests being 
well represented, well informed and locally accountable; and it also assumes that the 
vagaries of the wider market can be held in abeyance to stabilise and improve 
environmental quality within the ecosystem. There is then a vision to develop an 
integrative coalition of state, commercial and private interests to comprehensively 
decouple development from environmental degradation within the region. It presupposes, 
quite emphatically, that future welfare is inextricably linked to a healthy and biodiverse 
environment and is committed to maintaining or expanding development to increase the 
social welfare of its inhabitants. In its theoretically mature form, this project is fully 
committed to the very strong sustainability (VS) paradigm. In its present immature form, 
it is far to early to tell whether it can work past its organisational baggage, although past 
history in the region would suggest that it has an enormous uphill battle to overcome. 
 
4. The Coalition of Nova Scotia Forest Interests: 
 
At the urging of the Minister of Natural Resources, the Hon. Don Downe; a coalition of 
forestry interests was established in 1993 to consider forest sustainability and the question 
of improved forest practices as the basis for a renewed provincially funded forest 
silviculture programme. The coalition consisted of fourteen representative groups 
including some woodlot owners, sawmill operators, pulp and paper companies, forestry 
                                                                                                                                                  
42 Bridgland and Marineau, January 1995. 
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and silviculture contractors, Christmas tree growers, manufacturers of wood products and 
forest industry workers. In its submission to the government, it recommended a registry of 
buyers be established requiring annual reporting of the quantity and type of wood 
harvested as well as the publication of this data. It also recommended the establishment of 
a forest practices code; the establishment of a funding mechanism for tree planting 
programs; the establishment of a sustainable forestry board to advise the minister of the 
Department of Natural Resources on forest management matters in the province. 
According to this coalition’s news release in October 1996, the strategy included 
principles of forest management focusing on sound ecological practices, the non-
involvement of government in scheduling harvesting on private land, and the need for 
unrestricted access to markets by landowners and producers. According to Diane 
Blenkhorn, the coalition chairwoman, “the strategy offers a plan to ensure the long-term 
viability of our forest resource on both Crown and private woodlands.”43  Before the 
subsequent minister, the Hon. Eleanor Norrie was prepared to receive this 
recommendation, however, an ‘independent’ panel was established to review public input 
at nine regional public hearings. These were held throughout the province within a month 
of the report’s release. Recommendations from this committee were finally submitted to 
the minister on November 18, 1996. 
 
After three years of behind closed doors discussion, at times running parallel to the 
planning of now defunct 1995 Envirofor III Conference, and relying on consensus 
building among essentially like-minded blocs in forest management, this process ran foul 
of substantial opposition. This primarily came from environmentalists and many small 
woodlot owners during subsequent public hearings. To be successful, this approach also 
assumed a disinterested public and the complete emasculation of political influence over 
forest public policy by environmentalists. In essence this process attempted, 
unsuccessfully as in turned out, to short-circuit the broader consensus building of efforts 
like the Envirofor process. Only a month was allowed from the report’s publication to the 
end of the public hearings. This overly short period for public feedback resulted in 
considerable bad press--there were accusations of railroading before informed and 
measured opposition could be mounted. Until this process became public, most observers 
                                                 
43 Chronicle Herald, October 21, 1996; C9. 
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of Nova Scotia’s forestry assumed that both the industry and government understood that 
a broader consensus building approach was essential to gain lasting acceptance of forest 
practices policy. It was evident, however, that by reverting back to the old seats of power 
that had run roughshod over forest management until the nineties, they (the multinationals 
and the government) believed they could again marginalise small woodlot owners, 
environmentalists and forest amenity users. As they had for so long before. 
 
 If anything, this botched attempt to seize the legislative and policy agenda by the 
traditional powers showed that they had changed little in their outlook since the early 
eighties. In terms of process they showed that it was clearly acceptable to disregard the 
public, environmentalists and a wide representation of small woodlot owners in the policy 
formulation process. They also showed that it was their intent all along to largely codify 
present standard operating processes rather than establish more environmentally sensitive 
forest practices codes. Their proposal was clearly committed to maintaining the 
production status quo. The coalition offered only peripheral forest management changes 
based on ‘end-of-pipe’ strategies and by this emphasis implicitly recognised market 
failure. But in doing so, it tried to mask future failure rather than averting it, by wrapping 
superficial forest management standards embodying present destructive practices in 
subsidy programmes for reforestation. Interestingly, there was no counter offer of 
accountability for measurable gains in sustainable practices. Had there been no great 
outcry of dissent, it seemed that the government was quite committed to codify those 
measures that forestry’s most powerful saw fit to impose on itself. The state, had it 
ratified this process as proposed, would again be seen as the industry’s agent-state. 
 
5. Forestry Certification: 
 
The impetus for certification comes from two related motivations. The first is to stimulate 
more environmentally friendly forest practices; the second is to use these as a marketing 
tool. There seems no doubt that the underlying interest in certification is the increasing 
worldwide consumer demand for environmentally friendly forest products. While there 
appears to be a single set of motivations, the drive for certification comes from two 
distinct camps. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) appears as a grassroots 
organisation of environmentalists and small and mid-scale forest managers that have 
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developed an international network. The second is mainstream in Canada; it is based on 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) certification and is led by the established 
forest industry and the federal government. 
 
The Forest Stewardship Council now based out of Oaxaca, Mexico was formed in 
Toronto in 1993 as a non-profit, non-government membership 
international organization whose mission is to promote environmentally 
responsible, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of forests. 
Part of its mandate is to accredit certification organizations which meet its criteria. 
 
It receives funding from evaluation and licensing fees, membership dues, and grants and 
donations. It supports voluntary and independent certification and encourages the 
development of forest management standards worldwide that promote forest stewardship. 
Jim Drescher of New Germany, Nova Scotia: an ‘alternative’ farmer, small woodlot 
owner and eco-forestry school director led the introduction of the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) Certification process at a standing room only meeting in Truro, Nova 
Scotia in April 1996. One hundred and eighty people from the three Maritime Provinces 
discussed the potential for developing an Acadian Forest Region chapter to develop 
certifiable forest practices standards for the region.44 
 
According to the FSC a viable forest management standards approach should be credible 
to the public, supplier/consumer focused, a single overall system that has international 
equivalence, is compatible with “relevant principles and criteria as well as with 
legislation”. It is equitable for all users, practical in application, voluntary and audible by 
a third party. Furthermore, it must incorporate continued improvement, be accessible to 
small and medium sized enterprises, it must be adaptable to different jurisdictions and 
ecological systems.45 As a grassroots organisation, buttressed against government and big 
business, it struggles to gain credibility and sufficient membership to make it a viable 
alternative to the CSA process in the Acadian Forest. In its favour there is growing 
support by important consumer groups. The World Wildlife Fund: U.K. and fifty-four 
U.K. based consumer companies have joined forces to promote FSC certified wood 
                                                 
44 Ecologic and Associates. Forest Stewardship Council Certification 
Consultation: Proceedings of Consultation Regarding the Acadian Forest Region, Truro, 
Nova Scotia. April 16, 1996. 3-6. 
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products. This group called for “the international trade in wood and wood products to be 
based on well-managed forests”. Its requirement for continued membership relies on 
phasing out wood-products purchases that do not have FSC certification by 1999.46 
 
The Canadian Standards Association Sustainable Forest Management (CSA: SFM) 
standards is clearly more financially stable. It has the philosophical backing of 
government in Canada and the financial backing of big business, but it has a credibility 
problem stemming from its design and its basic certification principles.47 The key 
difference between the Forest Stewardship Council and that of the CSA approach is that 
the former certifies the product from its source and tracks it to the retail outlet or place of 
consumption. The CSA approach only certifies the management process. According to 
Elliott, the Canadian  
forest industry has been promoting an alternative approach to certification based 
on auditing the management system of the forest company, rather than the forest 
management performance, as required by the FSC. 
 
The CSA: SFM process was set in motion in June 1994 with funding from the forest 
industry. The ratification of the certification process was dependent upon a technical 
committee with representatives from producers, environmental and general interest 
groups, professionals, academics and practitioners, and the government/ regulatory 
authority. As Elliott makes clear, the process was the result of “international and domestic 
criticism of the environmental impact on forestry operations in Canada”.  
In the absence of internationally accepted standards or definitions of sustainable 
forest management, Canada is concerned that some countries may restrict trade of 
forest products on the basis of often arbitrary and inconsistent rules.”48 
 
Despite its apparent broad representation and its claims for widespread support the CSA 
process was the subject of considerable criticism from environmental groups. It was 
however, able to claim support from Wildlife Habitat Canada who “strongly supports the 
CSA initiative because it will require that forest managers establish and meet biodiversity 
objectives.” The Industrial Wood & Allied Workers of Canada (IWA Canada) also said 
                                                                                                                                                  
45 Ecologic, 6-7. 
46 FSC Notes: A Newsletter of the Forest Stewardship Council. January ‘96, 
Volume 1-Issue 2. 6-7. 
47 Chris Elliott, Senior Forest Advisor, WWF International. Forest Management 
Certification: ISO, FSC and CSA: What’s going on? Taiga-News 19, November 1996. 
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that they “gladly accepted the CSA invitation to help develop sustainable forest 
management standards for Canada. We saw this as an opportunity to protect worker’s jobs 
and ensure better forest practices.” The Canadian Federation of Woodlot Owners also 
threw their support behind the process; they stated that “Sustainable harvests, better 
management practices, [and] more secure markets ... are three reasons why [we] worked 
with the CSA to develop national forest management standards.” 
 
The CSA SFM approach is patterned on the ISO 14001 Environmental Management 
System (EMS) approach. This involves the establishment of and commitment to a SFM 
policy for a defined forest area. It also includes the definition of goals and indicators; 
planning; implementation of the plan; and the assessment of implementation. Finally it 
includes a review and continued improvement of the plan. A key difference from the FSC 
model is that in the CSA process the forest owner or manager sets the performance level 
for a forest unit based on six national criteria. The more concrete criteria are conserving 
biodiversity, maintaining and enhancing forest ecosystems, and conserving soil and water. 
It also includes more esoteric requirements including contributing to global ecological 
cycles, providing multiple benefits to society and accepting society’s responsibility for 
sustainable development. The key operative is that management must show ability to 
move towards these conditions rather than actually doing so through ground level 
assessments. 
 
Gaining recognition by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has been 
rather problematic for the Canadian Industry despite its claims that its ‘company 
certification’ standards are consistent with ISO l4001. As it clearly states, meeting this 
standard does not imply an absolute measure as “two organisations carrying out similar 
activities but having different environmental performance may both comply with its 
requirements.”49 As a result of this lack of objectivity, the submission of the Standards 
Council of Canada (SCC) presented in May, 1995 was vigorously opposed by the World 
Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace, as well as Scandinavian Countries and the USA. It was 
subsequently withdrawn. It has since been discussed at an ISO meeting in Rio de Janeiro 
in June 1996, and has more recently been referred to a technical working group chaired by 
                                                                                                                                                  
48CSA SFM System: Overview document, August 25 1995, Z808. Cited in Elliott. 
49 ISO 14001. Cited in Elliott. 
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New Zealand. 
 
It will be interesting whether one or both of these systems survive the test of time and 
whether either will lead to better forest practices. There are two key points worth 
emphasising concerning forest standards certification. The first is that certification is 
producer driven but heavily consumer dependent. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
regulation in the country of consumption or without consumer preference for certified 
products--usually at a premium cost--this process is fundamentally unworkable. 
Experience elsewhere, such as in household products for example, suggests that interest in 
the environment and paying for green products is ephemeral. It appears to run in brief 
spurts like the business and the election cycles, it is not necessarily compatible with the 
long-term planning outlook necessary in sound forest management. The second point, 
which is its key strength, is that forest standards can be applied to almost any scale from a 
small forest stand to a landscape scaled ecosystem or eco-region, or even country or 
international trading block. This advantage over several other conservation initiatives 
means that it can be applied to a single ownership unit. Unlike the other examples 
outlined in this section, certification supports landowner sovereignty rather than works 
against it. It is not altogether dependent on building consensus within any particular 
geographical unit--which is after all, a communal or quasi-socialist endeavour. Rather it 
supports individual initiative and the right to associate--a fundamental and cherished 
plank of the rights of private property. 
 
Consistent with these points, both certification models cut through the inherent 
complexities of multi-agency/ organisational consensus building and the necessity to 
continually maintain support within a pre-determined geographical area and group. This 
process de-emphasises the importance of but does not necessarily eliminate the need to 
sway government in order to ratchet-up regulation when consensus is reached. By 
capitalising on its underpinnings of consumer sovereignty and its inherent market forces, 
and the efficiencies of scale developed by like-minded producers, different forest 
management standards can be developed for a number of producer groups. If these 
producer groups are successful in the marketplace, power will be devolved to ultimate 
consumers through their various retailers, wholesalers and producers. If one or more 
certification groups predominantly represent small and medium sized producers, then 
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some influence will be devolved to them via their consumers. This will inevitably transfer 
some power and influence from larger producers who held power in the first place. For 
sustained success in the marketplace there is nevertheless, a requirement that a sufficient 
aggregate of fee-paying producers join the certification scheme and they self-impose 
marketable forest practices on themselves. Retailers must follow a similar self-restraint, 
although they may not necessarily be fee-paying they may indeed receive incentives from 
producer groups. 
 
To extensively change ground level forest practices and to have meaningful impact on a 
region’s sustainable development, however, it will require much more than market 
success. Success at ground level will depend upon a number of factors. One is that there 
will be sufficient aggregate compliance in any given area to actually improve forest 
quality over time and space. A single conforming producer is better than none, but this 
may not have any appreciable impact on sustainability. Two, the likely inevitable 
reductions in production--per unit area--that results from more environmentally sensitive 
forest practices will not simply be compensated by increases elsewhere using inferior 
forestry methods. Three, it is essential that poor forest practices are not merely postponed 
when schemes collapse in the marketplace. Sustainability must be for the long-term. A 
clear drawback then is that environmental enhancement is linked to consumer preferences 
that are often transitory.  
 
One seeming irony of this process is that certification appears to be a direct outgrowth of, 
and recognition of the sanctity of global trade. Certification not only puts faith in global 
marketing, despite the growing recognition that neo-liberalism and unabated global trade 
seems to be the main cause of worldwide pollution and forest degradation, but it also touts 
certification as its solution. The market in this case assumes that each resource sector can 
alleviate its own environmental failures through collective marketing and the wise 
purchasing behaviour of environmentally astute consumers. To complete this rather 
difficult scenario, it must be assumed that the state will necessarily reduce its own 
interventions that lead to environmental degradation and will support the private sector in 
its corrective mechanisms. For the state this may well go beyond mere enabling efforts to 
actually sanctioning controls. If the latter is necessary, however, such action likely means 
continued evasive action by industry laggards. This was seen in the STA era, in the failure 
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of the Envirofor process, and the collapse of the St. Mary’s project. All exemplified the 
reluctance of powerful actors to support actions that would devolve influence more 
broadly. 
 
The Department of Natural Resources Position Paper: 
 
In response to its continued failures in curbing market failure and its own state failures, 
the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources published a position paper entitled 
Toward Sustainable Forestry in October 1997.50 This arose from the ashes of the aborted 
Coalition of Nova Scotia Forest Interests proposal that was summarily rejected in public 
hearings the previous year.51  In its introduction this latest document recognises several 
important requisites for future forest management. First it emphasises the unique 
character of Nova Scotia’s forestry management’s land tenure in Canada; it being 
predominantly privately owned and managed. It also concedes that the demand for forest 
fibre has increased substantially in recent years, that much immature woodland is 
exploited, and that total harvest levels are unsustainable. Exploitation of softwood has 
risen from 2.7 million cubic metres in the early eighties to an average of 3.7 million 
between 1986 and 1990, and to 4.0 million from 1991-1995 with the level for 1995 being 
4.8 million. Ominously the 1996 and 1997 levels are thought to be still higher. More 
intensive forest management with extensive replanting and silviculture was once the hope 
for higher sustainable yields for the future but the government now acknowledges that the 
era of large federal/ provincial forest management subsidies, upon which these predictions 
were predicated, is over. Most significantly, it recognised that the time for regulatory 
enforcement, in the absence of sufficient subsidies and the lack of support for green type 
taxes, has come. It dismissed, however, the direct intervention of government regulation 
in forest practices. It cited as rationale that land ownership sovereignty is prized 
throughout Nova Scotia and that forest managers dismiss the notion that anyone but the 
owner/ manager can dictate when and how forest harvests should be scheduled. 
Consequently it did not perceive an appropriate role for government to be involved in the 
decision-making process on private land. It did concede, however, that the public 
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51 John T. Sears, DBA: Panel Chair. Public Response to: Coalition of Nova Scotia 
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demands that forests be managed more broadly than solely for the forest industry and that 
exceptions are made to a hands-off policy when environmental considerations are at stake. 
 
The major trust of this proposed policy paper recommends that the Department initiate a 
registry for all wood buyers in the province, and that they have an approved wood 
acquisition plan. It also recommends that the province continue to “provide incentives and 
technical support for silviculture operations on woodlot holdings”. With concern for 
sustainable development, it recommends, however, that the Forest/ Wildlife Guidelines 
and Standards regulations developed for Crown lands and adopted by some commercial 
operators be enforced on all private lands. It also points out that 
the need to develop guidelines for forest management to protect genetic, species 
and habitat diversity is specifically referenced in the National Forest Strategy, as is 
the need for public and private forest management agencies to include specific 
measures to maintain forest biodiversity in management planning.52 
 
Although it is apparently ready to implement a comprehensive code of forestry practice on 
Crown lands it is only willing to recommend rather than enforce directly the same on 
private lands. It also plans to require that all harvesting above a threshold of two hectares 
be registered at the local Department office before harvesting begins. This it contends 
“will allow monitoring by the Department to ensure that immature stands are not being 
harvested and/ or to improve harvesting generally”. Finally it plans to complement these 
actions with a “strong, coordinated education-extension-communications effort”.53 
 
Despite the humiliation that the Coalition received at the hands of the public input 
regarding their forest strategy in 1996, its most prominent association, the Nova Scotia 
Forest Products Association (NSFPA) still seems quite oblivious to its sullied image as 
forest protector. By representing “itself as the only organization that speaks for all sectors 
of the forest industry”, it, in response to the government’s position, called for Natural 
Resources to endorse a voluntary system of forest management reporting and make it 
(NSFPA) the keeper of the registry. In essence it suggested that it do the policing of Nova 
Scotia’s forestlands. Despite this twist on the government’s proposals it did endorse in 
principle the government’s design to have annual registration of buyers, enforce forest/ 
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wildlife guidelines, and the collection and reporting of data and support for the concept 
for the annual publication of the “State of the Forest Report.54 
 
According to the government’s position paper the key to a process to stimulate 
sustainability 
is to devise a framework that responds to the need and respects traditional rights of 
ownership. This suggests that a greater responsibility for the maintenance of the 
resource should be placed with those that are generating the demand (i.e. the 
industry).55 
 
In some ways this appears as a classic ‘end-of-pipe’ strategy but there is no direct end of 
the line remediation of environmental damage by the processors proposed. There is 
nevertheless a provision for the payment of silviculture funds by the processor to the 
producer, and an arrangement that buyers and suppliers enter into a stewardship contract. 
Recently Stora entered into a joint management plan with the Nova Scotia Landowners 
and Fibre Producers (the official bargaining group within Stora’s monopsony boundary) 
that serves as an operational model for this government proposal. The resultant 
acquisition plan of future buyers, according to the government 
must include enough information to permit the Department to analyze the impact 
on the future wood supply and provide the necessary assurance that the silviculture 
program can be carried out.56 
 
This must be capable of being monitored, be verifiable and audible.  
 
This provision at first glance appears as a creative sidestep around the political problem of 
direct government intervention on private lands. It potentially provides continuing funds 
for forest management whether the producer wishes to be involved or not, and it can, if 
acquisition plans become sufficiently sophisticated, address many of the issues 
concerning environmentally sensitive forest practices. The most serious problem, and 
likely to be its nemesis however, is the question of market control. In a free market, which 
as already argued in this study, Nova Scotia’s forest products market is not; sellers can 
shop around when the buyer’s conditions are deemed unsatisfactory. In a monopsony the 
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seller must generally sell to the monopsony buyer or not sell at all. The overwhelming 
asymmetrical power of the multinationals over this uneven marketing field means such 
arrangements are more likely to strengthen the political economies of the dominant 
commercial operators. This is especially true where the seller has largely become the 
political dogsbody of the multinationals and where the multinationals’ track record on 
forest management is less than stoic. In addition to this serious potential weakness, this 
proposed policy also ignores the issue of vertical integration. The larger commercial 
operators obtain substantial produce from their own corporate or licensed lands. Much of 
the funds earmarked for forest management, as a levy on sales (a green tax by another 
name) will likely become a bookkeeping transfer and a forest conservation auditor’s 
nightmare. As history attests and argued in Chapter Eight, any strengthening of the 
multinationals’ bargaining power and strengthened political economy are likely to come at 
the expense of the small suppliers and the condition of the forests. Contrary to what these 
measures are supposedly designed to protect. 
 
Conclusions: 
 
A few principles initially seem clear from this contemporary overview. The first is that 
forest practices legislation is clearly not the instrument of choice for government or 
industry, and seemingly not in the first place that of environmentalists. While there 
appears to be a growing consensus or at least recognition that forest practices must be 
based on sustainable development, sound ecological principles and broad social 
consensus, little seems to have been learned from past experiences by government and 
industry that can be readily applied to modern forest practices prescriptions. Although 
there is obvious concern for consensus, the problem of consensus building among the 
disparate factions impacting forestry policy has haunted regulators for decades without 
any clear way forward. Rather than finding workable solutions, the forest conservation 
problem seems to have got steadily worse and more complex as time goes on. It is in this 
context that the following and final chapter attempts to draw the fundamental problems of 
the forest conservation in Nova Scotia under one cover. It does so by drawing on the 
lessons from each legislative era and by assessing the key forces impinging on the forest 
sector in the past, in the present and what is likely in the future. To do this, Chapter Ten 
draws on the four themes or idioms of analysis first outlined in Chapter Four. As these 
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idioms take a rather broad-brush view of the policy process, so this next chapter steps 
back from particular details to assess the broad themes underlying forest conservation 
policy. Based on these broad guides, Chapter 10 speculates on what can be done to make 
forest enhancement and sustainable development a more feasible proposition in Nova 
Scotia in the future. 
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Chapter Ten: 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations. 
 
This study of forest conservation policy in Nova Scotia has focused largely on power and 
influence over forest policy decision-making rather than about technical, biophysical 
interventions on the forest floor. It is mainly about the market’s ability to impose its will 
over forest resource management and the state’s weakness to take corrective action. The 
outcome has been about an increasingly worsening renewable resource whose 
degradation has rapidly increased since the industry’s post-war expansion to meet post-
war rebuilding efforts and later escalating consumerism. In its simplest form it is an 
account of deceit, foolishness and naivety. It is also a story of apparent failure when 
legislative failure actually meant success for some and it is about political opportunism 
and blunt corporate power. For the most part it is a tale of two opposing forces, the first 
bolstering economic wealth and the second trying against severe odds to maintain 
environmental quality. It is above all a continuing chronicle of the challenges of 
environmental management that become increasingly more complex and more difficult to 
solve everyday. 
 
In its investigative and descriptive form, this case study analysed the policy process 
through close chronicling of policy events. This micro policy analysis stood various 
legislative, policy and program events in order and then unveiled the web of 
interrelationships that were often counterintuitive, frequently couched in misleading 
rhetoric, and sometimes led by well meaning but quite naïve policy actors. Mesoanalyses 
of power and influence were regularly built on these investigative analyses; these more 
theoretical approaches repeatedly pried open otherwise hidden motives for policy action 
that helped explain otherwise seemingly irrational policy behaviour. Finally, in the 
penultimate chapters and in this chapter’s conclusion, this study made more sweeping 
macroanalysis of the forest conservation process to assess its performance in the light of 
ecological modernisation and sustainable development. Putting policy events in the 
context of modern ecological management theory provided important insights into the 
development of forest conservation policy and its increasing complexity. Putting Nova 
Scotia’s forest conservation in the context of world trade and the rise of neo-liberalism 
attuned the analysis to the realisation that no legislation alone, and likely no provincially 
inspired package of conservation initiatives can solve the problem of forest degradation. 
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Rather this analysis suggests the need for substantive action on numerous fronts including 
the province, the nation and in international trade. The underlying theme of this study was 
that as time went on, so the forest conservation problem became more convoluted, the 
countervailing forces working against forest conservation became both more extensive 
and acute, and the critical consequences of failure--although possible solutions were 
continually delayed--become more onerous every passing day. This study’s overall 
conclusion is that present forest conservation efforts are woefully inadequate and are 
unlikely to improve until radical shifts in thinking and action permeate the forest industry 
and the international marketplace. 
 
Summary: 
 
The initial account of forest conservation legislation in Nova Scotia with the Broad 
Arrow Act tells of the colonial power protecting its strategic interests by conserving 
masts and spars for the Royal Navy. Early emphasis was then not so much about 
conserving the forest for future generations and protecting environmental quality, 
although there was an implied harvesting delay of specific trees, it was shorter-term and 
about reserving trees for their optimal use--as defined by Nova Scotia’s colonial power. 
As with later efforts at forest conservation there is evidence that compliance was far from 
perfect, although the best evidence of non-conformance with the Broad Arrow Act came 
from the New England states. Civil disobedience there evidently grew to sedition and 
contributed eventually to the War of Independence. The main points to be made about 
forest conservation here are that the forests had utility to the British only as an industrial 
installation. An important point was that legislation was not for any supposed 
environmental or strictly conservation benefit; it was that the key political-economic 
force on forest management--even at this early stage--came from outside Nova Scotia’s 
boundaries. 
 
Although there was considerable economic exploitation of Nova Scotia’s forests prior to 
World War II there was no great effort to legislate forest conservation. Most exploitation 
of the forests in this pre-war era was at the hands of foreign nationals, mainly from New 
England. During the Depression considerable land, once in the hands of small woodlot 
owners, was gobbled-up by capitalist opportunists mainly from the States and Montreal. 
Despite these aggrieved transactions it was nevertheless, a matter of public policy and 
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bureaucratic effort to accumulate more Crown lands and to exact forest conservation 
practices on the government’s lands. In practice much of the land accumulated from the 
private sector was denuded, most deemed surplus by industry once its stumpage value 
was extracted. Again the tale in this pre-war era is that forest degradation was in large 
part at the hands of foreigners and other outsiders. Forest management decision-making 
was made by those controlling capital and not by more direct interests in forest 
conservation. 
 
The STA stands as the only legislation to create real and positive change on the forest 
floor. It is placed alone as the only legislation that slowed forest degradation caused by 
market forces. As a conceptually simple statute it had both strengths and weaknesses. Its 
strength was clearly its ease of application; any tree failing to meet its minimal girth 
requirement could not be felled without ministerial approval. Its major technical 
weakness was that without ministerial approval it safeguarded scrub trees in perpetuity. 
Its operational weakness was that ministerial permits were provided routinely for 
immature forests that could not rightly be considered sylvian junk. Once the pulp industry 
was to be expanded its conceptual limitation was its intent to delay harvesting until trees 
matured sufficiently for sawlogs. Its policy weakness ironically was that it could be 
implemented if the political will was there, but because it potentially slowed down 
harvesting, it stood in the way of an expanding pulp industry and consequently became its 
political target.  
 
The dying days of the STA is a story of political intrigue. The government and the 
expanding pulp sector--aided by the official opposition’s acquiescence--obfuscated the 
real reason for the STA’s rescission that was to expedite clearcutting. To counter this 
there was an equally cryptic attempt by the indigenous forest industry to wrap its 
opposition to rescission in forest conservation rhetoric, although the real reasons were 
more clearly new competitive threats. While the STA was very much a woodfibre 
conservation measure and was philosophically and practically tied to conserving trees in 
the industrial installation context, with this political posturing it became the indigenous 
industry’s symbol of appropriate forest management. It became a rallying cry for what 
was right about the indigenous industry and their forest practices and what was wrong 
with the new industry with their technocentric routines. The STA became a symbol for 
multiple-uses of the forest including the developing tourism industry and recreation. The 
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policy outcome of all this posturing was placation of the indigenous industry by support 
for new forest conservation legislation, but the real winner--who did not want new forest 
conservation legislation--remained the expanding pulp sector. Although its victory was 
victory somewhat delayed, the new pulp industry eventually got its way to freely clearcut 
with impunity once the STA was rescinded. 
 
At first glance the soft industrialists appeared to win this policy battle because 
replacement conservation legislation was enacted prior to STA rescission. This process 
was more realistically however, the government’s slight of hand and was more accurately 
regulatory rationalisation. At the very least this should have been an important lesson for 
soft-industrialists that the resource policy war is never over, only battles are won and lost 
along the way. In truth, however, a major skirmish was won by the expanding pulp sector. 
The STA with its controls on clearcutting was stripped from the statute books to make 
way for increased forest production. At this point there was no real concern in 
government whether environmental quality would suffer; the important question was 
whether economic development could be enhanced. The policy process also suggested 
that much could be done to fool a disinterested and ill-informed electorate. It was difficult 
to imagine that the public might even consider that an act entitled the Forest Improvement 
Act would actually herald expanded forest exploitation. History clearly showed, however, 
that the forests in time did expand output and produce more wealth, but at the expense of 
a degraded forest. 
 
Unlike the STA, the 1962 FIA, the act first destined to replace the STA was given no 
regulatory teeth to slowdown forest degradation. It was mainly of platitudes rather than 
concrete measures to expedite conservation--it was a measured response to placate the 
indigenous forest industry. The FIA’s most significant and only potentially concrete 
outcome was to rescind the STA upon proclamation. This for the time being, however, 
was not to be. Almost at the same time as enactment and before proclamation, this FIA 
version run foul of both old and new industries and almost immediately instigated a fresh 
legislative renewal process. For the first time the 1962 FIA proposed measures to codify 
multiple forest uses, interestingly however, it said little about how trees would actually be 
conserved. Other than the fact that this legislation could have led to STA rescission, it 
was unlikely to have direct ground level impact. The key ground level outcome of the 
1965 FIA version was, however, that upon proclamation the STA was concurrently 
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rescinded. Without regulatory controls being enacted at the time of STA rescission, FIA 
enactment signalled a new set of unregulated conditions--the industry could clearcut with 
impunity and to a large extent did so. 
 
As written, the 1965 FIA was potentially far more repressive than its predecessors. It was 
directed to private lands requiring detailed reporting, the maintenance of recreation and 
environmental corridors and allowing for various corporatist district forest improvement 
boards to set and administer forest practices. Its complexity was both the industry’s 
salvation and its dissipation. Such legislative complexity ensured that little or nothing 
would actually be enforced at ground level for well over twenty years, yet its intricate 
conceptual underpinnings continually gave rise to belief that it could deliver either 
production or environmental goods various factions supported. In the end, the FIA’s 
complexity and confusion led to gridlock and a Royal Commission was called in 1983. 
 
Had the FIA been implemented at ground level as written, considerable power and 
influence would have been devolved to corporatist bodies. During enactment, however, 
the government of the day could not reasonably anticipate an uprising of 
environmentalism and could not reasonably foresee their influence over the Provincial 
Forest Practices Improvement Board. Had PFPIB influence remained confined to the 
main echelons of power within the forest industry, there was a better chance the 
improvement boards might have worked—at least operated more smoothly. The 
corporatist boards of the 1965 FIA, based on a Swedish model, were theoretically an 
attempt to make forest practices sensitive to local environmental and political conditions. 
It reflected the notion that well meaning forest industry actors could adequately dialogue 
to establish meaningful, consistent and acceptable rules and practices that would 
eventually lead to higher production, better quality forests and more favourable multiple-
use opportunities. Devolving power and influence to environmentalists was, however, 
clearly unacceptable to both industry and government so the FIA and the forest 
improvement board process, like the STA before it, was targeted for rescission. Although 
this study raised considerable doubt whether there was any real intent, especially in FIA’s 
early years to implement this legislation, the fact remains that as written, it envisioned a 
far broader conception of the forests than as an industrial installation. It saw the forests as 
a provider of environmental goods and as a playground as well as a continuing industrial 
source of woodfibre. Regardless of its intended meaning, in the end it had little impact at 
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ground level accept, as a result of prolonged policy debate, to continually support de facto 
extensive clearcutting. 
 
The Forest Enhancement Act that replaced the FIA covertly acknowledged the need by 
government to continue placating soft industrialists and environmentalists to support the 
corporate agenda. Little or no concrete policy action relating to the FEA since its 
enactment attests that the government was no longer serious, if it ever was, about 
applying legislative tools to mitigate forest degradation. The FEA, as written, was non-
interventionist in the extreme. It indirectly codified and legitimised the return of decision-
making on forest management standards to the forest owner where it had largely resided 
since STA days. Unlike the FIA that kept industrialists, soft-industrialists and 
environmentalists consumed in continued debate on forest practices, the FEA left a 
discourse gap in forest practices that increasingly grew wider as worldwide sensitivity to 
sustainable development expanded. This growth in awareness and acceptability of 
sustainable development, in its various and broad interpretations, led to increased 
legitimisation of discussion if not action on environmental issues among politicians and 
consumers. This created increasing uncertainty for Nova Scotia’s industry managers and 
forestry bureaucrats who saw themselves increasingly marginalised in environmental 
policy debate. The initiatives of this decade in promoting various forest conservation 
projects best represent a period of transition in forest management; a period of turbulence 
where the destructive pressures of global trade and the countervailing forces of 
environmental sensibility are playing out in the global and local policy arenas. Just what 
this means and where this may lead are discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
Conclusions: 
 
One common thread of Nova Scotia’s various forest conservation initiatives, including 
the industry’s recent attempts to shape conservation policy outside the legislative 
framework is that each recognises that the market alone, is incapable of maintaining 
environmental quality. As Weale puts it: 
markets on their own cannot be expected to produce an efficient allocation of 
resources so long as uncompensated externalities exist. The task of politics is to 
supply the public good of environmental protection.1 
                                                          
1 Weale, 41-42. 
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Mindful of negative externalities, the unresolved question is whether the forest industry 
can continue to do business as usual with impunity, whether it believes its major quest is 
one of marketing or ‘candy-coating’, or whether it really believes that better forest 
practices are necessary for its wellbeing. This basic decision will clearly direct its future 
actions. A second issue attests that conservation policy, especially legislation, can be 
risky business. For example, even though the STA could be effective at ground level 
when and where implemented, it was politically explosive to an expanding pulp 
processing industry. Furthermore, if the 1965 FIA was truly a ruse to rid the industry of 
the STA, the unforeseen danger was some subsequent forest minister might take it 
seriously. This of course was the case as two forestry ministers in succession tried to 
implement the FIA as written to later cause considerable policy grief. Similarly, if the 
present legislation--the FEA, was conceived as policy pretence and was dismissed 
without much ado; the now evident danger is that the policy vacuum created will be filled 
in some other and largely unpredictable way. In Nova Scotia’s recent forest management 
it was not the expected resurgence in environmentalism that drove the renewed debate for 
instance, but that of market uncertainty. Policy discourse like that in the Envirofor 
process, the forest products certification process, or the Central Region’s IRM project and 
the industry’s voluntary participation in such conservation projects may not be substantial 
testament to sustainability but rather ways for the industry and government to deal with 
their uncertainty. There is no doubt, however, that doing something is chancy but doing 
nothing likely carries worse perils. 
 
In this final summary the various idioms of analysis explicated by Weale are used to 
clarify what has been learned and what remains unclear about Nova Scotia’s forest 
conservation processes. As preface, it is important to note that the forest sector’s 
uncertainty about its future markets and the changes necessary in forest conservation 
strategy are serious business for them even though their indecision reflects an industry in 
strategic disarray. Despite this uncertainty it is clear, however, that the policy process is 
in transition and the industry is at last attempting to refigure its direction. Knowing not 
exactly what to do but knowing that neither the permissive nor the restrictive policy 
approach has worked well in the past is clearly perplexing for the industry, the 
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government and the interested public.2 3 It is also clear, nevertheless, that small measures 
can no longer be expected to suffice yet more ambitious measures have few, if any 
convincing empirical models. While few definitive answers have been provided by past 
forest conservation legislation, the conceptual underpinnings of how environmental 
policy should work are now more clearly understood. The potential for concrete, 
workable solutions have, however, become substantially more difficult as overarching 
obstructions have grown. The discussion that follows then examines forest policy in the 
context of various idioms of analysis that are in essence different and substantive ways of 
viewing various policy influences and dimensions of power. 
 
The Rational Choice Idiom: 
 
At first glance and broadly speaking few things seemed rational in the workings of Nova 
Scotia’s forest conservation legislation. Nevertheless in their time and circumstance, and 
under more detailed examination many policy events first appearing unreasoned reveal 
some internal logic. In the STA era it is clear for instance, that politicians pursuing 
legitimacy and re-election well understood the trade-offs required attracting industry to 
the province. In the government’s bargaining with foreign multinationals, it is clear that 
politicians well understood the urgency for job creation. Although the multinationals' 
actions to wrest the best possible policy conditions and financial concessions may seem in 
retrospect unfair, they were clearly rational from their profit seeking perspective. In a 
similar vein the indigenous industry’s support of cost incurring forest practices 
regulations hardly seemed rational at face value. However, in the light of more detailed 
analysis it became clear that the expanding pulp industry was faced with a substantial 
competitive threat and as a result it too seems to have some rationality--bounded by its 
limiting circumstances. At the same time, the government’s behaviour, although 
seemingly much less logical given the lopsided agreements with the multinationals and 
their long-term forest exploitation implications, appear quite reasoned when viewed in the 
context of election cycles. Even the government’s apparent underhandedness in playing 
                                                          
2 Steve Harder. Forestry problems worry expert. Chronicle Herald, August 20, 
1997, A4. 
3 Steve Harder, N.S. forest and wildlife rules exist to be broken. Chronicle Herald, 
August 19, 1998, A1-2. 
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one forestry element against another made sense in the overall pursuit of this job creation 
goal. 
 
Rationality then seems to be in the eyes of the beholder and comes into and out of focus 
depending on the prevailing unit of analysis. In the light of two emerging and competing 
agendas derived from the old and the new industrial sectors, and failing a viable win-win 
option, the government’s crafting of a political solution packaged to placate both camps, 
seemed possibly the only reasonable political option open to them at the time. In this 
political and policy context, the 1962 FIA legislation gave only the most superficial 
evidence that the government had concern for forest conservation, but this was in the 
context of its main agenda quite rational and seemingly enough to satisfy its critics of 
pulp expansion. In this context, this action indeed may be seen as highly rational, and 
indeed a well measured response to satisfy competing parties. These same rather toothless 
FIA provisions in the 1962 legislation were also sufficient to reassure the multinationals 
that the government’s real concern and focus was indeed industrial expansion. This short-
term expediency clearly worked well enough to get the 1962 FIA bill enacted but not well 
enough to get it proclaimed. This was likely the government’s intentions or if not, worked 
to the government’s advantage anyway.  
 
The changes in the FIA’s legislative structure from 1962 to 1965 reflected the outcome of 
recurring policy battles between the old and new industries and their more or less rational 
attempts to influence ground level policy. Stora’s support for the 1965 FIA, although at 
first glance quite illogical given its extensive forest operations, appears very much a 
rational choice once it is realised that this FIA was not to be applied to them as a Crown 
licensee but rather to their suppliers and main rivals in woodfibre procurement. Even 
Stora’s cooling FIA support once the STA was rescinded, reflected a sober and rational 
second look at their legislative goals. Their main objective to have clearcutting officially 
condoned was accomplished by STA rescission and trying to mobilise small woodlot 
owners to greater production was increasingly recognised as an impossible task. This 
softening on the regulatory provisions of the FIA recognised the growing but often erratic 
mobilisation of the small woodlot owners to develop woodfibre marketing boards. This 
action reflected the small woodlot owners’ own disappointment that their woodfibre 
would not procure substantially larger demand, increasing prices and greater political 
power in light of overall increases in demand. Their increasingly weaker bargaining 
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position as part of more onerous multinational monopsonies became a major contention 
that was exacerbated by their entrenched distrust in government and big business. Their 
inherent distrust in state intervention seemed to blind them to the vagaries of the new 
market domination, however. While woodlot owners’ actions may have been rational 
within the confines of their knowledge, attitude and experience, their collective policy 
actions did not appear so. For example, their infighting assured no concerted opposition 
could be mounted against the multinationals’ market domination. In similar perspective, it 
is possible to see the prolonged failure of the FIA as a continuous but clandestine process 
of rational manoeuvres by the most powerful forest sector agents. Although the 1965 FIA 
initially played into Stora’s hands, the government’s ten-year legislated deferment was 
likely rationally conceived to console the industry’s other major pulpwood interests: 
Bowater’s and Scott. They likely saw the FIA’s implementation as a major administrative 
charge and a substantial cost centre for various ground level conservation outlays. 
 
The FIA’s prolonged failure to bring agreement on forest maturity within the forest 
improvement boards’ structures might also be seen as rational action to either get basic 
scientific principles right or alternatively, as a veiled attempt to continue the 
externalisation of environmental costs in the interest of industrial efficiency for as long as 
possible. In contrast to Weale’s implication that 
presumably the rationality of agreeing to establish a common authority to solve 
collective action problems depends upon our expectation of how well that political 
authority is likely to perform its task,4 
bureaucratic opposition to the forest improvement board structures was more likely senior 
management’s self-serving concern that this body should never succeed. Their explicit 
concerns couched as ‘likely ministerial loss of influence in the policy development 
process’ more likely reflected their potential loss of power and presumably reflected their 
understanding that this would unlikely direct public sympathy their way. The 
government’s lack of action over continued forest degradation is understandable given 
this aggregate of political and policy concern for industrial development but can hardly be 
condoned as complete rational action given forest management’s supposed broader 
perspective. Nevertheless, passing on ingrained and serious problems to the next 
generation of forest managers seems somewhat rational given the lack of industrial 
consensus, and more especially with the industry and environmentalists’ ongoing debate. 
                                                          
4 Weale, 42. 
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For those industry and government officers who lived through the spray wars of the late 
seventies and early eighties and its increasingly vociferous environmentalists’ opposition, 
finding a way to placate this hostility as their main focus of policy development may have 
seemed quite rational in the mid-eighties. The subsequent structuring of the FEA 
therefore, that had general platitudes but no ground level teeth, seemed quite reasoned 
from a political view but hardly at all from an environmental management perspective. At 
first glance the recent initiatives of the forest industry in the nineties to bring forest 
conservation back to public attention can hardly be considered rational given this concern 
to extricate environmentalism unless it is seen in the light of increasing customer concern 
and market uncertainty. Even here, the on-again, off-again industry inclination towards 
comprehensive forest conservation action and the less than lively involvement of the 
federal or provincial governments emphasise their policy ambivalence.  
 
Even with these diverse and separate forest conservation initiatives, here again 
conservation action falls short of necessary effort to create real sustainability. The totality 
of Nova Scotia’s ground level forest conservation falls well short in the industrial 
installation context, and is practically nonplus in the broader ecological modernisation 
sense given its continued emphasis on extensive clearcutting. The question looms then, if 
rational choice is a major determinant of policy action and the reasonable assumption is 
made that forest conservation and ecological modernisation are keys to a sustainable 
society, then what are the changes necessary and possible to bring this vision to fruition? 
 
Social Systems Idiom: 
 
Moving from the analysis of the rational choice of individual policy actors and units to 
the broader view of interacting social systems provides further insights into the forest 
conservation policy process. Taking this broader view of the STA rescission process it is 
clearly evident, for instance that the market/ state interface was in forceful transition. The 
forest industry as a whole was rapidly changing from a locally focussed sawlog industry 
to a regionally and even globally based pulpwood enterprise. During this period the rather 
confined and regionally weak sawmill monopsonies and Bowater’s were continually 
losing policy influence and market strength, and in their place much more ominous, 
pulpwood based, politically potent economies were taking shape. The government that 
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had largely instigated this transition was now faced with dealing with these powerful 
policy influences. 
 
Prior to this, the state discharged only a minimal role in the marketplace, largely holding 
itself to a rather weak regulatory function. Although the state had from time to time 
applied physical assets in the marketplace, in this transitory era it more vigorously applied 
broader means including its natural resources, tax concessions and subventions to 
expedite development goals. These predominantly short-term manoeuvres, however, 
came with substantial long-term repercussions that went well beyond inefficient use of 
natural resources and heralded profound changes in the way forestry policy decisions 
were made. This era provided for instance, evidence of substantially increased 
international corporate power incursion into Nova Scotia’s forest sector and provided 
early evidence of the negative impact of globilisation on forest policy and environmental 
management. This emerging new order was not without other socio-political impacts. It 
helped replace, for example, some of the more perverse outcomes of Confederation that 
had previously shifted considerable political and market power to Upper and Lower 
Canada. Unfortunately, this shift was not positive. This transfer simply shifted the worst 
aspects of corporate power within Canada to give it broader international dimensions. 
While this provincial government capitulation to corporate power can be rationalised as a 
necessary response to normative claims for industrial growth and jobs, it also emphasised 
a lack of concern over forest and environmental quality.  
 
Although the state’s role during the STA rescission can generally be seen in a ‘make-
work’ role, the state’s overriding part during the FIA was that of spoiler. It seemed that 
the senior bureaucracy’s role, for example, was to ensure that the FIA was never 
implemented. Coincidentally, the state in general was heavily involved in protecting the 
multinationals’ interests in pulpwood production and marketing—always ensuring for 
instance, that the variously organised small woodlot owners would be denied a level 
playing field to bargain. Although this was short-shrift for the small woodlot owners, 
adding to their own woes; they, as a group, were slow to recognise that their autonomy as 
independently thinking and acting production agents was vulnerable on two fronts. 
Although the small woodlot owners were always alert to the explicit threat of state 
regulation, the growing structural power of the pulp sector’s monopsonies, however, were 
largely concealed and in the end much more serious for them. Despite this distortion in 
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market power, the persistent and combined actions of the state were nevertheless to act on 
behalf of corporate power. This ensured the multinationals’ wellbeing that was 
presumably to protect jobs but generally impaired the forests.  
 
As an involved third party, as an intermediary social system, the forest management 
profession led by the CIF:NS can on the one hand be seen in society’s watchdog role, on 
the other however, its role is not so obvious. As Weale points out 
other non-producer interest groups fall mid-way between the public interest group 
and the producer groups. For example, a resident’s group that it affected by 
pollution will have a greater economic incentive to take action than the standard 
public interest group, but typically this incentive will not be as great as the 
producer group. Moreover, unlike the producers groups, residents groups lack the 
full-time staff and office support that makes collective action easier.5 
 
Unlike Weale’s examples, however, this watchdog had well defined interests and 
established secretariat resources but their professional association masked their corporate 
and agency affiliations. Because of its members’ corporate affiliations, this ‘watchdog’ is 
best seen as an advocate of the status quo serving ‘its not so obvious masters’ in the old 
sawlog industry and traditionalists within government circles. In contrast, the rise in 
strength of environmentalists in the debate over forest practices in the FIA era can best be 
seen as the broadening strength of third party influences over forest policy. 
Environmentalists were a rather different intermediary than the CIF:NS, one initially 
without the CIF’s credibility but nevertheless a moderating influence on the 
environmental excesses of the industry’s forest practices. During this era, the clamour for 
jobs and industrial development for the most part rang louder that any fervour the 
environmentalists could rankle. But their view was heard clearly from time to time and in 
particular during the spray wars over insecticides and herbicides. Although this evolution 
of influence heralded a significant change in the discourse of government and industry, 
fostering closer and more covert links with each other, it had only modest impact on the 
all-important and explicit state/ market interrelationship and the intramarket relationships 
of woodfibre producers. The key factors in these changing social systems were the 
bolstering of the multinational companies’ pulpwood trading dynamic and the generally 
humble normative claims of the public for better forest practices. Although the public’s 
interest in and impact on forest practices were generally low during the FIA era, the 
public had a growing interest in the forests’ multiple values. With increasing interest in 
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outdoor recreation, aesthetics and tourism, the forest as a resource policy interest became 
increasingly more sophisticated although the industry was slow to recognise or 
acknowledge this. 
 
Globalisation and Forest Conservation: 
One way of looking at the demise of STA policy process in the late fifties and sixties is as 
an early warning that state sovereignty—that is the state’s prerogative and responsibility 
to intervene for environmental quality when the market fails—can be seriously 
undermined by international capital and power. Although it can also be argued, as it was 
in Chapter Six that the state was a compliant partner in stripping away the STA, it 
nevertheless remained true that the state appeared compelled—under pressure to attract 
foreign capital—to forgo environmental quality for economic development. Throughout 
the following decades and two subsequent legislative eras—the FIA and the FEA—this 
perceived pressure to develop at the expense of environmental quality became more 
acute. The surmised need to compromise forest quality and quantity clearly drove 
successive provincial administrations to capitulate to international corporate power and in 
order to justify their actions politically, the government became increasingly devious to 
befuddle the public and placate environmentalists. 
 
In isolation, as simply a Nova Scotian forestry management phenomenon these actions 
may not seem terribly important. Seen in the context of similar trends in Canadian and 
forestry worldwide, however, and especially in light of the effects of globalisation on 
environmental quality in general, these signs are clearly ominous. The serious 
environmental management questions are then: Should anything have been done about 
this and can anything be done? The first question is largely a moral question that weighs 
society’s responsibilities against its short-term goals; the second is more pragmatic. It is 
more about relative power and asks whether any administration could have been 
environmentally effective, given a stronger philosophical resolve. Although these 
questions are in retrospect speculative and academic, similar questions concerning 
contemporary conditions are of serious practical import. The evidence of the impacts of 
the global marketplace, including increasingly accelerated trade and its associated 
wholesale and worldwide dismantling or overpowering of environmental controls and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Weale, 44. 
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regulations, suggest that few with influence seriously question the moral or the practical 
outcomes of globalisation. This international corporate trade and power phenomenon is 
largely treated as a ‘given’ among governments, labour and the public alike. The recent 
‘report card’ from the Sierra Club of Canada, for example, attests strongly that the 
Canadian government, as a supposed guardian of environmental quality, is largely a 
myth. The overwhelming facts suggest that Canada’s environmental management 
performance is steadily eroded by its omnipresent global trade agenda that it not only 
carefully nurtures and heartily endorses but vigorously defends. The second issue, can 
anything be done, is not merely a question of technicalities—although some are 
increasingly complex such as those impacting ozone depletion; it is primarily one of 
political will. Just as long as politicians perceive their election contingent on promoting 
global trade and that maintaining environmental quality has little political consequence, 
the dire consequences of unabated trade, and natural resource depletion and degradation 
are unlikely calculations in any serious political sphere. 
 
Although the state as a political system shows little lasting inclination to protect the 
forests, this case study has provided some evidence that serious environmental 
stewardship might evolve from influences within the market itself. Some evidence was 
reported, for instance, that foreign woodproducts’ customers are becoming increasingly 
environmentally discerning and more and more demand ‘green type’ products. The 
abating argument was made however, that these consumer preferences are frequently 
ephemeral, they appear to ebb and flow with various accounts of environmental crises and 
tweaks in public awareness resulting from one global conference or another. The cautious 
but sombre conclusion is then, that this countervailing force is unlikely to unseat the 
massive forces of the global economy without a substantial swing in public opinion. It 
seems that this is more likely to result from serious environmental calamity that is 
followed by international and national trade policy re-orientation rather than from 
‘rational’ calculated planning. The question raised here is whether this long awaited 
paradigm shift in the way that nations view global trade and the way international capital 
affects environmental management will happen before things get too bad. The question 
more directly concerned with Nova Scotia’s forest sector is what is indeed possible to 
change or what changes are reasonable to expect in the absence of this long awaited shift? 
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The Institutional Idiom: 
 
The analyses of institutional impacts on resource management take a mid-view of the 
forestry sector’s policy dynamics; they conceptually tie rational choice to social systems 
perspectives. As explained in Chapter Four, rational choice analysts see institutional 
effects as the aggregation of rational choice whereas social systems analysts see them 
more as moderators of system effects. In the early STA era as inferred in this study’s 
discussion, the institutions of land tenure and the means of production apparently suited 
the industry, as it existed. Then these institutions reflected the industry’s stress on local 
sawlog demand and its considerable lesser emphasis on export timber and pulpwood 
production. As previously noted, although some of their attention was focused outside the 
local area, pre-STA forest products demand was never large enough to cause much 
concern over impending shortages or price distortions. These generally stable sawmill 
monopsonies provided for local markets, although likely with all the inefficiencies 
associated with monopsony trade. While producers prior to pulp sector expansion 
considered these relatively small-scale monopsonies more or less indisputable and 
intractable, over time they were in constant transition resulting from the vagaries of local 
markets, broader swings in sawlog demand and the typical uncertainties of small business 
lifecycles. 
 
In time, however, these localised markets no longer maintained their hold over producers 
and more powerful pulpwood markets eventually subsumed them. The wholesale 
transition from many, relatively politically inert monopolistic markets to three imposing 
ones increased concern about multinational power and how it permeated the forest 
sector’s multi-agency structure. While these grander monopsony forces infused the forest 
sector, the FIA’s provisions supposedly designed to counteract their worse effects, fell 
foul to multi-agency dynamics. The government’s attempt to develop mobilising 
institutions as forest improvement boards (democratic institutions the government 
insisted) to derive consensus and drive production as well as stimulate conservation 
failed. This failure not only emphasised the ingrained differences between the needs of 
large capital, the production underclasses and environmentalists; the FIA’s provisions 
also did not sit well with the bureaucracy. The 1965 FIA, as written, was therefor seen by 
some an effort to superimpose regulations on the multi-agency production system to 
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moderate forest degradation, for others its purpose was to stimulate greater production. 
These varied objectives and aggregate objections unfortunately led to political stagnation. 
 
The lack of regulatory ardour that was reflected in the FEA (1986) signalled above all the 
government’s resignation that the forest sector’s main steering mechanism was its 
participating multinationals. The FEA’s dearth of regulation also motioned recognition 
that even fine control of forest policy was unpopular through regulatory mechanisms. 
Contemporary efforts to moderate market uncertainty resulting from international 
consumer environmental concerns have stimulated the search for new ways to fine-
control this complex multi-agency production system. In noting that state intervention in 
the late fifties and early sixties had a profound impact on market structure and production 
capacity and methodology, the critical contemporary question is whether equally 
pervasive policy mechanisms can be found that can safeguard the environment as well as 
maintain reasonable production? 
 
The Policy Discourse Idiom: 
 
Policy discourse stresses conceptual aspects of the policy resolution problem. Although 
all three primary legislative eras examined—the STA, the FIA and the FEA—clearly 
have elements of obfuscation and placation as part of their legislative workings, their 
specific texts implicitly acknowledges, more or less, the notion of the market as an 
imperfect driver of forest policy. The continued tinkering or revamping of legislative 
structures, however, not only concedes to the imperfections of state intervention as a 
corrective tool but to a greater or lesser degree also recognises changing 
conceptualisations of the forest management and conservation problem. Any superficial 
analysis of the STA’s technical limitations, for example, might justifiably lead to the 
belief that its small tree focus was its critical weakness and the primary rationale for its 
rescission. Despite any weaknesses of a minimal girth provision, this study made clear, 
nevertheless, that the STA’s technical imperfections were not the primary grounds for its 
demise. Putting aside the government’s policy development slight of hand in this 
rescission process and its failure to explain the real reasons for the STA’s dissolution; 
there is good evidence to believe that its undermining was a ‘legitimate or legitimated’ 
effort to boost forest production. As an act constructed almost in its entirety to promote 
the sawlog industry, and with the understanding that increased pulp production would 
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radically change future forestry needs, new industrial developments made the STA’s 
conceptual underpinnings outmoded and rendered rescission efforts justified on a 
conceptual basis. What was less justifiable both conceptually and more pragmatically 
were efforts to completely remove cutting controls, especially in light of seemingly 
legitimate longer-term supply concerns and increasing recognition of associated and 
escalating forest degradation. 
 
To countervail support for regulatory liberalisation, there were clearly other forest 
management understandings that drove to strengthen forest practices restrictions. These 
included increasing recognition of the forest resource as a finite entity--this was not well 
reflected previously in policy or practice. In addition, the related belief that industrial 
expansion would lead to sawlog shortages (later belied by the experience of the seventies 
and eighties), and the understanding of the indigenous industry’s increasing loss of 
power--likely their most pervasive motivator--intensified this countervailing effort. These 
led to other conceptualisations that more forcefully drove policy action or inaction. A key 
understanding was that the new industry was more highly dependent upon clearcutting 
than the old industry, and a related belief was that clearcutting was more environmentally 
destructive than traditional methods. These conceptualisations provided considerable 
political fodder for the indigenous industry. They promoted more restrictive forest 
practices knowing full well that these would hurt the new industry more than they would 
itself. 
 
As inferred earlier, the conceptual underpinnings of the FIA’s forest improvement 
boards—devolution, representation and science--were notions that promoted participatory 
democracy and objectivity in Canadian natural resource management well before their 
time. They reflected understandings of the importance of consensus building and broad 
ownership in policy design as an important aid to implementation. The FIA’s architects 
were nevertheless naïve in thinking that consensus building among disparate factions with 
widely different forest management ideologies was possible, especially given the uneven 
power relationships of its various constituents. Their complete ignorance that 
environmentalists would eventually dominate the forest improvement board processes 
and render them inept, was nevertheless forgivable given that the rise in 
environmentalism could not reasonably be foreseen. What is less excusable is the 
continued denial of these influences on the contemporary forestry policy process. 
248 
Continued denial, no matter how difficult it is to involve disparate views in the policy 
formulation process, renders more exclusive policy building efforts delusive. Given this 
continued denial, a burning issue is to determine what are the relevant conceptualisations 
of the forest conservation problem from the past and what new ones are necessary for the 
future?  Based on the lessons from the STA and FIA eras, present day realities, and the 
more theoretical insights from the ecological modernisation literature, the following 
questions loom in setting and evaluating the recommendations that follow in this 
concluding chapter. Addressing these issues is critical, if forest policy is to have any 
meaningful role in forest conservation in the future. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
This study is primarily about power and how it permeates and impacts Nova Scotia’s 
forest conservation policy and decision-making process. This examination of the 
workings of forest legislation and policy has identified several important issues and 
questions regarding the efficacy of contemporary forest conservation and sustainable 
development, as well as how various influences continually undermine conservation 
efforts. An essential understanding emanating from this study is that power and influence 
arise from various quarters and levels, and impact the policy process in varyingly direct 
and subtle ways. As the analysis of various idioms made clear in this Chapter, these 
dimensions fall into three broad and overlapping themes from global-external 
considerations, to intermediary and sectorial issues, and individual actor and 
organisational concerns. In making recommendations regarding Nova Scotia’s future 
forest management it is crucial that all these interlocking influences are considered. 
 
Global-External Concerns: 
 
With the new policy proposal of the department of Natural Resources: Toward 
Sustainable Development, it is seductive to think that Nova Scotia might become a model 
for forest conservation management. Unfortunately this tends to belie political and 
industrial reality. Nova Scotia is a small province operating in a national and international 
marketplace. It is, however, not without political influence and responsibility. While its 
natural resources, especially its forest resources contribute to the global commons and 
international production and marketing, regional and global trade as well as pollution also 
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substantially impacts it.  Nova Scotia can, if the political will is sufficient take substantive 
steps to protect its forests from significant external and internal threats. These political 
and more direct conservation initiatives can minimize and mitigate some of the worst 
influences of global trade and environmental destruction.  
 
In terms of socioeconomic influences, there are two key countervailing forces impinging 
on resource production decision-making. The global wave of neo-liberalism makes it very 
difficult to impose environmental regulations without incurring costs that render 
provincial forest operations less competitive, at least in the short-term. There is 
nevertheless, a growing concern that forest practices worldwide are environmentally 
destructive and more customers demand environmentally friendlier products. One clear 
choice is to develop policy to further exploit this market niche and at the same time take 
political steps within various inter-provincial trade and environmental management 
forums to oppose destruction of environmental regulation provincially, nationally and 
internationally. To be effective, however, this will require Nova Scotia, the other 
provinces and territories, and the Canadian government to rethink their sweeping 
endorsement and headlong run into global trade. While the task is daunting, leadership 
can just as well come from Nova Scotia as elsewhere in Canada, and can just as easily 
come from Canada on the international front. 
 
A fundamental pillar of effective leadership on this front is the creation and dissemination 
of pertinent information.  Encouraging appropriate research and requiring conservation 
and sustainability issues to be addressed in all trade agreements and contracts involving 
provincial government resources are a necessary step.  Realistically before this is likely to 
happen, however, considerably more critical and informed debate must ensue before the 
merits and costs of global trade and its dominantly inverse relationship with sustainable 
development is widely appreciated.  Two basic considerations must be taken into account. 
The first concerns the integrative impacts of the environment and forest policy. This 
requires clear indication whether forestry policy has environmental costs, whether it 
involves inter-media transfer, and whether forest policy transfers environmental 
degradation from one location to another or from one time to another. Emanating from 
this first concern, assessments must also be made on what impact forest policy has at 
global, international, transnational, national, regional, provincial, ecosystem and local 
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levels. Understanding the distribution of the benefits and costs of forest policy will make 
it more accountable to the people most effected by it. 
 
Intermediary-Sectorial Concerns: 
 
The question was raised earlier whether sustainable forestry could be propelled in the 
absence of a long awaited paradigm shift, especially in the way that nations view global 
trade with its concomitant capital effects on environmental and natural resource 
management.  The discussion above suggests that substantial progress relies on timely 
information, mass attitudinal change and ultimately a major shift in shaping resource 
policy.  While the timeframe is largely indeterminate, it is clear that a paradigm shift is 
eventually required and the sooner the better.  A supplementary concern is what 
immediate role should Nova Scotia’s government play in forest conservation. This evokes 
the question as to what is indeed possible to change and what is reasonable to expect 
without a fundamental shift in global political attitudes?  Although the task is clearly 
onerous in the absence of a fundamental shift in policy thinking and public attitude, there 
is a clear glimmer of hope from past forest policy that substantive change can be made. 
 
As explained earlier in this study, provincial forestry policy had a marked effect on 
provincial market structure and production capacity in the late fifties and early sixties.  
Although it must be conceded that the government of the day unlikely had a clear vision 
of what precise direction their policy initiatives might take, in hindsight it is clear that it 
had profound impact.  Although also conceding that the forces of international trade and 
the impact of global pollution and forest degradation are much more serious than they 
were then, this policy ‘success’ suggests that provincial intervention in the marketplace 
can be successful. Given the need for action at the provincial level, the first question 
looms as to how can the locus of power be effectively shifted from outside Nova Scotia to 
within and to its various regions and ecosystems? 
 
The best chance of this happening seems to be to develop institutions that devolve 
decision-making power to more regionally based, preferably ecosystem based 
jurisdictions.  Although the regional forest improvement boards of the FIA era did not 
work, this was largely a function of the government’s failure to devolve power to those 
most affected by forest policy rather than a failure of devolution in principle. Given a 
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move to devolution, questions loom whether supporting institutions can be made 
responsive to socio-economic cycles and evolving biophysical conditions.  How can these 
institutions be used to decouple development from environmental degradation? What 
level of sustainable development will these strategies offer; and will this level be 
sufficient given the prevailing state of the environment, socio-economic realities and the 
extrapolated needs of future generations? 
 
There are no clear success indicators with these questions, but what this study makes 
clear is that the present system fails badly.  Devolving power will not of itself dismantle 
the present inefficiencies created by uneven corporate power and multinational dominated 
monopsonies. The theoretical logic suggests, however, dismantling these structures will 
lead to more efficient markets; less need for additional state intervention, especially 
costly corporate subsidies; and all other things being equal, higher prices. The important 
questions are: How will devolution help? How will devolution reduce market failure, 
especially as market failure relates to environmental degradation? How will this policy 
diminish state failure, especially as state failure relates to environmental degradation?  
 
At present considerable power in ground level decision-making is centralised or more 
accurately focused in the boardrooms of large, foreign corporations.  Such centralisation 
with its uniform production processes is efficient for them.  Resultant forest policy and 
practices means, however, that most forest production ends up as sawlogs at best but 
generally pulpwood, and there is little incentive to consider more value-added production 
such as furniture manufacturing or various other niche markets.  A focus on pulpwood 
encourages efficiency driven harvesting practices that pays little regard to local forest 
conditions, speciality production potential or to longer-term environmental needs.  
Devolution provides the opportunity for more precise resource analysis and closer 
matching of local produce needs with production techniques. 
 
Monopsony power will not disappear simply because the government dictates.  The 
conditions supporting these structures must be undermined.  The closed woodfibre quota 
markets nurtured by the multinationals that created compliant and co-operative producers 
and consumers must be removed.  In its place, open and free markets must be established 
whereby sawlogs and woodchips are bought and sold without fear of reprisal; should a 
sawmill or woodlot producer openly oppose the policies of the multinationals.  
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Considerable market power is vested in the multinationals and other large corporations by 
virtue of their access to Crown land production.  Subsidised Crown land stumpage not 
only creates an inefficient market but also puts considerable downward pressure on prices 
for small woodlot owners that leads to further market failure.  Agreement or legislation 
requiring all wood products derived from Crown lands to be traded in open market is 
needed to reduce this unfair trading.  These measures alone would put upward pressure on 
prices and reduce the market control of the multinationals and other large producers. 
 
What does this have to do with forest conservation?  Higher stumpage prices create a 
number of management possibilities whereas lower prices generally dictate little money is 
available for forest management—without government subsidies.  One possible scenario 
is that suppliers will have greater incentive to cut wood to maximise short-term profits, 
and a second possibility is that they will be able to generate target revenues with less 
wood.  Either way they will have more money per unit of production to reinvest in forest 
management.  To combat harvesting immature forests there seems no doubt that some 
state intervention and regulation will be necessary to control the worst effects of the first 
scenario. Given the pressures from local accountability and green market incentives as 
well as increased awareness of sustainability issues, woodlot managers can reasonably be 
expected to invest more in conservation.  Given additional financial resources among 
small woodlot owners and greater local control, it can also be expected that forest 
managers will be more responsive to natural disturbances as well as socio-economic 
variations. 
 
How can such a set of policies be effectively superimposed on the present social, 
institutional and organisational structure of Nova Scotia’s forestry sector?  This study has 
clearly shown that the forest sector is a disparate and difficult sector to apply conservation 
policy.  Based on past experience, the notion that disparate interests can sit around a table 
and develop a meaningful agreement on forest conservation management may need to re-
examined. The political will necessary to bring about change in the forestry sector will 
more likely result from a rather rapid dissemination of information recognising the 
adverse sustainability impacts of an inefficient and repressive woodproducts marketing 
structure.  In essence, this requires a comprehensive reformulation, new insights and new 
conceptualisations of the forest management problem.  How realistic is it to imagine that 
these new insights will be forthcoming is dependent upon how vigorous a campaign, the 
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incumbent industries provide, including the playing of their trump card to withdraw from 
the province.  It is also dependent upon how energetic a campaign those supporting 
sustainable development can mobilise resources.  In the end, much will depend upon the 
rational choice of individuals and individual forest sector units and the relative strength of 
various incentives influencing that choice. 
 
Individual and Organisational Issues:  
 
The question looms then, if rational choice is a major determinant of policy action and a 
reasonable assumption is made that forest conservation and ecological modernisation are 
keys to a sustainable society, then what changes are necessary and possible to bring this 
to fruition?  At present there is little to induce those with market power, the 
multinationals and large corporations, to support fundamental change in market structure.  
It is difficult to believe, however, that they could openly support arguments that endorse 
closed, centralised markets and mechanisms that work against sustainable development 
such as inefficient and environmentally damaging subsidies. A necessary link in any 
strategy to budge the multinationals’ intransigence is a public education process to bring 
political pressure on them. 
 
Although the government’s position paper: Toward Sustainable Forestry was a focus of 
condemnation in the previous chapter; it appears on the whole to be a step in the right 
direction. This strategy as proposed envisions a major public education process. As 
argued in the previous chapter, however, its greatest weakness is its disregard for 
monopsony power that distorts the forest sector’s marketplace and political economy. 
Should the province try levelling the playing field by forcing more open trading and 
allowing small woodlot owners greater access to collective trading, then other elements of 
this proposed policy will likely make a positive difference. This policy proposal at last 
accepts two political factors that are abundantly clear in Nova Scotia’s forest sector, 
however. Neither direct government intervention in the form of forest practices 
regulations are likely to find favour nor is any direct form of taxation. The proposal to 
shift the burden of compliance to buyers, in the form of a levy to fund conservation 
activities, potentially addresses both concerns ‘with one stone’. The onus will be on 
buyers to assess a levy for conservation activities (this is to all intents a Green Tax except 
that assessments are not collected directly by government) and to make sure that 
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producers follow sustainable practices. Measures of sustainability will not necessarily 
have to be made at the individual woodlot level but can be made co-operatively. It is 
conceivable therefore, that inter-woodlot assessment can be made to meet preservation, 
harvesting, and reforestation requirements. Although this in itself does not necessarily 
lead to an ecosystem management approach, it supports this possibility. Should the 
province in time decide that application of a forest practices code is necessary for all 
private lands, careful coding can stimulate cross boundary co-operation, which is a 
necessary requisite of ecosystem management in a multi-agency context. In time and as 
needed, statutory planning and land-use mechanisms can be established that encourages 
responsible local accountability for environmental management. The UK National Parks 
management may be seen as a possible model.6 
 
The rational behaviour of buyers will be influenced by their dependence on compliant 
woodfibre producers to renew their buying license. The rational behaviour of producers 
will be influenced by the reluctance of buyers to purchase from non-compliant woodlots. 
The strength to such a policy will be that previously uncompensated environmental 
externalities such as loss of community amenity can be addressed in future production 
planning, or directly compensated from production levies. This is another requisite to 
diminish monopsony power. Expenditures from this sustainability fund should be 
controlled under carefully constructed guidelines sensitive to local conditions at the 
community level to encourage ecosystem and regional forestry planning. This will allow, 
for example, some forest managers to focus intensively on production favouring efficient 
harvesting methods while others will be encouraged, with funds from the sustainability 
fund, to nurture their woodlots to sustain more natural structures and processes. 
 
The caveats include the greatly increased compliance costs such as reporting, policing 
and enforcement that can only work if the forest sector remains supportive. If 
implementation and enforcement is uneven, then the system will quickly break down. If 
the ‘silviculture/ sustainability’ levy puts downward pressure of stumpage prices, the 
system will falter from the political fallout of disillusioned woodlot owners. If the buyers 
                                                          
6 Bissix, Glyn and Sue Bissix. Dartmoor (U.K.) National Park’s Landscape 
Management: Lessons for North America’s Eastern Seaboard. In Tom B. Herman, Soren 
Bondrup-Neilsen, J.H. Martin Willison, and Neil W.P. Munro, eds. Ecosystem 
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lose their enthusiasm for this scheme (the genesis of this idea came from the Coalition’s 
proposal) the policy will falter. If forest practice codes fail to reflect the diversity of the 
forests and forestry throughout Nova Scotia and their requisite forest management 
prescriptions so that forest managers fail to see their relevance, this process will fail.  
 
To lead this process--a substantive omission of the government’s position paper--a clear 
vision of the future forests must be drawn as a basis for a forest practices code. Included 
in this vision, all Crown lands must become, over time, model forests--rather than fibre 
banks for major corporations used as levers to reduce the bargaining power from private 
woodlots. Although the idea of consensus building among factions with historically 
disparate ideologies is unrealistic, a critical mass of forest sector actors must emerge 
leaving behind, either by market forces or government regulation those unwilling to 
participate. To nurture this, the present closed system of woodfibre market exchange must 
be made more transparent. Exchanges must be legislated to occur through open markets, 
this will help reduce the power and influence of the monopsony political economies. This 
transition can be first enforced with woodfibre from unlicensed Crown lands, 
progressively to licensees on Crown lands, then to commercial and finally to all private 
forest lands. 
 
Giving the lack of trust among various factions of the forest sector and with the 
government in general, two developments are necessary to encourage greater and more 
widespread confidence in policy application. First, an independent forest inspectorate 
must be established that reports directly to the legislature, as does the auditor general. The 
inspectorate must report at least annually and whenever appropriate information critical to 
the state of the forest is required. While the inspectorate may generally rely on 
information fed to it by the ‘Registry’, it must have the capacity to conduct independent 
audits on the Registry and conduct wider investigations as it sees fit. Second, an 
independent scientific panel to monitor, analyse and evaluate policy performance must be 
instituted funded by the industry, to continually bring to bear independent analysis of 
commissioned and uncommissioned research on the welfare of forest policy and forest 
sustainability. 
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The Final Word. 
 
This study has made an extensive analysis of Nova Scotia’s forest conservation policy 
and legislation. It has chronicled a litany of legislative and policy reforms under the guise 
of forest conservation but more accurately regarded as exploitation initiatives. Although 
the final sections of this chapter outlining the government’s latest policy initiative seem 
rather optimistic, this study has clearly shown that history in Nova Scotia’s forest sector 
is replete with policy enthusiasm and fanfare only to be followed by intra-sector 
intransigence and conflict. Ambient policy conditions are nevertheless, sufficiently 
different to reasonably imagine a more compassionate response toward forest 
conservation policy. Recent levels of woodfibre exploitation that clearly threaten the 
industry’s long-term viability have shaken the centres of power. Forest managers in 
general are beginning to accept the inevitability of consumer driven environmental 
standards for forest products; and in response the government now appears ready to 
regulate and implement, although in a rather circumspect way. There is no longer an 
issue, however, that Nova Scotia’s forests are threatened by over-exploitation and 
workable conservation policy is necessary. Just how long action can be put-off before a 
substantial socio-economic and environmental crisis is precipitated is still nevertheless, 
unclear.  
 
From a theoretical perspective this case analysis has exposed the danger of taking too 
narrow a view of the forest conservation problem. Restricting analysis to the narrow 
workings of the forest conservation policy process is unlikely to expose the persistent 
power relationships between competing, short-term economic agendas and those of 
conservation. Similarly, taking a snapshot view of forestry is also problematic. A very 
different picture of the forestry problem is lightly to emerge, for example, when analysis 
is made during times of high demand compared to glut or recession. It also is important to 
remember that the forestry sector is notoriously cyclical, often leading politicians to knee 
jerk reactions in down-cycles, ignoring along the way all the lessons of history. Similarly, 
a very different policy dynamic is evident during one policy phase as opposed to another. 
The variation in policy dynamics that can be expected within different policy phases then; 
for instance the policy formulation phase as opposed to the implementation phase, 
requires dedicated analytical approaches. A one-size-fits-all approach is inadequate to 
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tease out the nuances of this policy dynamic. In any study of forest conservation policy 
effectiveness, therefore, it is also important to understand that the present biological 
structure and future forests capability have developed over an extensive period (often 
measured in several decades and centuries). Likewise, the organizational structure as well 
as policy inertia of the forest sector has likely developed over an extended period (often 
measured in several decades). It therefore beholds the policy analyst to give sufficient 
attention to a long-term, temporal view of forest policy development and dynamics before 
drawing conclusions on important power relations and policy effectiveness. This 
contextual uniqueness of the forest management sector leads to the necessity of assessing 
data drawn from a broad temporal range. This study has shown, however, that analysis 
embracing even a complete and extensive policy era; for example, the protracted 
deliberations of the Forest Improvement Act, is insufficient to fully understand the forest 
conservation policy problem. To gain an understanding of this era’s influences, it was 
necessary to probe backwards to the Small Tree Act to begin to adequately appreciate the 
FIA’s form, structure and raison d’etre. It is likely elsewhere, therefore, where forest 
conservation policy analysis is a stated goal that an extended temporal view is necessary 
to get at the root of policy and power dynamics.  
 
The central key to analysis of this case was the conceptualization of the policy dynamic 
as a multi-agency, multi-objective organizational network providing a mid-view analysis 
of the resource management policy dynamic. In the context of North America’s Eastern 
Seaboard and the USA’s southern states, where small private woodlots predominate, this 
particular case study provides a sobering testimony to consensus based, multi-agency 
ecosystem management initiatives. In the nineties, Landscaped and Ecology Management 
(LEM) or ecosystem management approaches have gripped the imagination of North 
America’s natural resource managers as a way forward in mediating the often contentious 
demands on natural resources. While a number of successful case studies are reported in 
the literature, most attention has been given in the West where public ownership abounds 
and public agencies can take a centralized, ‘hub and wheel’ approach to resource policy 
management. To date, little critical attention has been given where no effective hub 
exists, where resource management is a largely diffuse network of variably powerful 
entities. While this study provides no simple solutions for such a complex management 
system, it provides important insights and possible ways forward.  
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Appendix A1: Decision-Making Models--Concept Summaries. 
 
Rational 
Models 
 
Procedural Rational 
Models 
 
Organisational 
Processes 
Models 
 
Political Bargaining 
Models 
 
The unit of analysis 
implies a singular 
coherent unit. 
 
Decision behaviour 
reflects the explicit 
goal of the decision. 
 
The decision-making 
unit when faced with a 
problem examines all 
alternative means to 
achieve desired goals. 
 
Chosen action either 
maximises desired 
objectives or minimises 
the costs of possible 
failure. 
 
Explanations of the 
decision process are 
concerned with the 
‘reason why’ a decision 
was taken, ‘what’ was 
attained and ‘how’ it 
was done. 
 
It disregards, among 
others, questions 
concerning constraints. 
 
At the collective 
decision level when 
several individuals or 
units are involved, the 
decision-making entity 
is simply redefined as a 
monolithic and 
coherent unit. 
 
Decisions tend to be 
explained as a 
conscious choice to 
attain a calculated 
objective. 
 
Procedures are only 
rational within the 
bounds or limits of the 
policy actor's own 
skills, knowledge and 
habitual modes of 
behaviour. 
 
Objective setting is 
fundamentally 
subjective, tempered by 
the decision actor’s 
own values, range of 
experience and 
knowledge. 
 
Goals are dynamic, 
they change with new 
experience. 
 
When targets are not 
reached, policy actors 
lower their standards. 
 
Decision-makers are 
involved in 
‘satisfycing’--they 
accept the first 
workable solution 
sacrificing optimal 
solutions for the first 
basically satisfactory 
option. 
 
Decision-makers are 
adverse to risk, 
consequently they tend 
to rely on routine 
standard operating 
procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recognises the `real 
differences' between 
individual and 
organisational 
behaviour. 
 
Dismisses the notion of 
the organisation being a 
‘super individual’ with 
greater information 
handling and 
calculation capacities. 
 
Recognises that in 
practice the 
organisation does not 
have a single set of 
goals with an agreed 
order of preference, nor 
does it carry out a 
similar search process 
for alternatives as an 
individual might. 
 
Recognises that the 
decision process is 
fragmented or 
disjointed and is spread 
among many 
individuals. 
 
Recognises that 
distinctive processes 
come into play, where 
other things being 
equal, a different 
decision will result 
from an individual, 
rationally oriented 
process. 
 
Recognises the 
importance of 
bargaining with its own 
implicit rules. 
 
Recognises that the 
final, collective 
decision outcome is 
completely dependent 
upon the interplay of 
participants and what is 
acceptable as a 
politically viable 
solution. The 
underlying 
consideration, whether 
for individuals, units, 
organisations, 
governments or nations, 
is that they have self-
defined interests to 
protect. 
 
When faced with a 
problem, the nature of 
the political bargaining 
decision process 
dictates that 
participants will focus 
on parochial interests. 
Rather than a 
 single, strategic 
problem requiring a 
solution, a host of 
intricately linked issues 
compete for the 
decision-makers’ 
interests. 
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Appendix A1: Decision-Making Models--Concept Summaries (Continued). 
 
Rational 
Models 
 
Procedural Rational 
Models 
 
Organisational 
Processes 
Models 
 
Political Bargaining 
Models 
 
An organisation first 
establishing its 
objectives and ordering 
them to reflect the 
collective or 
organisation’s desired 
preferences explains 
collective decision-
making. It finally 
settles on that which 
maximises its 
objectives or 
minimises the cost of 
possible failure.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recognises that 
important societal 
questions are taken by 
organisations that 
provide a vital 
distinction to individual 
the decision-making. 
 
Recognises that there is 
considerable sub-unit 
complexity found in 
organisations. It is too 
much to assume that 
different departments 
will have the same 
ranking of objectives-- 
nor can they be 
assumed to `set-up' the 
problem according to 
the organisation's initial 
problem definition. 
 
Recognises that 
organisational officers 
place value on such 
incidental goals as 
personal security. 
While organisations 
don't officially 
acknowledge these 
informal pressures, 
privately they make 
accommodations. 
 
Recognises the capacity 
of individuals in an 
organisation to control, 
manage, and otherwise 
distort `information'. 
 
 
Continued in the 
Bottom of Next 
Column. 
 
What structures the 
outcome of this process 
is the underlying and 
informal elements of 
power, the resources 
participants are willing 
and able to commit, 
and the negotiating 
skills each possess. 
These are dependent 
upon identifying key 
problems and a general 
process of bargaining 
and trade-offs. 
 
The final outcome of 
the political bargaining 
process is that it has 
general support when 
all influential 
participants are 
reasonably satisfied. 
 
The nature of political 
bargaining is that it is 
neither rational as a 
calculation nor does it 
follow established 
routines. 
 
Organisational 
Processes - 
Continued: 
 
Recognises that 
disjointed decision 
inputs results in bias 
that affects decision 
space (scope) or the 
definition of what 
constitutes feasible 
alternative solutions. 
 
When the decision is 
explained the process 
appears to be non-
rational and disjointed.  
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Appendix A2: Conceptual Summary of the Three Dominant Political Interpretations 
of Power. 
 
 
 
Pluralism 
 
Elitism 
 
Structuralism 
 
Dominant 
Assumptions & 
Concerns 
 
Individuals, groups and 
movements have the 
ability to shape the policy 
process and gain access 
to policy decision-
making. 
 
Power is concentrated 
among certain elites and 
is derived from superior 
resources. 
 
Concerned with power 
and class interests and 
the local, regional, 
national and 
international links of 
the production 
process. 
 
Focus and 
Character 
 
There is a reliance on 
observable events with a 
focus on concrete 
decisions. 
 
Elites are not 
representative of the 
polity/community, they 
consist mainly of the 
middle and upper 
classes. 
Elites often speak as 
though they represent 
the community or 
broader interests due 
mainly to their superior 
leadership skills and 
qualities. 
The decision milieu is of 
limited numbers who 
make only limited 
consultations with those 
effected by decisions. 
Power elites 
disproportionately 
control scarce resources, 
they have much better 
skills, better access to 
relevant information 
than the general public 
and better access to 
decision-makers. 
These conditions favour 
the elites creating a 
“community of 
interests”. 
 
It is derived from 
Marxist Theory and 
contrasts with 
pluralism and elitism. 
Its focus is on the 
outputs of policy and 
the outcomes or 
effects. 
It focuses on the 
objective needs of 
society rather than 
subjective interests. 
 
Socio-Political 
Dynamics 
 
Various interests 
aggregate through 
interests and advocate 
groups. Advocate 
interests are mediated 
through the political 
process to solve policy 
problems. 
 
There is a concentration 
of power. Key policy 
issues are not 
necessarily visible. 
Elitism addresses some 
key weaknesses of 
pluralism which are that 
viable policy is often 
confined to safe, non-
contentious areas of 
policy, pluralism is 
unable to differentiate 
 
In structuralism the 
inference is that 
certain class interests 
have the necessary 
power to realise their 
own objectives. 
Decision-making 
concerning policy 
outcomes is dependent 
upon the interests of 
capital at the local, 
regional, national and 
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between important and 
less important policy 
issues (no prioritisation) 
and it ignores the 
pressures that can lead 
to non-action. 
Policy bias is a result of 
special access to 
decision- makers. Real 
power is situated with 
those who control the 
decision rules.  
international levels 
which limits the 
influence of labour, 
environmental and 
community advocate 
groups that typically 
have a much narrower 
scope. 
 
Nature of Power 
 
Power is effectively 
shared among an 
interested and involved 
community. 
 
Elitist strategies are 
deemed successful when 
policy issues are 
constrained and out of 
public view, or when 
they reach public eye, 
the decision-making 
process remains outside 
the regular democratic 
system. 
 
The outcomes of 
power are based upon 
class interests as 
opposed to expressed 
preferences and on 
how those outcomes 
were either revealed or 
concealed in the policy 
process. 
 
Functional 
Underpinnings of 
Political Style 
 
The state is both 
representational and 
responsive. The state 
establishes an interest 
when constituent interests 
are expressed as 
identifiable preferences. 
Policy preferences are 
revealed by active 
political participation. 
Power is effectively 
shared among an 
interested and involved 
community. 
 
Elitism emphasises that 
policy decision-making 
favours those who 
presently hold power 
and are recipient and 
beneficiaries of policy 
outputs. 
Recognises that elites 
are able to challenge and 
influence decision-
making through the 
mobilisation of 
concentrated power. 
Recognises that there is 
a policy bias with real 
power situated with 
those who control the 
decision rules. 
 
Neo-Marxism 
concedes to the 
separation of the 
political / economic 
roles of the state but 
nevertheless perceives 
the state as “relatively 
autonomous”. This 
tends to ignore the 
needs of constituents 
and acts to bolster the 
needs of the state 
itself. 
 
Political Strategies 
 
Involves a responsive 
administration with 
various segments and 
interests of the 
constituency. Decision-
making takes place in an 
ongoing process of 
negotiation, bargaining, 
conciliation, compromise 
and resolution through 
open and democratic 
channels of the state. 
 
Elites, both within the 
administration and 
private sectors are 
involved in the 
prevention and/or 
suppression of policy 
issues. 
The concentration of 
visible decision-making 
is focused on innocuous 
matters. 
Both of these above 
strategies are aligned 
with “Corporatist 
 
Business is alleged to 
be able to define both 
overt and convert 
political agendas, 
secure political 
victories and benefit 
disproportionately 
from policy outcomes. 
Business / capital is 
able to exert superior 
power by (1) its timely 
access to relevant 
information, (2) its 
privileged access to 
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Strategies” where there 
is privileged access to 
the state’s decision-
makers. 
officials/decision-
makers, and (3) its 
ability to use 
propaganda to raise 
the publics concern 
and present rational 
arguments for its cause 
/ case. 
Business’ trump card 
is the withdrawal of 
capital whereas the 
state’s possible 
sanction is to close 
down an operation for 
violation of safety and 
environmental 
regulations. The latter 
is rarely used, 
however. 
 
Policy Outcomes & 
Conclusions 
 
Power is diffuse, spread 
relatively equally 
throughout all sections of 
the community. This 
diffusion of power 
implies that the outcomes 
of interests in 
competition is 
unpredictable where there 
is no consistent bias in 
power or 
disproportionate 
resources available to any 
particular segment. 
 
The influences on 
decision-making are 
removed from the public 
arena. 
The outcomes from the 
policy process are 
derived from bargaining 
behind closed doors. 
They emerge from 
mutually acceptable 
compromises between 
the state and power 
elites. 
 
Both pluralists and 
elitists suggest that 
subjective interests are 
translated into 
preferences which 
influence decision-
making. Structuralists 
suggest preferences 
change, thus are 
imperfectly 
communicated to 
decision-makers. 
Furthermore, they 
point out that most 
people are unaware of 
their real interests 
(needs) and certain 
classes or groups are 
willing or unable to 
participate in a 
political process that 
they are likely to lose. 
Structuralists are 
concerned with the 
objective outcomes of 
the policy process. 
They contend that 
policy evaluation is 
beyond an individual’s 
consciousness or 
understanding. 
Marxism (upon which 
structuralism is based) 
is normative or 
prescriptive. While 
recognising that class 
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determines the 
realisation of interests 
(or their denial) it 
deplores a political 
system that denies the 
objective interests of 
what is usually the 
underclass. The 
conceptual problem 
for structural analysts 
is whether the political 
struggle of the classes 
is inevitable. 
 
Theoretical 
Limitations 
 
Pluralism skirts the effect 
of, and the 
disproportionate 
distribution of power as a 
central theme. 
The pluralists retort to 
the elitists critique of 
ignoring non-decisions is 
that non-decisions are 
merely latent issues 
which will eventually 
arouse public interest. 
 
Pluralists point out that 
inaction is observable 
where as non-decisions 
are undefinable and 
therefore 
unresearchable. 
Elitists concede many of 
these conceptual 
problems but claim that 
the elitists perspective 
affords the study of 
decision-making that is 
outside public scrutiny. 
 
If business/capital has 
such pervasive power 
as implied by the 
structuralist view then 
this power should be 
demonstrable in 
concrete, empirical 
terms. However, it is 
argued that other 
interests are able to 
exert influences over 
capital to force 
concessions. 
The question is raised 
whether 
capital/business really 
has superior power or 
whether it is merely 
one interest in 
competition with 
others. 
 
Research 
Strategies 
 
It minimises or de-
emphasises the 
importance of non-
decisions and the effects 
of structural bias. 
The focus is on overt 
behaviour of the state. 
Examines specific and 
explicit decisions of the 
state. 
Issues emerge from an 
open polity which openly 
bargains for issues to be 
added to the political 
agenda. 
Analysis leads to an 
examination of explicit 
and open state decision-
making. This provides 
insight into the balance of 
power which ultimately 
 
There is great difficulty 
in pinpointing action or 
inaction and in 
identifying and 
explaining motives. 
Elitists interpretations of 
the democratic process 
tend to be cynical as 
they tend to focus on 
anticipated reactions of 
actors, abstentions by 
certain groups from the 
political process and 
mobilisation of bias in 
the decision-making 
process. 
There is a conceptual 
dilemma for neo-elitist 
interpreters. For on the 
one hand they are 
concerned with the 
 
The theoretical 
emphasis is one the 
major role that 
economic factors play 
on social policy and 
social change.  
Debate centres on the 
sustained power of 
capital. 
The “functionalists 
faction” argues that 
everything in the 
structure of society 
serves capital. Even 
the occasional 
concessions to labour, 
environmentalists and 
humanists are simply 
tactics of the ruling 
class. Everything is 
predetermined where 
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leads to a focus on 
outcomes and winners 
and losers. 
subjective conception of 
interests which is similar 
to pluralists, and on the 
other they are concerned 
with “false 
consciousness”. 
The rules of the game 
which focus more on the 
objective needs of 
constituents. This is 
closer to the Marxism / 
structuralists view of the 
democratic world. 
political process is 
merely vestigial. 
The alternative 
structuralists view is 
that the non-capitalists 
class can sustain a 
challenge to capital, 
however, they concede 
that the over-riding 
power is that of 
economic forces. 
Abstracted and Adapted from: Andrew Blowers. Something in the Air: Corporate Power and the 
Environment.. Harper and Row, Publishers, London, 1984. 
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 Appendix B. 
 
 Chronology of Nova Scotia Forestry. 
 
 
1755 
  
Expulsion of the Acadians by the British. Land management emphasis changed from the 
construction of dykes to create farmland to the clearing of forests for farmland.  
   
1763  After the Treaty of Paris, the British Lords of Trade instructed the Governor to make free 
grants of land in Nova Scotia but not in Cape Breton Island. In Cape Breton only licenses 
of occupation were granted--land reverted back to the Crown upon death of the licensee. 
   
1767  At least 27 sawmills in Nova Scotia. Production of planks or deals not only for the local 
market but for export to Newfoundland, England, the West Indies, Bermuda and South 
America. 
   
1784  Cape Breton separated from Nova Scotia. The Governor began to make grants of land. 
 
Charles Morris, Surveyor General of Nova Scotia, reported very few pines in Central 
Nova Scotia suitable for masts and spars. Similar reports were made about Eastern Nova 
Scotia. 
   
1794  The first game law, it made it unlawful to kill partridge and blue winged ducks at certain 
times of the year. 
   
Early 1800's  Canadian paper makers were having a difficult time meeting the demand for newsprint 
because of increased demand and not enough rags. 
   
1801-2  First forest inventory in Nova Scotia by naturalist Titus Smith. 
   
1831 - 38   One thousand vessels measuring nearly 100,000 tons 
were built and registered in the Province. 
   
1839  Over 1,400 sawmills employing 3,000 men, 130 shingle mills, 6 lath mills, one paper mill 
and a number of planer mills. 
   
1844  Charles Fenerty of Lower Sackville, N.S. developed a new way to make pulp from 
grinding wood. 
   
1867  The British North America Act. Canadian Provinces are given primary responsibility for 
the development, conservation and management of the forests. Jurisdiction over wildlife 
was not specifically set out. 
   
1869  Due to influx of people to Cape Breton in the first half of the nineteenth century there 
was a need to clarify land ownership. An Act to Facilitate the Perfecting of Titles was 
past. Few titles were actually settled thus requiring further clarification in the early 
nineteen sixties. 
   
1875  St. Croix Mill near Windsor received its first load of pulpwood. 
   
1885  Canada's first sulphite mill at Sheet Harbour. 
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Late 1800's  The Nova Scotia ship building industry was under heavy competition from steamships 
and iron hulls. Good, big trees were becoming hard to find. 
   
1894  Act for the Preservation of Useful Birds and Animals was passed, this created the need 
for game wardens. 
   
1896  The Nova Scotia Game Act. It collected together the various regulations pertaining to the 
hunting of game animals. 
   
1908  A new Game Act was passed in 1908. 
 
Publication of the Tent Dwellers by A.B. Paine. This was an account of outdoor 
recreation activities in Nova Scotia--primarily hunting and fishing. 
   
1912      B.E. Fernow concluded the second Nova Scotia forest inventory. This was the first to 
cover the whole province and included forest type maps. He published a report entitled 
Forest Conditions of Nova Scotia. 
   
1917  The Migratory Bird Convention Act (Canada). 
   
1921  The 1908 Game Act changed its name to the Forest and Game Act.  
   
1926  In 1926 the Department of Forests and Game was merged with the Department of Crown 
Lands to form the Department of Lands and Forests (DLF). It was charged with 
administering the Lands and Forests Act and other statutes. 
   
1937  DLF adopted a policy of conserving timber resources and began to purchase cutover 
lands. Estimates of ungranted Crown land and land in ownership dispute were made. 
   
1939-1945  The Second World War. 
   
1942  The first version of the Small Tree Act was passed in the legislature but never 
proclaimed. 
   
1946  The Small Tree Act was passed and proclaimed in the Nova Scotia legislature. This was 
allegedly a "primitive and self defeating act" to stop the cutting of small diameter trees--it 
did not discriminate against the cutting of poor quality, older trees. 
   
1949  Canada Forestry Act gave the federal government authority to enter into financial 
assistance programmes with the provinces. The Canadian Forestry Service administered 
composite agreements. Composite agreements ended in 1967 after Nova Scotia received 
a total of $1.5 million, in addition, special agreements totalled $0.7 million. 
   
1953-57  The third province wide inventory was completed under a federal / provincial agreement. 
Interpretations from air photo as well as statistical data from sample plots were used. 
   
1958  The Nova Scotia Pulp Limited Agreement Act. This act was critical to the decision of 
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags, Aktiebolag, Falun, Sweden in establishing a 300 tpd. 
sulphite pulp mill on the Straights of Canso. This agreement gave access to virtually all 
Crown lands of the seven Eastern counties and permitted the company to harvest 150,000 
cords of softwood pulp per year. Their annual requirement was pegged at 250,000 cords 
per year. 
   
1959  Provincial Parks Act. Provincial Parks are designated by Order-In-Council. 
   
Early 60's.  The Province ceased issuing confirmatory grants for Cape Breton Island. 
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Early 60's to 
Early 70's 
 Significant growth in pulp production. It was recognised that future development 
dependent on the availability of raw material from more intensive forestry. 
   
1960  Canada Forestry Development and Research  Act. 
   
1962  The first version of the Forest Improvement Act (FIA) enacted but never proclaimed. 
 
Canada Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development Act subsequently provided cost 
shared federal provincial forestry programmes that provided forest access. It also 
developed a more heightened concern for better forest management. Nova Scotia 
received in excess of $3 million in federal funding for forestry under ARDA, matched by 
at least equal provincial funding. 
 
Bowaters Mersey Agreement Act, SNS. 1962, C.2--never implemented. 
   
1963  The Department of Lands and Forests began to issue "Certificates of Non-Interest" on 
lands in Cape Breton.1965 
 
The fourth province-wide forest inventory began with plan of completion in seven years. 
The intent was then to redo the inventory to ensure that no data was more than seven 
years old. New forest type maps from air photo interpretation was used--land was 
categorised as to Crown, large private (commercial) and small private. Permanent plots 
were established to measure growth--remeasured every five years. (As of 1983 all plots 
had been measured twice and the third round was about 40% complete.) 
 
The Scott Maritimes Pulp Limited Agreement Act. An inducement to establish a 500 
t.p.d. kraft pulp mill at Abercrombie Point, Pictou County. Allows access to most of the 
productive Crown land in eastern Halifax County--50,000 cords of "wood of all kinds" 
representing 12% of annual requirements. (Since 1978 a silviculture rebate has also been 
in effect.) 
 
The second version of the Forest Improvement Act enacted, proclaimed but never 
implemented at ground level. The Small Tree Act was rescinded. Provides for the 
maintenance, protection and rehabilitation of the forests throughout the Province so as to 
provide continuous and increasing supplies of forest products, to conserve water and 
reduce floods and to improve conditions for wildlife, recreation and scenic values. 
   
1967  Production from sawmills dropped below 200 million fbm. but remained steady at 200 
million to about 1985. 
 
Beaches and Foreshores Act, RSNS. 1967, C.19. Regulates the leasing of any ungranted 
flat beach or foreshore. 
 
Lands and Forests Act, RSNS. 1967, C163 (as amended). 
 
Provincial Parks Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, C.244 (as amended). Power to purchase, 
expropriate or otherwise acquire lands for park purposes. 
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1968  The FIA was amended to include a Provincial Forest Practices Improvement Board 
(PFPIB). 
 
   
1969  Agreement with Nova Scotia Pulp Limited was renegotiated to allow expansion of their 
pulpmill to 450 tpd. sulphite pulp and 400 tpd. of newsprint. The new need of 550,000 
cords was to be offset by cutting rights of 330,000 cords from Crown land. A silviculture 
programme was also began at this time. 
 
Influx of adult moths of the spruce budworm to Cumberland County followed by a 
similar influx in 1973 to Inverness County. This marked the beginning of the major 
epidemic causing damage in the late seventies. 
   
1972  The second cycle of the fourth inventory was extended to a ten year cycle. The island of 
Cape Breton was omitted because of on-going spruce budworm mortality. 
   
1973  Added Section 11A to the Lands and Forests Act to simplify land claims but was found to 
be ultra vires. Only the courts could decide. 
 
The Canada Wildlife Act. 
   
1974  Agreements under Section 79A of the Lands and Forests Act amendment. Wood products 
companies could enter an agreement with the Province for the supply of wood from 
Crown lands. Generally with sawlog companies but also a major agreement with 
Masonite Canada Ltd. for their hardboard plant. 
 
10 year General Development Agreement (GDA.) with the federal government. This 
enabled Nova Scotia to negotiate subsidiary agreements for various resource sectors. 
   
1975  Beaches Preservation and Protection Act; SNS. 1975, C.6. It states that all beaches are 
for the benefit, education and enjoyment of the people of Nova Scotia. 
   
1977  After the expiry of ARDA in 1976 a Subsidiary Agreement of DREE was negotiated. It 
provided for a comprehensive forest management programme. It provided $25.6 million 
for forestry of which $20.2 million was federal money. Increased in future years with 
make-work projects to a total $57.8 million. 
   
1978  Institution of flat-rate taxation for forest lands. 
 
A new version of the Trails Act enacted, SNS. 1978, C16. 
   
Early 80's  Over supply of softwood to the forest products industry caused by mature and overmature 
forests and the salvage of budworm infested forests. 
   
1980  Shows a dramatic increase in the total industrial harvest from around 2,265,000 m3 (1 
million cords) during the 1935 - 60 period to 4,270,000 m3 (1.9 million cords in 1980.) 
 
Forestry sector provides 8,000 person years of direct employment in the Province. Actual 
number of people involved much higher because of seasonal employment. 
 
210,600 licensed anglers fished for 1,292,600 person days in fresh water and 210,600 
person days in salt water. Note: children under 14 need not buy a licence. 
 
Establishment of the Provincial Parks, Heritage Resources and Outdoor Recreation 
Programme by the Deputy Ministers' Committee on Land Use Policy. 
   
1981  116,000 hunting licenses issued, including 1,000 non-resident licenses. 
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The 1981 census showed since the previous census (1976) that the population of Nova 
Scotia increased 2.25 to 847,442. Towns and cities , however, actually declined 0.3% and 
rural municipalities increased by 2.2%. 
 
The sixth inventory started and integrated with a wildlife inventory. One or two counties 
are completed each year. 
 
The value of forest products exports are $350 million. Represents 30% of all Nova Scotia 
exports. 
   
1982  Forest Resource Development Agreement signed with the Canada Department of 
Environment. $53.4 million with Canada's contribution being $28.0 million. 
 
An Act for the Protection of Private Property C.13, SNS. 1982. Attempts to protect 
certain classes of property. Section 3(I)(e) allows posting of signs prohibiting entry on 
private property. Section 15, however, stipulates that a person cannot be prosecuted for 
contravening such a notice on undeveloped forest land if engaged in a bona fide 
recreational activity. 
   
1984  Report of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Forestry. It proposed major changes in 
forest management including a “Conservancy Approach” designed to maintain and 
increase forest production into the next century. 
   
1985  The Minister of Lands and Forests announced that the taxation provisions proposed in the 
Royal Commission report will definitely not become policy. This was done after 
considerable public opposition, mainly from the small land owners. 
   
1986  A new forest policy announced and a new legislative package enacted and proclaimed 
including the Forest Enhancement Act (FEA). The FIA was rescinded. 
   
1987  "Our Common Future.” published by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development. 
 
A new wildlife policy announced and new wildlife legislation enacted and proclaimed. 
   
1987-1992  The first phase of the St. Mary’s River Forestry / Wildlife Project. 
   
1988  A new parks policy announced and a new parks’ legislation enacted and proclaimed. 
   
1989  Environics publishes a survey: Attitudes of Canadians Towards Forestry". This survey 
clearly shows that Canadians believe that the forest industry is the worst polluter in the 
country. 
   
1990  Environment Canada publishes "Canada's Green Plan.” 
   
1991  The first Nova Scotia Envirofor held bringing together industrialists, environmentalists, 
government personnel, small woodlot owners, recreationists, wildlife advocates, first 
nations, and academics. Envirofor'91 unanimously agreed to a second Envirofor to 
discuss ground level forest practices and to approach government to proclaim the 
dormant Special Places Act. 
 
Federal government announces a nation wide multi-million dollar, five year Model Forest 
Programme. 
   
1992  Several environmentalists boycott the second Nova Scotia Envirofor because of a 
disagreement over payment of travel expenses. In the absence of many key 
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environmentalists the congress agrees to publish a hierarchy of forest values. This list, 
with ecological values at the top, was to form the basis of subsequent ground level forest 
management practice guidelines. 
   
1994  Envirofor'94 cancelled. 
   
1995  Unprecedented roundwood exports from Nova Scotia. 
   
1996  The Canadian Forestry Service revises its calculations on the worth of forestry in Canada 
during 1994. Exports are now calculated to be worth a record $32.5 billion--up 21% from 
the previous year. The value of wood pulp exports rose by 44.6%. Spokesperson claims 
that Canada has achieved increased production while improving its environmental 
performance. 
 
Coalition of Forestry Interests publishes its report on sustainable forestry. 
   
1997  The Department of Natural Resources publishes a position paper entitled “Towards 
Sustainable Forestry”. 
   
1998  Department of Natural Resources implements policy on sustainable forestry. 
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Appendix C. 
 
Interviews, Key Project Participants, and Key Institutions. 
 
Nova Scotian and Canadian Forestry Actor Interviews: 
 
Dave Algar: Woodlot Owner and Cross-country Ski Area Operator, Cape North, Cape Breton Island; Cape 
North July 1994. 
 
R.E. (Ed) Bailey: Director, Reforestation and Silviculture Division, Department of Lands and Forests: Truro 
August 1987. 
 
James Bridgeland: Park Ecologist, Cape Breton Highlands National Park; Ingonish Beach March 1995. 
 
Robert (Bob) Burgess: former Deputy Minister of DLF, 1969 - 1977; Truro August 1987. 
 
Clemont Comeau: Sawmill and Commercial Forest Owner; Saunierville, NS.; Saunierville September 1987. 
 
John Connor: former Chairman, Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Forestry-1984; Wolfville July 1986.  
 
W.I. Creighton: former Deputy Minister of Lands and Forests, February 1949 - March 1968. French 
Village, Halifax County, NS. August 1987. 
 
Ron Day: former Extension Forester and retired Manager, Parks Operations, Department of Lands and 
Forests; Debert August 1987. 
 
Maurice Delory, MD: former Minister of Lands and Forests; Bridgewater August, 1987. 
 
Barry Diamond, Director of Parks and Recreation Division, Department of Lands and Forests; Debert 
September 1985. 
 
Jack Dunlop: Woodlands Manager, Bowater Mersey: Liverpool February 1986. 
 
Dave Dwyer: Forester and former Secretary of the Provincial Forest Practices Improvement Board, 
Department of Lands and Forests; Wolfville March 1986.  
 
Don Eldridge: Commissioner, Commission of Forest Enhancement-NS.; Truro September 1987. 
 
Hugh Fairn: former Chairman of the Provincial Forest Improvement Board, 1971 - 1984; Wolfville 
February 1986. 
 
A. F. Gibbs: Chief Park Warden, Cape Breton Highlands National Park; Ingonish Beach March 1995. 
 
Mike Gillis: Forester, Baddeck Valley Woodproducers Co-op Ltd., Cape Breton Island; Baddeck July 1994. 
 
Bill Goodfellow: Woodlands Managers, Scott Maritime; Abercrombie May 1986.,  
 
E.D. (Ed) Haliburton: former Minister of Lands and Forests, July 1959 - May 1968; Avonport April 1986.  
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LLoyd Hawbolt: retired Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister and former Chief Forester, Department of 
Lands and Forests; Truro August 1987. 
 
George Henley: Minister of Lands and Forests. 1978-1983; Oxford August 1987. 
 
Scott Hennigar: former Woodlands Operations (Woodcutting and Silviculture) Foreman - Stora; Wolfville 
July 1996. 
 
Lief Holt: former Woodlands Manager for Bowater's Mersey: 1965-1983; Liverpool April 1986. 
 
Hank Howard: former Manager of Lands Aquisition, Scott Maritimes; New Glasgow May 1986. 
 
Ralph Johnson: former Chief Forester for Bowater's Mersey; Liverpool April 1996. 
 
David Irvine: Councillor, Municipality of Digby; telephone conversation October 1993. 
 
John Leduc: Planner, Parks and Recreation Division Department of Lands and Forests; Debert September 
1985. 
 
Bob Levy: Member of the (NS.) Legislative Assembly, Forestry Critic for the New Democratic Party; 
Wolfville September 1987. 
 
Brian Levy: Excutive Director, NS Woodlot Owners and Operators Association; Wolfville. 
 
Ivan Levy: President of S.G. Levy & Sons, Malanson, Kings County; Melanson June 1986. 
 
Elizabeth A. MacDonald: Marketing and Public Relations Co-ordinator, Cape Breton Highlands National 
Park; Baddeck, Cape Breton March 1995. 
 
Don MacDougal: Minister-United Church of Canada, former Presenter to the Royal Commission on 
Forestry for the NS. Recreation Association; Halifax  September 1985. 
 
Vince MacLean: former Minister of Lands and Forests, Oct. 1976 - Oct 1978 and Leader of the Official 
Opposition, NS Liberal Party; Halifax May 1987. 
 
Malcolm (Maxie) MacNeil: Woodlot Owner and Member of the Route 223 Forest Management Ltd. (Group 
Venture), Iona, Cape Breton Island; Iona July 1994. 
  
Ian Miller: Atlantic District Director, Forestry Canada; Truro July 1989. 
 
Perry Munro, Woodlot Owner, Maple Sugar Producer and Professional Guide, Sunken Lake, Kings County; 
Sunken Lake December 1994. 
 
Margaret Murphy; Legislative Librarian, NS. Legislative Library; Halifax Spring-Summer 1987. 
 
Wayne Myles: Cross Country Ski Area Operator and Son of Woodlot Owner, Bishopville, Hants County; 
Wolfville July 1994. 
 
Johannes Ottens: Senior Policy Officer, Policy Branch-Policy, Division of Planning and Economics, 
Canadian Forestry Service; Hull, Quebec October 1986. 
 
Ebbis Peill: former Chairman of the Kings County Forest Improvement Board and Pulpwood and Sawlog 
Exporter, Port Williams, Kings County; telephone interview April 1986. 
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Murray Prest: former Sawmill Owner and present Land Owner; Moose River, Halifax County August 1987. 
 
Mark Pulsifer: Regional Biologist, Department of Natural Resources, Antigonish, NS.; field interview in the 
St. Mary's River Watershed April 1993. 
 
Vince Ropar: Forest Products Harvesting and Haulage Contractor; New Ross June 1986. 
 
Andre H. Rousseau: Senior Development and Analysis Officer, Division of Forestry Development and 
Communications, Canadian Forestry Service; Hull, Quebec October 1986. 
 
Hollis Routledge: Assistant Woodlands Manager, Stora Forest Industries; Port Hawksbury October 1987. 
 
Dale Smith: Manager-Park Planning Development, Parks and Recreation Division, Department of Lands 
and Forests; Debert September 1985.. 
 
John D. Smith: Senior Manager, Policy and Program Development, Department of Lands and Forests; 
Halifax May 1987.  
 
George Snow: Lands and Forests Minister, 1968 - 1969; Port George September 1987. 
 
James St. Clair: Landowner, MacFarlane Woods Nature Reserve, Mull River, Cape Breton Island and 
Member of the Public Review Committee for the Proposed Systems Plan for Parks and Protected 
Areas in Nova Scotia; Wycocomagh March 1995. 
 
Ken Streatch: Minister of Lands and Forests; Halifax May 1987. 
 
Julie Towers: Extension Forester, Division of Extension Services, Department of Natural Resources, 
Halifax; Field Interview in the St. Mary's River Watershed April 1993. 
 
Russ Waycott: General Manager Woodlands, Stora Forest Industries; Port Hawksbury October 1987. 
 
Jan Weslien by L. Anders Sandberg. Spring, 1989; Summary relayed to author in communication of June 
24, 1989. 
 
James Wilber: Enfield, NS. Sawmill Owner and Commercial Forest Owner; Enfield September 1987. 
 
Charlie Williams: Executive Director, Nova Scotia Federation of Landowners and Forest Fibre Producer 
Associations; Port Hawksbury October 1987. 
 
 
 
Dartmoor (England) National Park Interviews: 
 
 
Tim Beevon: Economic Development Officer, West Devon District Council; Tavistock June 1993. 
 
Tim Brooks: Regional Secretary - Devon, Country Landowners Association; Exeter June 1991. 
 
John Chase: Rural Development Commission, Exeter; telephone interview June 1991. 
 
Chris Gregory: Duchy of Cornwall; Liskard, Cornwall June 1993. 
  
Edward Holdaway: Western Region Office, Countryside Commission; Bristol June 1991. 
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Alison Kohler: Senior Recreation Officer, Dartmoor National Park Authority, Bovey Tracey; telephone 
interview June 1993. 
 
Phil Markham, Principal Local Planning, Recreation, Tourism Officer, Dartmoor National Park Authority; 
Bovey Tracey June 1991. 
 
Peter Morgan: Owner and Manager, White Hart Hotel, Mortonhampstead, Devon; Mortonhampstead June 
1993.  
 
Jack Price: Chairman, Dartmoor Tourism Association; Fingle Bridge, Devon June 1991. 
 
Terry Robertson: Corporate Planning Officer, Countryside Commission, Cheltenham; Mitcham Hampton, 
Gloucestershire June 1991. 
 
Alan Thompson: Thompson Transportation, Mortonhampstead: Mortonhampstead June 1993. 
 
Peter White: Assistant Chief, Dartmoor National Park Authority: Bovey Tracey June 1991. 
 
Hugh Whitley: Hill Farmer, Holwell, Devon: Holwell, June 1993. 
 
Jack Wigmore: Chairman, Dartmoor National Park Authority, England; Plymouth, England June 1993. 
 
Frank Willianson: District Councillor, West Devon District Council; Okehampton June 1993. 
 
 
 
St Mary's River Project Steering Committee (Phase 2). 
 
 
Susan Hruszowy: Recreation Specialist, Department of Natural Resources, and Chair, Canadian Institute of 
Forestry - Nova Scotia Section, Halifax.  
 
Bruce M. Carter: Private Lands Forester, Department of Natural Resources and Committee Chair, 
Lawrencetown, Annapolis County. 
 
Murray Anderson: St. Mary's River Association, Sherbrooke, NS. 
 
Glyn Bissix: Project Facilitator, Associate Professor, School of Recreation and Physical Education, Acadia 
University. 
 
Tony Duke: Wildlife Habitat Resources Manager, Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources, Kentville, 
NS. 
 
Mark Elderkin: Project Biologist, St. Mary's River Forestry - Wildlife Project, Antigonish. 
 
Greg Filyk, Wildlife Habitat Canada, Ottawa. 
 
Peter Jackson, Stora Forest Industries, Port Hawksbury. 
 
D.A. (Sandy) MacGregor: Manager of Timberlands, Scott Worldwide Inc., New Glasgow. 
 
Peter Neily: Forester, Forest Research, Department of Natural Resources, Truro. 
 
Mark Pulsifer: Regional Biologist, Department of Natural Resources, Antigonish, NS. 
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Jim Richards, Forestry Canada, Truro. 
 
Robert (Bob) Rutherford: Chief, Habitat Planning, Habitat Management Branch, Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans - Canada, Halifax. 
 
Julie Towers: Extension Forester, Division of Extension Services, Department of Natural Resources, 
Halifax. 
 
Russell Waycott, Manager of Woodlands, Stora Forest Industries, Port Hawksbury. 
 
 
 
Nova Scotia Envirofor '92 Steering Committee. 
 
 
Jim Dressler: Chairman, Farmer, Woodlot Owner and Environmental Planner, New Germany. 
 
Glyn Bissix: Associate Professor, School of Recreation and Physical Education, Acadia University. 
 
C.L.C. (Chris) Clarke: Secretary and Director of Public Relations, Bowater Mersey Paper Company 
Limited, Liverpool, NS. 
 
Tom Herman: Professor, Department of Biology and Co-director, Centre for Wildlife and Conservation 
Biology, Acadia University. 
 
Gerry T. Joudrey, Director of Extension Services, Department of Natural Resources, Halifax. 
 
Carol Martin, Native Council of Nova Scotia, Truro.  
 
Lynda McLean: Adult Educator, Truro. 
 
Peter Neily: Forester, Forest Research, Department of Natural Resources, Truro. 
 
Soren Bondrup-Nielsen, Assistant Professor, Department of Biology and Co-director, Centre for Wildlife 
and Conservation Biology, Acadia University. 
 
 
Key Institutions and Alternative Names. 
 
 
Bowater Mersey / Bowater's Mersey / Bowaters Mersey. 
 
Canadian Forestry Service (CFS) / Forestry Canada. 
 
Canadian Institute of Forestry - Nova Scotia Section (CIF:NS) . 
 
Forest Practices Improvement Board / Provincial Forest Practices Improvement Board (PFPIB) / District 
Forest Practices Improvement Board (DFPIB). 
 
Government of Canada /federal government. 
 
Government of Nova Scotia / provincial government.  
 
Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources (DNR)/ Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests 
(DLF). 
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Nova Scotia Economic Renewal Agency / Nova Scotia Department of Trade and Commerce. 
 
Nova Scotia Federation of Landowners and Forest Fibre Producer Associations (NSFLFFPA) 
  
Nova Scotia Forest Products Association (NSFPA). 
 
Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners and Operators Association (NSWOOA) / Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners 
Association. 
  
Parks Canada / Canadian Parks Service. 
 
Scott / Scott Paper / Scott Maritimes / Scott International /now Kimberly Clark. 
 
St. Mary's River Forestry / Wildlife Project Committee / SMRFW Committee / St. Mary River - Liscombe 
River Model Forest / St. Mary's River Landscape Management Project Steering Committee. 
 
Stora / Stora Kopparberg / formerly Nova Scotia Forest Industries. 
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 Glossary of Selected Terms. 
 
 
Age Class: The interval into which the age range of trees, stands or forests is divided.* 
 
Allowable Cut: The amount of wood which may be harvested for a given period (annually or periodically), 
from a specified area under management.** 
 
Biotic Diversity or Biodiversity: The variety of different species, the genetic variability of each species, and 
the variety of different ecosystems they form.*** 
 
Board Foot: A measurement equal to 1" x 12" x 12".* 
 
Breast Height: 1.3 meters (4.5') above ground level.+ 
 
Clearcutting: The removal of all standing trees in a given area at one time.*** 
 
Commercial Forests: Forest land capable of producing merchantable species of timber along with a variety 
of non-timber benefits.++ 
 
Coniferous Trees: Commonly called softwood or evergreen. Although there are exceptions, most coniferous 
trees have cones and keep their needles throughout the winter.+ 
 
Conservation: An area or species management strategy that involves protection, preservation and/or 
appropriate utilisation.*** 
 
Conservancy: The combined effect of restoration, conservation and improvement.** 
 
Consumptive Use: The removal of a resource for use away from its normal place or habitat.*** 
 
Cord: A stack of wood containing 128 cubic feet.** 
 
Crosshauling: The process in which raw material for one [pulp processing] plant passes similar material 
being transported to another plant or plants, with the consequence that transportation costs are not 
minimised.** 
 
Cruise: A survey to locate and estimate the quantity of timber on a given area according to species, size, 
quality, possible products or other characteristics.* 
 
Deciduous: Commonly referred to as hardwoods or broad leaf trees. In most cases they lose their [leaves] in 
the fall.+ 
 
Diameter Limit: The smallest size to which trees are to be cut. Differs from species to species and is 
measured 1 foot (30 centimetres) above average ground level outside bark.* 
 
Dynamic: Marked by continuous, usually productive, activity or change.** 
 
Ecology: The scientific study of the interrelationships that exist between organisms, including humans, and 
their environment. Sometimes called environmental biology.*** 
 
Ecosystem: An integrated and stable association of living and nonliving resources functioning within a 
defined physical location. More narrowly defined as the flow of energy within a community of 
plants and animals.*** 
 
Environment: All of the factors, living and nonliving, that surround and affect or influence a specific 
organism or group of organisms.*** 
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Fibre: A general term of convenience for any long narrow cell of wood.** 
 
Forest: A complex community of plants and animals in which stands of trees are the most conspicuous 
members.* 
 
Forest Management: The practical application of scientific, economic, and social principles to the 
administration of a forest property for specified objectives.* 
 
Greenbelt: A zone of vegetation usually along a river, stream or lakeshores.*** 
 
Herbicides: Chemical compounds specifically formulated to kill plants.*** 
 
Highgrading: Selective cutting, a type of exploitation cutting that removes certain species, above a certain 
size and of high value, with sustained yields being wholly or largely ignored or found impossible to 
fulfil.* 
 
Immature: Trees or stands that have grown past the regeneration stage, but are not yet mature.++ 
 
Indirect Jobs: Various employment opportunities that have been developed to meet the demands created by 
direct jobs in the forest sector.++ 
 
Integrated Resource Management: The management of two or more resources in the same area.*** 
 
Kraft: A heavy paper or paperboard made from wood pulp by boiling wood chips in a sodium sulfate 
solution. Typically used for corrugated paper or grocery bags.++ 
 
Kraft Pulp: One of the many processes whereby wood is reduced to a soft uniform mass from which a pulp 
product is manufactured.** 
 
Mature Stand: A stand of trees is considered mature when height, diameter, and volume growth levels off. 
Different species mature at different ages.+ 
 
Monoculture: Raising crops of a single species, generally even-aged.** 
 
Monopsony: A single buyer in an area.** 
 
Newsprint: A cheap paper made chiefly from pulp and used mostly for newspapers.** 
 
Non-government Organisation (NGO): Any organisation that is not a part of federal, provincial, territorial, 
aboriginal or municipal government.*** 
 
Non-renewable Resource: A resource that can be used up completely.*** 
 
Non-consumptive Use: The use and enjoyment of a resource in its normal setting or habitat without 
impairing it for future use and enjoyment.*** 
 
Old Growth Forest: A forest containing large, long-lived trees, large standing dead trees, numerous logs 
lying about the forest floor, and multiple layers of canopy created by the crowns of trees of various 
ages.*** 
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Pesticides: Substances, usually chemical compounds used to kill unwanted plants and animals (pests), 
sometimes referred to as biocides.  (Includes algicides, fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, 
rodenticides and avicides.)*** 
 
Processing: Submitting a felled tree stem to a succession of conversion operations, typically at a mill but 
sometimes even before it is removed from the stump.** 
 
Pulpwood: Wood cut and prepared primarily for manufacture into wood pulp.** 
 
Reforestation: The artificial establishment of forest on a given area.** 
 
Regeneration: The process by which a forest is renewed.** 
 
Renewable Resource: A resource that can theoretically never be exhausted because it is being continually 
produced (or replenished) e.g. salmon, trout.*** 
 
Roundwood: Wood in the round - before being processed.* 
 
Sawlog: A log considered suitable in size and quality for producing sawn timber.* 
 
Scrub Growth: Inferior growth consisting of small or stunted trees or shrubs of low economic potential.* 
 
Selection Cutting: The periodic removal of trees, individually or in small groups (group selection) from an 
uneven-aged forest in order to realize the yield and establish a new crop of irregular constitution. 
The improvement of the forest is a primary consideration.* 
 
Selective Cutting: See Highgrading.* 
 
Shelterwood Cutting: Any regeneration cutting in a more or less regular and mature stand, designed to 
establish a new stand under the protection of the old. Shelterwood system, an even-aged 
silvicultural system in which, in order to provide a source of seed and/or protection for 
regeneration, the old stand (the shelterwood) is removed in two or more successive shelterwood 
cuttings, the first of which is ordinarily the seed cutting (though it may be preceded by a 
preparatory cutting) and the last is the final cutting, any intervening cuttings being termed removal 
cutting. The lengths of the regeneration interval and the regeneration period determine the degree 
of uniformity in age of the resulting stand.* 
 
Silviculture: The science and art of cultivating forest crops. More particularly, the theory and practice of 
controlling the establishment, composition, constitution, and growth of forests.** 
 
Special Places: Areas designated by government as containing significant plant or animal species for 
protection.*** 
 
Stand: A community of trees, possessing sufficient uniformity as regards composition, age, spatial 
arrangement, or condition, to be distinguishable from adjacent communities, so forming a 
silviculture management entity.** 
 
Stewardship: The care given to land and other resources by private landowners based on ethical 
commitment to conservation.*** 
 
Stumpage Charge: The fee paid by companies or individuals for the right to harvest timber on Crown 
lands.++ 
 
Sustainable Development: The development of forests to meet current needs without prejudice to their 
future productivity, ecological diversity, or capacity for regeneration.++  
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Sustainable Use: Use of an organism or ecosystem at a rate within its capacity for renewal or 
regeneration.*** 
 
Thinning: Cutting in an immature stand to improve quality, to improve species composition, to obtain 
greater merchantable yield, and to recover material that may be lost otherwise.*  
 
Value Added: The addition to income brought about by the use of the material or its product in the 
province.** 
 
Watershed: A natural drainage area defined by topography.*** 
 
Weeding: A cultural operation eliminating or suppressing undesirable vegetation during the initial period of 
a plantation.* 
 
Whole Tree Harvesting: Utilisation or the removal of the entire tree excluding the root system.*** 
 
Wildlife: All wild mammals, birds, reptiles, fishes, invertebrates, plants, fungi, algae, bacteria and other 
wildlife organisms and their habitats.*** 
 
Wildlife Management: Any policy, legislation or program to protect, control, enhance, perpetuate, use or 
allocate wildlife.*** 
 
Windthrow: A tree or trees uprooted by the wind.* 
 
 
* The Trees Around Us - A Manual of Good Forest Practice for Nova Scotia. 
** Forestry - Report of the Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Forestry 1984. 
*** Living with Wildlife - A Strategy for Nova Scotia. 
+ Introduction to Silviculture - Home Study Course. 
++ The State of Canada's Forests 1991. 
